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Preface 
 
 
Focusing on North Africa, this impressive volume gathers a set 
of remarkable contributions to the analysis of the uprisings that shook 
the Arab-speaking region, starting from the well-known tragic episode 
that triggered the still ongoing chain of events – the self-immolation 
of the young Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 in the Central 
Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.  
The book’s first part, less than one third of the whole, may lack 
homogeneity, but its eclectic character makes it all the more 
stimulating in opening various analytical perspectives. It offers an 
examination of some of the material parameters that partook in 
determining the 2011 regional shockwave with regard to social and 
economic issues as well as to water and food. Also assessed are how 
the upheaval affected key anthropological paradigms in the study of 
the region, its impact on European policy on migration, and the 
religious/secular tension with respect to the definition of citizenship. 
This same tension is naturally at the heart of several entries in 
the second part of the volume, which is dedicated to gender-related 
issues in the Arab upheaval. This largest part of the book will 
certainly become prominent as a major contribution to its topic. It is 
very rich indeed, with several examinations of different aspects of 
feminist activism in North Africa, and often in the Middle East as 
well. Whether in comparing mainstream feminism with the Islamic 
variant, or in examining specific feminist expressions in art and 
literature, or in discussing sexual violence and the struggle over urban 
space, this second part constitutes an important and most interesting 
addition to the fields of both gender studies and Middle East and 
North Africa studies.  
Reading the present volume, one could envy historians of 
medieval or earlier times, who must deal with a dearth of data and 
contemporary testimonies and assessments. In contrast, the 
exponential expansion of the number of scholars, and of scholarly 
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production therefore, over the last decades has concerned the Arab-
speaking world to a very high degree. Due to the turmoil that has 
characterized it almost continuously since the end of the Second 
World War, this region has attracted a considerable amount of 
scholarly attention from all over the world, in addition to the scholars 
based in the region or originating from it. 
The result is that, six years only after the beginning of the 
regional upheaval, making an inventory of the scholarly production on 
the ‘Arab Spring’ and its aftermath would already be a demanding 
endeavour. Future historians who will wish to work on those years 
will be confronted with such an amount of investigation and analyses 
that the task may appear daunting to them. The wealth of research that 
is contemporary of the events will certainly force a major part of 
future research into narrowing down its focus on singular countries or 
parts of countries and specific aspects of the historic revolutionary 
shockwave, instead of offering comprehensive assessments of the 
overall process. Collective works will probably tend to become the 
rule, whether collections of individual chapters or multi-volume 
undertakings of a greater magnitude. 
In that sense, the present book edited by Ersilia Francesca and 
Anna Maria Di Tolla fits into a pattern that will likely become 
dominant in the future exploration of the great Arab upheaval. It is 
well fit to stand out as a useful and lasting contribution to the field, 
offering precious insights into various dimensions of the North 
African events. 
 
 
Gilbert ACHCAR 
School of Oriental and African Studies, London 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Gender Mobility and Social Activism in  
Post-Revolutionary North Africa1 
 
Ersilia FRANCESCA - Anna Maria DI TOLLA 
 
 
The political trajectory of the Arab world was shaken by the 
popular uprisings which burst forth in Tunisia in late 2010 and rapidly 
swept through the region in 2011. These uprisings produced a 
glimmer of hope for democratic change in the region, yet six years 
after their inception their outcome remains highly uncertain, the 
regional scenario being characterized more by violence, terrorism and 
civil war than by a democratic transition. In a previous work published 
in 2012 the editors of these volumes explored some of the economic, 
political, social and historic factors that led to the Arab uprisings 
which, at that point, were still optimistically designated as the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in the hope that the long-awaited ‘blossoming’ of democracy 
in the Arab region would soon happen.2 
But the hopes for a peaceful ‘democratic transition’ in the region 
were soon dashed, turning the ‘Arab Spring’ into the ‘Arab Winter’ of 
authoritarianism, mounting instability, civil war and Islamist terror. 
Probably the most serious factors which brought to the failure of the 
uprisings lay in the elites’ incapacity to tackle effectively the severe 
turmoil and the economic crisis the region was experiencing, the 
absence of a clear political post-revolutionary agenda, and the slow 
                                                 
1 This introductory chapter has been written by A. M. Di Tolla and E. Francesca 
from p.1 to p. 16, and by E. Francesca  from p. 16 to p. 27. 
2 A. M. Di Tolla - E. Francesca (eds.), La rivoluzione ai tempi di internet. Il 
futuro della democrazia nel Maghreb e nel mondo arabo, Università di Napoli 
“L’Orientale”, Napoli, 2012. 
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progress in terms of social and economic rights which continues to 
feed social tensions among the population. 
The region’s future is uncertain, racked by fragile democratic 
institutions, weak economic momentum, identitarian issues, and an 
insufficient level of maturity and/or democratic commitment on the 
part of some parties or leading politicians. The intertwined set of 
factors which had been at work before the uprisings are still operating 
in the aftermath, namely the socio-economic grievance and discontent 
of large segments of society, women’s and youth unemployment or 
under-employment, the sense of marginalization and humiliation of 
the poorest strata of the population, and the quest, especially of the 
educated youth, for genuine political freedoms, social justice and 
economic security.3 As Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi point 
out in their recent book Democratic Transitions in the Arab World, 
today’s resistance in the Arab region against advancement into a 
democratic transition can be ascribed to the same elements which 
fostered different forms of autocracy in the region in the decades 
before the uprisings, namely oil, conflicts, neighbourhood effects and 
external interventions by both regional and international powers.4 
The most resilient regimes are the ‘rentier states’ possessing oil 
wealth, which provides them with the resources necessary to cement 
ruling coalitions and to co-opt opponents. Also still very resilient are 
monarchies and other hereditary regimes, where the ruling family can 
count on long-term legitimacy but also on solid coercive apparatuses, 
making the political overturn of the sort observed in Egypt and 
Tunisia unlikely. 
These elements are not unique to the Arab region but seem to be 
stronger here than elsewhere. They are considered to be the main 
causes for the emergence of what appears to be a region-wide 
authoritarian counter revolution in response to the uprisings. Further 
reasons are the lack of a broad-based socio-economic contract and of 
successful transitional economic and social policies. Nonetheless the 
process of change initiated by the uprisings of 2010-11 is far from 
extinguished.5 According to Gilbert Achcar, the revolutionary 
                                                 
3 E. Alimi - A. Sela - M. Sznajder (eds.), Popular Contention, Regime, and 
Transition: The Arab Revolts in Comparative Global Perspective, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2016, pp. 278-281. 
4 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017. 
5 I. Elbadawi - S. Makdisi (eds.), Democratic Transitions in the Arab World, pp. 
307-312. 
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potential is still alive and the key to turning it into durable change lies 
in building a new progressive leadership which has thus far been 
lacking. This new leadership should be able to overcome the regimes’ 
ability to draw on the structurally determined reserves of loyalty and 
repressive capacity used by them to fight back challenges or prevent 
them from consolidating.6  
The three North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) 
on which the volumes mainly focus are at very different stages in their 
political transition relative to one another. Morocco and Tunisia have 
mostly succeeded in establishing more transparent, more efficient and 
more participative institutions; Tunisia, in particular, still represents 
an exemplar for revolutionary change in the region with the new 
Constitution strengthening citizens’ political, social and economic 
rights.  
The main challenges the country has to face are the turmoil of the 
educated youth confronted with limited economic opportunities, the 
rising levels of unemployment and growing regional disparities along 
with a large informal sector which offers low-quality jobs. These 
problems are generating growing pressures for reform and for the 
development of a more coherent and more inclusive socio-economic 
system.7 In Morocco, the on-going regional protests prove the 
shortcomings of the government’s performance and the need for 
further implementing the reform process. The new Constitution and 
the king’s reform following the uprisings were welcomed as a 
peaceful alternative to the chaos spreading in the region, 
demonstrating Morocco’s status as an exception among the 
authoritarian Arab regimes. Nonetheless, the Morocco ‘model’ shows 
several limits. The mechanisms of repression of opponents and co-
optation of consensus continue to operate, proving that the feeling that 
the country was on the verge of a radical transformation, 
unprecedented since its independence in 1956, is not completely 
founded. The situation is rendered more complicated by a number of 
specific socio-political and economic features, such as patrimonialism 
and the strong control exercised on the country’s resources by the 
                                                 
6 G. Achcar, Morbid Symptoms. Relapse in the Arab Uprising, Saqi Book, 
London, 2016, pp. 17-172. 
7 M. Boughzala - S. Ben Romdhane, ‘Tunisia: The Prospects for Democratic 
Consolidation’, in I. Elbadawi - S. Makdisi (eds.), Democratic Transitions in the 
Arab World, p. 111. 
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ruling elites.8 In Egypt the spectre of counter revolution has emerged 
due also to the lack of the kind of pluralistic civil society and powerful 
labour associations which characterized Tunisia. Instead, Egyptian 
civil society was mainly mobilized by religious associations lead by 
the Islamist parties which were able to take advantage of Mubarak’s 
ousting, though with dramatic and ephemeral results.9 The 
neighbourhood effect has been largely unfavourable to Egypt. 
External illiberal forces favoured the rise of authoritarian regimes in 
the uprising’s aftermath; in fact, both the supporters of the Muslim 
Brothers’ rise to power (Turkey, Qatar and Iran), and the advocates of 
Sisi’s restoration (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait) opposed any 
progressive liberal change in Egypt. The civil wars and turmoil which 
are plaguing Syria, Libya and Sudan accentuate the adverse 
neighbourhood effect in Egypt, legitimating the regime’s interest in 
national security and war on terror campaign instead of addressing the 
revolutionary demands for freedom, liberties and social justice. The 
only positive outcome to date is the politicisation of the Egyptian 
population and its resilience in front of the regime’s consolidated 
autocratic instruments of repression, violence and occasional 
concessions.10  
Initially the Arab uprising was loaded with the promise of change 
being realised immediately. The mass enthusiasm was contagious and 
was further reinforced by the widespread belief that the united 
population could gain control of its destiny and overthrow the 
authoritarian regimes, as clearly synthetized in the revolutionary 
mantra “The People Want…”. But the people’s mobilization proved 
difficult to turn into a political project capable of succeeding over the 
political machinery controlled by the elite. Political failures, 
                                                 
8 J. Kalpakian, ‘Between Reform and Reaction. The Syrian and Moroccan 
Responses to the Arab Spring’, in The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector 
Innovation Journal, 18/1 (2013), p. 15; T. Belghazi - A. Moudden, ‘Ihbat: 
Disillusionment and the Arab Spring in Morocco’, in The Journal of North African 
Studies, 21/1 (2016); pp. 37-49. 
9 J. Brownlee - T. Masoud - A. Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of 
Repression and Reform, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 2015, pp. 212-
215. 
10 N. El Mikawy - M. Mohiedin - S. El Ashmaouy, ‘Egypt: The Protracted 
Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy and Social Justice’, in I. Elbadawi - 
S. Makdisi (eds.), Democratic Transitions in the Arab World, p. 134, 178-180; R. 
Abou-El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt: Connecting Domestic and International 
Struggles, Routledge, London, 2015, pp. 3-5. 
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disillusionment and a cruel repression campaign led to demobilisation, 
but also to re-mobilisation in several local upheavals. People in Egypt 
seem to switch between opposite feelings of empowerment and 
frustration, but the energies which were unleashed during the uprising 
are still smouldering under the ashes of repression and disengagement. 
The 2010-2011 uprising demolished a longstanding barrier of fear: 
gathering in the streets, protesting, discussing politics are now part of 
a nationwide tradition in North Africa and they are hopefully signals 
of an enduring revolutionary process.11 
 
A primary objective of these two volumes is to shed light on some 
of the dynamics of the post-revolutionary period in North Africa. In 
particular, the case studies taken up in these volumes tackle issues 
linked to gender mobility and women’s political and social 
participation, social activism, Berber identity and Berber minority 
rights. The books seek to give space to insights that followed from 
discussion during the three-day-long international conference titled 
North Africa Transition and Emerging Actors. Berber Movements, 
Gender Mobility and Social Activism, convened at the University of 
Naples “L’Orientale” on 23rd-25th September 2014. The conference 
aimed at exploring the extent of challenges to implementing 
democratic reform in the years following the upheavals, taking as a 
starting assumption the fact that successful revolutions do not ensure 
successful democracies. On the contrary, the democratization process 
is often uneven and is not infrequently characterized by setbacks or 
backward steps. The North African uprisings exacerbated many of the 
region’s underlying problems and tensions. The hectic schedule of 
political events set by the transition road map took place amid 
continuing and perhaps escalating security and economic problems. 
Nonetheless, in post-revolutionary North Africa new governance 
models emerged and existing social actors assumed a new and more 
effective role. In particular, the conference focused on associationism, 
gender mobility and Berber activism as crucial factors in the 
composition of the transition road map in North Africa. 
These volumes have purposefully brought together papers by the 
scholars (both senior and young scholars) who took part in the 
conference, along with some invited papers in order to give insight 
into some crucial issues affecting contemporary North Africa, seeking 
                                                 
11 R. Abou-El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, p. 9. 
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to contribute to a growing body of literature addressing the dynamics 
of transition from autocracy to sustained democracy in the aftermath 
of the Arab uprisings. 
 
Gender Mobility and Social Activism 
The North African uprisings opened a new window of opportunity 
for the improvement of women’s rights across the region, although 
women, along with other marginalized groups, such as ethnic and 
sexual minorities, and the economically disadvantaged and rural 
classes, continue to suffer various forms of discrimination and face the 
same dominant system of conservative and patriarchal ideologies and 
socio-economic inequalities as before.12 The intersection of gender 
agency, power and activism is crucial in building new democratic and 
developmental policies within the North African countries. But not all 
governments have the capacity to institute a virtuous synergy with 
trade unions and civil society associations, including women’s 
associations, in order to institute a fairer social welfare regime. 
State capacity varies across the different countries of the region; 
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are currently confronting severe 
restrictions on their ability to secure the social rights of citizens.13 In 
these countries, young people and women, the driving forces of the 
revolutionary process, have been sidelined by the established political 
forces that have taken control of the political space. Nonetheless, they 
remain politically engaged in the democratic transition through their 
own associations and civil society initiatives. Their aspirations for 
freedom and social justice are connected with other urgent issues, 
such as democratic transition, independence of the judiciary, internal 
security, and economic uncertainty. 
The new forms of activism which emerged from and at least in part 
lead the uprisings, represent one of the best achievements in the 
region. Social media were used to re-appropriate the public space and 
implement social changes. They generated an increase in knowledge 
regarding social reform issues and stimulated positive responses 
towards the reform goals by increasing the audience involved in their 
                                                 
12 G. Achcar, Morbid Symptom, p. 172. See also L. Touaf - S. Boutkhil - C. Nasri 
(eds.), North African Women after the Arab Spring: In the Eye of the Storm, 
Springer, New York, 2017, pp. 1-9. 
13 M. Karshenas - V. M. Moghadam - R. Alami, ‘Social Policy after the Arab 
Spring: States and Social Rights in the MENA Region’, in World Development 64 
(2014), pp. 735-736. 
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development. Feminist activism took advantage of online social 
networks which helped to construct, essentialize, and render visible 
gendered messages and topics. 
These and other questions are the main focus of this volume which 
takes Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt as paradigmatic examples for an 
analysis of women’s status in North Africa in the aftermath of the 
uprisings. 
Gender equality is crucial in processes of regime change and 
progressive transition to democracy. In particular, reduction of the gap 
in the literacy ratio, defined as the ratio between the share of educated 
women and that of educated man, has been found statistically to have 
a positive and significant effect on both the likelihood of transition 
and the likelihood of its success.14 Overall, in North Africa and in the 
Middle East women have made significant progress in educational 
attainment, health care, and participation in the labour force over the 
past three decades. These achievements have had significant 
implications for the formation of human capital, for women’s 
empowerment and women’s participation in their countries’ social and 
political life. Starting from the 1950s and the 1960s the MENA region 
made important steps in the fields of women’s education, access to the 
labour market and political and social participation. Although these 
positive trends slowed down by the end of the 1980s, socio-economic 
indicators concerning women’s empowerment have continued to 
improve. 
In the 2000s the MENA region succeeded in raising the ratio of 
girls to boys in primary and secondary education up to 0.96, and in 
significantly increasing the ratio of young women attending 
universities. Female enrolment in the region’s school systems has 
increased dramatically over the past decades to the point that the wide 
gender gap in educational attainment that was prevalent during the 
1960s and 1970s has been bridged. By 2010, the average years of 
schooling for females in the region as a whole stood at nearly 14 
years. In 11 MENA countries the share of women’s enrolment in 
tertiary level education is now larger than that of men. Unlike the rest 
                                                 
14 C. Freund - M. Jaud, ‘On the Determinants of Democratic Transitions’, in 
Middle East Development Journal 5/1 (2013), p. 2, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793812013500053  
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of the world, there is a ‘reverse’ gender gap in the region with girls 
outperforming boys in school results at almost all educational levels.15 
The last three decades have also seen a remarkable decline in 
fertility rates with the number of children born per woman decreasing 
from about seven children in the 1960s to three children in the 2000s. 
By 2010, in four countries (Iran, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey) 
fertility rates were at or below the replacement level of about 2.1 
children per woman. Lower fertility rates are associated with better 
health outcomes for women and children. Maternal mortality rates 
decreased dramatically over the last decades, thus meeting the 
objectives set by the UN Millennium Goals with regard to improving 
maternal health and reducing child mortality.16  
However, these advancements have not translated to a more 
effective economic and political inclusion for women. In particular, 
they have not resulted in commensurate rates of increase in female 
labour force participation. The average rate of female participation in 
the region moved slowly upwards from 22% in 1980-1985 to about 
28% in 2005-2010, in sharp contrast to rates and trends in other 
regions, irrespective of their development status. The evidence 
suggests that the gap between the North African and Middle Eastern 
countries and other developing countries has widened despite the 
region’s remarkable convergence with the rest of the world in terms of 
female education and fertility decline.17 In particular, the neoliberal 
economic policy turn of the 1990s – which entailed denationalization, 
privatization, and liberalization of industry and commerce – resulted 
in growing unemployment among the large population of educated 
young people and women. 
The Middle East and North Africa region shows an increase in 
women’s unemployment rates between 2012 and 2014, and a 
persistent gender gap with rates of young women’s participation in the 
labour market much lower than those of young men. Women, 
particularly young women, are more exposed than their male 
counterparts to unemployment, underemployment or informal 
employment.  
A key part of the call for change emanating from women and 
young people during the Arab uprising has been the request for access 
                                                 
15 N. Chamlou - M. Karshenas (eds.), Women, Work and Welfare in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Imperial College Press, London, 2016, pp. 4-6. 
16 Ib., pp. 6-7. 
17 Ib., pp. 7-16. 
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to greater economic opportunities. To date, on the socio-economic 
front, the governments of the region have responded to this call 
mainly by increasing state spending on subsidies and public sector 
wages and expenditures. However, addressing the aspirations and 
needs of these demographics will require more comprehensive 
reforms focusing on job creation strategies without further affecting 
the budget deficit.18 
The revolutionary act constituted a political and cultural shock for 
the previously established political order as well as for the existent 
gender discourse. Women contributed to the elaboration of new 
resistance strategies through chants, banners, slogans and graffiti, and 
were able to turn physical violation and sexual harassment into a new 
culture of the body and into a re-positioning of the gender discourse. 
The revolutionary generation went ‘beyond gender without 
abandoning gender’, thus allowing women to exercise agency within a 
broader discourse centred on citizens’ rights and democratic 
mobilization against authoritarian and corrupt regimes.19 
In this new scenario, women presented themselves as active agents 
of change in the region and they succeeded in disrupting the strict 
public/private space dichotomy, which prioritizes their role within the 
household. Nonetheless, the current political and socio-economic 
context is not favorable to women’s empowerment. Economic and 
political factors which have for decades characterized the region – 
such as economic stagnation, social insecurity, political instability, 
legal injustices – continue to have a negative impact on gender 
equality in the aftermath of the uprisings. 
In 2004 the World Bank, under the supervision of Nobel Prize 
laureate Shirin Ebadi, published the seminal report titled Gender and 
Development in the Middle East and North Africa.20 The report 
explores the situation of women in the region through two key 
concepts: the ‘gender paradigm’ and the ‘gender paradox’. The first 
                                                 
18 The World Bank, Opening Doors, MENA Development Report 2013, pp. 115, 
121, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/338381468279877854/pdf/751810 
PUB0EPI002060130Opening0doors.pdf. 
19 S. Abouelnaga, Women in Revolutionary Egypt: Gender and the New 
Geographies of Identity, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 2016, pp. 
6-7. 
20 The World Bank, Gender and Development in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Women in the Public Sphere, MENA Development Report 2004, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15036. 
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refers to the asymmetrical relationships between men and women in 
the region, which create and sustain inequalities, such as the fact that 
the husband/father holds the role of breadwinner within the family, 
that a ‘code of modesty’ is imposed on women and that several forms 
of inequality are perpetrated in the law, giving privileged conditions to 
the men especially in family and hereditary law. Unlike other 
developing regions where improvements in female health and 
education have gone hand in hand with women’s economic and 
political empowerment, in North Africa and the Middle East the 
‘gender paradigm’ has been only challenged, but not demolished. This 
is what the report calls the ‘gender paradox’, namely the low female 
political empowerment and the low female labour force participation 
rates in the region despite women’s significant achievements in terms 
of education, life expectancy, and fertility.21 The outcomes of the 
2004 report still hold true today, and it is still possible to make the 
point that the major obstacle to female employment and political 
participation in the region is the incapacity to translate women’s 
achievements in term of education and healthcare into a significant 
improvement of women’s political and economic role.  
The experience of women during the uprisings and in their 
aftermath varies from country to country. According to Valentine 
Moghadam the more women’s empowerment was advanced before the 
upheavals, the greater the possibilities of a successful transition to 
democracy and of a significant raise in leadership roles for women in 
politics. In the decades before the uprisings, both Morocco and 
Tunisia experienced substantial legal reforms aimed at removing 
gender inequalities in their domestic law, especially in family and 
hereditary law, and at promoting women’s political participation. In 
Morocco reform movements resulted in the constitutional 
amendments restricting the king’s vast powers and institutionalizing 
the rights of women and of the Berber minority. The female share of 
total seats in parliament increased from 11% to 17% thanks to a fully 
implemented reserved seat system. In early 2014, after the suicide of a 
young woman, Amina Filali, who had been forced to marry her rapist, 
the Moroccan parliament voted unanimously to repeal rape marriage 
from the penal code, and in June 2014, Moroccan female activists 
vehemently protested against the prime minister’s comments that the 
                                                 
21 G. Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, 
Saqi Books, London, 2013, pp. 31-33. 
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role of women is to focus on the family. In Tunisia, the new 
Constitution, adopted in January 2014, enshrines the equality of 
women and men rather than their complementarity, as was instead 
initially requested by al-Nahḍa and other conservative forces. In the 
October 2014 legislative elections, 47% of all parliamentary 
candidates were women, and 12% of those who led the political party 
candidate lists were women as well. The liberal-left coalition party 
Nidā’ Tūnis won the election, and the new parliament has a 31% 
female share of members.22 Recently (July 26th 2017) Tunisia’s 
parliament passed a bill aiming at promoting gender equality and at 
ensuring that any form of gender-based violence is brought to face 
justice. The new law, which will be officially introduced next year 
(2018), seeks to ensure that in daily life women’s dignity and gender 
equality are respected as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
In contrast to the freedom Moroccan and Tunisian women 
experienced during rallies and sit-ins, Egyptian female activists were 
subjected to humiliating sexual harassments by gangs of men, by 
police, and by the military during and after the Tahrir Square protests. 
This proves that Egypt was lagged behind compared to the other two 
North African countries with respect to reducing the gender gap and 
promoting gender equality.23 Indeed one of the main constraints for 
gender equality in Egypt, namely the clause that the State shall 
guarantee the agreement between women’s work in society and her 
duties to the family (1956 Constitution Article 19), was passed again 
in the 1971 Constitution, promulgated by Sadat, and was left almost 
unchanged in the 2012 (art. 10) and 2014 (art. 11) Constitutions. In 
particular the 1971 Constitution states that ‘The State shall guarantee 
the agreement between the duties of a woman toward her family and 
her work in society, considering her equal status with man in the fields 
of political, social, cultural, and economic life, without contravening 
the laws of Islamic sharī‘a’ (Article 11). This clause seems to promote 
gender equality concerning public rights, but only a sort of gendered 
‘complementarity’ in private family life, with Islamic religion playing 
a major role in distinguishing between the two fields. 
Though the expansion of women’s participation and the scope of 
their rights do not seem to be a priority for revolutionary forces, 
                                                 
22 V. M. Moghadam, ‘Democratization and Women’s Political Leadership in 
North Africa’, in Journal of International Affairs 68/1 (Fall/Winter 2014), pp. 70-
72. 
23 Ib., pp. 69-70. 
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women have nonetheless made remarkable achievements.24 Generally 
speaking, the uprising demolished the principle of homogeneity, 
marking the appearance of a real diversity on several levels: 
ideological, cultural, religious, educational, class-based and gender-
oriented. The revolutionary act worked as a political and cultural 
shock that brought about a subversion of previously solid national 
gendered discourses.25 Nonetheless, the revolutionary discourse, 
which centered on social justice and freedom, better job opportunities 
and demand for participation, was outstripped by the dominant 
discourses adopted by the political forces. These focused instead 
mainly on issues of Islamism versus secularism, modernism versus 
conservatism, national security and the war on terror. Women do not 
believe in the old political models but at the same time they have not 
yet been able to articulate a new one. They remain nonetheless 
politically engaged in the post-revolutionary transition through their 
own associations and civil society initiatives. They are convinced that 
the current system is not serving them, but continue to put pressure on 
the authorities through street protests, sit-ins, activities on social 
networks and independent associations. 
Understanding the factors that are driving gender-based economic 
and social inequality is a crucial issue, not just for reasons of pursuing 
equality and economic inclusion, but also for political reasons. An 
inclusive and sustainable post-revolutionary development agenda 
should address gender equality in order to minimize women’s 
vulnerability (especially for rural and underprivileged women) and 
maximize opportunities, to turn contradictions into balanced 
approaches addressing economic, social, and political dimensions. 
 
Layout of the Book 
Taken collectively, the articles in this book tackle some of the 
abovementioned topics and by doing so open up a new range of 
questions for future research on social activism and the trajectory of 
women’s participation, resistance and resilience transpiring in North 
Africa in the aftermath of the uprisings. The chapters are organized 
into two sections. Part one, titled Economic and Social Issues, 
engages with some elements of the puzzle raised by the Arab 
                                                 
24 M. Olimat (ed.), Handbook of Arab Women and Arab Spring: Challenges and 
Opportunities, Routledge, London -New York, 2014. 
25 S. Abouelnaga, Women in Revolutionary Egypt, p. 3. 
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uprisings and subsequent events by addressing issues such as 
migrations, water and food shortage, economic challenges, citizenship 
and transitional democracy. The articles of section one explore the 
contours of a rational framework through which we can understand 
the drivers of change which led to the uprisings, and the evolution of 
the socio-political forces in the aftermath. Some issues seem to be 
unrelated to the main content of the book but this is not truly the case. 
In particular, the articles by Giuseppe Cataldi, Quelques observations 
sur les migrations dans la Méditerranée dans la perspective de 
l’Union Européenne and by Eugenia Ferragina and Giovanni 
Canitano, Crise hydrique, crise alimentaire et bouleversement 
politique au Maghreb provide an invaluable set of insights 
concerning the causes, the emergence, and the unfolding dynamics 
and trajectories of the revolutionary movements in North Africa. The 
(apparently) unpredictable manner in which they emerged as well as 
the recurrence of social and political violence in the Middle East and 
North Africa are certainly connected to some major issues that are 
being faced by the whole Mediterranean region, namely the 
asymmetrical North-South dynamics, the inequalities generated by 
globalization, and the climate change and progressive desertification 
which are dramatically affecting several African regions. The 
dependence on basic foodstuffs imports makes North Africa 
particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations on the international 
markets, which along with environmental problems and water 
shortage, are negatively influencing the transition economies and 
social security of the region. On the other hand, the European 
incapacity to deal with the unstable situation in the countries of the 
South Mediterranean is paradigmatically exemplified by the lack of 
solidarity on the part of EU States when confronted with migrants 
fleeing from wars, extreme poverty and violence, in the face of the 
fundamental principles enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and in 
particular in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. One of the major 
causes behind the uprisings is the failure of the neo-liberal and 
structural adjustments policies across the MENA region. The present 
situation calls for a more inclusive development approach and requires 
a new socio-political paradigm, more regional integration and more 
involvement from Europe and from other international actors in the 
reconstruction and development of North Africa. Six years after the 
uprisings, the perception of inequality has risen and the social and 
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political unrest sweeping the Arab world has further deteriorated the 
economic and social situation of average citizens. Focusing mainly on 
Tunisia and Egypt (two countries where the 2011 uprisings share 
many similarities), Ersilia Francesca’s paper, titled Economic 
Opportunities and Social Challenges in the North African 
Transition, explores how the post-revolution political and economic 
situation is affecting the status of women and young people, who 
played a significant role in the revolutionary phase. The important 
issues of governance, democracy and citizenship receive attention in 
the last two articles of section one: Challenging the Paradigms. 
Changing Theories in the Middle-Eastern Anthropology after the 
Tunisian Revolution by Domenico Copertino and Islam and 
Citizenship in Tunisia after the Yasmine Revolution. The Debate 
over the Law of Awqāf by Pietro Longo. The former provides a 
theoretical framework for analyzing the concepts of freedom, dignity, 
social justice, and governmentality, with reference to both their 
explicit formulation and implicit understandings by the individuals 
and groups involved in the revolutionary process. The paper by P. 
Longo focuses on the rise of political Islam in Tunisia and the ensuing 
polarization of politics. It suggests that, during the first four years 
after the uprising, the Islamists of al-Nahḍa deliberately issued 
controversial draft laws in order to ‘test’ people’s reaction, and 
modified their agenda accordingly. Under this light, restoring pious 
foundations for state law can be understood to form part of al-Nahḍa’s 
political strategy.  
In part two, titled Gender Dynamics, the articles engage with the 
key themes of the book by addressing the ways female activists and 
feminists (both secular and Islamic) responded to the authoritarian 
regimes and to an increasingly perceived inequality of opportunities 
by creating new forms of reaction, resistance and resilience and 
developing a more active political consciousness. Women’s ability to 
resort to the street and to social media in strategically smart ways 
represents a major challenge to traditional gender dynamics in the 
region, and will it make more difficult for the authoritarian and 
conservative forces to monopolize power in the future. The first article 
in the section, Mapping the Forms of Women’s Activism and 
Leadership in Post-Uprising Arab Countries by Aitemad Muhanna 
Matar, based on empirical field research, outlines how newly emerged 
non-feminist women’s leaders, especially those who represent Islamist 
 Introduction. Gender Mobility and Social Activism in Post-Revolutionary North Africa 25 
 
parties, are trying to implement a new model of feminist leadership 
within the moral framework of Islamic tradition. The heterogeneity 
within female activism in Tunisia as well as the emergence of new 
social actors following the 2011 uprising is highlighted also in the 
article by Marta Bellingreri, titled Tunisian Women: A Polyphonic 
Choir in a Heterogeneous Society. The fall of President Ben Ali in 
January 2011 marked a turning point in Tunisian history, opening up 
new horizons of freedom for the country’s people after years of 
constant censorship. Gina Annunziata (Le regard libéré. La 
militance féminine dans le cinéma tunisien postrévolutionnaire) 
outlines the role of a number of Tunisian female filmmakers – such as 
Nadia El Fani, Sonia Chamkhi, Hinde Boujemaa – who have taken 
advantage of this space of freedom to describe reality through the 
stories of women engaged in various ways in a process of change. 
Cross-cutting issues in the following articles of section two are 
women’s empowerment and strategies of resistance in Egypt. Rania 
Abdelrahman (The Politics of Mourning: Mothers of the Martyrs’ 
Narratives of Resistance and Empowerment) analyses the 
narratives of a group of Egyptian mothers whose sons were killed 
during the demonstrations of 25th January 2011 in Egypt, arguing that 
their narratives are simultaneously narratives of resistance and 
empowerment. Roswitha Badry (Increased Gender-Based Violence 
as a Result of the Greater Visibility of Women’s Rights Defenders 
in the Public Sphere? Remarks on ‘Anti-Harassment’ Initiatives 
in Egypt) discusses how women reacted to sexual harassment and 
gender based violence in the country facing off any attempt to push 
defenders of women’s rights out of the public sphere back into the 
private sphere. Mounira Soliman, in her paper Urban Space, Power 
Struggle, and the Remaking of the City, also focuses on the re-
appropriation of the urban space. Taking into account the youth 
movement of the January 25th revolution, she underlines the way in 
which the utilization of different forms of popular culture, including 
graffiti, street fairs, public concerts and popular performances, created 
a new city and sustained a platform for political engagement. 
Margherita Picchi (Egypt in Transition: What future for Islamic 
Feminism?) addresses the question of how the dramatic and on-going 
changes that Egypt has faced since the beginning of the 2011 uprising, 
are influencing ‘Islamic feminism’ which represents a dynamic and 
diversified phenomenon in the specific context of the country. Pervine 
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Elrefaei (Intellectuals and Activists Writing under the Sign of 
Hope: Radwa Ashour and Ahdaf Soueif’s Manifestos of the 2011 
Revolution) and Loubna A. Youssef (The Victory of the Egyptian 
Vernacular in Egyptian Writings pre and post January 2011) both 
explore the Egyptian revolutionary movement through the lens of 
literature. The contribution of P. Elrefaei focuses on Ahdaf Soueif’s 
2012 memoir Cairo: My City, Our Revolution, and Radwa Ashour’s 
2013 autobiography Athqal min Radwā (Heavier than Radwa: 
Excerpts from an Autobiography) arguing that the selected texts – 
depicting issues of identity, the self and nationalism as crucial points – 
can be regarded as acts of literary activism or textual spaces of 
resistance. On the other hand, L. Youssef examines the tension 
between standard and vernacular Arabic in pre- and post-January 2011 
Egyptian literature, arguing that the Egyptian dialect, which is hailed 
as the real language of the people, entails a subversive function of 
overturning the logics and structures of power, thus giving voice to the 
revolutionary ideals.  
The last two articles of the book, Being Young and Post-Feminist 
in Morocco: The Emergence of a New Women’s Activism by 
Renata Pepicelli and Égalité de genre au Maroc après 2011 ? Les 
droits sexuels et reproductifs au centre des récentes luttes de 
reconnaissance by Sara Borrillo help to provide an understanding of 
how women in Morocco reconfigured gender roles and turned squares 
and streets into new gendered spaces. R. Pepicelli, on the basis of 
interviews with activists from different generations, investigates the 
forms and tools of social and political engagement of the young ‘post-
feminists’ in Morocco, focusing mainly on the 20 February 
Movement. S. Borrillo explores the impact of urban female activisms 
on the recognition of formal equality between women and men, and, 
in particular, she analyzes the emergence of sexual rights issues in the 
struggles for the ‘rights to recognition’. 
 
This volume, as well as the 2014 international conference, is part of 
the research program PRIN 2010-2011 State, Plurality, Change in 
Africa financed by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and 
Research.26 The preparation process included one round of peer 
                                                 
26 The research program has been directed by prof. Pierluigi Valsecchi of the 
University of Pavia. The principal investigator for the University of Naples 
“L’Orientale” has been prof. M. Cristina Ercolessi. 
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reviewing by anonymous readers to whom we are very much obliged 
for helping us in the difficult task of editing a book. The articles 
presented in this volume have been formally standardized as far as 
possible in order to facilitate the readers’ comprehension of Arabic 
proper and place names. Some differences in the spelling of names 
have been maintained where it seemed important to respect the 
individual character of each contribution. Our thanks are also due to 
Sara Borrillo and Valentina Schiattarella, postdoctoral research 
fellows at the Department of Asian, African and Mediterranean 
Studies (DAAM), who helped us in the editing of the volume. Last but 
not least, we want to thank David Ginsborg, Barbara de Lutzinger and 
Sarah Pinto for their competence and patience in revising the English 
and French language throughout the volumes. 
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Quelques observations 
sur les migrations dans la Méditerranée 
dans la perspective de l’Union Européenne 
 
Giuseppe CATALDI 
 
 
« Qu’est-ce que la Méditerranée ? Mille choses à la fois. Non pas un paysage, mais 
d’innombrables paysages. Non pas une mer, mais une succession de mers. Non pas 
une civilisation, mais des civilisations entassées les unes sur les autres. (…) Tout 
cela parce que la Méditerranée est un très vieux carrefour. Depuis des millénaires 
tout a conflué vers elle, brouillant, enrichissant son histoire ». 
Fernand Braudel1 
 
Abstract 
In this article the author deals with the question of migration through 
Mediterranean corridors in the framework of the relationship between European 
Union and States engaged in the so called ‘Arab Spring’. The problem is that real 
solidarity is lacking on the part of European Union States, notwithstanding the 
fundamental principles enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and in particular in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Asylum system adopted by the European Union 
is in crisis, it does not work due to the absence of any coordination among State 
Members, divided by different opinions on migration’s needs. Temporary Protection 
has been introduced as a new form of assistance to migrants, but it is not sufficient 
and humanitarian corridors should be created. The case of the incident between Italy 
and France at the Ventimiglia border (April 2011), where these two States quarreled 
for the destiny of no more than five hundreds of Tunisian migrants is emblematic of 
the attitude of European Union Member States toward this issue. Is the European 
Union interested to the protection of Fundamental Rights or of European Rights? 
This is the main question. To be European Union or to become a ‘Fortress Europe’. 
 
Introduction. Printemps arabe et démocraties occidentales 
L’histoire de la Méditerranée est une histoire de civilisations, de 
projets, d’attentes et parfois d’illusions qui se rencontrent, se heurtent 
et se mélangent. Mais c’est aussi l’histoire d’une mer non pas 
                                                 
1 F. Braudel, La Méditerranée - Espace et histoire, Arts et métiers graphiques, 
1977; rééd. en poche, Champs, Flammarion, Paris 1985, pp. 8-9. 
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enfermée dans des frontières rigides, mais entourée de frontières 
éphémères et changeantes, une mer qui est en relation avec d’autres 
mers et civilisations. Si l’on regarde la Méditerranée comme une 
mosaïque, on voit que ses tesselles sont toutes différentes, mais que 
chacune a une grande importance et, par conséquent, l’on accepte le 
fait qu’il n’existe pas une seule Méditerranée mais qu’il s’agit de 
plusieurs civilisations « entassées l’une sur l’autre ».2 La diversité et 
la spécificité de la Méditerranée font de cette région un espace de 
réflexion critique pour la civilisation occidentale tout entière. 
L’Ouest et l’Europe n’étaient pas préparés au printemps arabe. On 
peut le constater par l’action (ou l’échec!) des États occidentaux et des 
instances européennes et supranationales, l’ONU, l’OTAN et l’Union 
européenne en premier lieu. Le « séisme » qui a ébranlé jusque dans 
leurs fondements et dans une succession rapide, entre décembre 2010 
et début 2011, la Tunisie, l’Égypte et la Libye, a irrémédiablement fait 
craquer l’ordre régional existant, marquant le début d’une 
transformation tous azimuts, similaire ou du moins comparable à celle 
qui a transformé l’Europe en 1989. 
Au début, face aux troubles survenus dans le sud de la Méditerranée, 
- des événements à la fois inattendus et redoutés -, les États-Unis et 
l’Europe sont restés inertes. Ce n’est que lorsqu’on s’est aperçu que le 
vent du changement ne cesserait de souffler avec force que l’Occident a 
embrassé la cause de la liberté et soutenu les processus démocratiques, 
en exhortant les régimes à promouvoir la transition démocratique. Ce 
brusque changement de direction est peu crédible à cause de l’absence 
d’une stratégie commune minimale au niveau européen, mais aussi de 
la crainte évidente et mal dissimulée d’une invasion d’immigrants 
illégaux et d’une avancée du fondamentalisme et du terrorisme.  
Depuis le début des années 90, la politique étrangère des États de 
l’Ouest et des organisations internationales qui sont leur expression, 
repose en fait sur deux domaines clés : les alliances géostratégiques et 
les relations économiques et commerciales avec les pays du sud de la 
Méditerranée. La région méditerranéenne et du Moyen-Orient a joué 
un rôle central dans l’agenda politique des États d’Europe occidentale, 
notamment ceux qui sont membres de l’OTAN et de l’UE. Toutefois, 
les actions menées n’ont pas été à la hauteur des attentes. Les 
politiques en question ont principalement tourné autour de l’idée que 
la coopération économique pourrait déclencher des dynamiques 
                                                 
2 Braudel, La Méditerranée, pp. 8-9. 
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politiques vertueuses, la démocratisation des régimes autoritaires et la 
croissance de la société civile, contribuant ainsi de manière décisive à 
la sécurité et à la stabilisation de la région. Il est bien connu que les 
accords de l’UE avec les pays tiers ont inclus, à partir des années 90, 
la clause dite de « conditionnalité démocratique », qui pose le respect 
de la primauté du droit et des libertés fondamentales comme 
fondement de ces accords, susceptibles de suspension en cas de 
violation desdits principes. On sait, toutefois, que l’UE a eu très 
rarement recours à la possibilité de résilier les accords avec les pays 
tiers pour sanctionner le non respect en termes de démocratie.  
Un choix qui non seulement affecte la cohérence et la crédibilité de 
l’action extérieure de l’UE et de ses États membres dans le domaine 
des droits de l’homme, mais qui en plus ne s’est pas avéré gagnant. 
Face à un avenir plein d’inconnues, pour l’Occident et l’Europe le 
plus difficile est à venir. L’enjeu, c’est bien plus que le destin des 
révolutions arabes individuelles. Il s’agit, en fait, de la crédibilité 
même de l’Occident, et en particulier de l’UE. Il faut partant faire 
preuve de cohérence et de cohésion. 
Le soutien à l’Afrique du Nord prend une valeur stratégique très 
élevée, dans l’immédiat comme dans un avenir proche, parce que la 
démocratisation de l’Afrique du Nord peut être un frein aux 
prétentions et à la violence des régimes autoritaires vis-à-vis d’autres 
pays arabes et de l’Afrique en général.  
Le soutien de l’Occident aux processus de transition en Afrique du 
Nord doit être double : d’une part, un soutien politique qui repose sur 
un plan stratégique de l’Union européenne pour l’ensemble de 
l’Afrique du Nord, avec l’identification de lignes d’une action 
commune à l’ensemble de la région ; de l’autre, un soutien 
économique tout nouveau, qui puisse abandonner les vieilles recettes 
financières dont les populations locales ont très mal et très peu profité, 
en subordonnant l’aide économique au développement de la société 
civile et à la protection et promotion de la démocratie et de la 
primauté du droit. Or, tout cela nécessite un changement des valeurs et 
de l’idéologie de l’Ouest, qui devrait cesser de souligner uniquement 
les dangers qui se cachent derrière le printemps arabe et recommencer 
par les « racines communes » des peuples de la Méditerranée. 
 
Printemps arabe et Union Européenne 
Celles que j’ai mentionnées, cependant, ne semblent pas être 
toujours les lignes directrices de la politique de l’Union Européenne 
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en la matière. Sur la base des principes généraux énoncés à l’art. 2 du 
Traité sur l’Union Européenne (TUE), il faut retenir le principe selon 
lequel l’Europe ne peut pas construire son espace de liberté, de 
sécurité et de justice aux frais des droits fondamentaux des 
ressortissants des Pays tiers ; en deuxième lieu, il faut tenir compte du 
fait que, en matière de droits fondamentaux, les États tiers ne sont pas 
toujours mus par les mêmes préoccupations que l’Union Européenne. 
Il ne faut pas que cela devienne pour nous, les Européens, un « alibi » 
politique pour faire moins, mais plutôt un point de départ pour 
prétendre plus lorsqu’il s’agit de s’accorder avec nos pays partenaires 
étrangers et les organisations internationales, notamment en matière 
de sécurité. L’Union devrait faire passer à ses interlocuteurs le 
message que notre coopération est subordonnée au respect d’un 
standard minimal. En termes plus clairs : les droits fondamentaux ne 
sont pas négociables dans un système politique se décrivant lui-même 
comme une démocratie. Il suffit de rappeler ici les arrêts bien connus 
Yusuf et Kadi de la Cour de Luxembourg, qui a démontré sans 
ambiguïté que l’acquis européen en la matière ne peut pas accepter le 
niveau de protection des droits fondamentaux pris en considération 
par le Comité des sanctions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies 
au moment où celui-ci décide sur les mesures qui gèlent les avoirs des 
personnes figurant sur une liste des terroristes présumés.3 Je me 
félicite de la tendance de la Cour de justice à proclamer l’identité 
constitutionnelle de l’Union, résistant ainsi à une mise en œuvre sans 
réserve du principe de primauté du droit international. La 
jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a aussi 
précisé que les États sont tenus de prendre en compte ces 
circonstances. Si nous rejetons cela, alors nous ne devrions plus parler 
de « droits fondamentaux » mais de « droits européens », ce qui 
correspond à l’idée d’une Europe « forteresse », fermée au monde 
extérieur. La prévention du terrorisme, en particulier, a montré 
récemment que l’UE ne peut pas s’isoler des contraintes des droits 
universels de l’homme et que la sécurité et les droits de l’homme ne 
sont pas des catégories nécessairement liées par une relation de 
conflit. 
 
                                                 
3 Cour de justice (grande chambre), Affaires jointes C-402/05 P et C-415/05 P, 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi et Al Barakaat International Fondation Contre Conseil de 
l’Union européenne et Commission des Communautés européennes, du 3/9/2008. 
 Quelques observations sur les migrations dans la Méditerranée 35 
Le système d’asile commun dans l’Union Européenne 
Un premier point à soulever est la faiblesse du système commun 
d’asile européen, récemment révisé,4 qui, à notre avis, n’a pas pleinement 
mis en œuvre le principe de solidarité requis par l’art. 80 du TFUE.5 
Nous savons que cette situation est principalement due à la 
réticence de plusieurs États membres et qu’elle a été confirmée par les 
conclusions du Sommet du Conseil européen, qui a eu lieu les 24 et 25 
octobre 2013, lesquelles sont, à notre avis, très frustrantes sur ces 
points.6 Il est certes encourageant de lire une référence à la nécessité de 
faire preuve de solidarité et de partager le poids dans cette matière, mais 
aucune nouvelle mesure législative n’a été déclarée comme opportune, 
et la révision du règlement de Dublin n’a pas été prévue. Dans sa 
dernière formulation, adoptée en juin 2013, en conformité avec la 
                                                 
4 Le 26 juin 2013 les actes normatifs suivants ont été adoptés, destinés à s’ajouter 
à la directive 2011/95/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 13/12/2011 
concernant les normes relatives aux conditions que doivent remplir les ressortissants 
des pays tiers ou les apatrides pour pouvoir bénéficier d’une protection 
internationale, à un statut uniforme pour les réfugiés ou les personnes pouvant 
bénéficier de la protection subsidiaire, et au contenu de cette protection : 1) le 
règlement (UE) n° 603/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 
relatif à la création d’Eurodac pour la comparaison des empreintes digitales aux fins 
de l’application efficace du règlement (UE) n° 604/2013 établissant les critères et 
mécanismes de détermination de l’État membre responsable de l’examen d’une 
demande de protection internationale introduite dans l’un des États membres par un 
ressortissant de pays tiers ou un apatride et relatif aux demandes de comparaison 
avec les données d’Eurodac présentées par les autorités répressives des États 
membres et Europol à des fins répressives, et modifiant le règlement (UE) n° 
1077/2011 portant création d’une agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle 
des systèmes d’information à grande échelle au sein de l’espace de liberté, de 
sécurité et de justice (refonte) ; 2) le règlement (UE) n° 604/2013 du Parlement 
européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 établissant les critères et mécanismes de 
détermination de l’État membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande de 
protection internationale introduite dans l’un des États membres par un ressortissant 
de pays tiers ou un apatride ; 3) la directive 2013/32/UE du Parlement européen et 
du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le 
retrait de la protection international ; 4) la directive 2013/33/UE du Parlement 
européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 établissant des normes pour l’accueil des 
personnes demandant la protection internationale. 
5 Article 80 : « Les politiques de l’Union visées au présent chapitre et leur mise 
en œuvre sont régies par le principe de solidarité et de partage équitable de 
responsabilités entre les États membres, y compris sur le plan financier. Chaque fois 
que cela est nécessaire, les actes de l’Union adoptés en vertu du présent chapitre 
contiennent des mesures appropriées pour l’application de ce principe ». 
6 Voir le doc. EUCO 169/13 du 25 octobre 2013, par. 46 à 49. 
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formulation précédente du règlement n. 343/2013, le règlement de 
Dublin établit que le critère principal pour l’identification de l’État 
responsable du traitement des demandes d’asile est celui du pays 
membre de première entrée. Or, en appliquant ce critère, le risque est 
d’abord de surcharger les États membres (en particulier les États de la 
Méditerranée) qui sont géographiquement les plus exposés. 
Deuxièmement, ce système est un obstacle à une répartition efficace 
des réfugiés sur la base du marché national du travail ou du réseau 
familial. Il serait nécessaire, à notre avis, d’établir périodiquement le 
pourcentage de réfugiés que chaque État membre peut accueillir, en se 
basant principalement sur sa situation économique, avec un mécanisme 
de compensation dans le cas des États ayant un pourcentage plus élevé 
par rapport à leur capacité. D’où la nécessité d’un « partage du 
fardeau » au niveau européen, avec la création d’un bureau pour 
l’analyse des demandes d’asile qui puisse répartir les candidats. 
Une autre question qui doit être, à notre avis, considérée avec 
attention est celle, soulignée plusieurs fois par le Conseil européen 
(également au sommet du 24 et du 25 octobre 2013), des avantages 
d’une politique de retour et de coopération avec les pays d’origine et 
de transit des migrants ainsi que des demandeurs d’asile. Il s’agit d’un 
point très sensible. 
Tout d’abord, nous sommes convaincus qu’il est nécessaire de 
séparer la question des demandeurs d’asile de celle des migrants 
économiques. Le risque est qu’un système construit pour protéger les 
demandeurs d’asile puisse être démoli sous la pression 
(compréhensible) des personnes à la recherche d’un niveau de vie 
acceptable, mais qui ne sont pas en danger. Cela implique une révision 
complète des politiques nationales en matière d’immigration, avec 
l’introduction de canaux d’immigration légale pour les migrants en 
recherche d’emploi. Je suis conscient des difficultés, mais je suis 
convaincu que c’est l’occasion de commencer à imaginer ce 
changement. Le Pacte européen sur l’immigration et l’asile remonte à 
2008 et le mettre à jour au début de la nouvelle législature devrait être 
le premier souci des législateurs européens. Dans cette perspective, je 
crois qu’une règle européenne interdisant la criminalisation de la 
migration irrégulière serait non seulement conforme au droit 
international (Convention de Palerme et ses protocoles),7 mais elle 
                                                 
7 Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée 
(15/11/2000), dite Convention de Palerme, y compris les trois protocoles 
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éviterait aussi un manque de cohérence des politiques nationales dans 
ce domaine. 
Deuxième constat : la majorité des migrants qui, à l’heure actuelle, 
arrivent sur les côtes italiennes sont des migrants humanitaires, en 
provenance de la Syrie, de l’Érythrée, de la Somalie et de 
l’Afghanistan. Par conséquent, ils ne peuvent pas être renvoyés dans 
les pays qu’ils ont fuis. En ce qui concerne la coopération avec les 
pays de transit, il est difficile de comprendre comment la rendre 
compatible, dans la perspective du Conseil de l’Union Européenne, 
avec le respect dû aux droits fondamentaux. La majorité des pays de 
l’Afrique du Nord, à l’heure actuelle, n’offrent aucune garantie. 
Prenons le cas de la Libye. Dans ce pays, selon Amnesty International, 
la situation des migrants est actuellement plus grave encore que ce 
qu’elle n’était sous le régime de M. Kadhafi.8 Par conséquent, les 
indications fournies par le Conseil européen semblent difficiles à 
suivre en termes pratiques. Il faut également ajouter que l’Italie (mais 
les autres États membres de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’Homme aussi, pour ce qui concerne les mesures générales) est tenue 
à faire exécuter la décision de la Cour de Strasbourg du 23 février 
2012 dans l’affaire Hirsi c. Italie. Dans cette affaire, la Grande 
Chambre a affirmé en termes explicites que la Libye n’était pas un 
lieu sûr pour les migrants, à cause du traitement qu’ils reçoivent 
pendant la détention, et aussi parce que ce pays n’a pas de dispositions 
normatives en matière d’asile et n’a pas ratifié la Convention de 
Genève sur les réfugiés.9 
 
Le Code « Schengen » et la protection « temporaire » 
En ce qui concerne les problèmes récents de l’arrivée de groupes de 
migrants qui fuient des situations de crise politique dans leur pays, ou 
même simplement des situations de famine, l’objectif politique devrait 
être de gérer cette situation avec toute la puissance et la compétence 
                                                                                                                   
additionnels: le Protocole visant à prévenir, réprimer et punir la traite des personnes, 
en particulier des femmes et des enfants (New York, 15/11/2000); le Protocole 
contre le trafic illicite de migrants par terre, air et mer (New York, 15/11/2000); le 
Protocole contre la fabrication et le trafic illicites d’armes à feu, de leurs pièces, 
éléments et munitions (New York, 31/5/2001). 
8 Voir le document du Conseil de l’Europe (Secrétariat du Comité des Ministres) 
DH-D(2012)744 du 24/8/2012. 
9 Convention du 28/7/1951 relative au statut des réfugiés, dite Convention de 
Genève. 
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de l’UE et non pas avec les moyens limités offerts par les États 
membres dans l’île de Lampedusa ou à Malte. 
La possibilité d’une protection temporaire est offerte, comme nous 
le savons, par la directive 2001/55/CE. À notre avis, cette concession 
devrait être complétée par la création de corridors humanitaires, c’est-
à dire des mesures visant à aider et surveiller l’évacuation des 
personnes qui peuvent bénéficier de la protection prévue par la 
directive. Ce serait une aide à la lutte contre la traite des personnes. 
Actuellement, la demande de protection temporaire, quand elle est 
admise, ne peut être faite qu’une fois que la personne est arrivée sur le 
territoire d’un État membre. Pouvons-nous tolérer encore que la 
limitation des demandes soit régie par des barrières physiques et 
politiques, tels que le désert, la mer, ou des États tiers hostiles aux 
réfugiés ? 
Sans doute, après les catastrophes humanitaires qui se sont 
produites au cours des derniers mois, de nouvelles mesures sont 
nécessaires afin de renforcer la recherche et le sauvetage dans la mer 
Méditerranée. Mais, à notre avis, cela ne peut être considéré comme 
une priorité absolue, car les institutions de l’Union et les États 
membres pourraient s’en servir facilement comme alibi pour montrer 
leur bonne volonté dans la lutte contre ce problème. Autrement dit, 
nous maintenons que des mesures structurelles (dont certaines ont été 
décrites ci-dessus) sont avant tout nécessaires. Par exemple, mettre 
pleinement en œuvre l’art. 80 du TFUE sur le principe de solidarité et 
de partage équitable des responsabilités entre les États membres aussi 
en matière de questions financières. 
Malheureusement, jusqu’à présent il y a une proposition de 
règlement uniquement sur les questions de recherche et sauvetage : 
(voir doc 14753/13 du Conseil, du 17 octobre 2013 établissant des 
règles pour la surveillance des frontières extérieures maritimes). Par 
conséquent, il n’est pas du tout étonnant que six délégations (celles de 
la Méditerranée : Italie, France, Grèce, Malte, Chypre, Espagne) aient 
exprimé leur opposition à ces mesures, faisant valoir que dans cette 
matière les États membres maintiennent encore leur propre 
compétence. Il est clair que ces six États membres sont préoccupés par 
le fardeau que les clauses sur la recherche et le sauvetage pourraient 
faire peser sur eux en l’absence d’un plan de solidarité significatif 
visant à partager les responsabilités avec les autres États membres. Le 
problème est que le contrôle des frontières est une question qui est 
encore entre les mains des États membres, bien que les frontières 
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extérieures soient celles de l’ensemble de l’Union. Ce constat est 
également confirmé par le règlement 1168/2011 instituant l’Agence 
pour le contrôle des frontières extérieures de l’UE (Frontex). Son art. 
1 affirme que « la responsabilité du contrôle et de la surveillance des 
frontières extérieures incombe aux États membres ». Avec le 
règlement nouveau les fonctions de l’Agence ont été élargies pour 
englober la possibilité de lancer des opérations conjointes proprio 
motu, de mettre fin à celles qui ont été lancées (en cas de violations 
graves des droits de l’homme) et de conclure des accords pour des 
opérations conjointes avec des pays tiers. Il est donc surprenant que le 
règlement confère la responsabilité du contrôle des frontières aux 
seuls États membres.10 Par ailleurs, le directeur de l’agence Frontex a 
rejeté la requête du Médiateur européen visant à prévoir un 
mécanisme de recours contre l’Agence même par les personnes qui 
subissent des violations de leurs droits. 
Il convient également de rappeler que la décision de 2010/252/EU, 
en cours de révision, prévoit que, s’il n’est pas possible de débarquer 
les personnes secourues en mer dans le pays tiers d’où elles sont 
parties, la responsabilité pour l’accueil appartient à l’État membre de 
l’UE dans les eaux duquel le sauvetage a eu lieu.11 Cela suggère que, 
l’impossibilité d’amener les migrants secourus dans des pays comme 
la Libye ou l’Égypte étant reconnue, le débarquement engagera les 
États membres qui se trouvent aux frontières méridionales de 
l’Europe, qui seront également chargés d’examiner les demandes asile 
et de l’accueil matériel des personnes secourues en mer. 
                                                 
10 Cf. A. Liguori - N. Ricciuti, ‘Frontex ed il rispetto dei diritti umani nelle 
operazioni congiunte alle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea’, in Diritti umani e 
diritto internazionale (2012), pp. 539-567. 
11 Décision du Conseil du 26 avril 2010 visant à compléter le code frontières 
Schengen en ce qui concerne la surveillance des frontières extérieures maritimes 
dans le cadre de la coopération opérationnelle coordonnée par l’Agence européenne 
pour la gestion de la coopération opérationnelle aux frontières extérieures des États 
membres de l’Union européenne pour la gestion de la coopération opérationnelle 
aux frontières extérieures des États membres de l’Union européenne, ligne no. 2.1. 
Cf. A. Del Guercio, ‘Controllo delle frontiere marittime nel rispetto dei diritti 
umani: prime osservazioni sulla decisione che integra il Codice delle frontiere 
Schengen’, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale (2011), pp. 193 e ss. 
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Pas de surprise donc que dans certains commentaires, en 
provenance des pays de l’Europe du Nord, l’attitude des « six » soit 
perçue comme choquante.12 
La solidarité entre les États membres de l’UE en matière d’asile 
reste limitée, avec les États-Unis qui réinstallent plus de réfugiés en 
provenance de Malte que tous les États européens réunis. 
Il est bien connu que le règlement n. 562 de 2006 (dit « code des 
frontières Schengen »), adopté en vue de réglementer les contrôles aux 
frontières extérieures des États membres de l’Union Européenne, a 
supprimé les contrôles de frontière « intérieures ». Dans un arrêt 
récent, toutefois, la Cour de Luxembourg considère légitimes les 
contrôles dans une zone géographique de 20 kilomètres à partir de la 
frontière interne visant à vérifier si les personnes appréhendées pour 
l’identification répondent aux exigences de la résidence légale 
applicable dans l’État membre concerné, pourvu que ces contrôles 
soient basés sur l’information et l’expérience de données dans le 
domaine de la résidence des personnes dans les lieux de contrôles, et 
si son exercice est soumis à certaines limitations, en particulier, leur 
intensité et leur fréquence.13 Il semble donc possible de déduire que 
ces mesures de contrôle peuvent intervenir même dans une zone plutôt 
étendue géographiquement, à condition qu’il ne s’agisse pas de 
contrôles systématiques. 
L’art. 3 du règlement prévoit que toute personne franchissant les 
frontières extérieures d’un État membre doit être soumise aux 
contrôles prévus par le même code. Ces contrôles visent à empêcher le 
franchissement non autorisé de la frontière et à lutter contre la 
criminalité transfrontalière (article 12.1). Si pour les citoyens de l’UE 
une vérification minimale est prévue, quand il s’agit, au contraire, de 
ressortissants de pays tiers (ci-après, PT), le test doit être analytique 
(article 7) et doit assurer la conformité aux conditions prévues à l’art. 
5. La non-conformité à une condition autorise le rejet du citoyen d’un 
PT par le garde-frontière (art. 13). Il convient de souligner, toutefois, 
que le « code Schengen » soumet le rejet à un certain nombre de 
garanties et de procédures afin de soustraire cette mesure à l’arbitraire 
des gardes-frontières. Le champ d’application de ces garanties est 
                                                 
12 Voir l’article de S. Peers, ‘EU Rules on Maritime Rescue: Member States 
Quibble while Migrants Drown’, 22/10/2013, in http://www.statewatch.org/ana 
lyses/no-243-eu-search-and-rescue.pdf (accès 9/9/2016). 
13 Arrêt de la Cour (deuxième chambre) C-278/12 du 19 juillet 2012, Atiqullah 
Adil contre Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel. 
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toutefois partiellement réduit par la clarification ultérieure selon 
laquelle l’appel « n’a pas d’effet suspensif sur le refoulement ». À 
notre avis, l’effet suspensif de l’appel devrait être prévu au moins dans 
les cas où une personne est menacée de risques de dommages 
irréversibles dans le pays de destination ou de transit, conformément 
aux dispositions de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme relative à l’art. 3 de la CEDH.14  
En revenant à l’examen des garanties prévues à l’art. 13 du « code 
Schengen », il est important de souligner l’affirmation de l’al. 1, selon 
laquelle le refoulement des personnes qui ne répondent pas aux 
exigences de l’art. 5 est sans préjudice de l’application des 
dispositions particulières relatives au droit d’asile et à la protection 
internationale. Les contrôles aux frontières ne devraient donc pas 
empêcher l’entrée de ceux d’entre les citoyens de PT qui fuient la 
persécution, le risque de torture et de traitements inhumains et 
dégradants et, plus généralement, de graves dommages. Ce principe 
est repris dans les différentes parties du règlement 562/2006, peut-être 
par souci d’en souligner l’importance : outre le préambule 
(considérant 20), l’art. 3 indique aussi que l’application des 
dispositions contenues dans le Code ne doit pas porter atteinte aux 
droits des réfugiés et des demandeurs de protection internationale, en 
particulier en ce qui concerne le non-refoulement. En outre, le code se 
réfère expressément au respect des droits fondamentaux, en particulier 
ceux qui sont consacrés dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de 
l’Union Européenne (considérant 20), et indique que les contrôles aux 
frontières devraient être effectués dans le plein respect de la dignité 
humaine et du principe de proportionnalité (considérant 7 et art. 6). La 
portée de ces obligations est telle que l’État membre peut décider 
d’autoriser le citoyen d’un PT qui ne répond pas aux exigences de 
l’art. 5, même s’il représente un danger pour l’ordre public, de rester 
dans son territoire pour des « raisons humanitaires » (art. 4, par. 4, 
lettre C). 
S’appuyant donc sur les règles ci-dessus, les contrôles aux 
frontières devraient avoir lieu dans le respect du droit d’asile et du 
principe de non-refoulement, dont le HCR (Haut Commissariat des 
                                                 
14 On renvoie, entre autres, à l’arrêt de la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme, Gebremedhin c. France du 26 avril 2007. Dans la doctrine voir A. Liguori 
- Le garanzie procedurali avverso l’espulsione dei migranti in Europa, Napoli, 
2010. 
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Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés) tire l’obligation de l’État d’admettre, 
au moins temporairement, la personne sur son territoire jusqu’à la 
conclusion des procédures visant à examiner la situation. Ces 
principes ont une portée juridique obligatoire pour les États membres 
de l’UE, en raison d’obligations internationales, figurant à la fois dans 
les traités consolidés (art. 78 TFUE) et dans la Charte des droits 
fondamentaux (articles 18 et 19), qui, après l’entrée en vigueur du 
traité de Lisbonne, a acquis une valeur contraignante. Il semble donc 
ne plus y avoir de doute quant à l’obligation pour les gardes-frontières 
de respecter les droits fondamentaux des personnes qui demandent à 
entrer sur le territoire de l’Union et, surtout, de ne pas refouler ceux 
qui ont exprimé des préoccupations au sujet d’un possible retour dans 
leur pays d’origine ou de transit. 
 
Les exceptions au système Schengen et l’affaire « franco-
italienne » de 2011 
Bien que le règlement 562/2006 du Conseil ait été adopté dans le 
but ultime d’assurer la libre circulation des personnes dans l’espace 
Schengen, dans certaines circonstances, la possibilité de 
réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, qui en règle 
générale ne devrait jamais avoir lieu (article 20 et 21), est autorisée. 
La réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures est régie par 
le chapitre II du « Code Schengen ». Elle est admise dans des 
situations exceptionnelles, et pour des périodes temporaires, en cas de 
menace grave à l’ordre public ou à la sécurité intérieure de l’État 
membre (article 23). La durée de ce régime exceptionnel est de trente 
jours, ou pour la durée prévisible de la menace si celle-ci dépasse 
trente jours, renouvelable pour des périodes d’une trentaine de jours. 
Lorsque la nécessité de rétablir les contrôles aux frontières est liée à 
des événements prévisibles (qui peuvent être des réunions des chefs 
d’État et de gouvernement, des sommets des organisations 
internationales ou des événements sportifs), l’État qui a l’intention de 
se prévaloir de cette possibilité doit suivre les indications de l’art. 24 
du « Code ». En particulier, il est tenu d’informer la Commission et 
les autres États membres et de fournir des orientations en ce qui 
concerne les raisons, la durée et la date de la réintégration des 
contrôles. Le règlement prévoit également la possibilité d’un 
événement non prévisible requérant une action urgente (article 25). 
Qu’il s’agisse d’événements prévisibles ou d’une action urgente, la 
restauration doit être exceptionnelle et doit faire l’objet d’un rapport 
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qui sera présenté en même temps ou peu de temps après, à la 
Commission, au Parlement européen et au Conseil.  
Depuis l’adoption du règlement 562/2006, les États membres ont 
réintroduit les contrôles aux frontières intérieures 22 fois, le plus 
souvent à l’occasion de réunions politiques ou d’événements sportifs, 
dans certains cas pour réagir à des attaques terroristes.  
Un épisode en particulier a néanmoins mis en évidence le caractère 
critiquable du mécanisme établi par le règlement 562/2006. Il est bien 
connu que suite à la « révolution des jasmins », sont arrivés sur les 
côtes italiennes des milliers de citoyens tunisiens. Devant le refus du 
Conseil de l’Union d’activer la directive 2001/55/CE du 20 juillet 
2001 sur la protection temporaire,15 le gouvernement italien a accordé 
à ceux qui avaient franchi la frontière italienne entre le 1er janvier et le 
5 avril 2011 (environ 25 000 personnes), un permis de séjour 
temporaire pour des raisons humanitaires (ex art. 20 de la Loi italienne 
sur l’immigration),16 prévu expressément par le droit de libre 
circulation dans l’espace Schengen « en conformité avec les 
dispositions de la Convention d’application de l’accord de Schengen 
du 14 juin 1995 et du droit communautaire ».17 Le décret ministériel a 
été précédé par une lettre du Ministre des Affaires intérieures à la 
Chambre des députés par laquelle il a communiqué l’octroi de permis 
de séjour temporaire à tous ceux qui ont montré, dans les entretiens 
qui ont été faits, le désir de se rendre dans un pays européen. 
L’octroi d’un permis de séjour qui a permis la libre circulation dans 
l’espace Schengen sans le consentement préalable des autres États 
membres a provoqué l’opposition de nombreux pays européens,18 
notamment une réaction forte de la part de la France. Ce pays a, en 
effet, immédiatement rétabli les contrôles aux frontières dans la ville 
frontalière de Vintimille et le 17 avril 2011 a bloqué les trains 
transportant des Tunisiens (et des représentants d’ONG) qui voulaient 
                                                 
15 Directive 2001/55/CE du Conseil du 20/7/2001 relative à des normes minimales 
pour l’octroi d’une protection temporaire en cas d’afflux massif de personnes 
déplacées et à des mesures tendant à assurer un équilibre entre les efforts consentis par 
les États membres pour accueillir ces personnes et supporter les conséquences de cet 
accueil. Depuis son adoption, la directive n’a jamais été appliquée. 
16 Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (DPCM) du 5/4/2011, 
adopté sur la base de l’art. 20 de la loi. 
17 Art. 2 par. 3 du DPCM. 
18 Allemagne, Belgique, Autriche, Pays Bas.  
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rejoindre les membres de leurs familles résidant sur le territoire 
français.19 
Le conflit a soulevé un certain nombre de questions. Tout d’abord, 
la légalité des mesures adoptées par les deux États à la lumière de la 
législation européenne, en particulier des dispositions de l’acquis de 
Schengen, auxquelles les deux États sont liés à la fois dans la gestion 
du contrôle des frontières extérieures de l’Union et dans le respect du 
principe de la liberté de circulation au sein de leurs territoires. En 
deuxième lieu, ont été mis en question, voire en danger, les principes 
généraux du droit qui sont à la base d’une politique européenne 
commune de l’immigration et du régime de Schengen,20 à savoir les 
principes de la solidarité, du partage équitable des responsabilités et 
d’une coopération sincère.21 
Par rapport à la première question, il nous semble qu’on ne saurait 
douter de la légitimité de la concession, de la part de l’Italie, d’un 
permis de séjour pour raisons humanitaires aux citoyens tunisiens, 
compte tenu des événements survenus dans le pays nord-africain. 
Comme nous l’avons vu, le « Code » prévoit expressément la 
possibilité d’admettre sur son territoire des ressortissants de pays tiers 
qui ne remplissent pas les conditions énoncées à l’art. 5 lorsqu’il y a 
des raisons humanitaires (paragraphe 4, lettre C).22 La seule obligation 
de la part de l’Italie était d’informer la Commission, conformément à 
l’art. 34 du règlement 562/2006, et les autres États membres, en vertu 
de la décision 2006/688/CE relative à l’échange d’informations sur les 
mesures que les États membres adoptent dans les domaines de l’asile 
et de l’immigration.23 L’art. 1 de la directive prévoit expressément que 
les États membres communiquent l’un à l’autre les mesures nationales 
« qui peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur plusieurs États membres 
                                                 
19 France blocks Italian trains carrying migrants, 17/4/2011, http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-europe-13109631 (accès 9/9/2016). 
20 Cf. S. Carrera - E. Guild - M. Merlino - J. Parkin, ‘A Race against Solidarity, 
The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair’, in CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe, 29 April 2011, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/race-against-
solidarity-schengen-regime-and-franco-italian-affair (accès 9/9/2016), p. 2.  
21 Sur ces concepts, voir la Communication de la Commission, COM (2008) 
359 déf., du 17 juin 2008. 
22 Dans le même sens, voir Carrera - Guild - Merlino - Parkin, ‘A Race against 
Solidarity’, p. 8. 
23 Décision 2006/688/CE, dans J.O.U.E:, L 283/40 du 14.10.2006.  
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ou sur l’Union européenne en général ». Il semble que le 
gouvernement italien n’ait pas manqué à cette obligation.24 
Des perplexités peuvent être tout à fait exprimées plutôt sur les 
raisons qui semblent être à l’origine de l’adoption du décret, à savoir 
l’attribution aux citoyens tunisiens de la liberté de quitter le territoire 
italien pour se rendre dans d’autres États membres, déchargeant ainsi 
l’Italie du poids de leur présence sur le territoire. Il s’agit d’une 
violation flagrante du principe de coopération loyale inscrit à l’art. 4 
al.3 du TUE.25 
Il faut bien préciser, au contraire, si la délivrance d’un permis de 
séjour national pour raisons humanitaires (en application de l’art. 5.4 
du « Code ») donne automatiquement le droit à la liberté de 
circulation dans l’espace Schengen. En ce qui concerne cette affaire, 
la confusion a été générée par l’attitude contradictoire de la 
Commission européenne qui, en un premier temps, a approuvé la 
réaction française, tout en invitant, après quelques jours, les pays qui 
font partie de l’accord de Schengen à reconnaître les Aliens travel 
document (Atd) délivrés par l’Italie (avec l’approbation de la 
Commission), ainsi que les permis de séjour, pour permettre la liberté 
de mouvement « pour des raisons humanitaires » aux ressortissants 
tunisiens. Une fois accordé un permis de séjour pour des raisons 
humanitaires en vertu de l’article 5.4 du « Code » et une fois 
communiquée toute l’information à la Commission (ce que l’Italie 
avait fait), les bénéficiaires d’un tel permis étaient donc libres de se 
déplacer dans l’espace Schengen sans avoir à démontrer la conformité 
avec les exigences de l’art. 5.1, contrairement à ce que la France 
soutenait. La vérification des exigences visées dans cette disposition 
avait en fait eu lieu au moment de l’entrée à la frontière extérieure et 
ne pouvait pas être effectuée systématiquement à la frontière 
intérieure, car ce serait contraire au principe de libre circulation dans 
l’espace Schengen. Par conséquent, comme il a été soutenu, le permis 
de séjour délivré par les autorités nationales « has the equivalence of a 
visa for automatic entry anywhere in the Schengen space ».26 Selon 
quelque autre auteur, partisan d’une opinion différente, ces permis 
constituent une mesure nationale, valable sur le territoire italien, sous 
                                                 
24 Sur le point, Carrera - Guild - Merlino - Parkin, ‘A Race against Solidarity’. 
25 Sur ce point, voir aussi B. Nascimbene - A. Di Pascale, ‘Emergenza 
immigrazione Italia fuori dall’Ue?’, 13/4/2011, http://www.affarinternazionali.it 
/articolo.asp?ID=1727 (accès 9/9/2016). 
26 Carrera - Guild - Merlino - Parkin, ‘A Race against Solidarity’, p. 10. 
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réserve des conditions prévues pour la liberté de circulation pour une 
période n’excédant pas trois mois dans le respect des dispositions en 
matière de l’Union Européenne.27 
Concernant la réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières 
intérieures de la France suite à l’émission, par l’Italie, d’un permis de 
séjour pour raisons humanitaires aux citoyens de la Tunisie, on a déjà 
dit que ce n’est pas la première fois que le chapitre II du règlement 
562/2006 trouve application.28 Cependant, l’affaire qui nous occupe 
est particulière en raison de ses implications en termes de principes de 
solidarité et de coopération loyale entre les États membres, et de 
l’impact produit sur la protection des droits des personnes concernées. 
Nous avons des doutes quant à la légitimité et à la proportionnalité des 
mesures prises par le gouvernement français. Il ne semble pas, en 
effet, que le franchissement de la frontière par quelques centaines de 
Tunisiens et leurs compagnons (militants italiens des mouvements 
antiracistes) pouvait être considéré comme une menace à l’ordre 
public et, par conséquent, une base légitime pour l’activation des 
articles 21-23 du « Code ».29 Dans les circonstances décrites, 
l’urgence qui pouvait justifier la restauration immédiate sans 
notification préalable à la Commission et aux autres États membres 
n’est non plus apparente. Les mesures prises par la France étaient 
donc incompatibles avec le principe de proportionnalité, auquel le 
« Code » fait également référence. Même sur le plan des conditions 
économiques requises aux bénéficiaires d’une protection humanitaire 
en vertu de l’art. 5.1 (disponibilité des ressources), la requête apparaît 
légitime, compte tenu du fait que l’Italie avait informé la Commission 
européenne de la décision d’accorder un permis de séjour. La 
restauration des contrôles aux frontières a également violé les droits 
fondamentaux des personnes concernées, et en particulier le droit à la 
liberté de mouvement, qui a été refusé aux citoyens de la Tunisie sur 
                                                 
27 Nascimbene - Di Pascale, ‘Emergenza immigrazione’. 
28 Voir la relation de la Commission au Parlement européen sur l’application du 
règlement (CE) n. 562/2006 (code Schengen), COM(2010) 554 def., 13/10/2010. 
29 Dans ce sens, la Commission européenne aussi. On renvoie aux déclarations 
du Commissaire Malmström du 1er avril 2011, voir http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/ 
player/streaming.cfm?type=ebsvod&sid=177156. Puis-je simplement rappeler que 
nous parlons de pas plus de 28 000 immigrés en totalité, et pas plus de 400 
personnes à la frontière française. 
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la base de leur nationalité, en violation du principe de non-
discrimination consacré à l’art. 6 du « Code ».30 
 
Conclusions 
L’épisode décrit ci-dessus a mis en évidence la nécessité d’adopter 
des mesures pour veiller à ce que l’espace Schengen soit 
effectivement en mesure de faire face aux pressions pouvant résulter 
de facteurs externes ou de faiblesses à la frontière. Sur ce point, un 
certain nombre de projets de révision normative sont actuellement 
soumis à l’attention du Conseil et du Parlement européen. Le partage 
du fardeau, la solidarité, une répartition équitable des responsabilités, 
la coopération sincère et loyale, le respect des droits fondamentaux, 
les paramètres de l’espace Schengen en s’appuyant sur un degré élevé 
de confiance entre les États participants : tous ces principes ont été 
ignorés par les deux États membres. Mais ce que je tiens à souligner, 
c’est surtout l’effet négatif de cette attitude divisée aux yeux de la 
Communauté internationale. Une page triste qui ne doit plus se 
répéter, et qui a peut-être soulevé la question de la nécessité d’une 
Charte des droits des migrants de l’Union Européenne.  
Sur ce genre de problèmes, à notre avis, un effet positif sera assuré 
par l’adhésion de l’Union à la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme. Il n’y a pas de problèmes spécifiques liés à la législation 
communautaire adoptée dans le cadre de l’espace de liberté de justice 
qui résulterait de l’adhésion de l’UE à la CEDH. Au contraire, les 
cours et les tribunaux dans les États membres sont d’ores et déjà 
confrontés à des questions qui ont été peut-être insuffisamment 
abordées lors de la rédaction de certains de ces actes juridiques relatifs 
aux droits de l’homme. La jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg 
peut avoir un rôle utile à jouer tout en rappelant aux institutions de 
l’Union et à ses États membres les valeurs fondamentales sur 
lesquelles l’intégration européenne est fondée. 
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Abstract 
Economic factors seem to have played a major role in the recent Arab awakening 
throughout North Africa. The perception of exclusion, the deteriorating standards of 
living, the high (and rising) unemployment rate were among the many reasons 
behind the 2011 revolutions. 
People demanded, among other things, a new socioeconomic model of economic 
participation and development. But six years after the ‘Arab Spring’, the perception 
of inequality has risen and the social and political unrest sweeping the Arab world 
has further deteriorated the economic and social situation of average citizens. 
Governments have started to take measures to reverse the rising unemployment 
figures and to shift spending in favour of the most disadvantaged sections of society. 
But in turning back to World Bank and IMF endorsed neoliberal policies, 
governments run the risk of further alienating the youth who spearheaded the 
revolution. Moreover, new political actors emerged in the North African transition: 
the Arab Gulf countries – in particular, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE – have 
been playing a leading geopolitical role and there is a great likelihood that they will 
get increasingly involved in North African reconstruction and development. 
In this new scenario, understanding the factors that are driving economic inequality 
is a crucial issue, not just for reasons of pursuing equity and economic inclusion, but 
also for political reasons.  
Focusing mainly on Tunisia and Egypt (two countries where the 2011 revolutions 
share many similarities), this paper aims at exploring how the post-revolution 
political and economic situation is affecting the status of women and young people, 
who played a significant role in the revolutionary phase.  
 
Introduction 
The application of neoliberal economic models throughout the 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region resulted, on the one 
side, in an impressive concentration of wealth and power in the hands 
of a few crony capitalists and public sector components, and on the 
other, in an impoverishment of the middle classes and the lower strata 
of society. Industrial workers, peasants, people relying on the informal 
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labour market (especially women, young people, and city dwellers) 
became more and more marginalised and increasingly disenchanted 
with the so-called macroeconomic success of the region. Even though 
the roots of popular discontent lie deeper than economic factors and 
social inequality, the Arab revolutions were in part entwined with the 
increasing feeling of dissatisfaction with a non-inclusive development 
model.1  
Following their independence, many countries in the region 
adopted economic policies, which saw the state as an instrument of 
social transformation, political mobilization and economic 
distribution. Up until the late 1980s many countries were able to 
ensure employment, social stability, and a moderate incidence of 
poverty and income inequality, thanks to the massive presence of 
state-owned enterprises, public investments in infrastructure, health 
care and education. Rising oil prices, intra-regional flows of capital 
and labour, and workers’ remittances were also factors, which 
contributed to social and economic stability.  
The introduction of neoliberal policies across the region, beginning 
in the 1990s, affected people negatively, giving rise to different forms 
of inequalities, and widening the disparities among socioeconomic 
groups and urban and rural areas. Inequality of opportunities and 
people’s disenchantment with the macroeconomic growth rate became 
a serious concern in the region and therefore constituted a partial 
precursor to the Arab revolutions.2 
The massive demonstrations, which characterized the Arab 
awakening, were also driven by these economic failures and by the 
growing perceptions of widening inter-personal and regional welfare 
disparities. People asked for a new developmental paradigm, but in the 
aftermath of the revolutions the governments were not able to 
undertake substantial reforms to stimulate a more inclusive growth 
capable of generating more jobs.3 Moreover, the widespread political 
                                                            
1 R. Roccu, The Political Economy of the Egyptian Revolution: Mubarak, 
Economic Reforms and Failed Hegemony, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire (UK), 2013, p. 92. 
2 N. Belhaj Hassine, Economic Inequality in the Arab Region, World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper 6911, June 2014, http://documents.worldbank.org/ 
curated/en/341911468275939996/pdf/WPS6911.pdf p.2. 
3 B. Momani, ‘Arab Gulf Investment into Non-Inclusive Urban Development in 
the Middle East: A partial Precursor to the Arab Spring’ , in Mohammed M. Aman - 
Mary Jo Aman (eds.), Middle East Conflicts and Reform, Westphalia Press, 
Washington DC, 2014, pp. 119-130. 
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and social unrest the Arab world is currently experiencing has further 
deteriorated the economic and social situation, thus exacerbating the 
perceptions of declining welfare and rising inequality, which led to the 
2011 uprisings in the region. Understanding the factors and the extent 
of economic inequality in North Africa is crucial for economic and 
political reasons and for helping draw popular support for the current 
transitional period. 
The phase of transition is following very different trajectories in the 
North African countries, which experienced the revolutions. Libya, 
plunged into civil war, is in fact divided into two, while Egypt and 
Tunisia are undergoing a difficult political transition, whose final 
outcome is still uncertain. In Tunisia the fall of the Ben Ali’s regime 
opened up spaces for the participation and mobilization of civil 
society. Some of the outcomes of the 2011 revolutions, such as 
freedom of expression and a quest for democracy, seem to be an 
untouchable achievement in spite of serious political difficulties and 
the economic crisis.4 
The ousting of Mubarak in February 2011 was a momentous 
victory for the Egyptian people, but the immediate aftermath has 
clearly shown the serious difficulties Egypt’s revolutionary process 
had to face, including the incapacity of the energy of the masses to 
consolidate into a concrete political movement. The Sisi regime 
clearly demonstrates how the counter-revolution has used all means to 
derail the revolutionary process and to protect the interest of the main 
elements of the old regime which are still well entrenched.5  
In Morocco the politics of compromise, initiated and controlled by 
King Mohammed V to neutralize protests in the wake of revolutions 
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, have allowed a smoother transition and a 
slow political reform process with positive and negative fluctuations. 
The past few years in North Africa have witnessed a gradual move 
toward resistance and the rupture of the pact of coercion and consent. 
                                                            
4 F. Merone, ‘Enduring Class Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity beyond 
Political Islam’, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42/1 (2015), pp. 74-
87. The special issue of the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies has been 
republished by Routledge: Paola Rivetti - Rosita Di Peri (eds.), Continuity and 
Change before and after the Arab Uprisings: Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, London, 
2015. 
5 G. Achcar, Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Uprising, Saqi Books, 
London, 2016, in particular chap. 2; M. Abdelrahman, ‘A Hierarchy of Struggles? 
The ‘Economic’ and the ‘Political’ in Egypt’s Revolution’, in Review of African 
Political Economy, 39/134 (2012), pp. 614-628. 
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People have experienced dramatic changes but also faced various 
frustrations as their political expectations and aspirations have at times 
not been met immediately or in a satisfactory fashion.  
This article aims at contributing to the understanding of a crucial 
point in the North African transition, namely how people, and in 
particular young people and women who embodied the spirit of the 
revolution, are reacting (or will react) to the changing scenario and to 
the challenges of economic and political transformation/restoration. 
 
The Economic Situation in Transition: Tunisia and Egypt 
Many difficulties that are currently being confronted by North 
African countries have an international dimension and are not unique 
to the region. The global economic slowdown of international trade 
and financial flows as well as the terror attacks and the influx of 
refugees from war-torn neighboring countries are at the root of the 
severe strains they are experiencing. Nonetheless, the aftermath of the 
2011 revolution has exacerbated the region’s structural problems: 
sluggish economic growth, declining opportunities, growing socio-
economic vulnerability. Inequality remains the region’s major 
challenge with almost 56% of the young population having no option 
but to enter the informal sectors of the economy. 
In the region, the average growth rate in gross domestic product 
(GDP) in real terms was estimated to be 3.0% in 2013, compared to 
7.7% in 2012. The economic situation in the fourth quarter of 2015 
remains grim and, according to the World Bank data, the average 
growth is estimated to be around 3% in 2016. The Real GDP is 
forecast to grow to close to 4% in 2017 and 2018, but this is still too 
low to ensure even a very gradual and uneven economic recovery in 
the region. Continuing at sluggish growth rate will affect the overall 
unemployment rate, now standing at 12%, and household earnings in 
the region.6  
Since 2011, North Africa has experienced a fluctuation in its 
growth rate as result of unstable Libyan economic performance. 
Overall, the growth of Arab economies is decelerating as energy 
prices and associated energy export revenues continue to decrease. A 
variety of reasons, including political instability, social unrest, civil 
war, armed conflict and a general sentiment of uncertainty, are still 
                                                            
6 See the WB website: http://data.worldbank.org/region/middle-east-and-north-
africa. 
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dampening the economic prospects of the region. Low levels of 
foreign direct investment and the crisis of the tourism sector place the 
Egyptian and Tunisian economies in particular in a spiral of slow 
growth rate. The share of total world FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investments) inflows towards Egypt and Tunisia was already 
declining before 2010, and the trend was further exacerbated by the 
2011 uprisings. 
In Tunisia the FDI inflows have almost constantly been 
outperformed by remittances from permanent migrants in European 
countries since the second half of the 2000s, thus proving the 
country’s failure in implementing neo-liberal and structural reforms 
and its marginalisation from the global political economy. The extent 
to which Tunisia has been progressively marginalised from the global 
political economy is further revealed by the share of extra-regional 
brain drain which has always been above 80% in the first decade of 
the 2000s.7 
Egypt also appears to be increasingly marginalised from the global 
political economy despite a policy of liberalisation and privatisation 
which began as early as in 1974 with Sadat’s policy of ‘opening the 
door’ (infitāḥ) to private investment. In Egypt, the declining trend in 
the percentage of total FDI stock was very marked in the last three 
decades, while the most stable sources of GDP continued to be the 
remittances coming first of all from the USA and increasingly also 
from Europe. The permanent extra-regional migration of specialized 
and highly skilled migrants is on the rise in both Tunisia and Egypt, 
proving that the growing marginalisation of the countries from the 
global economy constitutes a vicious circle, which the current unstable 
transition phase could even make worse.8 
The inflow of external bilateral and multilateral financial support 
became even more crucial for these countries in order to alleviate 
foreign exchange constraints and inflationary pressures and to 
establish a renewed policy platform for sustainable economic and 
social development.9 
                                                            
7 L. S. Talani, The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire (UK), 2014, pp. 123, 156, 162-173. 
8 Talani, The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy, pp. 184, 200-201. 
9 ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia), Survey of 
Economic and Social Developments in The Arab Region, 2013-2014, 2014, pp. 3-15, 
https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/uploads/summary-survey-
economic-social-arab-region-2013-2014-english.pdf. 
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An increased number of financial agreements have been signed 
with foreign actors, including World Bank, IMF, EU and GCC 
countries, to support the recovery of North African economies. 
Nevertheless, weak industrial development and high unemployment 
remain structural risk factors for the region. Employment creation 
continues to be the most important item on the policy agenda of the 
region. Unemployment rates remain high: in 2013, Egypt stood at 
13.4%, Morocco at 10% and Tunisia at 15.3%.10  
The unemployment situation appears critical in Egypt due to 
political and economic uncertainties, the reduction in income from 
tourism and in the flow of FDI, as several investors have either 
postponed their projects or withdrawn their capital altogether, 
resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs. Inefficient institutions and 
high political risk adversely affected the FDI flow towards Egypt 
which decreased from 8999M$ in 2005-2007 (pre-crisis) to 4256M$ 
in 2013 and 4612M$ in 2014 and finally stood at 6885M$ in 2015.11 
This phenomenon has been exacerbated by the intervention of rating 
agencies that have, since 2011, lowered the rating of the country, thus 
making access to financing for projects and enterprises more 
expensive.12 
Poverty is widespread in rural areas. Rural Upper Egypt recorded 
the highest rates of poverty affecting 51.5% of the population (twice 
the national average), while the Greater Cairo region has the largest 
number of poor and food-insecure people (about 3.5 million people). 
Monetary poverty affects 21.6% of the population and it is a major 
constraint for access to food given that households spend about 40% 
of their monthly income on food.13 
                                                            
10 Ib., p. 9; AlexBank Research, Egypt Macroeconomic Update, p. 6, 
https://www.alexbank.com/Cms_Data/Contents/AlexBank/Media/Publication/Egypt
-Country-Report-2014.pdf. 
11 Data from the World Investment Report (WIR) of UNCTAD, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-
Sheets.aspx. 
12 UNECA (United Nation Economic Commission for Africa), The Economic 
Situation in Egypt in the Context of Political Instability and a Risky Transition, 
August 2013, p. 6, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/note-on-
egypten.pdf. 
13 Ib., p. 6. 
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In Tunisia Government revenues as a percentage of GDP declined 
by 26% in 2015 compared to 2014, while the debt stood at 33%.14 Due 
to political instability, tourism dwindled by 50% and FDI declined 
from 1902M$ in 2005-2007 to 1063M$ in 2014 and 1002M$ in 2015, 
with more than 80 foreign companies leaving Tunisia.15  
The number of unemployed people has been growing in the last 
few years due to the return of Tunisian migrant workers fleeing the 
conflict in Libya, and the increased number of unemployed university 
graduates, who make up around 70.000 to 120.000 persons entering 
the workforce each year.16 
In order to face the difficult economic situation, Egypt turned again 
to the FMI, in addition to resorting to donations and loans from Saudi-
Arabia, Qatar and the Arab Monetary Fund. Negotiations with the 
IMF have been crucial for the Egyptian authorities as they have 
facilitated further aid from the World Bank and other international 
financial institutions and have contributed to the restoration of 
economic operators’ confidence. Within this context, the government 
has intended to reduce the deficit by lowering expenditure, mainly by 
reducing energy grants, which currently represent approximately a 
fifth of the total expenditure. The government is also working on 
increasing income through a series of fiscal reforms, including the 
implementation of older projects to move from a general tax on sales 
to the establishment of a true value added tax. These reforms, which 
were announced several times over the last budgetary years, have not 
yet been fully implemented because of the lack of consensus and the 
risk that they could adversely affect social stability.17 
The Islamist parties, both in Tunisia and in Egypt, did not introduce 
significant changes in the national economic policies. Al-Nahda 
leaders talked of a hybrid ‘social economy’ of free market capitalism 
and socialism without clarifying all the details.18 They tried to 
combine initiatives to create a friendly climate for investments and to 
foster public-private entrepreneurship with slogans for social justice, 
                                                            
14 T. Brésillon, « Alliance conservatrice à l’ombre de la menace djihadiste », in 
Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2016, pp. 6-7. On line edition: 
https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2016/01/BRESILLON/5445. 
15 Data from the World Investment Report (WIR) of UNCTAD. 
16 S. L. Alianak, The Transition towards Revolution and Reform. The Arab 
Spring Realised?, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2014, pp. 52-54. 
17 UNECA, The Economic Situation in Egypt, p. 3. 
18 A. Etzioni, ‘Socioeconomic Rights: A Dialogue with Islam’, in Mohammed 
M. Aman - Mary Jo Aman (eds.), Middle East Conflicts and Reform, p. 191. 
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equitable growth and a sound governance system. Al-Nahda’s guiding 
party document, the Basic Law, is strongly influenced by the general 
principle of Islamic economic thinking, but it is not revolutionary. It 
places labour at the origin of earning and as basis of economic revival; 
it also advocates social justice and the abolition of disparities 
stemming from corruption, wasteful consumption, monopoly, 
hoarding and other illegitimate practices. According to the ambitious 
electoral platform, which covers the 2012-2016 period, the party 
committed to achieving a 7% annual growth in GDP combined with a 
decline in the unemployment rate from 14% in 2010 to around 8% by 
2016, thus securing Tunisian leadership in the region. But Al-Nahda’s 
economic program suffers from two major shortcomings: it does not 
clearly specify the state’s involvement into economics, and does not 
identify the sources of revenue to finance its ambitious economic 
goals.19 
The short lived Morsi government in Egypt was also unable to 
formulate a coherent economic program which could meet the 
country’s growing economic problems, particularly unemployment 
and the lack of opportunities for young people. Changes have been 
mainly cosmetic since the time of Mubarak: economic and foreign 
policies, authoritarian methods, and demagogic consensus co-optation 
strategies have remained virtually unchanged.20  
The mismanagement of power that Morsi displayed during his year 
in power clearly demonstrated as the idea that the Muslim Brothers 
(MB) were an effective counter-hegemony movement was completely 
false. On the one hand, they attempted to come to terms with the army 
and the security forces, and on the other hand, they managed to 
occupy all the top policy making positions, suggesting that they aimed 
at achieving integration within the extant regime, rather than pursuing 
its systematic transformation. The inability to provide at least some 
measures, which could meet popular demands, together with the 
generalised economic crisis, paved the way to their ousting.21  
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The MB was not able to develop economic projects that would go 
beyond the economic-corporate moment, despite its roots in the 
wealthy community of ‘pious’ entrepreneurs (as for example Kairat El 
Shater, a leading member of the MB and a successful businessman), 
and their presence among small- and middle-sized entrepreneurs as 
well as within the working classes.  
The ‘Turkish Model’, as an example of reconciling a secular state, 
Islam and vibrant economic liberalism, attracted the attention of the 
businessmen’s circles linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and 
the al-Nahda party in Tunisia. As is well known, the ‘Turkish Model’ 
formed the basis of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s 
ascendancy and for some time it was hailed across the world as the 
main reason for the economic and political development which 
Turkey underwent over the last two decades.22 But in fact the ‘Turkish 
model’ not only showed its structural weakness in its home country 
but proved not to be compatible with the political and economic 
situation of the Arab world. As Gilbert Achcar argues, both the 
Egyptian Brotherhood and Tunisian al-Nahda party have very little in 
common with the AKP. The MB tried to emulate the Turkish 
experience by constructing an association of businessmen, EBDA 
(Egyptian Business Development Association) on the model of the 
Turkish MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association) whose successful economic performance supported the 
AKP’s political ascendancy. But the Egyptian attempt was short lived, 
frustrating the Muslim businessmen’s alleged intentions to ‘inject new 
blood into the country’s ossified business culture by mixing ethics and 
values in economics, along with social and political reforms’, as 
Osama Farid, co-founder and head of international relations at EBDA, 
declared in an interview published in Financial Times on November 
8th 2012.23 Nonetheless, it remains unclear if EBDA really represented 
an expression of pluralism and a novelty in Egypt’s post-revolutionary 
economic landscape or if it simply constituted a new channel for the 
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cronyism that characterized the relationships between the business 
elite and Mubarak’s regime. 
Moreover, as Achcar states, Turkey represents an ‘emergent’ 
country with a strong export-oriented neoliberal economy, while in 
Tunisia and Egypt industrialization and neoliberal economic reforms 
adapted to a neo-patrimonial dictatorship highly dominated by crony 
capitalism and nepotism.24 
From the perspectives of a political economist, what is most 
striking in the current situation in Tunisia and Egypt is the staggering 
continuity with respect to the economic policies pursued by the 
previous regimes. The only arguable transformation with respect to 
the functioning of the national economy is to be found in the shifting 
networks of support and patronage in the region, with Qatar strongly 
supporting Morsi, and currently Saudi Arabia and Kuwait doing the 
same with the Sisi regime.25  
The Revolution had initially raised Tunisian people’s expectations, 
but they were soon confronted with harsh realities.26 The expectations 
of the unemployed youth, who were impatient for results and who 
wanted quick economic relief, were frustrated. The government 
started to take measures to reverse the rise in unemployment figures 
and to shift spending to the impoverished regions of the interior of the 
country. But it faced a dilemma. Should it accept the IFM-endorsed 
policies and cut fuel and food subsidies and resume privatization, 
which would run the risk of alienating further the youth who 
spearheaded the revolution, or not? People’s frustration and the rise of 
corruption (according to a survey by the Transparency International, 
the level of the corruption in the country rose over the course of the 
two years following the 2011 uprisings) could undermine the efforts 
of the Government to restore stability.27 Political tensions are 
currently delaying the implementation of policies necessary to 
stimulate the economy and are undermining government efforts to 
root out corruption and improve the economic situation in the internal 
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regions which were neglected under the former regime. Cronyism, 
blackmail and nepotism are among the main problems the Tunisian 
government is still facing. They can only be tackled successfully 
through new transparency mechanisms for business and public 
tenders, within a climate of national reconciliation.28 
In Egypt, the military restoration (or counter revolution?) re-
established the Mubarak-era hierarchies of emphasising stability and 
prioritising security. In so doing, the Sisi regime preserved those 
elements of the authoritarian state – the plutocrats, the security and the 
military – that were necessary to recreate Egypt’s status quo from the 
full brunt of revolutionary unrest.29  
Sonia Alianak’s study of four cases (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, 
Jordan) proves that at the origins of the 2011 Arab revolution there lay 
a hierarchical dissonance in values between the priorities of the rulers 
who aimed towards stability, and of the ruled who yearned for 
economic justice and democracy. This conflict was perceived less in 
Morocco and Jordan where the kings could resort to religion as a 
legitimation strategy and as a diverting method of co-optation, 
repression and illiberal democracy. In the more secular republics of 
Tunisia and Egypt, without the umbrella of religious legitimacy, the 
authoritarian regimes’ tactics were hence perceived as insincere, 
opportunistic and unjust.30  
The ultimate aim, in all four countries, seems to have been a return 
to the prioritising of an elusive political stability in the quest for 
economic relief. But appealing again to the IFM in this search for 
economic relief, the North African countries were only told to cut 
subsidies to fuel and food, which did not match well with the 
economic justice their people demanded. The failing neoliberal 
economies and the emergence of a financing gap might contribute to 
economic risks associated with political instability and social unrest, 
which are often part of socio political transition processes. Designing 
a new financing strategy in the North African context seems to be 
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crucial to resolving the financing gap problems and to achieving 
sustainable socioeconomic development in the post-transition era.31 
 
The Support of the Gulf Countries versus that of the International 
Finance Institutions? 
International actors are playing a strongly supportive role in 
elaborating policies that should promote investment and improve the 
business climate in the North African region. 
In particular, the geopolitical weight of the Arab Gulf countries’ 
involvement has increased in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, with 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UEA getting increasingly involved in the 
region’s reconstruction and development. However, in spite of the 
billions of dollars in loans, grants and investments the oil rich Gulf 
countries poured (or sometimes just announced they would pour) into 
the struggling North African transition, they have initiated no 
‘Marshall Plan’ in the Middle East as called for by a number of Arab 
policymakers at the 2011 World Economic Forum meeting.32 
During the last five years the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Kuwait) provided a strong hand in helping the Egyptian economy with 
more than 12 billion US$ in form of cash grants, oil products and 
interest free loans promised to the Egyptian transitional government. 
This financing and stimulus package from the Gulf countries was 
intended to sustain investors’ confidence in Egyptian markets in order 
to push private investment up to 5% during the financial years of 
2013/14 and 2014/15.33 It has also helped to reduce the impact of the 
cut in US military grants and the return of 3mUS$ in Qatari funds. 
Recently Saudi Arabia agreed to provide Egypt with more than 3bn 
US$ in loans and grants plus a 1.5bn US$ loan to develop the Sinai 
Peninsula and 1.2bn US$ to finance Egypt’s oil purchases. The 
massive pledge of aid from the GCC states is a significant example of 
the rich Arab oil countries seeking to extend their influence, via 
financial munificence, in post-revolutionary or politically vulnerable 
states.34  
                                                            
31 ESCWA, Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the Arab Region, 
2013-2014, p. 10. 
32 Momani, ‘Arab Gulf Investment into Non-Inclusive Urban Development in the 
Middle East’, p. 130. 
33 AlexBank Research, Egypt Macroeconomic Update, pp. 4-5.  
34 The Economist Intelligence Unit (London UK), Country Forecast, Middle 
East and Africa. Regional Overview, December 2013 (www.eiu.com), pp. 27-28; A. 
 Economic Opportunities and Social Challenges in the North African Transition 61 
The enthusiastic support Saudi Arabia offered Sisi allowed Egypt 
to receive substantial economic assistance and, in the meantime, 
diminished the role of Qatar, the small Gulf country which had 
proactively backed the Morsi government, in the region.35 For Saudi 
rulers fostering Egyptian recovery and therefore sustaining the 
stability of the most populous Arab country in the region is part of 
their project of supporting conservative Islam throughout the world. 
Moreover, the Egyptian community constitutes the largest expatriate 
group, numbering about 1.6million, in Saudi Arabia, and the 
remittances sent home by this community are a significant source of 
revenue for the Egyptian economy.36 
Qatar is still committed to supporting Tunisia, though its aid seems 
to be significantly smaller than what was promised when al-Nahda 
rose to power.37  
Financial support from some Gulf States, mainly without clear 
constraints on funding, does not mean an absence of dependency on 
donor countries. Nonetheless this support has helped transition 
authorities not to feel compelled to hastily reach a deal with the 
International Financial Institutions (IFI), thus accepting the social 
risks involved in their conditions. The amount of IFI support to Egypt 
is smaller than that provided by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, 
but Egypt is expected to receive in December 2016 the first 1bn US$ 
tranche of a 3bn US$ loan from the World Bank.38 
Moreover, IMF funding is a necessary condition for obtaining 
further funds from a variety of IFI, including the African 
Development Bank and the European Union, as it plays a central role 
in the implementation of the partnership, and no significant 
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disbursement is carried out without an agreement with the IMF on 
structural reforms.39  
Tunisia, which has made important strides in the political and 
constitutional realms, necessitates financial support and yet this 
assistance has been lacking or is not sufficient. The international 
community must do more to help Tunisia, as the model it has come to 
represent in the region cannot be allowed to fail. The IMF agreed a 
US$1.74bn financing program with Tunisia in June 2013, which is 
meant to encourage faster progress in the country’s structural reform 
program including reform of food and fuel subsidies.40 Already in 
June 2011, the World Bank agreed to provide two US$500million 
Development Policy Loans (DPL) as part of a US$1.3billion package 
offered in conjunction with the African Development Bank, the 
African Development Fund and the European Union. The loan is 
aimed at the achievement of three main goals: sustainable growth and 
job creation, social and economic inclusion, strengthening 
governance: voice, transparency and accountability.41 
The general character of the platforms proposed by International 
Financial Institutions and the goals that they aim to achieve do not 
constitute significant changes compared to the economic policies they 
fostered in the region before the revolutions, even though they profess 
a new course in line with the socio-economic goals of the uprisings, 
namely enhancing sustainable inclusive growth while ensuring 
adherence to good governance and the democratic process. It is 
difficult to judge the efficacy of their economic assistance before it 
has been practically tested. What is clear is that the challenges 
confronting the North African countries require radical changes in the 
existing order, and also farsighted planning. They all suffer from large 
budget deficits and deteriorating economic conditions, and will 
require financial assistance to meet their political and socio-economic 
objectives. In this context, the deepening engagement of International 
Financial Institutions with North Africa will likely constitute a key 
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axis to allow an economic growth with rapid recovery of public 
finances and balance of payments.42 
According to the ESCWA (UN Economic and Social Commission 
for Western Asia), the difficulty of the transition and lack of national 
consensus in the MENA region will have a negative impact on the 
security situation and on economic activity, thus worsening the 
economic and social crisis. An ideal scenario would be the end of 
violence with strong consensus among the different actors. This 
consensus would be the main leverage to implement sound economic 
reforms.43  
 
Women and Young People in Transition: Resilience and Calling 
for Change 
Starting from the 1950s and the 1960s the MENA region made 
important strides in the realm of women’s education, access to the 
labour market and political and social participation. Although these 
positive trends slowed down by the end of the 1980s, socio-economic 
indicators concerning women’s empowerment continued to improve, 
with the rate of female schooling rising very fast. In the 2000s the 
MENA region succeeded in bringing up to 0.96 the ratio of girls to 
boys in primary and secondary education, and in significantly 
increasing the ratio of young women attending universities. Maternal 
mortality as well as fertility rate decreased dramatically in the last 
decades, thus meeting the objectives set by the UN Millennium Goals 
with regard to improving maternal health and reducing child 
mortality.44  
However, these advancements have not been translated into a more 
effective economic and political inclusion for women. In particular, 
the Middle East and North Africa region shows an increase in 
women’s unemployment between 2012 and 2014, and a persistent 
gender gap with rates of young women’s participation in the labour 
market much lower than those of young men. Women, particularly 
young women, are more exposed than their male counterpart to 
unemployment, underemployment or informal employment.  
Gender disparities are key to understanding the situation of youth 
in the North African labour market as well. Young people represent a 
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large share, almost 1/5, of the Arab region’s total population. They 
constitute a significant group, not only in terms of its size, but also 
because the progress in education in recent years has turned this 
generation into the best-educated in the history of the region. 
Nonetheless, Arab countries have made insufficient progress in 
empowering their young people and in improving their agency and 
participation in political and governance processes. The region 
continues to be plagued by a very high youth unemployment rate, 
which currently stands at 28.2% in the Middle East and 30.5% in 
North Africa.45 
One main problem in the region is the state’s incapacity to ensure a 
healthy dynamic labour market, which is able to create more 
productive jobs and to progressively reduce the number of less 
productive ones. Public sector jobs still remain the most sought-after 
as they are much better compensated than equivalent private sector 
positions, particularly for the highly educated. However, as the 
creation of new positions in the public sector has decreased and has 
not been able to keep pace with the growing number of young people 
looking for qualified jobs, a new pattern has occurred in the labour 
market, the so called ‘wait unemployment’, namely young people who 
remain unemployed in the hope of eventually finding a job in the 
public sector.  
According to Chaimaa Yassine, in Egypt both the formal public 
and private sectors suffer from extremely rigid environments in which 
workers, after securing their job, will hardly ever leave or move to 
other jobs. Job-to-job transition occurs more within or towards the 
informal sector, which offers less protection than the formal one and is 
targeted at specific groups of workers, such as young people and 
women, who are already among the most vulnerable. Unemployment 
in Egypt tends to be dominated by structural patters, rather than 
cyclical or frictional ones. However, it has worsened following the 
2008 financial crisis and the January 25th 2011 revolution.46 
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The Arab uprisings have highlighted the precarious and 
marginalized situation of women and young people across the 
region.47 They increasingly voiced their aspirations and their calling 
for change and participation in development, providing new solutions 
and bringing high levels of energy and commitment to the 
improvement of their societies. A key part of this call for change is 
access to greater economic opportunities. To date, on the socio-
economic front, the governments have responded to their call by 
increasing spending on subsidies and public sector wages and 
expenditures. However, addressing the aspirations and needs of these 
countries’ youth will require more comprehensive reforms focusing on 
job creation strategies without further affecting the budget deficit.48 The 
lack of job opportunities and growing frustration are especially 
poignant for the young women of the MENA Region.  
In post-revolutionary Egypt, the economic and political 
empowerment of women is uncertain and their status may be 
deteriorating. Gender based violence (GBV), including sexual 
harassment in public spaces or the rape of women and girls, has 
increased due to the general climate of conflict and insecurity. The 
enforcement of measures to promote gender equity is lagging behind. 
Moreover, first the agenda of the Islamist political forces, and later the 
autocratic and authoritarian shift of Sisi’s regime, challenged 
women’s participation in the democratic process. Despite the 
remarkable increase in women’s education, their participation in the 
labour market remains relatively low. Women remain marginalised in 
economic activities: data from Egypt’s statistical agency show an 
unemployment rate of 24% among women during 2012, more than 
double that of men (9.1%). Data figures have continued to worsen 
since then particularly for young women.49 
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Tunisian women have enjoyed greater socio-political and civil rights 
compared to the neighboring countries since independence in 1956. 
However, their political participation and economic empowerment 
remained controlled by the state. They actively took part in the 
revolution, calling for freedom, equal citizenship, and for a greater role 
in society for women. In the aftermath of revolution their economic 
situation is grim. In Tunisia in 2012, the unemployment rate among 
women reached the 26.9%, compared to a world average of 6.5%; 
moreover, there was a significant increase in the unemployment rate of 
undergraduate women, which stands at 49,4%, compared to 21% 
among their male peers.50 
The North Africa region remains a traditional society which 
generally prioritizes women’s role within the household. The 
patriarchal elements are not unique to the region but are perhaps more 
pronounced there than elsewhere. However, these elements are 
changing: as education spreads and the demographic balance shifts, 
younger and more educated women are less supportive of the 
housewife stereotype. The same applies to women’s participation in 
the political sphere: younger and better-educated women in the North 
Africa region express greater confidence in women’s ability to 
contribute in the public sphere.51 
According to the recent World Bank report Opening Doors: Gender 
Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, the 
North Africa region is experiencing several forms of discrimination 
against women, which are exacerbated by the present political and 
economic situation. First of all, women experience inequality in the 
workplace. The majority of North African countries have laws against 
discrimination in the workplace and legislation mandating equal pay for 
equal work. In practice, however, the enforcement of non-
discrimination laws is difficult. The equal pay provisions are 
undermined by inequalities in non-wage benefits which usually are 
allocated to the husband. Many women cannot benefit from proper 
labour legislation as they are employed in the informal sector – mainly 
domestic or agricultural labour –, which offers less protection than 
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normal employment contracts. This lack of protection leaves them 
vulnerable to exploitation and unfair employment practices. Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia have legislation sanctioning sexual harassment in 
the workplace. They encourage victims of sexual harassment to report 
instances of illegal conduct but, as in many other countries, there are 
significant barriers to the effective enforcement of the law. Legal claims 
against the harasser are difficult to pursue and are rarely an option for 
women who are afraid they would be blamed by their communities.52 
The expansion of the public sector mainly in the 1960s and 1970s 
created many jobs, especially for the well-educated. Women have 
benefited directly from these jobs, which they perceived as socially 
acceptable and compatible with family care and housework. But the 
high level of public sector employment has distorted the labour market 
by attracting the brightest workers at rates of pay that the private 
sector cannot match. Second, generous subsidies and family benefits 
certainly have helped to reduce vulnerability and poverty, but have 
worked also to reinforce a vision of women as homemakers and 
discouraged them from entering the labour market.53 
Finally, a central tenet of the social contract has been heavy state 
investment in education. But, despite the high level of educational 
attainment in the region, there is a disconnection between what 
students learn and what productive jobs require. This problem is more 
pronounced for women. Following gender norms, women are inclined 
to study education, health and welfare, humanities and the arts. These 
educational specializations in turn limit the job opportunities available 
to educated women: predominantly public sector positions in 
education, health, and administration. Unfortunately, given the cuts to 
the public sector, the number of new positions in these fields has been 
decreasing. Women also are less likely than men to acquire job-
relevant skills outside formal education. As a result, women have 
relatively less diversified and fewer marketable skills than men do. 
These limitations restrict women’s ability to adjust their skills to suit 
private sector employers.54 
The school-to-work transition of young people seems today to be a 
long and difficult path. In Upper Egypt, focus group discussions with 
young adults highlighted how they felt that they had not learnt any 
job-relevant skills either in school or in vocational education. 
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Employers in Egypt share similar views. Less than 30% of human 
resource managers agreed that the university graduates whom they 
had hired in the previous year possessed the appropriate professional 
skills.55 In order to face the challenges of the labour market, the 
Egyptian Government developed the Youth Employment National 
Action Plan (2010-15) which includes three priority areas: technical 
education and vocational training, enterprise development, and labour 
market policies and programmes.56 Major gender- and youth-related 
concerns in the Egyptian labour market are represented by young 
women’s very low participation in the labour force and the poor 
quality of jobs held by young men and women. Moreover, Egypt has a 
very low presence of young entrepreneurs who also cannot count on 
institutional financing mechanisms. According to the ILO program 
Work4Youth, only 34.4% of Egyptian youth is able to access a stable 
and/or satisfactory job; another 29.4% of young people remains ‘in 
transition’, meaning that they are unemployed or have been only able 
to obtain a temporary and non-satisfactory job, and the remaining 
36.2% has not yet started the ‘transition’ to work.57 The average time 
Egyptian young people spend in transitional activities before obtaining 
stable or satisfactory employment is very lengthy, almost four years 
(48.5 months), with a quite significant difference between young men 
and women (about 35 and 53 months respectively).58 
Education seems not to have a positive influence on young people’s 
job opportunities. Indeed, the youth unemployment rate increases with 
each additional level of educational attainment; university graduates 
show the highest unemployment rate (34%), compared to an 
unemployment rate of only 2.4% among young people with less than 
primary-level education. However, important gender related differences 
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can be found. For young women, the highest unemployment rate (76%) 
is among those with general secondary-level education, while it is 
46.9% for female university graduates and 56% for young women with 
educational qualifications above the intermediate level. On the other 
side, the unemployment rate of young Egyptian men reaches a 
maximum of 23% among young university graduates.59 
According to the analysis provided by the ILO, the main problems 
in the Egyptian gender and youth-related labour market are 
represented by low quality employment, high level of informal 
employment, depressed wages and very long study-to-work transition 
paths, thus resulting in high rates of unemployment and inactivity. 
There is little consensus in the literature on how to stimulate job 
creation. Approaches span from emphasis on skill specialization and 
division of labour to promoting investment in infrastructure and 
human capital, and enhancing macroeconomic stability and good 
governance. Mainstream policies focus on cooperation between the 
public and private sectors, and between state and civil society 
organizations to improve youth employment outcomes. Whatever 
policies Egypt will implement, it needs to address its youth 
employment issues as soon as possible by creating more and better 
jobs, particularly high-skilled jobs that are necessary to meet the 
demand for workers in this type of occupation.60 
Tunisia shares several commonalities with Egypt. Despite the 
decline in the number of births, the demographic transition is not yet 
completed and the number of young people entering the labour market 
is still above the number of the workers reaching retirement age. This 
makes young people highly vulnerable to the risk of long term 
unemployment or underemployment. Young people’s level of 
education has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, thanks to 
massive public investment in the sector, but the system continues to be 
mainly academy-oriented and doesn’t provide adequate employment 
schemes. Vocational education and training systems are slowly 
emerging but remain mainly linked to the school system rather than 
organized in apprenticeships or other alternative schemes.61  
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According to current Tunisian labour market data, 24% of young 
people (aged 15-29) are unemployed, 32% are employed in the 
informal sector, 13% are in education and 18% are inactive non-
students. Only 8% of young people have a formal job (with a written 
contract) and 5% are freelance workers or employers.62 There are 
significant differences in the labour market data according to 
geographical patters (the depressed inland and southern region versus 
the coastal regions, and rural versus urban areas), as well as according 
to gender indicators. Gender disparities are strong when it comes to 
employment opportunities with 39% of young women aged 15-29 
neither participating in the labour market nor being enrolled in 
education. The considerable difference between young women and 
young men in terms of overall participation in the labour force is 
partially due to social norms dictating that women (especially married 
women) are not expected to work outside the family circle. The 
primary role of women as housewives and caretakers for children and 
elders within the family is due not only to the norms of a conservative 
patriarchal society but also to the difficulties in accessing childcare 
and other social services. The possibilities for married women of 
having a job as employees in both the formal and informal sectors is 
lower than for their male counterparts. The private sector in particular 
seems to be a hostile environment for women. On the one side there 
are elements of discrimination against female applicants on the part of 
employers, and on the other women themselves refrain from engaging 
in long term training and long working hours in the private sector, 
having internalized the prevailing social norms which dictate their 
principal role to lie within the household. The gender gap is 
exacerbated in rural areas where almost half of the young female 
population does not enter the labour market at all. For both women 
and men, being a new entrant increases the probability of 
unemployment (+21 points for women and +17 for men). The level of 
education does not influence women’s access to the labour force but 
women with a tertiary education do not give up hope of finding a job, 
even if they are not actively seeking one. Self-employment is rare 
among young men and almost non-existent among young women. It 
would therefore be appropriate to implement policies which would 
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aim towards steering a greater number of young people into creating 
their own enterprises by providing training in SME management.63 
According to the ILO, a way out of the high unemployment rate 
which has deteriorated the socio-economic stability of most Arab 
countries can be found by rethinking the recruitment system and 
innovating the whole educational system in order to provide young 
people with qualifications and skills necessary to meet the profound 
changes in the labour market. In its reports, the ILO voiced young 
people’s demand to be offered better job opportunities and to be 
allowed to participate in political decisions related to education and 
labour by inviting the Arab countries to put emphasis on an 
innovation-based school and training system and to foster the creation 
of new companies or activities by providing counselling services and 
specific training in business management. 
The Egyptian and Tunisian governments have, in general, not 
remained inactive and have introduced programmes to assist young 
people entering into the labour market. Egypt launched the Youth 
Employment National Action Plan (2010-15) which is, unfortunately, 
still concentrated on low labour intensity sectors, and neoliberal 
economic policies, the major factors of youth exclusion; moreover, no 
information is yet available regarding the results obtained by the 
plan.64 In 2011 Tunisia developed the AMAL programme, aimed at 
people seeking their first job, and who are higher education graduates 
and holders of the ‘Brevet de Technicien Supérieur’ vocational 
qualification. This programme encountered a number of shortcomings 
and therefore the Government established, in substitution of AMAL, 
the National Unemployment Fund (21/21 Fund) aiming to address the 
challenges of unemployment through the creation of the Employment 
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Promotion Programme (Programme d’Encouragement à Emploi) 
targeting in particular the most vulnerable among the unemployed.65  
Self-employment and vocational education policies alone do not 
suffice to address the severe economic crisis and the large social 
inequalities North African countries are currently facing, unless they 
are included in a broader framework of economic reforms, including 
labor policies aiming at reducing the incidence of informal 
employment, and social policies, especially in the area of housing. 
Indeed, housing issues, as well as transportation, are crucial to young 
people. Many, even when married, don’t have access to a first home 
due to lack of resources, and still live with their parents. Thus their 
claim to autonomy is almost impossible.66  
Because the 2011 Arab uprisings have largely been considered as 
‘youth revolutions’ against political, socioeconomic and cultural 
marginalization, ‘youth’ as a category has increasingly attracted the 
interest of scholars and experts who have generated a large number of 
papers, articles and books looking for a comprehensive understanding 
of inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics of youth in the Arab 
world. The majority of these works feature a multidimensional 
approach structured not only on generation, but also on gender, class, 
ethnicity and other social differences that contribute to the creation of 
inequalities among young people themselves.67  
The experience of exclusion and marginalization does not only 
characterize young Arabs, but is instead typical of many young people 
living in Africa and now this phenomenon is emerging among young 
people in developed societies as well, due to the widespread financial 
and economic crisis. The working class and impoverished youth, 
especially members of racial-ethnic minorities, are more and more 
bearing the heaviest burdens of the crisis, and experiencing a delayed 
or blocked transition to adulthood. They are not able to achieve social 
and economic autonomy under the socio-economic and political 
conditions that prevail in most countries. Having no access to a proper 
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job or to any form of economic autonomy, they are forced to renounce 
to (or to indefinitely postpone) what are considered the markers of 
‘adulthood’: being independent, getting married and providing for 
their own families. The term ‘waithood’ has been coined to describe 
this generation, forced by a deep socioeconomic crisis into a long 
process of negotiating personal identity and financial independence 
which could potentially last for years or even for their entire lives. 
‘Waithood’ has become an indefinite status for many young Africans 
and a new form of ‘adulthood’, in which young people have to create 
their model of what it means to be a mature person despite miserable 
prospects for the future. But this ‘waiting generation’ is also an agent 
of change. It is actively asserting itself, fighting against government 
corruption and repression, and opposing economic policies that 
exacerbate poverty, class inequality and uneven development. They 
are working out their own lives in their concrete circumstances and 
using the resources available to them. ‘Waithood’ is not a failed 
transition, it is a new and difficult phase that young people are 
actively and creatively engaging with in order to find solutions for 
their everyday problems.68 
The North African ‘waiting generation’ has been the major player 
in the revolution, but it has been nonetheless progressively 
disenchanted and marginalized by the course of the democratic 
transition which, respectively: prioritized compromise with the former 
regime’s institutions while introducing a few reforms in Tunisia; and 
turned into an authoritarian counterrevolution in Egypt. The collective 
force of young people, women and men, who led the revolution, was 
diluted in the aftermath while different interests and prospects 
emerged, so that they were not able to articulate an alternative 
political discourse that could stand on its own, and face the challenges 
of the democratic transition. The revolutionary discourse, which 
centered on social justice and freedom, better job opportunities and 
demand for participation, was outstripped by the dominant discourses 
adopted by the political forces. These focused instead mainly on 
issues of Islamism versus secularism, modernism versus conservatism, 
national security and war on terror. Young people do not believe in 
the old political models but at the same time they have not yet been 
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able to articulate a new one.69 They thus distanced themselves from 
the formal political parties, or were sidelined by the dominant forces. 
However, they remain nonetheless politically engaged in the 
democratic transition through their own associations and civil society 
initiatives. Like many other young people all around the world who 
have divorced from formal politics, young North Africans are 
convinced that the current system is not serving them, but continue to 
put pressure on the authorities through street protests, sit-ins, activities 
on social networks and independent associations.70 
 
Conclusion: North Africa in Flux 
The North African countries which experienced the 2011 
revolutions are in a phase of political transition, but at very different 
stages from one-another. Morocco and Tunisia mostly succeeded in 
establishing more transparent, more efficient and more participative 
institutions; Tunisia, in particular, still represents an exemplar for 
revolutionary change in the region. Libya is in the throes of an 
unprecedented civil war. In Egypt the spectre of the counter-
revolution has emerged with the current elite using the old regime’s 
consolidated autocratic instruments of repression, violence and 
occasional concessions.  
The region’s future is uncertain, shocked by fragile democratic 
institutions, weak economic momentum, identitarian issues, and the 
insufficient level of maturity and/or democratic commitment on the 
part of some parties or leading politicians.  
International as well as Arab scholars advocate for the restoration 
of a sense of complementarity and interdependence in the social and 
economic spheres in order to successfully overcome the current 
turmoil in the region. They call on internal political actors as well the 
region’s countries to put old grudges and divergent interest aside and 
work together for national and regional reconciliation, arguing that no 
country can be reconstructed after a crisis without a cohesive society.  
According to FEMISE (Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de 
Sciences Économiques), only by introducing significant changes in 
the growth model based on a shared social contract, the region can 
achieve its objectives of macroeconomic growth and institutional 
stability in a sustainable and long-term manner. The Institute strongly 
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calls for policymakers to base growth dynamics on innovation and 
technological progress and to reallocate the production factors in order 
to favour the opening up of the markets. It also suggests a greater 
decentralisation so as to allow a larger participation on the part of the 
population, notably at the local level, combined with a particular care 
to the training of local staff, to their status and their autonomy with 
regard to the central power.71 
But no one model can be easily applied to the post-revolution 
North African countries and there are several patterns deserving of a 
more in-depth analysis. Paradoxically, the governments of countries in 
transition are reluctant to implement economic reforms, as they are 
focused on seeking ways and means to improve the political situation. 
Some obstacles to economic growth in North African countries may 
be common to other emerging economies, and moreover, the situation 
of the North African countries before 2011 was already characterized 
by a relatively slow growth rate due to the negative impact of neo-
liberal reforms and the exploitation by the ruling elites of sectors of 
the economy through privatisation schemes and crony capitalism. 
Authoritarian regimes, declining opportunities and growing socio-
economic vulnerabilities increased the gap between political power 
and ordinary citizens, allowing a number of non-state actors to fill the 
vacuum of the receding state. Among the clearest indications of the 
failures of Arab states there is the highest level of youth 
unemployment in the world with more than 50% of young people 
having no option but to get a job in the informal sectors of the 
economy. 
International donors and IFI support seems to be fundamental to 
overcoming the economic crisis. But the solutions they suggest do not 
differ from the previous neoliberal policies. They still focus on easing 
monetary policy and using the exchange-rate mechanism in order to 
improve competitiveness in the export market; reorienting the macro-
economic policies towards a growth objective; and rethinking the 
subsidies policies, thus leading to a distortion of competition and 
undermining the operation of the internal market.72 The policies 
carried out by international actors, including those of the EU, towards 
North African transitional countries continue to concentrate primarily 
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on free-market approaches to economic growth and to prioritize 
stability over the importance of social justice. These elements of 
continuity between pre- and post-revolution strategic choices are 
worrying: although all international institutions are sympathetic with 
the revolutionary claim to social and economic justice, they continue 
to emphasize policy stances which have historically reinforced 
inequality and supported oppressive regimes bearing no more than 
democratic ‘facades’.73  
A more holistic approach would have been better suited to 
accommodating the combination of political and socio-economic 
demands in the conception of democracy emerging from the Arab 
revolutions.  
The role of the Gulf countries in the North African transition seems 
to be ambiguous. Their interests mainly correspond to those of the 
Western powers and institutions, since Gulf states have been a prime 
beneficiary of the neoliberal opening up of the region over the last two 
decades. Thus, the Gulf countries’ financial support constitutes not 
only an attempt to strengthen their position in the region, but is also 
part of maintaining a status quo in the region’s economies, which 
continue to be fully neoliberal and accommodative towards their 
interests. According to Adam Hanieh, the Gulf states’ dominant 
position in the political economy of the Arab world has been 
facilitated by neoliberal choices. Therefore, the underlying causes of 
the revolts, namely the intensification of an authoritarian 
neoliberalism and the increasing dispossession and exclusion of the 
middle and working classes, are intertwined with the extension of the 
Gulf’s political and economic power across the region. Over the last 
two decades, Gulf-based capital has taken a central position in key 
sectors of the Egyptian economy – notably agribusiness, finance and 
real estate – as a consequence of neoliberal reforms and 
internationalization which have facilitated the integration of Gulf-
based investors within the Egyptian economic structure. This also 
helps to explain the crucial role of the Gulf countries in granting 
financial support to Egypt, which widely surpasses the financial 
assistance offered by the IMF and the World Bank.74 
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The policies sponsored by the International Financial Institution 
and the GCC match perfectly with the corporate interests of Egypt’s 
ruling elite, which has manipulated the political process in order to 
maintain the neo-liberal policies and the political order which 
impoverished millions of Egyptians and created the impetus for 
ousting Mubarak.75 
In North African countries, the aspirations of youth and women, the 
driving forces of the revolutionary process, which have been sidelined 
by the established political forces that have taken control of the 
political space, are still alive and could contribute to positive changes. 
They remain politically engaged in the democratic transition through 
their own associations and civil society initiatives even if they do not 
participate in formal politics. Young people’s and women’s rights in 
the North African transition are negatively affected by social attitudes, 
such as patriarchy and conservatism, and by institutional weakness. 
They cannot be disconnected from other urgent issues, such as 
democratic transition, judicial independence, transitional justice, 
internal security, and economic uncertainty. 
The revolutionary act constituted a political and cultural shock for 
the previously established gender discourse. Women participated 
actively in the revolution, they took to the streets along with their 
male counterparts to express their anger and their quest for democratic 
participation and social justice. They contributed to elaborate new 
strategies of resistance through chants, banners, slogans and graffiti, 
and were able to turn physical violation and sexual harassment into a 
new culture of the body and in a re-positioning of the gender 
discourse. The revolutionary generation went ‘beyond gender without 
abandoning gender’, thus allowing women to exercise agency within a 
broader discourse centred on citizens’ rights and democratic 
mobilization against authoritarian and corrupt regimes.76 The young 
revolutionary generation, made up of women and men alike, feel 
themselves as if caught between a sense of empowerment and vitality 
and one of vulnerability and frustration with respect to its unfulfilled 
expectations, but its conspicuous presence in the public sphere during 
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the revolution and in its aftermath cannot pass unnoticed and its 
energy is, hopefully, still alive. 
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Abstract 
The paper intends to analyse water and food security in the SEMCs and their 
domestic and regional implications. The water-food nexus explains how water 
consumption is strictly linked to the production, consumption and trading system of 
agro-food products. The trade liberalisation process imposed by the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) has fostered a specialisation in highly water-
intensive agricultural products, such as fruit and vegetables. The dependence on basic 
foodstuffs imports related to this production pattern, make SEMCs particularly 
vulnerable to price fluctuation on international markets. Environmental problems are 
likely to increase the uncertainty factors that weigh on the global economy and affect 
especially transition economies, such as those of North Africa and Middle East. The 
vulnerability was evident during the global food crisis of 2008, when a number of 
factors, both economic - reduced supply of cereals due to bad harvests in grain 
exporting countries - and structural - increased demand in the emerging countries, 
European and US incentives for biofuel production - caused a surge in the price of 
basic foodstuffs (wheat, rice and maize) in international markets. The strong 
dependence on food, coupled with the absence of social safety dampers, due to the 
reduction of subsidies for basic foodstuffs, made the increase in the price of bread a 
detonator of the riots that triggered the ‘Arab Springs’. The proposed contribution 
wants also to explore water and food security in its geopolitical dimension at the 
regional scale. Demographic pressure and climatic hazards, in recent years, have 
strongly undermined water and food security in Southern Mediterranean region. The 
authors present some competition scenarios relating to both large international water 
basins and fossil water aquifer shared by various countries. 
 
Introduction 
Au Maghreb l’eau est le lien majeur entre le réchauffement 
progressif de la planète et l’insécurité alimentaire, car il existe une 
corrélation directe entre le niveau des précipitations, la dotation des 
ressources en eau et les rendements agricoles. La dépendance 
alimentaire rend les pays de la région particulièrement exposés à 
l’évolution des prix agricoles, avec des retombées politiques qui ont 
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déjà émergé au cours des nombreuses émeutes du pain des années 80 et 
90 et qui ont été confirmées par les récents événements du printemps 
arabe. La volatilité des prix ainsi que la persistance d’une forte 
instabilité dans le marché alimentaire mondial liée, entre autres, aux 
effets du changement climatique sur les rendements agricoles, risque 
donc de devenir un facteur supplémentaire de vulnérabilité politique et 
économique. 
 
Le climat et les sols 
La surface du Maghreb est occupée en grand partie par le désert qui 
présente un niveau pluviométrique très bas, autour de 200 mm par an. 
Les zones humides soumises au climat méditerranéen se caractérisent par 
un été sec et deux saisons pluvieuses, l’une principale, en automne, 
l’autre secondaire, au printemps.1 La moyenne des précipitations n’atteint 
les 1000 mm par an que dans quelques zones montagneuses, telles que le 
Nord tunisien, l’Est algérien et la chaîne du Rif, mais le régime 
pluviométrique est très irrégulier, tant à l’échelle journalière qu’annuelle. 
L’agriculture pluviale est fortement limitée par l’aridité du climat qui 
engendre un niveau d’évapotranspiration très élevé limitant l’apport 
hydrique des cultures. 
La région manque de grands bassins fluviaux et les principales 
réserves en eau se trouvent stockées dans le Haut et Moyen Atlas 
marocain, dans la Kabylie algérienne et dans les nappes souterraines 
situées à différentes profondeurs, renouvelables dans les régions au 
Nord fossiles dans la région saharienne. En plus, la concentration de 
l’habitat et des activités productives le long des littoraux de la 
Méditerranée conduit à une distorsion géographique entre la 
localisation des sources et les zones où la demande en eau est 
concentrée. 
Le climat a des conséquences considérables sur la conformation des 
sols agricoles. Contrairement à ce qui se produit aux Tropiques, où la 
chaleur et les pluies entraînent la décomposition des roches du sous-sol 
(pédogénèse), au Maghreb, ce phénomène est réduit. Cela est dû à la 
fois au manque de pluies estivales, qui seraient nécessaires pour 
provoquer les réactions chimiques indispensables à la formation du sol, 
et au fait d’atteindre des températures suffisamment élevées dans les 
autres saisons. Les sols de la région du Maghreb, formés grâce à de 
                                                 
1 J. Margat, L’eau dans le bassin méditerranéen, Les fascicules du Plan Bleu, 
Economica, Paris, 1994. 
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longues périodes chaudes et humides, ne se renouvellent plus 
aujourd’hui. Ils sont soumis à une forte érosion, liée à la violence des 
pluies en hiver et à la sécheresse de l’été, des facteurs qui rendent 
extrêmement difficile la reconstitution de la couverture végétale.2 
Dans les pays du Maghreb, les phénomènes de dégradation des sols 
sont essentiellement liés à la pression humaine sur les ressources. Le taux 
de croissance de la population encore soutenu, associé à une disponibilité 
limitée des terres agricoles (5 pour cent en moyenne, à l’exception de la 
Turquie) a réduit, au cours des dernières décennies, la disponibilité des 
terres par habitant. La déforestation, l’intensification de l’agriculture et 
de l’élevage sur des terres structurellement fragiles a réduit la couverture 
végétale, tout en amplifiant l’effet érosif causé par la pluie et le vent. 
L’érosion hydrique est liée aux fortes pluies après de longues périodes de 
sécheresse qui lavent les sols, causant la perte en surface de la couche 
d’humus fertile. L’érosion éolienne est également liée à la présence 
limitée de matière organique dans le sol qui fait que le vent brise le terrain 
en petites particules et les disperse. Tous ces phénomènes de dégradation 
des terres engendre une « réduction ou la destruction du potentiel 
biologique du sol qui peut conduire à des conditions désertiques », selon 
la définition donnée par la Conférence des Nations Unies sur la 
désertification tenue en 1977 à Nairobi. 
Le changement climatique est susceptible d’avoir un impact 
significatif sur la diversité biologique, tout en provoquant l’extinction 
des espèces et de profonds changements dans la structure et dans la 
fonction des écosystèmes. La Méditerranée est considérée comme un 
haut lieu de la biodiversité parce qu’elle couvre 1,6 pour cent de la 
production mondiale et concentre 10 pour cent des espèces végétales 
connues. L’action humaine au cours des siècles a encore accru la 
diversité écologique de la région, en aidant à caractériser le paysage 
avec la propagation d’arbres fruitiers et cultures. Typique du paysage 
est l’arganier, présent principalement dans le sud-ouest du Maroc, et le 
palmier dattier, répandu dans de nombreuses régions d’Afrique du 
Nord. La résilience des nombreux écosystèmes au Maghreb, c’est-à-
dire de résister et/ou s’adapter au stress, a été fortement affaiblie par les 
changements climatiques et les phénomènes qui leur sont associés 
(inondations, sécheresses, incendies, désertification), ainsi que par 
d'autres facteurs déclenchés par l’intervention humaine (changements 
                                                 
2 Y. Lacoste, « Les rythmes du climat, le drame de l’eau et des sols », en Y. Lacoste 
- C. Lacoste (eds.), L’État du Maghreb, La Découverte, Paris, 1991, p. 28. 
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d’utilisation des terres, la pollution et la surexploitation des ressources 
naturelles). Par conséquent, de nombreuses espèces végétales, déjà 
menacées d’extinction, pourraient disparaître d’ici la fin de ce siècle. 
 
L’eau : aspects environnementaux et pression humaine 
Selon les prévisions, le changement climatique dans la région de la 
Méditerranée pourrait entraîner des variations spatio-temporelles des 
précipitations et une augmentation de l’intensité et de la fréquence des 
événements climatologiques extrêmes (vagues de sècheresse, 
exondations des fleuves, aggravation des phénomènes de déséquilibres 
hydrogéologique).3 Le Maghreb serait exposé à une montée des 
températures et une diminution des précipitations, tandis que la hausse 
du niveau de la mer Méditerranée menace les infrastructures côtières et 
pourrait conduire à une perte de terres arables et au déplacement des 
populations.4 
Au Maghreb, les précipitations, par leur rareté et leur concentration 
sur certaines périodes de l’année, n’assurent pas un apport suffisant et 
régulier en eau. Dans une situation de pénurie structurelle des ressources 
en eau, le changement climatique engendre une pression sur les 
ressources en eau régionales parce qu’il réduit le niveau des 
précipitations et augmente l’évapotranspiration, tout en accentuant les 
déficits hydriques des cultures pluviales qui couvrent la majeure partie 
des surfaces arables au Maghreb. Les vagues de sécheresse qui sont 
devenues plus fréquentes à partir de la fin des années 80 ont donc 
                                                 
3 « De nombreuses zones semi-arides (le bassin méditerranéen, l’ouest des États-
Unis, l’Afrique australe et le nord-est du Brésil) subiront les effets d’un 
appauvrissement de leurs ressources en eau du fait du changement climatique (degré 
de confiance élevé). Selon les projections, les zones touchées par la sécheresse vont 
s’étendre, ce qui devrait avoir une incidence négative sur de nombreux secteurs, 
comme l’agriculture, l’approvisionnement en eau, la production d’énergie et la santé. 
À l’échelle régionale, on anticipe une forte augmentation de la demande d’eau 
d’irrigation consécutive aux changements climatiques ». Groupe d’Experts 
Intergouvernemental sur l’Évolution du Climat (GIEC), Changements climatiques, 
Rapport de Synthèse, GIEC, Genève, 2008, p. 49. 
4 E. Ferragina - D. Quagliarotti, ‘Climatic Change in the Mediterranean’, in Medit 
4 (2008), pp. 4-13; Plan Bleu, United Nation Environmental Program (UNEP), 
Changement climatique et énergie en Méditerranée, 2008, p. 111; E. Ferragina - D. 
Quagliarotti, ‘Degrado ambientale e movimenti di popolazione: i migranti 
ambientali’, in P. Malanima (ed.), Rapporto sulle Economie del Mediterraneo, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2012; F. Gemenne, Migration et développement. L’enjeu 
environnemental et l’avenir des politiques migratoires, Note de l’Ifri, janvier 2011. 
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provoqué une oscillation des surfaces destinées aux cultures céréalières 
dans tous les pays du Maghreb entre 1980 et 2012 (Fig.1, 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Taux nationaux des précipitations 1963-67 et 1998-02 (en millimètres 
par an) 
 
Source: Élaboration à partir des données Aquastat database.
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Fig. 2. Surfaces cultivées de céréales 1963-2013 (hectares) 
 
Source: Élaboration à partir des données du World Development Indicators, 2014.  
 
La réduction du niveau pluviométrique et l’augmentation de besoin 
d’irrigation des cultures alimentent la compétition entre secteurs 
productifs pour l’accès à l’eau. La part des ressources en eau consacrée 
au secteur agricole est très élevée et dépasse 80% dans le cas du Maroc 
et de la Libye (Fig.3). La demande en eau du secteur agricole est 
étroitement liée à la production et à la consommation des denrées 
alimentaires. Les choix culturels des dernières décennies ont contribué 
à la croissance de la demande en eau, en privilégiant les produits 
maraîchers à haute teneur en eau. Dans les périmètres irrigués, la 
polyculture a été remplacée par des monocultures intensives qui ont fait 
régresser les habitats riches en espèces sauvages beaucoup plus 
adaptées aux écosystèmes locaux arides que les espèces cultivées.5 Pour 
ce qui concerne la consommation, l’élargissement de la classe moyenne 
                                                 
5 Presque 80 espèces de légumes sauvages et de plantes céréalières utilisées par 
les Berbères dans la région de l’Ahaggar en Algérie ont été inventoriées. Centre 
International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM), 
Mediterra 2012, Presses de Science Po, Paris, p. 185. 
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a favorisé un changement du régime alimentaire avec une 
consommation accrue de viande. Ce phénomène a eu des retombées 
environnementales très graves, l’élevage étant l’un des principaux 
responsables de la déforestation, de la dégradation des terres, de la 
réduction de la biodiversité et de l’augmentation de la demande en eau. 
La consommation d’eau pour la production de viande et de produits 
laitiers est plus élevée que celle utilisée pour les cultures. Durant la 
phase de production d’un kilo de blé, 500 à 4000 litres d’eau 
s’évaporent - selon le climat, les rendements, les pratiques agronomes 
et la variété des cultures - tandis que la production d’un kilo de viande 
demande de 5000 à 20000 litres, principalement pour arroser les 
fourrages destinées à l’élevage.6 
L’augmentation de la population, l’amélioration des conditions de 
vie, la diversification du tissu économique, contribuent de leur côté à la 
croissance de la demande en eau. Un indicateur très important de la 
pression sur les ressources en eau est l’indice d’exploitation qui mesure 
le rapport entre les prélèvements et la disponibilité globale des 
ressources en eau renouvelables. Un indice d’exploitation inférieur à 
50% montre déjà des tensions entre les différents usages de l’eau, 
comme dans le cas de la Tunisie et de l’Algérie. Un indice 
d’exploitation de 100% indique que toutes les ressources en eau 
renouvelables sont utilisées ; un pourcentage supérieur à 100% 
implique une exploitation de ressources non renouvelables, comme 
dans le cas de la Lybie où le taux d’exploitation atteint 718% (Fig. 4). 
Le taux d’exploitation de la Lybie est liée au projet de la Grande Rivière 
artificielle développée pour satisfaire les besoins en eau du pays à 
travers l’épuisement de l’Aquifère des Grès de Nubie, une nappe fossile 
partagée entre le Tchad, l’Égypte, la Libye et le Soudan, qui occupe 
autour de 2 millions de kilomètres carrés, avec un volume de plus de 
542 000 kilomètres cubes d’eau. Lancé dans les années 80, ce projet 
envisageait le transport de l’eau à l’aide d’une canalisation en direction 
de la côte (Tripoli et Benghazi). Le programme s’inscrivait sur une 
période de 25 ans et devait assurer le transfert de 6,6 millions de mètres 
cubes d’eau par jour pour un investissement global de 30 milliards de 
dollars. La mise en œuvre du projet a été affectée par les sanctions du 
gouvernement américain contre la Libye qui ont fait croître le coût, déjà 
                                                 
6 Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes 
(CIHEAM), Mediterra 2012. La diète méditerranéenne pour un développement 
régional durable, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2012, p. 192. 
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énorme, du projet. Le pipeline a été endommagé lors de l’intervention 
militaire de 2011 qui a provoqué la chute du régime de Kadhafi.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Répartition de l’eau dans les différents secteurs productifs (%) 
 
Source: Élaboration à partir des données du World Development Indicators 2014. 
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Fig. 4. Retraits annuels d’eau douce, total (% des ressources internes) 
 
Source: Élaboration à partir des données du World Development Indicators 2014. 
 
Le cas de la Lybie s’inscrit dans un contexte régional ou le 
changement climatique réduit le débit des cours d’eau superficiels et 
entraîne une augmentation de l’exploitation des eaux souterraines qui 
ne sont pas exposées aux effets du réchauffement global. La diffusion 
de technologies simples et peu coûteuses, telles que les motopompes, a 
rendu l’activité de pompage des nappes beaucoup plus facile et moins 
onéreuse, en provoquant ce que Ramon Llamas appelle une 
« révolution silencieuse », à savoir le creusement illégal de puits et la 
multiplication des prélèvements qui échappent au contrôle de l’État et, 
par conséquent, ne sont pas assujettis à tarification.7 L’exploitation 
intensive des eaux souterraines (1000 km3/an) a favorisé le 
développement d’une économie agricole florissante et dynamique, la 
                                                 
7 M. R. Llamas - P. Martínez-Santos, ‘Intensive Groundwater Use: Silent 
Revolution and Potential Source of Social Conflicts’, in Journal of Water Resources 
Planning and Management, September/October (2005), pp. 337-341; R. Llamas - L. 
Martinez Cortina - A. Mukherji (eds.), Water Ethics, Taylor & Francis Group, 
London, 2009. 
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groundwater economics.8 Toutefois, ce type de développement a eu des 
effets très graves sur l’environnement tels que l’épuisement des 
ressources d’eaux souterraines, la détérioration de la qualité de l'eau, la 
dégradation des sols et des milieux aquatiques.9  
Dans la région du Maghreb, on observe un épuisement rapide des 
nappes dont le niveau peut s’abaisser jusqu’à 5 mètres par an. Plus de 
10% de la production alimentaire repose sur la quantité d’eau 
souterraine mobilisée et surexploitée. La mise en valeur des eaux 
souterraines concerne principalement les ressources renouvelables, 
mais au Maghreb on enregistre une utilisation croissante des sources 
non renouvelables, soit les nappes fossiles. Les exploitants les plus 
importants d’eau fossile à l’échelle mondiale sont l’Arabie saoudite, la 
Libye et l’Algérie qui consomment presque 85% du total mondial 
estimé (Tab. 1).10 Il s’agit de pays qui ont une économie basée 
principalement sur les hydrocarbures et qui poursuivent la même 
exploitation minière des ressources en eau. Cette exploitation n’est pas 
durable sur le plan environnemental et elle est très dangereuse à long 
terme dans la mesure où, si l’on peut faire face à l’épuisement des 
ressources en hydrocarbures grâce au développement des énergies 
renouvelables, en ce qui concerne l’eau, il n’existe pas de ressources de 
substitution et, à long terme, le coût de leur tarissement devra être payé 
par les générations futures.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 E. Custodio - A. Gurguí, Groundwater Economics, Elsevier, London, 1989. 
9 E. Ferragina - F. Greco, ‘The Disi Project in Jordan. An Internal/External 
Analysis’, in Water International 33/4 (2008), p. 456; E. Ferragina, « L’exploitation 
d’une ressource fossile partagée : le cas du projet Disi en Jordanie », in Maghreb-
Machrek 210 (2012), pp. 99-117. 
10 J. Margat, Les eaux souterraines dans le monde, BRGM-UNESCO, 2008, p. 22. 
11 E. Ferragina, Environmental and Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean. 
10 papers for Barcelona 2010, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 
Barcelona, 2010. 
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Tab. 1. Exploitations minières des ressources en eau souterraines non 
renouvelables dans le monde 
Pays Date de valeur Extraction 
(km cubes 
par an) 
Aquifères 
exploités 
Références 
Libye 1999-2000 3,2 Nubian 
Sundstone 
Aquifer 
SASS 
Murzuk 
M. Bakhbakhi 
2002, OSS 
2003 
Algérie 2000 1,68 SASS OSS 2003 
Tunisie 2000 0,46 SASS OSS 2003 
Source: J. Margat, Les eaux souterraines dans le monde, BRGM-UNESCO, 2008. 
 
La pression humaine sur les ressources souterraines représente un 
défi pour la sécurité alimentaire et l’ordre social. La surexploitation des 
ressources souterraines, combinée à la raréfaction et pollution des 
ressources superficielles, risque de réduire la résilience aux épisodes de 
sècheresse et d’avoir un impact négatif sur la productivité agricole 
régionale. 
Face à une offre d’eau stable ou en régression, la croissance 
démographique a engendré, au cours des dernières décennies, une 
réduction de la disponibilité en eau par habitant par an (Fig. 5). Cette 
disponibilité a connu une réduction entre 1962 et 2013 dans tous les 
pays du Maghreb, même au Maroc qui était le plus riche en eau et qui, 
à partir de 2002, se trouve au-dessous de la dotation minimale en eau 
nécessaire à la satisfaction des besoins de la population et des divers 
secteurs de production (1000 m3 par an et par habitant).12  
                                                 
12 La disponibilité en eau par personne par an est un indicateur très utilisé, mais 
qui ne tient pas compte des différences qui existent entre les pays par rapport au climat 
et donc la demande en eau plus élevée pour la consommation humaine et l’agriculture 
dans les environnements arides. J. Margat, « Quels indicateurs pertinents de la pénurie 
d’eau ? », in Géocarrefour 80/4 (2005), pp. 261-262. 
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Fig. 5. Disponibilité en eau par personne par an (en mètres cubes)  
 
Source: Élaboration à partir des données du World Development Indicators 2014. 
 
Le lien entre dépendance alimentaire et bouleversement politique 
La nature multidimensionnelle de la crise alimentaire au Maghreb 
nous amène à considérer le rôle des politiques agricoles menées et des 
régimes des échanges agroalimentaires entre le Maghreb et le reste du 
monde, ainsi que les retombées politiques de la crise alimentaire. 
À partir des années 80, les grands organismes financiers 
internationaux pousse à une libéralisation des échanges dans le cadre 
des Programmes d’ajustement structurel (PAS). L’un des objectifs de 
cette politique est la sécurité alimentaire, à poursuivre à travers la 
spécialisation dans les productions agricoles irriguées à haute valeur de 
marché et l’achat des denrées alimentaires de base sur les marchés 
internationaux. Le cours des denrées alimentaires de base a favorisé 
l’adoption de cette stratégie, car les politiques des subventions agricoles 
de la part de l’Europe et des États-Unis ont entraîné entre 1976 et 2001 
une chute de 53% des prix des produits alimentaires sur les marchés 
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mondiaux. Le processus de libéralisation a donc conduit à privilégier 
l’exportation de fruits et légumes, a réduit le prix interne des céréales, 
tout en stimulant leur importation. Le résultat de ces politiques 
commerciales a été un clivage croissant entre la production et la 
consommation des céréales qui a augmenté la dépendance vis-à-vis du 
marché international. Pour assurer l’alimentation de base aux couches 
les plus démunies de la population, les prix des céréales ont été 
subventionnés, mais à partir des années quatre-vingt, la Banque 
mondiale et le FMI ont imposé une réduction des subventions dans le 
cadre des politiques de rigueur économique imposées par les PAS.13  
La détérioration des conditions de vie a créé un fort malaise social. 
En juin 1981 au Maroc, plusieurs subventions sur des produits de 
première nécessité ont connu une baisse très importante dans le cadre 
du PAS. L’effet sur les couches les plus défavorisées de la population a 
été aggravé par une sécheresse persistante (le pays subit sa première 
vague de sécheresse de 1980 à 1984) et une très grande inflation (de 
l’ordre de 12,5 % en 1981). Les émeutes ont éclaté dans les quartiers 
populaires de Casablanca. En Tunisie, en décembre 1983, suite à une 
demande du FMI de stabiliser l’économie nationale, le gouvernement 
annonce l’augmentation des prix du pain et des produits céréaliers, 
comme la semoule. Des « émeutes du pain » éclatent alors entre le 27 
décembre 1983 et le 6 janvier 1984.  
La dépendance alimentaire des pays du Maghreb est très importante, 
surtout vis-à-vis de l’Europe, et témoigne de la persistance de relations 
commerciales asymétriques entre le Nord et le Sud du bassin. Dans le 
cadre de la politique de libéralisation des échanges euro-
méditerranéens, les pays européens ont maintenu des mesures (quotas 
et calendrier d’exportations) visant à protéger les secteurs les plus 
sensibles à la concurrence des pays partenaires. Les pays du Maghreb, 
au contraire, ont vu augmenter leur dépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe 
surtout en ce qui concerne les céréales, la viande et les produits laitiers. 
Les productions maraîchères irriguées des pays du Maghreb ont donc 
bénéficié du processus de libéralisation commerciale envisagé par le 
                                                 
13 Le prix bas des denrées alimentaires de base était partie intégrante de ce que 
certains politologues ont appelé le modèle d’accord autoritaire, c’est-à-dire un accord 
entre gouvernants et gouvernées qui assurait une certaine forme de soutien de la part 
de l’État aux bas revenus à travers les subventions et l’emploi dans l’administration 
publique, sans pourtant concéder aucun droit politique et civil. A. Galal - H. Selim, 
‘The Elusive Quest for Arab Economic Development’, in Middle East Development 
Journal 5/1 (2013). 
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processus de Barcelone, initié en 1995, qui a accéléré l’intégration 
commerciale des pays du Maghreb à l’Europe avec la signature des 
Accords de libre-échange euro-méditerranéens. En conclusion, les 
mesures de protection que les pays européens ont adopté en direction de 
ces pays n’ont pas vraiment permis que la hausse des exportations 
compense celle des importations. 
Le taux d’autosuffisance pour les céréales montre clairement la 
détérioration de la situation alimentaire dans les pays du Maghreb.14 Dans 
les années 60, ces pays avaient un taux compris entre 0,54, pour la 
Tunisie, et 0,87, pour la Libye ; au début du nouveau siècle, ce taux était 
tombé à 0,1 pour la Lybie et l’Algérie. À la même période, le taux 
d’autosuffisance de la Tunisie et du Maroc oscillait entre 0,2 et 0,4 (Fig. 
6). Cela veut dire que, en quarante ans, les pays du Maghreb sont devenus 
quasiment incapables de nourrir leurs propres populations. 
 
                                                 
14 Dans cet article, on fournit des données concernant aussi bien le taux de 
couverture de consommation intérieure à travers les importations, que le taux 
d’autosuffisance, vu que le premier ne tient compte que de la dépendance des 
importations, alors que le deuxième considère aussi la capacité d’exportation d’un 
pays. 
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Fig. 6. Taux d’autosuffisance en céréales* 
 
Source: Élaboration sur la base des données Usda - Fas. 
*Le taux d’autosuffisance alimentaire exprime la capacité d’un pays à nourrir sa 
population par la production nationale et considère les importations et les exportations 
de produits alimentaires. L’indice de l’autosuffisance alimentaire varie de 0 à 1. Une 
valeur de 1 exprime la pleine autosuffisance alimentaire, tandis qu’une valeur de 0 
exprime une complète dépendance des importations. 
 
Dans ce contexte de forte dépendance alimentaire, la hausse de 
prix des produits agricoles de base sur les marchés internationaux en 
2008 et en 2011 a donc bouleversé des équilibres déjà précaires, tout 
en mettant en évidence les interactions entre changement climatique, 
conditions de vie de la population et stabilité politique. En 2011, les 
aléas climatiques ont apporté une contribution importante à la crise 
alimentaire mondiale. En 2010, la production de blé a été réduite en 
Russie (-32,7 pour cent), en Ukraine (-19,3 pour cent), au Canada (-
13,7 pour cent) et en Australie (-8,7 pour cent). La Chine - le plus 
grand producteur et consommateur de blé au monde - pour faire face 
à une sécheresse dans la partie orientale du pays a acheté du blé sur 
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le marché international, contribuant ainsi à la crise alimentaire 
mondiale. 
La crise alimentaire a eu des conséquences graves sur les conditions 
de vie de la population parce que dans les pays arabes une grande partie 
du revenu familial est consacrée à l’alimentation (35,8 pour cent en 
Tunisie, 43,9 pour cent en Algérie). La hausse des prix des denrées 
alimentaires de base a donc aggravé les niveaux de pauvreté et de 
malnutrition dans un contexte déjà marqué par le chômage et 
l’augmentation des clivages sociaux. L’incidence des consommations 
alimentaires sur le budget familial nous amène à tirer des conclusions à 
propos des retombées politiques de la crise alimentaire. Appelés 
« démocraties de pain », les pays arabes ont pendant des années basé 
leur équilibre politique interne sur un modèle appelé « accord 
autoritaire » : un contrat social entre gouvernants et gouvernés qui 
engage les régimes au pouvoir à fournir de la nourriture à des prix 
subventionnés aux plus démunis en échange de l’abandon des citoyens 
à la pleine jouissance des droits civils et politiques. Bien que le 
printemps arabe ne puisse être attribué à une matrice unique, étant le 
produit d’une série de facteurs qui ont conduit à l’implosion des régimes 
arabes, il est indéniable que l’augmentation du prix du pain a contribué 
à éroder ce pacte social et à renforcer le mécontentement populaire, tout 
en devenant le détonateur de l’instabilité politique qui a affecté la 
région.15  
 
Conclusions 
Dans les pays d’Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient, la forte 
pression humaine sur les ressources, due à la croissance démographique, 
a alimenté une spirale de « consommation des ressources naturelles » 
dans laquelle la pauvreté a encouragé le développement de pratiques non 
durables de gestion, qui sont devenues, à leur tour, un obstacle au 
développement. Dans ce contexte, le changement climatique contribue à 
la dégradation des sols, à la perte de biodiversité et à la pénurie en eau, 
provoquant une baisse du PIB et de sérieuses contraintes à la satisfaction 
des besoins alimentaires de la population. En même temps, les politiques 
de libéralisation économique et d’intégration aux marchés européens ont 
favorisé une spécialisation productive en biens agricoles à haute teneur 
                                                 
15 A. Gana, ‘The Rural and Agricultural Roots of the Tunisian Revolution: When 
Food Security Matters’, in International Journal of Agriculture and Food 2 (2012), 
pp. 2001-2013. 
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en eau (fruits et légumes) à exporter sur les marchés internationaux.16 
Cette stratégie a conduit à une dépendance alimentaire croissante vis-à-
vis des marchés mondiaux en matière de fourniture de denrées 
alimentaires de base.  
Le déclenchement de la crise alimentaire mondiale a touché de plein 
fouet les pays du Maghreb tout en mettant en évidence le lien existant 
entre changement climatique, sécurité alimentaire et stabilité politique. 
Dans un monde global où les pays ont tendance à externaliser leur 
demande alimentaire en recourant aux marchés internationaux, le 
changement climatique représente un « multiplicateur de menace » qui 
bouleverse les équilibres à différentes échelles. La question de la sécurité 
alimentaire au Maghreb est donc un problème complexe, dans lequel 
interagissent des variables de nature économique, politique et sociale et 
qui détermine un degré élevé de vulnérabilité géopolitique à la crise 
alimentaire. 
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Abstract 
The major historical dimension of change, introduced in the Middle Eastern 
scholarship by the so-called Arabs springs, should inform the anthropological study of 
the region. I discuss three main anthropological paradigms (interpretive, praxiological, 
reflexive) against this need-for-change background. The interpretive paradigm is 
discussed through balancing the experience-distant concepts of political-
anthropological analysis with the experience-near concepts of Tunisian social actors 
involved in the revolutionary process: I tried to locate the analytical concept of 
democracy against the background of the ideological and practical tools of the 
protagonists of the revolutionary process. The sub-categories covered under the 
broader concept of democracy are closer to social actors’ own experience: I refer to 
such concepts as freedom, dignity, social justice, governmentality, that are analysed 
with reference to both their explicit formulation and implicit understandings by the 
individuals and groups involved in the revolutionary process. The reflexive approach 
in the anthropological study of cultures disseminated the idea that the deeper the 
involvement of the researcher in the reality s/he is studying, the more comprehensive 
is the understanding of that culture and society. The ease of immersion in the post-
revolutionary Tunisian context, due to the compelling wave of freedom of expression 
in Tunisia after the revolution, makes that context attractive for anthropologists and 
researchers in Middle Eastern issues. The sense of freedom researchers experience 
doing fieldwork in post-revolutionary Tunisia, studying the political movements that 
fostered freedom of expression during the revolutionary process, is related to the 
historical change and conquered freedom of expression. Praxiology might be discussed 
through the ethnographic experience in revolutionary Tunisia, in order to understand 
how such ideas as homosociality, secularism, pluralism, hegemony become part of 
people’s daily practices. 
 
Introduction 
Since the eruption of the Arab revolutions, in December 2011 - 
January 2012, there has been an increase in the number of statements 
related to change in the methods, topics and frameworks of Middle 
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Eastern scholarship. The common idea is that, since the societies 
involved in the so-called ‘Arab Springs’ have changed to some extent, 
the social sciences studying them should transform themselves too. 
Tunisian intellectual Hakim Ben Hammouda effectively summarized 
this mood: 
 
For some months, theoretical reflection has developed and there has 
been an increase in the number of works analyzing such sudden 
emergence of history and its ripples through a world that many 
considered convicted to immobility.1 
 
It is as if scholars drawing on Edward Said’s seminal book 
Orientalism suddenly felt the perspectives they themselves have long 
taken for granted had been finally accepted by a wider audience, now 
persuaded that an Orientalist knowledge of the Middle East, based on 
a powerful discourse entailing its radical otherness, its exceptionality 
as regards the modernization of the World and its failure to represent 
itself, has been proved wrong at last. According to Jean-Pierre Filiu, 
 
The real Arab exception is the spread with which the democratic 
protests sweep the regimes away. Arabs are back in the headlines 
worldwide, this time not through war and/or terror, but because of 
popular dedication and celebration of liberty: this is also quite a 
revolution.2 
 
According to several scholars, the Arab springs spread to a wider 
audience the idea of the Middle East as constituting part of the modern 
world: 
 
The world has been finally taking cognizance of the fact that the core 
itself of what has been long dubbed the ‘Arab and Islamic’, or even 
‘Arab-Islamic world’ (a construction that al-Jazeera itself has obsessively 
reiterated during the 15 years of its existence) does share in a modern 
                                                 
1 H. Ben Hammouda, « Le printemps arabe et l’effet kaleidoscope », in Réalités 
1448 (August 2013), http://www.realites.com.tn/2013/09/un-autre-regard-le-
printemps-arabe-et-leffet-kaleidoscope/. 
2 J. P. Filiu, The Arab Revolution. Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising, 
Hurst & Company, London, 2011, p. 16. 
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type of collective political subjectivity, and produces a socio-cultural 
experience in which it injects new interrogations and opens new gaps.3 
 
How may this widened awareness inform the anthropological study 
of the Middle East and the Arab world? Since the publishing of Lila 
Abu-Lughod’s ‘Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab 
world’ (1989), on the one hand anthropologists have reconsidered 
their interest for such topics as Islam, segregation, segmentation, 
despotism (the ‘zones of theory’); on the other hand, new fields of 
anthropological interest have been developed by anthropologists 
working in the Middle East, such as media, cultural heritage, gender 
and piety as means of subjectivity production. The risk with 
developing new fields of interest is that they may lose their novelty 
and become in turn zones of theory, comfortable intellectual cradles in 
which scholars lull themselves with their favourite topics, gatekeeping 
concepts, anchors and languages. In other terms, certain styles of 
thought, approaches and methods developed starting from a critical 
stance towards stereotypes, risk to become stereotypical themselves. 
Despite the fact that anthropologists working in the Middle East 
have been urging for the taking into account of the dimension of 
historical change and cultural transformation, the paradigms, methods 
and subjects of Middle Eastern anthropology have not been affected 
by the radical change introduced by the Arab revolutions so far. 
Furthermore, the anthropological stress on contemporaneity and 
cultural convergences has influenced other disciplines and 
anthropologists are not any longer unique among scholars of Middle 
Eastern societies in coping with such dimensions. 
I discuss three main anthropological paradigms (interpretive, 
praxiological, reflexive) against this need-for-change background; I 
have chosen such paradigms since they constituted the theoretical 
framework I moved in, dealing with the issues raised by my fieldwork 
in Syria and Tunisia; furthermore, they have been developed or 
implemented by scholars with fieldwork and experience in the Middle 
East: Clifford Geertz, Pierre Bourdieu and Lila Abu-Lughod. Geertz’s 
fieldwork in Morocco was fundamental for his Interpretation of 
cultures; though Bourdieu was not an anthropologist, his interests and 
                                                 
3 A. Salvatore, ‘Only a Question of Time? From Connectedness to Mobilization 
in the Public Sphere’, in Culture and Society, 11/3/2011, http://theoryculturesociety. 
blogspot.it/2011/03/armando-salvatore-on-egypt-facebook-and.html?m=1 (last access 
22/5/2015). 
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methods in Outline of a Theory of Practice are evidently influenced by 
anthropology, and his concept of habitus, explained in this book, 
thoroughly influenced the later debates about such basic concepts in 
anthropology as culture and society; American-Palestinian 
anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod did not define her approach as 
‘reflexive’, although Veiled Sentiments is constructed around the 
observation of the ways the Bedouin culture and subcultures ‘reflect’ 
on the anthropologist: she shows that this reflexive process is basic for 
the understanding of the ‘other’ culture, whose ‘otherness’ is toned 
down as it becomes part of the anthropologist’s identity. 
 
Interpretivism 
In Geertz’s approach, culture is understood as a web of meaning 
whose knots are unwound by the socio-cultural analyst; like language, 
social action is intended as a complex of symbols that anthropologists 
get to know and interpret through the ethnographic experience. Since 
people interpret these symbols in their daily interactions, the 
observation of social action is aimed at grasping their interpretation. 
The first step of fieldwork is the description of such symbolic 
interactions, what Geertz terms ‘thin description’; the following step is 
the ethnographer’s interpretation of these interactions. Since the latter 
includes people’s interpretations, the ethnographer’s work is meant as 
an interpretation of interpretations; this is achieved through ‘thick 
description’, which includes the observation of interactions, the account 
of people’s interpretations and the ethnographer’s interpretation of 
interpretations. Ethnography is not intended as ‘grasping the natives’ 
point of view’, but as narrowing the gap between the anthropologist’s 
and his/her interlocutors’ points of view.  
In the interpretive perspective, participant observation is 
experienced as meeting halfway between two subjects’ worldview. 
This is pursued by balancing between experience-near and experience-
distant concepts, namely the ideas people draw from to interpret their 
daily interactions (near to their experience) and the anthropologist’s 
intellectual background (distant from people’s experience). 
Ethnography is not meant as a collection of bizarre ideas and practices, 
but rather as the construction of a common ground between different 
cultures. This leads the anthropologist to counter the perception of 
otherness when describing cultures. This is particularly fruitful for the 
anthropological study of Middle Eastern cultures, since the latter 
concentrated for decades on those traits and worldviews liable to 
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reproduce their exoticism and otherness. Lila Abu-Lughod criticized 
this clustering of ethnographic researches about what she terms the 
‘zones of theory’: harem theory (dealing with gender segregation), 
segmentarian theory (dealing with tribalism and conveying the image of 
Arabs as homines segmentarii), Islam (intended as a theoretical 
metonym for a world where everything is influenced by religion). These 
zones cover the anthropological study of the Arab cultures, whereas 
other ‘gatekeeping concepts’4 concern Turkish (despotism) and Persian 
(bazaar economy) contexts. 
Directing my research mainly within the interpretive paradigm, I 
put much of my effort into balancing the experience-distant concepts 
of political-anthropological analysis with the experience-near concepts 
of Tunisian social actors involved in the revolutionary process. In 
particular, I followed the meetings of one youth Islamic association, 
Ash-Shabab ar-Rissali (‘The young messengers’) which formed part 
of the Tunisian civil society5 that gained visibility after the ‘14th 
January revolution’ and was close to the Muslim Brotherhood 
network. I also had several conversations with some representatives of 
Ennahdha, the Tunisian party that constitutes the political branch of 
the Brotherhood. The league (rābiṭa) Ash-Shabab ar-Rissali was 
founded right after the revolution, since such associations were 
prohibited or strictly controlled by the police during the Ben Ali’s 
regime. The ‘young messengers’ promote both da’wa in the narrow 
sense of the term (inviting non-practicing Muslims to pray) and the 
knowledge of Islam from the historical and educational perspective. 
                                                 
4 A. Appadurai, ‘Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery’, in Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 28/2 (April 1986), pp. 356-361. 
5 ‘Civil society’ itself could be analysed as an experience-distant concept, on the 
background of ethnographic research among such Islamic association. Indeed the 
concept has been thoroughly debated in anthropology, and studies from North 
African and Middle Eastern contexts have contributed to the deepening of its 
complex definition. Although several studies about North African civil societies 
focus mainly on the activities and discourses of secularist organizations, and 
Tunisian public debate is currently caught into a sharp polarization opposing the 
political parties, in crisis of legitimacy and consensus, to the most influent 
association of what is commonly referred to as the Tunisian civil society (Ugtt, 
Utica, the National Bar Association, the Human Rights League), I rather focus on 
the activities of democratic participation of Islamic associations engaged in 
spreading pious practices among the population, what is commonly known as 
da‘wa. 
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I tried to locate the analytical concept of democracy against the 
background of the ideological and practical tools of these protagonists 
of the revolutionary process. This was meant as a contribution to the 
debate within the anthropology of democracy, a field of interest whose 
borders and subjects are currently being defined, following a seminal 
article by Julia Paley.6 The main aim of this debate is comprehending 
current understandings of democracy, through both cross-cultural 
comparison and reference to global discourses that inform the 
conceptualization and shaping of practices of democratic participation 
in different contexts across the world. 
Indeed, different forms of democratic participation shape the public 
debate in contemporary Tunisia. The post-revolution Tunisian public 
space is open to extremely different political activities and 
discussions, showing the complexity of the historical change for 
which the revolutionary phase of December 2010/January 2011 was 
but the tinder. Scholars are tracing a frame of the complex landscape 
of the contemporary Tunisian public sphere through reference to 
different forms of democratic participation, such as the youth activism 
in social media debates, street demonstrations, the struggle for 
political freedom conducted by traditional secularist and Islamic 
political parties, the middle-classes’ involvement in the movements for 
change, the popular struggles for labour rights, social justice and 
equity, and the role of the army in the revolutionary process. 
Furthermore, the anthropological perspective analyses concepts and 
practices which, starting from a narrow definition of democracy, could 
appear as antithetical, such as the participation of the army in the 
democratic process, and the post-revolutionary hegemony of the 
Islamic movement and party Ennahdha. 
Through comparison and categorization of these practices under the 
broader category of democracy, the latter is being deepened in its 
complexity. ‘Democracy’ in the anthropological perspective is used as 
an analytic category quite distant from the explicit formulation of 
social actors, that in some cases refuse this concept or discard it as a 
Western neo-colonial ideology. According to Tunisian intellectual 
Hakim Ben Hammouda, the idea of the Arab revolutions as a major 
project of democratization, modernization and emancipation from 
dictatorship, carried on in the name of the ‘post-national power of 
                                                 
6 J. Paley, ‘Toward an Anthropology of Democracy’, in Annual Review of 
Anthropology 31 (2002), pp. 469-496. 
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freedom’, is affected by a euro-centric perspective, that identifies the 
movement toward modernity with societies’ common evolution into a 
‘shared universe of freedoms and human rights’.7 Anyway, the sub-
categories covered under the broader concept of democracy are closer 
to social actors’ own experience: I refer to such concepts as ḥurriya 
(freedom), karāma (dignity), ‘adāla ijtimā‘iyya (social justice), that 
are analysed with reference to both their explicit formulation and 
implicit understandings by the individuals and groups involved in the 
revolutionary process. 
Probably the most outstanding achievements of the Tunisian 
revolution were those related to the major ideal of political freedom 
(entailing freedom of expression and association), gained within the 
space of just a few weeks: the tyrant’s hasty escape; the creation of the 
Higher Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the 
Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition; the 
suspension of the 1959 Constitution; the first democratic elections in 
the history of the country. The opening preamble of the new 
Constitution, passed on 27th January 2014, lists among its objectives 
the end of tyranny, injustice and corruption and the pursuit of freedom 
and dignity. Indeed, the official political map of Tunisia soon after 
January opened up to all those parties that were excluded from it; the 
regime’s opponents were freed from prison or returned from exile. 
Besides freedom, the Tunisian revolution has been celebrated for 
fostering the value of karāma (often translated as ‘dignity’), a concept 
the Islamic movement conceived of mainly as social justice. 
According to Ennahdha MP Osama al-Saghir, with whom I had 
several conversations from 2013 to 2015, karāma means first of all 
equality, resulting in a project aimed at reducing the socioeconomic 
gaps among Tunisians, improving the material conditions and 
fostering the social advancement of unemployed or underemployed 
people. This aim is strictly related both to that of freedom and to 
another meaning of karāma, namely the idea of a national stance 
against international political and economic interference. Though the 
Islamic movement since its beginning has fought against Western 
economic and political domination, after the revolution it has been 
facing the prospect of a flight of European capital; as a ruling party, it 
has been concerned with how to keep multinational corporations in the 
country, whilst at the same time trying to keep their power of people 
                                                 
7 Ben Hammouda, « Le printemps arabe et l’effet kaleidoscope ».  
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and capital management from ignoring or breaching the laws of the 
State. As al-Saghir told me,  
 
In the past, when Eni or Benetton did business in Tunisia, they spoke 
with some regime’s official and the deal was made; their investment 
cost was minimal; the local manpower was underpaid; the previous 
regime found it all good clean fun. Nowadays deals are made abiding 
by laws, openly. Tunisian workers earn treble what they did before. 
That’s how the concept of karāma is translated into practice.8 
 
The third experience-distant concept I drew on is Foucauldian 
governmentality,9 tested against the background of the experience-
near concept of Islamic rule. The latter was controversial over the 
three years of Ennahdha majority in the National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA), when the Islamic party ruled the country through 
several cabinets. The debate was first of all about the reference to 
sharīʻa in the new Constitution and was enlivened by Tunisian 
secularist circles, accusing the Islamists to aim at the foundation of an 
Islamic state.10  
In fact, the debate in Tunisia did not lead to a total opposition 
between the secularists and the Islamists about the latter’s alleged 
project to bind the new Constitution to sharīʻa. For instance, the 
acknowledgement of Islamic conduct as a basic unifying value of 
Tunisian society was the subject of some discourses of the President 
of the Republic Beji Caid Essebsi, whose election was celebrated by 
some observers as the victory of the secularist world terminating the 
‘Islamic autumn’ that followed the ‘Arab spring’. Furthermore, the 
Islamic movement was not unanimous in arguing that sharīʻa should 
inform the Constitution. As Osama al-Saghir told me,  
 
What’s the point of referring to sharīʻa in the Constitution? Sharīʻa 
doesn’t exist in itself, it’s not a book: have you ever seen a book titled 
                                                 
8 Interview with the author, Tunis, September 2013. 
9 M. Foucault, ‘La governamentalità’, in Aut-aut 167/168 (1978), pp. 12-29. 
10 S. Labat, Les islamistes tunisiens entre l’état et la mosquée, Demopolis, Paris, 
2013; A. Meddeb, « La défaite des islamistes et l’alliance occidentale », Leaders 
10/2013, p 6; H. Hkima, « De quelle démocratie parle-t-on? », in La Presse, 
14/4/2015; N. Benazouz, « De quelle union nationale parles-tu, ‘ayouhal-ablah’ ? », 
La Presse 8/4/2015; L. Blaise, « Le projet de la nouvelle Constitution tunisienne en 
10 questions », 15/5/2013, http://nawaat.org/portail/2013/05/15/tunisiela-constitution-
en-10-questions/ (access 16/12/2016). 
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The Sharīʻa ? We were planning to put it into one of our Constitution 
drafts, as an opening-up factor: it would have been a positive value to 
refer.11 
 
This draft, presented in March 2012, mentioned sharīʻa as one 
source of the law and provided for a specific board (majlis ʻalā lil-
iftā’) to check the compliance of laws with Islamic norms.12 The 
following debate led the Islamic movement to reconsider this plan, 
since the reference to sharīʻa would come to constitute a rift factor in 
the society, producing an effect opposite to what was intended. Osama 
told me: 
 
We realized that the Constitution didn’t need to be checked against the 
background of sharīʻa. If misinterpreted it could create division, as if 
in our society there were people for or against Islam. The Tunisian 
society had joined together for the revolution and we didn’t want to 
fragment it. Therefore, in our second draft we took off the reference to 
sharīʻa.13 
 
This was Rached Ghannouchi’s (2012) idea as well: 
 
Nous ne voulons pas que la société tunisienne soit divisée en deux 
camps opposés idéologiquement, l’un pro-charia et l’autre anti-charia. 
Cela ne nous réjouit pas et c’est très grave. Nous voulons plutôt une 
Constitution qui soit pour tous les Tunisiens quelles que soient leurs 
convictions. (…) L’essentiel, c’est que les Tunisiens sont aujourd’hui 
unis autour de l’islam et de la démocratie. (…) L’islam n’autorise pas 
de traiter autrui de mécréants.14 
 
Indeed, the following constitutional draft presented by the Islamists 
did not mention the sharīʻa. They found it was enough not to amend 
the first article of the 1959 Constitution, that recognized Islam as the 
official religion of the country. Such broad reference to Islam was 
accepted by the NCA and written in the preamble of the current 
                                                 
11 Interview with the author, Tunis March 2015. 
12 Y. Ben Achour, ‘Religion, Revolution, and Constitution: the Case of Tunisia’, 
Yadh Ben Achour Blog, 26/10/2012, in http://yadhba.blogspot.it/2012/10/religion-
revolution-and-constitution_6573.html (last access 6/12/2016). 
13 Interview with the author, Tunis, March 2015. 
14 P. F. Naudé, « Tunisie : Ennahdha renonce à introduire la charia dans la 
Constitution », 27/3/2012, in http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB201 
20327091704/ (access 6/12/2016). 
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Constitution, that expresses the Tunisian people’s ‘commitment to the 
teachings of Islam, to their spirit of openness and tolerance’, and to 
‘the foundations of our Islamic-Arab identity’.15 Furthermore, Article 
1 reads: ‘Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is 
Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican. This article 
may not be amended’.16 
It could be argued that supporting the reference to Islam in the 
Constitution was part of the Islamic movement’s search for a moral 
principle to credit the post-revolutionary ruling class with the 
authoritativeness it still lacks, having inherited the governmental 
structures from the previous regime. In other terms, from 2011 to 2014 
the Islamic movement has been trying to strike a balance between 
such structures and a sovereign principle - Islam - to legitimize itself 
as the ruling party. Having gained the NCA majority, Ennahdha was 
invested with the task of leading the transition from Ben Ali’s 
autocratic power to democracy, in a complex phase for the country. 
Indeed, besides economic stagnancy, the country was in the sights of 
the growing international Islamic terrorism, that struck Tunisia with 
violent attacks with few precedents in the country. Well before the 
tragic massacres of Bardo and Sousse (2015), the Islamic majority 
cabinets had to face dozens of jihadist attacks against military and 
police targets (the worst in Chaambi on 29th July 2013 and in Sidi 
Bouzid on 23rd October of the same year) and several political 
homicides (the most notorious being those of Chokri Belaid and 
Mohamed Brahmi, on 6th February and 25th July 2013). 
The Islamist cabinets thus focused on the technocratic character of 
the executive, focusing on security policies, more and more detached 
from society and from the control of other powers, a crucial aspect of 
governmentality. According to Butler,17 who effectively summed up 
Foucault’s reasoning, governmental power is exercised through 
regulations that replace the State laws and are not bound by 
international law. Power is thus delegated to civil servants that act as 
managers with limited sovereignty, interpreting and enforcing the 
regulations unilaterally. Sovereignty is thus understood as an ‘extra-
legal authority that may well institute and enforce law of its own 
                                                 
15 Tunisian Constitution of 2014, Full Text, in https://www.constituteproject.org/ 
constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf (access 6/12/2016).  
16 Ib. 
17 J. Butler, Vite precarie. Contro l’uso della violenza in risposta al lutto 
collettivo, Meltemi, Roma, 2004. 
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making’.18 Such delegation of power is justified by a state of 
emergency, as in Tunisia in the decade before revolution, when the 
struggle against terrorism was a power strategy of the regime, aimed 
officially at protecting the West and the secular elites from jihadism. 
Under such cover the Ben Ali’s regime prohibited any kind of political 
opposition and reduced the media to silence. The anti-terrorism law 
issued in December 2003 gave full governmental power to the security 
forces, legitimizing arbitrary arrests, torture, rough trials and the 
suppression of opponents.19 Countering the 2011-2013 jihadist attacks, 
the Islamist cabinets stressed their governmental features – e.g. former 
Minister of the Interior Ali Laarayadeh was appointed as Prime 
Minister in reply to the complications of the Belaid affair – and 
strengthened the security apparatus, that despite the regime change 
was inviolate after the revolution.20  
Furthermore, the new Tunisian Constitution does not define the 
power balance between governmentality and the law: convicts’ rights 
are stated in the abstract and the constitutional structure of police and 
security forces is not well defined.21 
The draft counterterrorism law, discussed in 2014 and 2015, was 
criticized by Tunisian public opinion; Human Rights Watch warned 
that it confirms the police’s arbitrary power, and ‘contains a broad and 
ambiguous definition of terrorist activity that could permit the 
government to repress a wide range of internationally protected 
                                                 
18 Ib., p. 60. 
19 Nawaat 2008, « La torture en Tunisie et la loi «anti-terroriste» du 10 décembre 
2003 », http://nawaat.org/portail/2008/07/10/la-torture-en-tunisie-et-la-loi-anti-terroriste- 
du-10-decembre-2003/ (last accessed 29/11/2013). The article 48 for instance 
provided for the protection of the identity of the judges and policemen in charge of 
establishing and punishing terrorist crimes, delivering them from the limitations 
made by the Convention against torture, though both president Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali signed it in 1987 and 1988. 
20 According to Bel Hadj Amor, the security apparatus, the main expression of 
the State, is legitimized by the ‘plenty of regulations, procedures, authorizations and 
agreements (…) that invest civil servants discretionary power, which causes abuses, 
injustice and corruption. Administration thus becomes the law’. W. Bel Hadj Amor, 
« Mais que savent donc les Américains? », in Leaders 29 (2013), pp. 40-41, p. 41. 
21 K. Roach, ‘Security Forces Reform for Tunisia’, in Z. Al-Ali - R. Stacey 
(eds.), Consolidating the Arab Spring: Constitutional Transition in Egypt and 
Tunisia, Stockholm - New York, International IDEA & The Center for Constitutional 
Transitions at NYU Law, 2013. 
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freedoms’.22 Furthermore, against the grain of Human Rights 
concerns, it introduces the death penalty. It is possible that the 
counterterrorism law provided the tinder for the tragic attack at the 
Bardo Museum on 18th March 2015, the same day the draft was 
discussed in Parliament, the centre of which adjoins the Museum. 
In Foucault’s theorization, governmentality is the power of 
regulation rather than the law, and it pertains to the executive rather 
than the sovereign. The latter’s moralizing orientation is excluded 
from the ‘governmentalized’ State, which does not need any ethical 
principle to accomplish its ruling tasks. At the same time, 
governmentality retrieves sovereignty and the law as tactics of self-
legitimization.23 Therefore, in Foucault’s reasoning governmentality 
does not exclude sovereignty and discipline: Foucault does not foresee 
a linear evolutionary process among these forms of power. He detects 
a relationship of complementarity (or triangulation) among them 
instead, since the management of population (the task of governmental 
power) involves its disciplining, and the disciplining of the population 
involves in turn the question of the authorizing principle that 
underpins sovereignty. 
Though the Islamic movement in Tunisia does not claim the 
sovereign power of some moralizing institution, as could be the case 
with some ‘ulamā’ cabinet in an Islamic form of State, it has been 
looking for a balance between a moral principle (Islam) and the 
governmental power inherited from the autocratic regime. Indeed, the 
shift from opposition to power entailed the movement’s shift to the 
governmental techniques, as expressed by the technocratic character 
of the Islamic cabinets from 2011 to 2013. The governmental 
techniques of the previous regime are seen as the despotic aggravation 
of the modern disciplinary power, yet the Islamic movement is not 
aiming at replacing it with some sovereign power with the Islamic law 
at its core. It is looking for a triangulation among these forms of 
power instead; the reference to religion in the Constitution is aimed at 
the quest for the sovereignty of the law, whose authority in this case is 
linked to the divine message, as the foundation of power despite the 
plight of the governmental fragmentation of the State powers. The 
religious reference in other terms is a tactic inside the quest for an 
                                                 
22 Human Rights Watch, ‘Memo on Counterterrorism Law in Tunisia’, 8/4/2015, 
in https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/08/memo-counterterrorism-law-tunisia (access 
6/12/2016).  
23 Butler, Vite precarie. 
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authorizing principle of sovereignty. One may consider sheikh Rachid 
Ghannouchi’s refusal of any institutional post as part of this tactic; the 
President of Ennahdha preserved his role as a moral, political and 
strategic guide for the activists and the Islamist representatives in the 
NCA and later in the Parliament elected in 2014. This helped to keep 
both the balance between the secular and religious forces, and the 
triangulation of the forms of power. 
Rather than considering democracy and authoritarianism as 
radically opposed, the comparative analysis of experience-near and 
distant concepts of governmentality, Islamic rule and sharīʻa show the 
convergences between such political systems. Governmentality 
represents the continuity existing between the authoritarian rule in 
Tunisia and the emerging forms of power. 
 
Reflexivism 
The major historical dimension of change, introduced - quite 
suddenly, one might say - in the Middle Eastern scholarship by the so-
called Arabs springs, directly influenced my own minor story as an 
anthropologist with a Middle Eastern ethnographic pedigree and much 
hoped-for academic career. Indeed, at the beginning of December 
2010 I was granted by Milan-Bicocca University a four-year contract 
as a researcher, on the basis of a project aimed at studying the 
‘patrimonialization’ of Syrian cultural heritage, following the main 
topic I had been developing during the previous seven years. After a 
few days, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi gave rise to the 
Tunisian revolution; in just a few weeks the revolutionary wave 
expanded to Egypt and in a few months it inflamed other Arab 
countries. In Syria, the violent reaction of the establishment provoked 
the civil war that had been avoided in Tunisia and Egypt thanks to the 
cautious behaviour of the local armies that did not act as the 
watchdogs of antidisestablishmentarianism. The Syrian plight forbade 
the prosecution of my fieldwork there, whereas the revolutionary 
process in Tunisia was stimulating for my anthropological interests; 
furthermore, after a few months of fieldwork there, I started to cope 
with the dimension of change in my main anthropological paradigms, 
introduced by the hermeneutic and existential condition that 
anthropologists term ‘being there’, namely the ethnographic experience 
that shapes the researcher’s theoretical concerns and fieldwork itself. 
The reflexive approach in the anthropological study of cultures 
disseminated the idea that the deeper the involvement of the 
114 Domenico COPERTINO 
researcher in the reality s/he is studying, the more comprehensive is 
the understanding of that culture and society. Thus the presence of the 
researcher in the field, far from being considered a misleading 
interference in the setting of fieldwork, that could distort the results of 
research, is enhanced by this approach. The description of one’s 
involvement in the studied context is fundamental to introduce 
convincingly to that culture the readers of the final essay. Explaining 
this involvement, bringing it from the personal experience of the 
researcher to the public presentation of his/her methodological tools, 
allows the anthropologist to keep the needed balance between 
immersion and detachment. 
Immersion in the post-revolutionary Tunisian context was easy for 
me, as an ethnographer that had spent already several years of 
fieldwork in other Arab countries. This is likely to be due to the 
compelling wave of freedom of expression in Tunisia after the 
revolution, which makes that context attractive for anthropologists and 
researchers in Middle Eastern issues. Had I to compare the troubles I 
faced in Syria (strangers’ suspicion, control by the security service), 
though studying an apparently apolitical issue (the patrimonialization of 
cultural heritage), to my ease in conducting an inquiry on a topic – the 
Islamic youth associations – considered sensitive in Tunisia until just a 
few months before my stay there, I would stress how research practices 
have been influenced by historical change. This would be no 
patchwork comparison, if one considers the similarities between the 
Tunisian and Syrian autocratic regimes during the last 20 years.24 
Speaking freely about Islam and how this religious tradition 
influences politics, daily life, and people’s social interrelationships 
                                                 
24 F. Rizzi, Mediterraneo in rivolta, Castelvecchi, Roma, 2011; M. F. Corrao 
(ed.), Le rivoluzioni arabe. La transizione mediterranea, Mondadori, Milano, 2011; 
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en marche, Les Editions de l'Atelier, Paris, 2011; Council on Foreign Relations, The 
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Foreign Relations, Lexington, 2011; J. A. Goldstone, Understanding the Revolutions 
of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies, Council of 
Foreign Affairs 90/3 (May-June 2011); J. P. Filiu, The Arab Revolution; M. 
Campanini (ed.), Le rivolte arabe e l’Islam: la transizione incompiuta, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2013; S. Mehli, « La Syrie, deux siècles de révolutions », in Revue 
Averroès 4/5 Spécial Printemps arabe (2011), pp. 1-8; C. Ryan, ‘The New Arab 
Cold War and the Struggle for Syria’, in Middle East Report 262 (Spring 2012), 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/new-arab-cold-war-struggle-syria; A. Cantaro 
(ed.), Dove vanno le primavere arabe, Ediesse, Roma, 2013. 
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and worldviews, in particular, was one right claimed by the revolution 
and gained through the liberation from a totalitarian regime that 
forbade the public expression of religious conviction and belonging, 
under the guise of a modernist and secularist ideal. 
The reflexive approach pursues one of the aims of cultural 
anthropology, that is bridging the gap between different cultures, by 
stressing the similarities existing beside differences; the researcher in 
this approach becomes the living proof of continuity between cultures, 
rather than the external observer of the Other. The presentation of the 
anthropologist’s life-story during fieldwork shows how the society and 
the culture s/he studied reflect on his/her subjectivity as a Western or 
Westernized researcher; Abu-Lughod’s Veiled Sentiments, a complex 
work that opened several horizons to the anthropological study of the 
Middle East, among other things is the story of the progressive tuning 
between the researcher’s and the researched’s emotions, sentiments, 
interpretations of relationships, and subsequent behaviours and 
worldviews. This approach is particularly fruitful for the study of the 
Arab world and the Middle-East, since it is liable to tone down the 
sense of otherness spread by the traditional ethnographic descriptions of 
these cultures. Indeed, reflexivity in anthropology shows how the 
Western self-changes through the prolonged contact with the others. 
As a consequence, the description of the anthropologist’s 
positioning in the studied field is not pushed into the background as a 
methodological aside; it is rather conceived of as an authoritative part 
of the account, key to the author’s reasoning and understanding of the 
other culture. The sense of freedom researchers experience doing 
fieldwork in post-revolutionary Tunisia is related to the historical 
change and conquered freedom of expression. Researchers are likely 
to work without obstacles in such a context; as social actors living in 
the field they are working in, they are likely to act at ease. Those 
studying the political movements that fostered freedom of expression 
during the revolutionary process cannot help dealing with the climate 
of their stay in the studied field. The reluctances of my Syrian 
informants (at least in the first part of my fieldwork there) and, on the 
contrary, the openness of Tunisians steered my research towards 
different directions. The caution my Syrian acquaintances often showed 
speaking with me and, on the other side, the flood of information that 
often overwhelmed me during my conversations and interviews in 
Tunisia (in a few weeks, I filled almost half the number of notebooks I 
had filled in over two years in Syria) drove me to different ways of 
116 Domenico COPERTINO 
conceiving the ethnographic fieldwork and understanding these 
cultures. In Syria, my undesired encounters and forced rendezvous with 
security service officers and would-be informers, acted as wake-up calls 
which served me to overcome naivety in relationships and taught me 
caution and endurance in my methods. Furthermore, on the one hand I 
noticed that sometimes it was me who was perceived as a potential 
informer for the authorities, especially when my participant 
observation included following practices that did not abide strictly by 
the law (such as some loose restorations of ancient private houses); on 
the other hand, sometimes my relational skills (part of the 
anthropologist’s tool kit) were exploited by social actors to 
communicate with each other despite the different socio-economic 
status and position in the arena of the patrimonialization of cultural 
heritage.25 This led me to observe the ethnographic encounter (the 
observation of participation in Tedlock’s terms)26 as one between 
different subjects (the anthropologist and the informants) who were 
likely to convey information to other people and whose identities were 
the product of mutual negotiation.27 
The choice of the very subjects of my research was influenced by 
the different climate of my fieldwork. The topic of Islamic activism 
was peripheral in my Syrian research, since it was surrounded with 
general suspicion there and concerned small niches of the population. 
Mosque discussions were always controlled by security officers; only 
one of my informants was a frequenter of such meetings, from whom 
he drew his worldview and behaviour patterns. On the contrary, in 
Tunisia my understanding of Islamic activism was influenced by the 
fact that it was victorious in the post-revolutionary Tunisian society. 
As an aside, both the extraordinary historical circumstances and the 
suitability of Tunisia as an ethnographic field are pushing many 
Middle Eastern anthropologists to move there from other troubled 
contexts in the area. This is likely to lead to the construction of a new 
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‘zone of theory’, in Abu-Lughod’s terms (1989): besides being the 
anthropologists’ preferred conceptual frameworks, the zones of theory 
are also the most frequently chosen geographic areas for ethnographic 
fieldwork. Noting that Geertz chose Morocco – as many other 
anthropologists – for his fieldwork and likened it to the American Far 
West, Abu-Lughod stated that the Middle Eastern anthropologists’ 
preferred geographic zones were the peripheries of the Arab world, the 
farther from the central areas, often at war or in political turmoil, the 
better.  
 
Praxiology 
The main contribution of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the 
current debate in anthropology is the redefinition of culture by means 
of the concept of habitus. Through the notion of habitus as related to 
specific social classes, Bourdieu added new layers of complexity to 
both the Marxist notion of class and the anthropological notion of 
culture: class structures play a role in people’s life, though they do not 
determine social action; they activate systems of permanent 
dispositions (habitus) that in turn generate practices or social action. 
Therefore, people’s practices, acts, thoughts, perceptions, expressions 
and utterances emerge in Bourdieu’s theory as regulated 
improvisations produced by habitus; they are limited by the material, 
historical and social conditions under which they are produced. 
Practices generated by habitus reproduce such objective conditions. 
Regularities in social action are due to these permanent dispositions 
that people internalise as a form of ingrained knowledge rather than a 
set of cultural rules. Thanks to Bourdieu’s formulation, 
anthropologists no longer do not need to write lists of the norms 
people follow in their daily behaviours, activities and 
interrelationships; getting to know people’s habitus and sharing it with 
them provides the researcher with a framework within which to locate 
and understand both cultural regularities and exceptions, 
improvisations, and the violation of rules. Some Islamic activists, for 
instance, though promoting the norm of gender segregation, do not 
always observe it strictly; but they are nonetheless not considered bad 
practitioners of the principles they promote. Indeed, rather than a 
norm, Islamic activists’ ideas of gender are part of their wider habitus 
of homosociality, understood as a framework according to which they 
act in their daily interrelationships and interpret other people’s 
positioning, interactions, distancing from the rules. One day, while I 
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was having a conversation with two young activists about their ideas 
of proper gender interactions, they spotted two friends of theirs in the 
same coffee bar where we were sitting, one boy and one girl, both 
members of their association, sitting at a table. Although gender 
promiscuity is avoided in their activities, after some momentary 
surprise, they said it was alright, since they were sitting in a public 
venue and they were not doing anything on the sly.  
Islamic activists gained freedom of expression by taking part in the 
revolution, though acting as individuals rather than movements. 
Living in a secularized society, they sense secularization in their daily 
lives, activities and interrelationships. Their project of spreading the 
Islamic tendency in politics and society is not in contradiction with the 
secularization of Tunisian society and the State. Rached Ghannouchi 
often referred to the concepts of ‘procedural secularism’ (‘almāniyya 
ijrā’iyya) and ‘partial secularism’ (‘almāniyya juz’iyya), to explain 
that the separation of powers in the State is not in contrast to its 
fundamental religious convictions. In other terms, the Islamic 
movement rejects reducing the different meanings of secularization – 
separation of powers, decline of the levels of belief, disenchantment of 
the conditions of belief –to the simple exclusion of religion from the 
public sphere, what Ghannouchi terms ‘integral secularism’ 
(‘almāniyya shāmila).28 
Tunisian Islamists see their activism as a contribution to the 
pluralist public sphere in the post-revolutionary Tunisian society. 
Among the goals of ash-Shabab ar-Rissali is ‘Fostering the logic of 
dialogue (manṭiq al-ḥiwār) and the value of coexistence (at-tā’ish al-
mushtarek)’. Young engineer Yahia Kchaou, an activist from the 
association I met in 2013, explained to me that 
 
Tunisian Islam is tolerant: that’s why we organize open discussions, 
with believers and nonbelievers. This is secularism: it’s a framework 
of respect for difference. Dialogue is different from tolerance, though 
the Islamic State safeguards non-Muslims and the Coran protects 
nonbelievers.29 
 
The Islamist discourse about pluralism covers the active 
confrontation with people who do not share religious convictions, 
pregnant with meaning in Tunisia, considering the scope of the 
                                                 
28 C. Taylor, L’età secolare, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2009. 
29 Interview with the author, Tunis, September 2013. 
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secularist world in Tunisian society, inside which the Islamist 
discourse involves but a limited part of the population. Ash-Shabab ar-
Rissali activists’ daily interrelationships involve mainly people who 
do not share the Islamist discourse; the neat distinction between 
secularists and Islamists, often stressed by both Tunisian and foreign 
observers, is sometimes the subject of the shabāb’s jokes. Once Yahia, 
asking me how my research was getting along, said: ‘So? Did you 
meet any ‘almāniyyīn (secularists)?’.30  
Besides personal interrelationships, in the last decades there has 
been a political and intellectual convergence between Tunisian 
secularists and Islamists, what Yadh Ben Achour31 termed ‘the 
Islamization of the democrats and the democratization of political 
Islam’.32 The opposition movements have combined their efforts 
against the regime since 2015, when they formed the 18th October 
Committee, a trans-ideological movement composed by personalities 
from the Congrès pour la République (CPR),33 the Parti démocrate 
progressiste,34 activists from the Islamic movement,35 secularist36 and 
Islamist37 journalists. The Committee rejected the regime’s anti-
Islamic rhetoric, shared by part of the opposition (e.g. Et-Tajdid 
party). 
                                                 
30 Interview with the author, Tunis, September 2013. 
31 Ben Achour, ‘Religion, Revolution, and Constitution: the case of Tunisia’. 
32 Ib. 
33 Among whom Abderraouf Ayadi e Fethi Jerbi; CPR was founded in 2001 by 
Moncef Marzouki, former President of the Republic. 
34 Among whom the leader of the party, Nejib Chebbi. 
35 Such as Ziad Daoulatli and Samir Dillou. 
36 Such as Lofti Hajji, director of the magazine Leaders. 
37 Such as Mohamed Fourati, who was imprisoned several times because of his 
adhesion to Ennahdha (V. Geisser - E. Gobe, « Des fissures dans la « Maison 
Tunisie ? »  Le régime de Ben Ali face aux mobilisations protestataires », L’Année 
du Maghreb II Dossier: Femmes, famille et droit (2005-2006), pp. 353-414). 
Furthermore, 18 October Committee brought together the opposition parties and 
organizations represented in Paris (V. Geisser - E. Gobe, « La question de 
« l’autenticité tunisienne » : valeur refuge d’un regime à bout de soufflé? », in Y. 
Ben Achour - E. Gobe (eds), Justice politique et société au Maghreb. L’Année du 
Maghreb III, CNRS Editions, Paris, 2007, pp. 371-408), such as the CPR itself, the 
Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés, Ennahdha, the Tunisian Workers 
Communist Party, the Nasserist Union, the Association of political prisoners’ 
families and relatives, the Tunisian Committee of Human Rights, Solidarité 
tunisienne, Voix Libre. 
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Thus the Islamic movement has practiced pluralism over the last 
decade. As MP Meherzia Labidi told me in March 2015, 
 
It’s intellectual pluralism. This was one of the first issues Ennahdha 
dealt with, since it was founded: we were aware we didn’t represent 
the whole Tunisia. Pluralism emerged in the movement’s mentality 
and action: in 2015 we joined the 18th October coalition, with 
personalities from the centre, the left, liberals and communists, about 
the core issues in building the new Tunisia: democracy, citizenship, 
change in power, opposition to Ben Ali.38 
 
Nonetheless, the Islamic discourse is hegemonic, in Gramsci’s terms 
(1966).39 Bourdieu’s praxiological approach provides the conceptual 
tools to interpret Gramsci’s idea of hegemony from an anthropological 
perspective. Hegemony indeed does not describe people’s coercive 
abidance by norms and ideology; it accounts for the spontaneous 
prevailing of consensus about certain shared ideas and behavioural 
patterns. Drawing on Campanini and Mezran’s work,40 I analysed 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as part of the Tunisian du‘āt’s (those 
who pursue da‘wa) practices and ideas of Islamic social and political 
activism. In Gramsci’s reflection, hegemony implies the complex 
ways coercion and consensus interact to maintain the domination of 
the masses; the Italian intellectual shows the overlapping of forms of 
power exerted by the political society, institutions and government on 
the one side (coercion), and those wielded by civil society, private 
citizens and intellectuals on the other side (consensus). Hegemony is 
thus the way power relationships are produced and reproduced, 
sustaining social inequalities.41 As a ‘complex interlocking of political, 
social and cultural forces’,42 hegemony covers the social process 
through which the dominant ideology (as an articulate, conscious and 
formal system of values, meanings, ideas and convictions) is lived and 
practically organized through dominant meanings and values. Besides 
indoctrination and exploitation, it covers a whole system of practices, 
                                                 
38 Interview with the author, Tunis, March 2015. 
39 A. Gramsci, Quaderni dal carcere, Einaudi, Torino, 1966. 
40 M. Campanini - K. Mezran (eds.), I Fratelli musulmani nel mondo 
contemporaneo, Utet, Torino, 2010. 
41 A. F. K. Crehan, Gramsci, cultura e antropologia, ed. it. a cura di Giovanni 
Pizza, Argo, Lecce, 2010, p. 114. 
42 R. Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford University Press, London, 1977, 
p. 108. 
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expectations, and the ways people perceive themselves and their 
world. Like religion in Durkheim’s43 and Geertz’s44 view, hegemony is 
a lived system of meanings and values that confirm each other, being 
experienced practically. 
The Islamic movement in Tunisia is trying to produce its hegemony 
in society, having developed its counter-hegemonic discourse for 
decades under the secular regimes. It covers both political and civil 
society, that in the Islamic hegemonic project do not appear as 
separated universes, but rather as a weaving of interests and 
interrelationships. The ethnographic glance shows the continuities 
existing between Islamic political representatives and du‘āt; in my 
research I got to know both thanks to their mutual acquaintance. 
Though some young du‘āt accept the islāmī (Islamist) designation, 
others refuse such self-identification. Achref Wachani, a computer 
engineer in his twenties and an activist from the Shabab ar-Rissali 
youth association, once told me: 
 
I hate the term “Islamist”! For me, my Muslim belonging descends 
from tradition. Islam invites to be active citizens rather than activists! 
Problems get solved through commitment, not through Islamic 
slogans. Many call themselves Islamists, but they don’t do anything 
but waving their flags to attract people. Furthermore, those involved 
with the recent terrorist attacks call themselves Islamists, which scares 
people.45 
 
Achref had followed a course in Islamic finance and wished to 
work for Zeytouna, the only Tunisian bank inside the financial circuit 
observing the shariatic rules concerning credit. Though holding 
ambitions of changing the Tunisian banking system following Islamic 
rules, in 2013 he was working for a bank that did not practice them. In 
mid-2014 he decided to change jobs and got a job in a technology 
development company; though earning less, he was happier, having 
followed his conscience. Furthermore, for du‘āt pursuing the rituals is 
not enough to live in accordance to Islam; one day in March 2015 I 
was walking with Achref in Bourguiba ave, in Tunis, which was 
packed with people going to the mosques for the Friday prayer (al-
                                                 
43 É. Durkheim, The Forms of the Elementary Religious Life, Translated from the 
French by Joseph Ward Swain, Collier Books, New York, 1961. 
44 C. Geertz, Interpretazione di culture, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1998. 
45 Interview with the author, Tunis, April 2015. 
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jumū‘a); the crowd was such that many were praying in the street. 
Achref said: 
 
They hardly give over one hour per week to religion: they rush to the 
city centre, they pray and then go back to their daily activities. They 
separate religion from life. For me and my friends it’s different. Islam 
gives us a model to live an engaged life and work hard for our society. 
Islam counters easy money and invites to work hard.46 
 
Indeed, for Tunisian du‘āt Islam is not just an intellectual 
conviction nor a belief to be lived inwardly. Achref told me:  
 
We don’t agree with those who say that Islam is only an inner 
dimension of the heart, as religion is conceived of in the European or 
American tradition.47  
 
Islam for them is a framework showing how to be active in society, 
not as activists but as citizens. Islamic education, the main aim of 
Shabab ar-Rissali, is intended as an invitation to young people to live as 
active Muslims. This is how they construct their hegemonic discourse, 
aimed at making Islam a spontaneous inclination in daily life. 
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Islam and Citizenship in Tunisia after the Yasmine 
Revolution. The Debate over the Law of Awqāf 
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Abstract 
Tunisia has been the engine of those awakenings that, collectively known as 
Arab Springs, shook several countries of the MENA region (Middle East and 
North Africa) between 2010 and 2011. As in Egypt, the victory of the most prom-
inent Islamic party, al-Nahḍa, raised ancient debates on the compatibility of Islam, 
citizenship and democracy, both at a scholarly and civil society level. During the 
constitutional drafting, al-Nahḍa’s behavior was cautious even if several of its 
members defended proposals commonly judged to be at odds with the liberal con-
ception of citizenship. These discrepancies between declarations and praxis can be 
observed in many occasions and, as a consequence, al-Nahḍa has been accused of 
double standards. This could be the case of the project of law (no. 55/2013) on the 
restoration of awqāf, issued on November 2013. According to the Islamic law, 
awqāf, sometimes called ḥabūs, are ‘pious foundations’ independent from the 
State and owned by the Muslim community. This paper analyzes the draft law 
proposed by the Islamists and explores its consequences over the Tunisian society. 
If, on the one hand, having awqāf restored could be a matter of identity for the 
Tunisians and part of their religious freedoms, on the other side, which is the im-
pact of restoring awqāf on the empowerment of citizenship rights and the process 
of democracy building? Discussing this controversial project law, I support the 
thesis that, during the first four years after the revolution, Islamists of al-Nahḍa 
deliberately issued controversial draft laws in order to ‘test’ the societal reaction, 
and thus modifying their agenda. Under this light, restoring awqāf could be con-
ceived as part of al-Nahḍa’s political strategy. 
 
Introduction 
Tunisia has been the engine of those awakenings that, collectively 
known as Arab Springs, shook several countries of the MENA region 
(Middle East and North Africa) between 2010 and 2011. As in Egypt, 
the victory of al-Nahḍa, the most prominent Islamic party at the first 
democratic elections, raised ancient debates on the compatibility of 
Islam, citizenship and democracy, both at a scholarly and civil society 
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level.1 During the constitutional drafting, al-Nahḍa’s behavior was 
cautious even if several of its members defended proposals commonly 
judged to be at odds with a liberal conception of citizenship. Alleged 
discrepancies between declarations and praxis can be observed on 
many occasions and, as a consequence, al-Nahḍa has been accused of 
‘two sideness’. 
This has been the case, for example, with the proposed law 
no.55/2013 on the restoration of awqāf, forwarded by al-Nahḍa and 
issued on November 2013.2 According to Islamic law, awqāf, 
sometimes called ḥabūs, are ‘pious foundations’ independent from the 
state and owned by the Muslim community. The secular opposition 
reacted by arguing that the restoration of the awqāf could be detrimental 
for the concept of citizenship in different ways. For example, while the 
2014 Constitution proclaims equality between men and women, 
restoring awqāf could maintain the traditional discrimination of women 
concerning inheritance, prescribed by the Personal Status Code.3 
This paper argues that the restoration of awqāf, while representing 
a sensitive issue for the Islamists, could indeed affect the modern 
conception of citizenship. The first part describes the awqāf from the 
point of view of Islamic law. Knowledge of the functioning of pious 
foundations, as codified by medieval jurisprudence, is necessary to 
understand their tentative application today. 
The second section analyses the development of citizenship in the 
Muslim world since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the formation 
of national states in the Mediterranean basin. According to western 
scholars, citizenship rights developed in Europe due to an 
‘incremental approach’. Not only civil and political rights were 
acquired before social rights, but they also allowed the 
implementation of the latter. 
The third paragraph explains how pious foundations and 
citizenship rights are related in the Muslim world. The rise of 
                                                            
1 F. Gerges, ‘The Islamist Movement: from Islamic State to Civil Islam?’, in 
Political Science Quarterly 128/3 (2013), pp. 389-426. On the Arab Springs see E. 
Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
Lessons from the Arab Spring’, in Comparative Politics 42/2 (2012), pp. 127-149.  
2 For the draft law: http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/projets/projets. 
jsp?n=55&a=2013 (access 12/9/2014). 
3 A. Ghribi, ‘Will Tunisian Women Finally Inherit What They Deserve?’, in 
Foreign Policy, 07/02/2016, http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/02/ 
07/will_tunisian_women_finally_inherit_what_they_deserve (access 2/12/2016). 
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secularist regimes in the MENA region, starting from the Second 
World War, passed through the nationalization of awqāf. In order to 
fight against political Islam, Muslims were taken out of their 
traditional spaces of socialization such as mosques or madāris. This, 
in turn, obstructed the development of citizenship rights, because 
awqāf played a huge role in providing social care and services. Pious 
foundations could be detrimental for certain categories of civil rights 
and the final part of this essay points out that revitalizing awqāf in 
today’s Muslim world could produce consequences mainly with main 
to gender issues.  
The principle of awqāf as defined by the Sunni schools of Islamic 
law is an Islamic specific kind of almsgiving. Waqf word means 
‘immobilization’ because constituting a waqf causes the inalienability 
of its assets once they are turned into pious foundations. Generally, 
scholars distinguish between two kinds of foundations: charitable 
waqf, which include commodities at the disposal of the community 
such as hospitals, mosques, schools, fountains etc., and civil waqf 
which is a kind of legal contract neither encouraged nor discouraged 
by the sharī‘a, employed primarily to protect private property. 
Turning assets into pious foundations immunizes them against 
occupation or expropriation.  
Beneficiaries of awqāf could be individuals or specific groups 
(such as the poor of a given city). Every kind of movable and 
immovable property could be turned into awqāf.4 In the oldest Islamic 
jurisprudential sources, the discipline of waqf was included under the 
general category of almsgiving (ṣadaqa).5 According to some 
scholars, waqf is an institution that did not exist in pre-Islamic Arabia 
                                                            
4 On awqāf in general see: A. A. Islahi, Waqf: a Bibliography, Scientific 
Publishing Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jedda, 2003. 
5 The word waqf is often replaced by ḥubs/ḥubus. Verbs waqafa and ḥabasa 
express the same idea of ‘to bind or immobilize’. The difference between the two 
words is only geographical, waqf being mainly in use in the near eastern countries 
while ḥubs/ ḥubus is more frequent in North Africa. The Ḥanafi and Māliki schools 
have developed a more detailed case law in this regard. For a Ḥanafi perspective on 
waqf see: Al-Shaybānī, Aḥkām al-Awqāf, Maktaba al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, Cairo, 
1965, pp. 1-5. For Māliki school see: Saḥnūn ibn Saʻīd, al-Mudawwana al-kubrā 
li’l-Imām Mālik riwāya Sahnūn, 4 vol., Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, Beirut, 1994; J. 
Schacht, ‘Early Doctrines of Waqf’, in Fuad Köprülü Armagani, Mélanges Fuad 
Köprülü, Osman Yalçin Matbaasi, Istanbul, 1953, pp. 444-452.  
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and was introduced by Islam.6 Therefore, its implementation dates 
back from immediately after the death of Muḥammad, as the Prophet 
frequently invited believers to perform charitable works and to use 
their property for actions pleasing to God.7 
With the rise of national states in the Arab-Islamic world, after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it is estimated that about three 
quarters of the land in Turkey, half in Algeria and a third in Tunisia 
were established as waqf. This helps to illustrate the importance that 
this institution has maintained over the centuries, although it was not 
ordered explicitly in the Qur’an. Initially the waqf acted as a way to 
encourage good behavior and balance social inequalities.8 According 
to a tradition, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb asked the Prophet to recommend a 
way to do something worthwhile. Muḥammad then advised him to sell 
a piece of land and give alms with the funds acquired. 
The waqf has been practiced since the second century of the hijra, 
and, according to historical sources, the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd 
pushed the Ḥanafi jurist Abū Yūsuf to regulate in detail this institution 
in his famous essay titled Kitāb al-Kharāj.9 Even the University of al-
Azhar, founded by the Fatimid Caliph al-Muʻizz in 970 AD, was 
equipped with a heritage constituted as waqf, the proceeds of which 
were employed to pay maintenance fees and teachers’ salaries. 
Islamic jurisprudence has codified two types of waqf: the first is the 
khayrī and the second ahlī.10 The first is the public waqf, established 
for the general welfare of the community and the primary purpose of 
providing services. Since the start of Islamic history, in fact, this 
institution held a social purpose: waqf were set up as schools, 
                                                            
6 D. Santillana, Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malichita, con riguardo anche al 
sistema sciafiita, Istituto per l’Oriente, Roma, 1925, vol. 2, p. 414. 
7 A. Cilardo, ‘Waqf’, in C. Fitzpatrick - A. Walker (eds.), Muhammad in History, 
Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God, ABC-CLIO, Santa 
Barbara, 2014, vol. 2, pp. 677-681; W. F. Fratcher, ‘The Islamic Wakf’, in Missouri 
Law Review 36/2, 1971, University of Missouri School of Law, pp. 153-166. See on 
that point, Cor. II, 215: ‘They ask you what you have to give away from their 
property. Reply: “what you give away your substance is for parents, relatives, 
orphans, the poor, the wayfarers; all that you do for good, God will know”’. 
8 A D’Emilia, Scritti di Diritto Islamico, ed. Francesco Castro, Istituto per 
l’Oriente, Roma, 1976, p. 237. 
9 Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, Dār al-Ma‘rifa li’l-Tibā‘a wa’l-Nashr, Beirut, 
1979. See also one of the oldest and accurate translations: E. Fagnan (ed.), Le livre 
de l’impôt foncier, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1921. 
10 P. C. Hennigan, The Birth of a Legal Institution. The Formation of the Waqf in 
Third Century Hanafi Discourse, Brill, Leiden, 2004, pp. xiii-xiv. 
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mosques, public fountains, hospitals, depots and similar facilities. 
Because the waqf was configured as an act of charity, it usually 
accomplished a charitable purpose and resulted from an act of selfless 
generosity. Muslims who decided to set up a waqf, from a property or 
an asset, should not expect anything in return, if not the reward of God 
after death. 
The waqf ahlī, however, is significantly different. This type of 
foundation was used to please those who constituted the pious 
foundation. This is true in the case of real estate, where the owner 
could employ waqf to distribute his inheritance to his heirs in the form 
of donations carried out according to his own will, following an 
arbitrarily established line. The descendants were called ‘aqib, a term 
that includes the male and female offspring in the first degree of 
kinship but is limited to males in the successive degrees, though some 
scholars also admitted females. In fact, if the foundation was donated 
to benefit all the descendants (awlād), then it regarded both men and 
women. 
The waqf ahlī was often employed to circumvent the succession 
rules imposed by the Qur’an that caused a fragmentation of 
inheritance among a large number of heirs. However, it also served to 
protect the assets from dissipation and to avoid expropriation by the 
political authority. In fact, the will of the waqf owner prevailed over 
the judiciary and the Caliph, except when the purpose for which the 
foundation was created was at odds with the sharīʻa. 
The first aim of civil waqf was, thus, to evade the strict rules the 
Qur’an imposed in the field of inheritance.11 In pre-Islamic Arabia, 
there was no equal right for inheritance: women were not entitled to 
inherit anything at all. Islam ascribed to women the capacity to inherit, 
even though they could receive less than men. The civil waqf, which is 
not prescribed by the sources of Islamic law but was elaborated by the 
jurisprudence of the scholars, sometimes allowed the restoration of pre 
Islamic customs. Constituting a pious foundation, a man could decide 
the lineage of succession in heritage, for example, in favor of his sons, 
by wholly excluding daughters. It is important to underline, however, 
that there are also records of waqf being used to ensure equal 
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inheritance for males and females. In short, the usage of waqf depends 
only on the will of its founder.12 
In Islamic law, both types of waqf require a formal act of creation, 
signed by the wāqif or muḥabbis. The constituent can be an individual 
or a community. The wāqif must possess the legal capacity to dispose 
of his assets and must have the following requirements: freedom; legal 
age; rationality; physical integrity. In addition, the wāqif must possess 
the assets he wants to immobilize and should have full contractual 
capacity. The dhimmīs are able to create pious foundations provided 
that their purposes are not in contrast with Islamic law. Even in this 
case, it is required that the waqf fulfills charitable purposes and is 
aimed at producing services in the interest of the community.13 The 
wāqif is not obliged to set up a foundation in his own name but he can 
also do it on behalf of another person or in execution of the decision 
of the latter. 
The beneficiary of the waqf (mawqūf ‘alaihi) can be an individual 
or a particular group of people, such as a disadvantaged social class. It 
can also be a non-profit organization or a work of public utility. If the 
recipients are citizens, they can also include non-Muslims as long as 
they are legally able to receive a donation. The following categories 
are unable to be the recipients of a waqf: non-Muslims who do not 
reside in the Islamic state and slaves, because by law they are unable 
to acquire assets. Revenues should be divided among the 
beneficiaries, regardless of age and sex, except when the wāqif has 
decided otherwise in the act of establishing the foundation, especially 
if it is a waqf ahlī. Only the beneficiaries can have access to the fruits 
of the waqf and everyone else who benefits, legally or illegally, from 
them can be accused of usurpation or misappropriation (ghaṣb). 
The substance (mawqūf) of the foundation can be any movable or 
immovable property, except in the case of goods prohibited by law. 
They also include all of the property owned by the settler. Besides 
being a good permitted by the law, however, it must be a precise 
object, well-defined but not necessarily present in the moment of 
institution of the waqf. The asset must be possessed before the 
formation of the waqf and it is not possible to constitute an asset 
which is still under construction. In the case of movable property, a 
group of witnesses must certify its possession by the wāqif and the 
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latter’s intention to create a foundation. All the schools of law 
consider the following assets permissible to set-up a waqf: lands, 
weapons, camels, horses, cattle, seeds, copies of the Qur’an. 
The purpose of the waqf must comply with the principles of Islam 
and must not contravene the sources of Islamic law. It is forbidden, for 
example, to establish a waqf that aims at the production and trade of 
wine or weapons to be used against Muslims. Constituting a waqf is 
an act to please God. Any public work which is considered legal is 
also grateful to God, according to the law: the maintenance of a 
mosque; the construction of a school or a public fountain; the creation 
of bridges, roads and hospitals; providing alms to the poor and needy. 
Moreover, a waqf that aims at benefiting a social class or a well 
determined family is also not permissible.14 Islamic law recognizes the 
following as charitable purposes: 1) providing alms to the poor; 2) 
developing education; 3) improving the health conditions of the 
population; 4) pursuing objectives related to local governance; 5) 
adopting policies that bring benefit to the community; 6) promoting 
the advancement of the Islamic religion. The latter includes the 
subsidies given to the maintenance of public goods, subsidies to pay 
teachers of Qur’anic schools and the fees intended for those who do 
not have the resources to perform the pilgrimage. Foundations which 
are established in order to foster a religion other than Islam are not 
valid and should be dissolved. 
The creation of a waqf is made legally valid through its acceptance 
by the beneficiary. This act may be implicit and may result from the 
mere possession of the asset. The beneficiary may refuse the donation 
and that decision is irrevocable. When a wāqif lists several 
beneficiaries, the rejection is valid only for those who have openly 
refused it and the fixed asset is donated to the second line of 
beneficiaries. Finally, it is required that the beneficiary takes 
possession of the asset, in either a factual or symbolic way. The 
administration of waqf should always take into account the will of the 
wāqif, expressed at the time of the constitution of the waqf. The 
beneficiaries are obliged to maintain the waqf and can enjoy their 
rightful part of its total income.15 
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All the schools of law agree that the wāqif must appoint a manager 
(nāẓir, also called mutawallī) who is responsible for its administration. 
It is possible to appoint more than one manager and, in this case, all 
managers are given equal powers. In fact, they are obliged to make 
decisions by consensus. According to one doctrine, however, there is a 
hierarchy among managers and usually only the first one is entitled to 
supervise the waqf. If the wāqif has not appointed a manager, this task 
must be performed by a judge. Anyone who is considered honest and 
of sound mind may be appointed as manager. Even dhimmīs can hold 
this task. A manager may also have a physical disability, as long as it 
does not preclude the administration of waqf. It is uncertain, however, 
if women can become managers. Lastly, the manager is required to be 
an adult.16 
 
Being Citizens in the Muslim World: From Dhimmitude to 
Citizenship 
There are few academic studies on citizenship in the Muslim world. 
While there are several works on democratization, the ‘citizenship 
perspective’ has been introduced only recently.17 The discourse on 
democracy and good governance in the Arab and Muslim world is 
typically dominated by questions pertaining to the role of the state in 
the economy, models of political participation, rule of law, and so 
on.18 These are fundamental issues that, as Butenschon stresses, must 
be discussed only when there is already an agreement on who 
legitimately constitutes the society that is the citizenry. But if 
citizenship is the ‘right to have rights’, then it is possible to conceive 
of it as an empty box to be filled by different perceptions of what is a 
right. Moreover, the ‘politics of citizenship’ must be analyzed on a 
double-track: on the one hand, it is true that citizenship, being issued 
by the state, is a mechanism of societal control which regulates the 
distribution of rights and obligations in a given society. This aspect 
                                                            
16 Clavel, Droit musulman, p. 14. 
17 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays, Cambridge 
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must be underlined when studying the post-awakening Arab societies, 
because the Islamists’ participation in politics could shape a new 
conception of citizenship. On the other hand, citizenship, through the 
struggle for civil, political and social rights, is shaped by society and 
must interpret its demands and aspirations. 
Looking at the extension and reduction of citizenship in the Arab 
world (i.e. within societies were religious, ethnic and social cleavages 
are present) implies studying which citizens are demanding which 
kinds of rights and, above all, if these requests are issued for the 
benefit of specific (religious, ethnic or social) groups or whether the 
whole citizenry will benefit from them. 
Rediscovering citizenship in the Arab world could help to revisit 
the Marshallian ‘incremental approach’. According to this theory, 
social citizenship is inconceivable without an established political 
citizenship while political citizenship presupposes civil citizenship.19 
In the Arab world, the three groups of citizenship rights have been, 
more or less officially, granted since the age of independence. 
However, people continue to struggle for them and, it is broadly 
accepted, the Arab uprisings erupted because of the lack of 
appropriate welfare systems, in the face of the international economic 
turmoil. This is the consequence of the failure of ‘revolutionary’ 
regimes (Nasserism, Baʻathism, Ghaddafism) as they were primarily 
concerned with the protection of their own power base.  
Citizenship, in its western conceptualization, supersedes all other 
patterns of authority, holding this principle as a prerequisite for an all-
inclusive and democratic citizenship. Thus, in the Arab world, 
citizenship must not reflect the state apparatus (regardless from its 
ideology) or the ‘majoritarian’ understanding of democracy, as 
purported by some Islamic theoreticians. Even when Muslim scholars 
underline the fact that Islam, being a universal religion, aims to create 
‘the’ more equal society, some discriminations persist, especially in 
the field of political rights as in the case of Tunisia where non-
Muslims are not allowed to run for presidency of the state, or in the 
field of gender issues. This situation bears parallels with the tension 
that exists between social and human rights because, as Turner 
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stresses, social rights are national, whereas human rights are global.20 
Moreover Turner adds that Marshall, in his conceptualization of 
modern citizenship, failed to incorporate ethnic and religious 
differences. As for the case of the Muslim world, the variables include 
not only the national understandings of rights, more or less completely 
inspired by universal human rights, but also the Islamic conceptions of 
rights that lack a unique interpretation. One should notice an 
important difference between citizenship, human and Islamic rights: 
citizenship rights are rights and obligations that attach to members of 
formally recognized nation-states and correspond to legal membership 
of a specific nation-state. Human rights are conceived as the core 
rights that belong to all the human beings per se while the Islamic set 
of rights belongs to Muslims and to the protected faiths in the 
framework of an Islamic state.  
The problem of the relationship between Islamic law and rights is 
addressed in works that usually seek to show as the sharīʻa does not 
constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the application of the latter, 
except in a few cases (such as some rules of Islamic criminal law that 
are highly detrimental to fundamental human rights). It was only 
during the 20th century that sharīʻa was codified into single national 
systems, opening up the problem of merging secular and religious 
laws. This topic has been discussed by An-Na‘im, a prominent 
Muslim scholar who, being critical of the traditional Islamic system of 
law, offered a middle path based on the necessity for a religious 
reform under the influence of international covenants.21 Similarly, 
Baderin explains that although there are differences of scope and 
application, there is no fundamental incompatibility between 
International and Islamic law, and that their differences could be 
better addressed if the concept of human rights were positively 
established from within the themes of Islamic law, rather than by 
imposing it upon Islamic law as an alien concept.22 
Citizenship, as mentioned above, is a bilateral relation where civil 
society shapes several demands, of which some are satisfied by the 
                                                            
20 B. S. Turner, ‘Islam, Civil Society and Citizenship. Reflections on the 
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state. In this perspective, the study of citizenship is also the study of 
the behavior of civil society and, at the same time, the study of the 
policies adopted by the state to face the growth of autonomous 
voluntary associations, as underlined by Ibrahim.23 In the post-
awakening Arab world, the new role of the Islamists in power could 
favor the emergence of Islamic associations that push for more 
religiously oriented understandings of citizenship, re-opening a harsh 
debate with secularist or non-partisan associations.  
This seems to be in line with Turner’s explanation of the gradual 
expansion of citizenship. According to him, citizenship expands when 
hierarchical and particularistic dimensions of social stratification are 
destroyed by violent or traumatic historical events and social 
movements.24 The political liberalization that followed, in certain 
countries, the Arab awakening, and which gave voice to the Islamists, 
could be thus taken to constitute the engine for the enlargement of 
citizenship. At the same time, however, the rise of the Islamists is 
perceived as a threat to its western liberal conception. This 
ambivalence is well described by Davis when he underlines that the 
imperative of secular democratic citizenship (i.e. equality before the 
law) in the Middle East conflicts with two well-established and 
entrenched interrelated political traditions, the first claiming the 
supremacy of one chosen confession over the state (fundamentalism) 
and the second proclaiming the supremacy of one chosen nation 
(sectarianism).25 Both fundamentalism and sectarianism represent 
gross violations of the universalist secular value of political freedom 
and, as a consequence, are perceived as tyrannical. 
As I argued above, citizenship is an empty shell, a legal device to 
which civil, political and social rights are attached. Being a citizen is a 
neutral condition that overcomes gender, ethnic and linguistic 
differences. The starting point for the analysis of citizenship in the 
Muslim world is the concept of dhimma. Dhimma is the specific 
instrument by which, historically, Islamic institutions have offered a 
regime of protection to members of recognized monotheistic faiths 
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(mainly Jews and Christians), in the Dār al-Islām. The enjoyment of 
this status was subject to the payment of a specific poll tax (jizya) 
(Cor. 9: 29) and it defined a category of rights and duties for the 
members of the ahl al-kitāb permanently residing in Muslim 
territories. 
Dhimmīs have therefore traditionally been considered proper 
subjects of the Islamic state and their status is kept distinct from that 
of both Muslims and idolaters. In addition, dhimmīs were 
distinguished from ḥarbis who, while professing the same faith, did 
not live in territories under the jurisdiction of Islam. Finally, dhimmīs 
also differed from musta’mīns, i.e. aliens who are granted the right to 
live in an Islamic territory for a short period (for most jurists, a year at 
most) mainly for economic reasons. Originally, only Jews and 
Christians fell into the category of dhimmīs. Soon, however, given the 
expansion of the Muslim empire under the ‘Abbasids, Zoroastrians too 
fell into the group of dhimmīs, and later, especially in Central Asia, 
even other minor faiths not mentioned in the Qur’an.26 
The transformation that took place in the Islamic Mediterranean 
area during the Ottoman Empire is closely tied to the idea of 
citizenship, national identity and the culture of belonging. With the 
adoption of the structural reforms known as the Tanẓimāt (between 
1829 and 1876), several Islamic institutions were abandoned and 
replaced with western juridical devices. Among them, the notion of 
citizenship, as sanctioned by the Ottoman Constitution. The Ottoman 
Constitution was adopted in 1876, and, although partially recalling the 
classical Islamic doctrine of the Caliphate and Sultanate, it 
transplanted civil law institutions and ascribed the legislative power to 
an Assembly, (forerunner of the modern Parliament). Moreover, the 
Constitution, itself an act of codification, stole the role of 
hermeneutics of the main sources of Islamic law (Qur’an and sunna) 
to the jurists (fuqahā’) and, most importantly, it identified new sources 
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for the law, namely the Sultan and Parliament. This ‘legal revolution’ 
was transmitted rapidly from the center to the periphery of the Empire, 
as demonstrated by the 1882 Egyptian Constitution.27 
The legal origin of citizenship in MENA countries is also rooted in 
the Ottoman citizenship law of 19th January 1869. The so-called 
‘Nationality Law of 1869’ created a common Ottoman citizenship 
irrespective of religious or ethnic divisions. This law introduced the 
ideas of citizenship and nationality into the Muslim world. At the 
time, tensions were erupting among the different ethnicities 
comprising Ottoman society, which was a complex mix of social, 
cultural, and religious communities. The crisis of the millet system, 
based upon the dhimma, was a sign of these tensions, particularly 
when set against the emerging system of foreign privileges, immunity, 
and interventions. This question was further complicated by the 
growth of new forms of national awareness and ‘identities’ which 
found a large audience among the different elites in Ottoman 
territories.28 For the Ottoman communities (millet), particularly those 
that were non-Muslim, these measures were understood as an 
application of the right to equality, while non-Turkish ethnicities and 
nationalities saw them as an opportunity to achieve a measure of 
participation. This was true even before secessionist demands began to 
spring up within the Ottoman Empire. 
The progressive abandonment of the Islamic traditional legal 
system across the Muslim world was preceded by a theoretical debate 
over the possibility, from the point of view of sharīʻa, to borrow 
western legal devices. Throughout the 19th century, scholars such as 
Rāfiʻ al-Tahṭāwī or Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī struggled to demonstrate 
how principles of equality, justice, participation and civil citizenship 
were not at odds with Islamic tradition. 
At the same time, the codification of Islamic law in the Ottoman 
context was particularly influenced by the French and Swiss models, 
and it produced a syncretism between the Islamic and the European 
legal and political cultures. Muslim scholars never agreed on the full 
compatibility of liberal philosophy with Islam and simply postponed 
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the debate. This emerges clearly when reading the minutes of the 
Cairo conference on the Caliphate held in Egypt in 1926.29 
Following the defeat of the Ottoman army in the First World War, 
scholars from several Muslim countries agreed not on the absolute 
impossibility of restoring the universal Caliphate but on the necessity 
to accept the rise of nation states prompted by the ‘new nationalist 
forces’. The debates over the nature of the ‘Islamic state’ and, then, 
those about citizenship within such a state remained unresolved. In the 
absence of a new and conclusive ijtihād (juridical effort to produce 
regulations in accordance with the Qur’an but also in touch with the 
spirit of the time) in the spheres of politics and citizenship, an 
interpretation that could make the status of dhimma more inclusive, 
some Muslim thinkers continue to sustain the idea that dhimmitude 
does not give full citizenship to non-Muslims inside the Islamic 
polity.30 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, by the 1930s, the 
emerging nation-states adopted different constitutional texts. Almost 
all national Constitutions, while indicating sharīʻa as ‘one’ or ‘the’ 
source of legislation, refused the ancient Islamic legal approach and 
defined national identity according to citizenship rather than the 
religious affiliation of the individual.31 Such national identity was 
referred to as muwāṭana (which recalls waṭan, the national 
homeland).32 However, it is important to point out that citizenship is 
also translated with jinsiyya, which is more strictly associated with the 
connotation of nationality. While nationality is commonly defined as 
the legal relation between the individual and the state, citizenship is 
conceived of as a specific juridical, but also social and cultural, 
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condition that, simultaneously, gives citizens a set of duties and 
rights.33 
In modern times, Muslim scholars have not been able to reach a 
consensus over a single meaning of citizenship in the light of Islamic 
tradition. However, we can identify a continuum of stances between a 
radical scholar such as the Pakistani Abū al-Aʻlā al-Mawdūdī (1903-
1979) and a more moderate one such as the Tunisian scholar Rāshid 
al-Ghannūshī. According to al-Mawdūdī, the Islamic state should 
include four categories of people: male Muslims, female Muslims, 
dhimmīs and non-Muslims. While dhimmīs are conceived, as in 
classical times, as the believers of ‘protected’ religions, non-Muslims 
are those who do not belong to the first two categories. In practice, al-
Mawdūdī only accepted those who fit into the latter as proper citizens 
of the Islamic state, with men enjoying full citizenship rights and 
women only partial rights.34 
On the other side, al-Ghannūshī dedicated a short essay to this 
topic, developing a middle way between Islamic traditional views and 
the western liberal concept of citizenship. According to him, the truest 
Islamic state, in order to fulfill its functions, must guarantee rights and 
freedoms to the community and the individual. Among these 
freedoms, the freedom of religious belief is the most important, 
legitimized by the well-known verse Cor. II, 256, ‘there be no 
compulsion in religion’. The Tunisian scholar distinguished also 
between a ‘general citizenship’ (muwāṭana ‘āmma), and a ‘special 
citizenship’ (muwāṭana khāṣṣa): Muslims, to which certain behaviors 
are prohibited (i.e. eating particular foods or drinking alcohol), enjoy 
general citizenship while the dhimmīs, to which the access to major 
public offices is forbidden, enjoy special citizenship. It is up to human 
beings to decide, by professing the religion of Islam or not, which 
kind of citizenship, and therefore rights, they may enjoy.35 Here 
citizenship seems to be a flexible idea, providing freedoms and 
prohibitions in accordance with religion. 
Al-Ghannūshī recognizes also a set of core rights, pertaining to 
every human being, which shapes the meaning of citizenship: rights of 
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equality, freedom (which also encompasses freedom of thought, 
freedom of belief and freedom of worship), and freedom of 
movement, including the right to establish schools and religious 
institutions. Even if al-Ghannūshī minimizes the difference between 
the two kinds of muwāṭana, he is keen to point out that the purpose of 
these restrictions is to safeguard the state and to protect the freedom of 
citizens, as well as the right of the majority to ‘impart on public life a 
color of their choosing’.36 Moreover, in a recent essay, published after 
the Tunisian uprisings, al-Ghannūshī modified his ideas, leaning 
toward a more inclusive conception of citizenship. 
 
Citizenship rights in practice: The Tunisian and Egyptian 
Constitutional traditions37 
Despite the above-mentioned theoretical conceptualizations of the 
Islamic state, historical experiments, such as the 1861 Tunisian 
Constitution, demonstrate that fundamental liberal rights were 
guaranteed after occasional struggles, not in a dissimilar way to the 
aftermath of 1848 revolutions in Europe. The Tunisian Constitution 
was adopted as part of a project to reform the country, formally still a 
province of the Ottoman Empire. Its main purposes were to enhance 
the administrative control of the peripheral zones and prevent the 
decline of the ruling dynasty. The event that fostered the adoption of 
the Constitution was the escalation of tensions between the Jewish 
minority and the rest of the Muslim population.38 This pushed for the 
development of a statute regulating relations between confessions. 
The twelfth chapter of the Constitution thus included a set of rights 
and freedoms officially guaranteed to all, regardless of faith. This list 
did not include freedom of association or freedom of expression, but 
the rights to inviolability of the person, honor and property were 
proclaimed. The Constitution extended the military service to all 
faiths, with the exception of Jews. 
The first Egyptian Constitution, adopted in 1883, regulated the 
functions of a consultative assembly (devoid of real legislative 
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power). This Constitution, unlike that of Tunisia, introduced 
instruments of checks and balances between state powers. However, it 
failed to proclaim the principle of political representation, as the 
assemblies that the Constitution created where composed only of 
members of the upper classes and were given merely advisory powers. 
In so doing, the Charter did not produce a strong empowerment in the 
field of citizenship rights.39 
In Tunisia, the French protectorate ended in 1956 and in the same 
year Tunisians elected their first Constituent Assembly. This process 
was influenced by the nationalist leader of the Neo-Dustur party who 
led the country’s struggle for independence, Habib Bourghiba (1903-
2000). The 1959 Constitution established a presidential Republic, 
where parliamentary powers were significantly weaker than 
presidential powers, even though article 3 proclaimed the principle of 
popular sovereignty stating that ‘the sovereignty belongs to the 
Tunisian people who exercise it in conformity with the Constitution’. 
Thus, relying on its unchecked nature, the executive, by adopting 
emergency laws, was able to restrict the rights and freedoms 
proclaimed in the Constitution. Only the amendments of the 1971 
Constitution introduced some devices for balancing the executive and 
making it accountable.  
Moreover, citizenship rights, as contained in the Tunisian Charter, 
were weak: this text, while proclaiming the equality of the people on 
the basis of citizenship (art. 6), stated (art. 5) that inviolability of the 
human being, freedom of conscience and protection and exercise of 
beliefs were guaranteed by the state with as long as exercise of these 
rights did not disturb the public order. Article 7 added several ‘legal’ 
provisions to decrease the scope of the same set of rights and 
freedoms ensured by Constitution as citizens could exercise the 
plenitude of their rights only ‘in the forms and conditions established 
by the law’. Stating that ‘the exercise of these rights cannot be limited 
except by a law enacted for the protection of others, respect for public 
order, national defense, the development of the economy, and social 
progress’, the state was given the discretionary power to interfere in 
the sphere of citizens’ prerogatives. 
The Tunisian Constitution did not provide for a specific chapter 
where fundamental rights and freedoms were grouped: they were 
                                                            
39 B. L. Garcia - C. F. Suzor, Introducciόn a los regίmenes arabes y constituciones 
árabes, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1985, pp. 28-31. 
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declared at the very top of the charter under the label of ‘general 
provision’. As demonstrated by article 8, the state could legitimately 
restrict those rights that normally most Constitutions define as 
‘absolute’. This article stated that liberties of opinion, expression, the 
press, publication, assembly, and association were guaranteed but 
could be exercised only within the conditions defined by the law.40 
In the field of social rights, the Constitution was really weak and 
did not contain any specific articles instituting social services or a 
healthcare system. At the same time, article 70 created the Economic 
and Social Council, a consultative assembly deputed to the elaboration 
of laws and regulations in economic and social matters. Its 
composition and its relations with the National Parliament were 
determined by law. Thus this council was not an independent 
institution but was controlled by the state.  
As for political rights, the Constitution extended the right to 
participate in politics to all the citizens, without discrimination based 
on gender, ethnicity or religion. At the same time, art. 40 fixed a set of 
conditions that were detrimental for spreading access to certain public 
offices, thus restricting political rights. For example, only Muslims 
were eligible for the Presidency of the state. Passive and active rights 
to vote were regulated by articles 20 and 21. According to article 20, 
the right to cast a ballot was given to every citizen who had held 
Tunisian nationality for at least five years and attained at least twenty 
years of age. According to article 21, any voter, born of Tunisian 
father, who was at least twenty-five years of age on the day of 
submission of his candidacy, could be eligible for election to the 
National Parliament. Both of these articles linked active and passive 
political rights to the law of citizenship, possession of which was 
regulated by a law that could be easily modified, due to the 
submission of the Parliament towards the executive.  
Egyptian constitutional history is much more fragmented than its 
Tunisian counterpart. During the early years of Nasser’s regime 
(1952-1970) the country was governed through Constitutional 
Declarations, quasi-constitutional documents that, without fixing the 
constituted powers once for all, maintained the powers in the hands of 
the military junta. The revolution of the Free Officials ended the 
                                                            
40 Even article 9 stated that the inviolability of the home and the secrecy of cor-
respondence must be guaranteed by the state, save in exceptional cases established 
by the law. 
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‘liberal’ era of Egypt, characterized by the liberal Constitution of 
1920. Under this perspective, the 1952 revolution weakened some of 
the liberal principles that had dominated the Egyptian monarchy in the 
first half of the XX century.41 Only in 1956 a permanent Constitution 
was adopted: it was composed by a Preamble and six chapters related 
to the form of the state, to the basic principles of the state, rights and 
duties of the citizens, the rules for ensuring national defense. The first 
chapter declared Egypt as an ‘Arab and democratic Republic’ whose 
nation, qualified as ‘Arab’, was composed of the Egyptian people, the 
sole holder of sovereignty. In addition, the Arabic language was 
referred to as the official language while Islam was settled as the 
official religion. The second chapter defined the rules related to the 
preservation of the family, whose pillars were religion, ethics and 
patriotism.  
On the economic side, private initiative was encouraged, providing 
that its outcomes contributed to social wellbeing. The text allowed 
ownership of the land but its subdivision was forbidden. The third 
chapter of the Constitution listed a number of freedoms, such as 
equality, regardless of sex, race, language, religion, and personal 
freedoms like the inviolability of private property, freedom of belief, 
freedom of opinion and press, freedom of association, freedom of 
education and right to work. Another Charter was adopted in 1962, 
which stressed the necessity for the state to be based on a new 
philosophy that mixed Arab nationalism, the ideal of pan-Arab unity, 
socialism and democracy. The Constitution nationalized the entire 
economic system and gave greater representation to the weaker 
classes of the society, stating that half of the MPs had to be chosen 
among the workers and peasants. These articles were maintained also 
by the 1972 Constitution. 
Article 3 ascribed sovereignty to the people defined as the source 
of authority and not of executive powers. The people were vested with 
the duty of exercising and protecting this sovereignty, safeguarding 
national unity in the manner specified in the Constitution. Articles 8 to 
11 provide the bases for ensuring citizenship rights. The state had to 
guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens and had to protect the 
family as the basis of society. Family must be founded on religion, 
                                                            
41 Garcia - Suzor, Introduccion a los regimenes arabes y constituciones árabes, 
pp. 38-63. 
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morality and patriotism.42 According to article 10, the state had to 
guarantee the protection of motherhood and childhood, take care of 
children and youth and provide suitable conditions for the 
development of their talents. As for article 11, the state provided for 
the harmonization of the duties of women towards the family and their 
work in the society, ensuring women’s equal status in political, social, 
cultural and economic life without violating the rules of Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
While these articles sanctioned a strong set of social rights, which 
they inherited of the Nasserian regime, article 12 showed a clear 
Islamic imprinting. This article gave society the duty of safeguarding 
and protecting morals and promoting genuine Egyptian traditions. The 
state was committed to abiding by these traditional principles and 
promoting them even if no direct references to Islam were made.  
The Egyptian Republic, as defined in the 1972 Constitution, also 
inherited from the Nasserian regime a strong commitment in the field 
of social rights. Article 16 gave the state the duty of guaranteeing 
cultural, social and health services, and of working to make sure they 
were regularly respected particularly in rural villages, so as to raise 
living standards. According to article 17, the state had to guarantee 
social and health insurance services and all citizens were given the 
right in accordance with the law to receiving a pension in cases of 
injury, unemployment and old age. Article 15 of the Constitution gave 
‘war veterans, those injured in or because of war, and the wives and 
children of martyrs killed in war’ priority in work opportunities.  
As for political rights articles 62 and 63 contained some advanced 
provisions: citizens were given the rights to vote and express their 
opinion in referendums according to the provisions of the law. Their 
participation in public life was defined as a national duty. The 
Constitution gave ordinary law the task of regulating the right of 
candidacy to the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council (the two 
chambers of Parliament). Even though the same article allowed the 
electoral law to adopt a system combining the individual and the 
party-list systems, such a system was supposed to include a minimum 
quota for women’s participation in both councils. Article 63 ascribed 
                                                            
42 According to the same article, the state is keen to preserve the genuine charac-
ter of the Egyptian family-together with the values and traditions it embodies-while 
affirming and developing this character in the relations within the Egyptian society. 
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to every individual the right to address public authorities in writing 
and under his or her own signature. 
All Constitutions adopted in Tunisia and Egypt were presented to 
the citizenry as ‘advanced’ legal documents because they contained 
provisions recognizing the universality of some rights (in the Tunisian 
case, political rights were restricted as we have seen). In practice, in 
both countries, the various Constitutions aimed to keep all 
prerogatives in the hand of the executive. This produced important 
consequences in the sphere of citizenship rights: despite their 
proclamation, their enjoyment was restricted by the adoption of 
emergency laws, justified by a state of necessity.  
The enjoyment of citizenship rights, in both countries, was also 
restricted by the endemic weakness of the judiciaries. Far from being 
independent, judges were subjugated by the executives and could not 
play the role of guarantors of freedoms. The Egyptian 1972 
Constitution contained a set of principles (articles 64-72) to ensure 
sovereignty of law. According to article 65, the rule of law was a 
supreme principle of the state. The independence and immunity of the 
judiciary were proclaimed as two basic guarantees for the safeguard of 
rights and freedoms (articles 65, 165 and 166).43 The organization of 
the courts, the judiciary authorities and their functions, as well as the 
conditions and procedures for the appointment and transferal of judges 
were defined by ordinary law. Despite the declaration of such 
principles, the enslavement of Parliament by the executive 
consequently weakened the independence of the judiciary. Even the 
composition of the Supreme Constitutional Court was left undefined 
by the Constitution that ascribed this task to the ordinary laws (article 
176) thus affecting its proclaimed independent nature (article 174). 
Also the Tunisian Constitution of 1959 provided for a set of similar 
articles affecting the independence of the judiciary. According to article 
65, the Tunisian judiciary was made independent and the magistrates 
exercised their functions being subject only to the law. The following 
article 66 stated that judges were nominated by decree of the President 
of the Republic upon recommendation of the Supreme Council of 
Magistrates. The Constitution did not add anything else in support of 
the independence of the judiciary, and also the procedures framing the 
Council of Magistrates were defined by ordinary laws (art. 67). 
                                                            
43 According to article 166 judges must be independent, subject to no other au-
thority but the law. No authority may intervene in cases or in justice affairs. 
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The Impact of Awqāf over Citizenship Rights: Are They 
Compatible? 
Promoting the awqāf while encouraging the empowerment of 
social rights could be detrimental in the sphere of gender equality, 
thus affecting two of the three classes of citizenship rights. Awqāf, for 
example, could influence the right of inheritance, preventing women 
from being eligible to inherit and thus bypassing the positive law of 
the state.  
With regard to the Tunisian case, al-Nahḍa leader al-Ghannūshī 
emphasizes that former Presidents Bourghiba and Ben Ali did not 
employ awqāf for their proper ends.44 An imposed secularism 
provoked disaffection among Tunisians for religious spaces, as public 
manifestations of Islam were prohibited. Mosques – a typical example 
of waqf that was for a long time controlled by the state – should now 
be given back to the community to allow freedom of religion, a 
cornerstone of any democracy. Al-Ghannūshī argues that the relation 
between state and religion must be built upon mutual respect: the 
problem is not freeing the state from religion but freeing religion from 
the strict control of the state, starting from the necessity to allow the 
community to practice religious freedom.45 
Historically, as awqāf were directed to the Muslim community or 
to a specific group of beneficiaries, public authorities did not have any 
power over the foundation and they had to respect the will of the 
owner. This means that if awqāf are to be restored, a strict regulation 
by the state is needed otherwise foundations will remain uncontrolled 
institutions, placed above the law, where violations of citizenship 
rights may take place under the banner of empowering religious 
freedom. In the field of gender issues, the Qur’an, stressing the 
physical differences between men and women, ascribes different 
social roles to them. As for political rights, women are not denied 
participation in politics but, at times, are forbidden to exercise 
authority as the capability of deciding over common interests. Certain 
fundamentalist scholars still deny the possibility for women to cover 
the highest political roles. Other moderate scholars, such as Yūsuf al-
Qaraḍāwī and Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, agree on a gender practice of 
                                                            
44 R. al-Ghannūshī, al-‘Almāniyya wa-‘alāqa al-dīn bi’l-dawla min manẓūr 
ḥaraka al-Nahḍa, CSID lectures, Tunis, 2012, p. 9. 
45 A. Stepan, ‘Religion, Democracy and the Twin Toleration’, in Journal of 
Democracy 11/4 (2010), pp. 37-57. 
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ijtihād, allowing women to interpret the sources of the law. Giving 
women full rights to legislate, these scholars pave the way for a 
comprehensive political equality between the sexes. However, they 
believe that political activism can be exercised by women in 
accordance with their fulfillment of traditional feminine roles, being 
women above all mothers and wives. 
The last point to be stressed here is the difference of approach 
between the Islamic constitutional philosophy and its western 
counterpart toward the ideas of ‘common good’ and individual rights. 
The medieval scholar Abū Isḥāq al-Shātibī (1320-1388) developed the 
doctrine of the so-called ‘aims of the sharī‘a’. According to his view, 
Islamic law provided the protection of several aspects of the believer’s 
life. Five elements, conceived as being necessary for people, enjoy the 
highest protection: religion, life, intellect, progeny and property. In 
second rank, the law safeguards whatever produces benefits for the 
community and, accordingly, its moral values. But in the name of the 
maṣlaḥa (public good), which is a legal hermeneutical device 
employed to approach the Islamic sources of law, the welfare of the 
community must be prioritized over individual good and enjoyment. 
This fact is also offered up by contemporary Muslim scholars as 
further evidence of the superiority of Islamic democracy over that of 
the West. 
Adopting traditionally western concepts of citizenship would be 
problematic in the Arab world, as it is characterized by ongoing 
political transitions in the region, involving contingent social, 
religious, and political aspects. The most striking difference with 
mainstream conceptions derived from Islamic Constitutionalism is the 
western individualistic ethos as compared to a more collective one 
espoused by most Muslim thinkers. While not denying this very 
significant difference, it is also true that also within western thinking 
there are elements calling for a greater attention towards collective 
interests, vis-à-vis individual ones and that within the Islamic 
constitutional tradition there are calls for greater attention to the 
dimension of individual rights, without necessarily adopting 
universalist conceptions. It is within these contested notions of rights, 
at both ends of the spectrum, that the debate about revitalizing awqāf 
took place in many Muslim countries after the Arab awakening. 
Mainly with reference to the Tunisian case, this debate could 
reverberate over to the conception of citizenship in the Muslim world 
and could deteriorate the principle of equality in the field of civil 
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rights. The following section, then, explains how restoring awqāf in 
Tunisia was perceived as a threat against the future of the democratic 
transition and the build-up of a new legal order based on liberal 
philosophy.46 
 
Restoring Awqāf in Tunisia 
On 17th October 2013, a bloc of MPs, belonging not just to al-
Nahḍa, proposed a controversial law that aimed to restore awqāf.47 
This proposal faced the harsh opposition of Tunisian secular parties 
that consider awqāf to be at odds with the relations between state and 
Islam that they in turn propose.  
When awqāf were done away with in Tunisia in late 1956, one-
third of agricultural land had been until then managed through this 
system.48 These lands became unproductive and could not contribute 
to the economic and social development of the country in any way. In 
fact, according to some historians, Habib Bourghiba, the founding 
father of Tunisia, did not decide to dismantle the endowments system 
because he wanted to establish a secular state.49 The decision was 
instead motivated by purely economic reasons and, in addition, 
Tunisia followed a regional trend in this regard. Several other Muslim 
countries were convinced of the outmoded nature of constituting 
property as awqāf, including Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.  
The proposed law on awqāf would have explicitly restored the 
endowments, as public, private, or mixed awqāf.50 All the 
                                                            
46 On the development of citizenship rights in Tunisia, mainly with regard to 
gender issues, see for example: S. E. Marshall - R. G. Stokes, ‘Tradition and the 
Veil: Female Status in Tunisia and Algeria’, in The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 19/4 (1981), pp. 625-646; M. Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The 
Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 2001; M. Charrad, ‘Tunisia at the Forefront of the Arab World: 
Two Waves of Gender Legislation’, in Washington and Lee Law Review 64/4 
(2007), pp. 1513-1527. 
47 S. Bulaq, ‘Mashrū‘ al-awqāf fī Tūnis bayna al-maṣlaḥa wa’l-tajadhdhubāt al-
idiulūjiyya’, in Babnet Tunisien, 14/11/2013, http://www.babnet.net/festivaldetail-
74665.asp (access 2/12/2016). 
48 C. Moore, Tunisia since Independence, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1965, pp. 34-35. 
49 ‘Ennahda pushes further Islamization of Tunisia’, in al-Monitor, 19/11/2013. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/11/ennahda-endowments-
islamization-tunisia.html (access 2/12/2016). 
50 Public awqāf are constituted for public wellness such as schools, hospitals, 
fountains, mosques, and so forth. Private foundations are established only for 
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endowments would have enjoyed economic and financial 
independence and would have been controlled by an institution 
created ad hoc by the same law (article 3). Finally, article 8 of the 
same proposed law explicitly settled the conditions the endowments 
had to respect in order to be legally valid. Among them, the proposed 
law provided that any private awqāf employed to discriminate 
between male and/or female heirs was rendered invalid. Under this 
condition, the law seemed to forbid any attempt at weakening 
citizenship rights.51 
Apart from its formulation, the law draft provoked a fierce debate 
in Tunisian society. Economic expert and former Finance Minister 
Houcine Dimassi (formally belonging to the opposition party Nida 
Tunis) argued that instituting awqāf could be one of the most 
dangerous things to happen to Tunisia, because this system would 
create a state within the state, whereby properties would be under the 
control of entities other than the state authorities.52 Moreover, under 
the law of awqāf, while it is true that the Muslim community would 
gain public spaces for religious practice and education, on the other 
hand preaching, teachings and proselytism will be controlled by the 
awqāf themselves, circumventing the regulation of the state. The 
problem with awqāf, then, is that they undermine the rule of law and 
give certain actors a huge power in defining social identity. After 
decades of dictatorship, promoting self-determination by different 
social groups is questionable unless it can be ensured that no specific 
group may prevail over the others. What provoked criticism of the 
proposed law reintroducing awqāf is the fact that restoring 
endowments could be considered as one of the elements of an overall 
project for the progressive Islamization of Tunisian society after the 
revolution. The idea of restoring endowments seems to be in line with 
other projects that al-Nahḍa launched since 2011, such as promoting 
Islamic finance, creating the Zakat funds, establishing Qur’anic 
schools all over the country, and spreading religious studies through 
the famous Islamic University of al-Zaytuna. 
                                                                                                                                           
specific groups, enlisted by the owner of the assets. Mixed awqāf are constituted for 
public purposes but could be restricted to specific social classes or groups. 
51 See Project law no. 55/2013, article 8. 
52 H. Keskes, ‘Tunisians Debate Proposed Reintroduction of Habous’, in Tunisia 
Live, 13/11/2013, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/11/13/tunisians-debate-proposed-
reintroduction-of-habous/ (access 2/12/2016). 
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Ferjani Doghmane, National Constituent Assembly (NCA) member 
for al-Nahḍa and chairman of the Committee of Finance, Planning, 
and Development, claimed that the project of restoring awqāf should 
not constitute a cause for concern, because its purpose is to reinforce 
the role of civil society. Foundations would simply sponsor cultural 
and educational projects which would otherwise lack funding. From 
this perspective, awqāf is merely a means for fundraising and self-
financing for those services that the state cannot manage properly.53 
Endowments, it is true, could certainly reinforce the funding allocated 
to charity and civil society and fill the legal gap in supporting civil 
society.  
Moderate voices, between these opposite extremes, have argued 
that awqāf are not a bad idea per se but they need severe regulation 
and independent control. If institutionalized in Tunisia, awqāf risk to 
be left unchecked and could be employed for political purposes, 
playing in favor of the Islamists. That this is a plausible argument is 
quite clear considering that Noureddine Khademi, former Minister for 
Religious Affairs of the second al-Nahḍa government, stated that the 
law on awqāf is one of the aims of the revolution.54 Islamists 
underline the fact that Bourghiba’s decision to suppress awqāf (decree 
31th May 1956) was linked to his personal struggle to challenge 
Islamism, adding that the new state, born after the revolution, needs to 
restore and reform this system. 
Restoring awqāf in Tunisia could reverberate also on the 
empowerment of women’s rights, because the implementation of waqf 
endowments may well forbid the former’s enjoyment of several rights. 
In the first draft of the Constitution, issued in August 2012, Islamists 
tried to propose articles minimizing the role of women in society, 
despite their official statements on the subject. The majority of female 
deputes in the NCA were elected in the lists of al-Nahḍa (26% of the 
217 elected members). On the other hand, Islamists tried to pass the 
‘complementarity law’, an article of the Constitution which denied full 
                                                            
53 « Ferjani Doghmani: La Loi sur les habous n’a aucun rapport avec 
Ennahdha », in African Manager, 12/11/2013, 
http://www.africanmanager.com/157886.html (access 2/12/2016). 
54 « Noureddine Khadhemi: Le projet de loi sur les habous ne menace nullement 
la civilité de l’Etat », in Directinfo, 16/11/2013, http://directinfo.webmanagercenter. 
com/2013/11/16/noureddine-khademi-le-projet-de-loi-sur-les-habous-ne-menace-
nullement-la-civilite-de-letat/ (access 2/12/2016). 
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equality between men and women.55 Indeed equality was not clearly 
marked and the use of terms such as ‘complementarity’ suggests that 
there was a desire to change the status of women. Criticism and 
pressure from civil society and part of the other MPs led to 
backtracking and to inscribing equality clearly in the final draft, 
adopted in January 2014. The final Constitution insists that all citizens 
(females and males in the Arabic text) are equal. In this framework, 
restoring awqāf may open up to discretionary practices that challenge 
substantial equality.56 
 
Conclusions 
Citizenship is not a new idea in Tunisia but, of course, it is 
evolving according to the actions of the new actors that gained space 
in the political arena after the revolution. Citizenship, being a neutral 
device, bears a set of rights and freedoms that are inscribed onto it, 
commonly known as citizenship rights. The debate on the rights of 
citizenship in the MENA region has always been dealt with in many 
ways and with different approaches. There are at least three main 
approaches: the first, which can be defined as culturalist, is based on 
the analysis of the relationship between Islam and democracy and is 
rooted in the idea that Islam, like every religion, might represent an 
obstacle for the practical application of some liberal ideals. 
Fundamentally, however, some of these studies start from the 
assumption that secularism is a precondition for democracy. 
The second approach, based on the methodologies of the political 
sciences and on the transitological paradigm, attempts to illustrate the 
processes of democratization, in the wake of the third wave of 
democracy suggested by S. Huntington.57 In this context, the rights of 
citizenship are relevant because the liberalization of national political 
                                                            
55 M. Marks, ‘Speaking on the Unspeakable: Blasphemy & the Tunisian 
Constitution’, in Sada. Middle East Analysis, 04/09/2012,  
http://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/04/speaking-on-unspeakable-blasphemy-
tunisian-constitution/drca (access 2/12/2016). 
56 Article 21 Constitution: ‘All the citizens, male and female alike, have equal 
rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any discrimination’. 
57 For a confutation of Huntington’s theory see: K. Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism 
and Human Rights, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007 (third edition); J. L. Esposito - J. Pis-
catori, ‘Democratization and Islam’, in Middle East Journal 45/3 (1991), p. 427-
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Press, Oxford 1996; G. Salamé (ed.), Democracy without Democrats?: The Renewal 
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systems requires the strengthening of these rights which, in turn, help 
to create a kind of substantial democracy that is not merely procedural 
and based on free and fair elections. 
The last approach to the study of citizenship rights is based on a 
critique of gender. A strong role of religion in society is often 
perceived as a pre-modern factor, opposed to the concept of 
modernity. Moreover Islam, by its very nature of constituting both 
religion and law, contains a set of rules which, if codified in national 
constitutions, can be detrimental to some civil rights ascribed to 
women, such as those relating to divorce, polygamy and inheritance. 
For this reason, the critique of gender represents another important 
theoretical key for analyzing the status of citizenship rights in 
Arab/Islamic societies, before and after the Arab Spring. 
Islamists could have different perceptions of citizenship rights, and 
the debate around the law of awqāf is a good example through which 
to highlight these differences. From a purely political point of view, 
al-Nahḍa is a highly pragmatic party and in many occasions it has 
seemed to be keen to reach a consensus, even if this means putting 
aside its initial goals. Indeed, a huge part of the secular opposition 
thinks that al-Nahḍa’s double discourses are a matter of strategy and 
through them the Islamic party usually tests the reaction of society at 
large in order to orient future political behaviors. The law on awqāf 
could be seen under this light as a way to disclose the societal reaction 
toward a sensitive project that could be seen ‘ideological’, as the 
opposition marked it. At the same time, we ought to take into account 
the fact that restoring awqāf could produce positive outcomes, too: 
endowments could formally replace the state in providing for social 
services. They could facilitate fundraising needed to finance new 
infrastructures. In this respect awqāf could diversify the Tunisian 
economic system and boost its development. 
Moreover, endowments could favor the rise of NGOs or grassroots 
associations for the benefit of the community as a whole, not just 
Muslims. This aspect recalls the difference between the conception of 
citizenship rights in the western and Islamic traditions. In the western 
tradition, a right is primarily an individual affair. Thus, in Europe 
social and welfare rights were born later than rights that belong to 
individuals. In the Islamic tradition, the relation is quite the opposite: 
being a ‘social religion’ (more than the other Abrahamic religions), 
Islam gives great importance to the believers as a group whose 
existence is necessary for the existence of the religion itself. In the 
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balance between community’s rights and individuals’ rights (such as 
women’s or minority rights), the latter may be restricted if this 
restriction produces advantages for the community at large. In this 
regard, restoring awqāf, if not properly controlled, could be 
detrimental in the path of the assurance of citizenship rights for all 
Tunisians. 
Endowments were abolished over fifty years ago and it is difficult 
to imagine which impact their restoration could produce on the post-
revolutionary society. The proposed law, advanced in November 
2013, has been put aside for the moment. But its proposal raised some 
questions, such control over the endowments’ activities or the 
possibility of creating a totally unchecked state inside the state. In 
conclusion, the opposite reactions the draft law on awqāf caused in the 
Tunisian society, ranging from a radical refusal to more optimistic 
positions, demonstrate the uncertainty raised by the question.  
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Abstract 
This article is based on empirical field-based research conducted in five Arab 
countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen and the occupied Palestinian territory) in 
2013.1 The research aims to map the diverse spectrum of newly emerging forms of 
women’s Activism and leadership in post-uprising countries and their effect on the 
process of gender transformation. Given the complex Islamist-secular identity divided 
context of women’s political participation in post-uprising Arab countries, the research 
focuses on how the newly emerged young female leaders - ordinary educated women 
with no specific feminist consciousness or previous political involvement - succeeded 
to shape a new form of women’s activism. The main argument of this research is that 
the newly emerged non-feminist women’s leaders, especially those who represent 
Islamist parties and their conservative gender agendas, have the potential to re-signify 
their gender norms within the moral framework of Islamic tradition and to transform 
their political leadership into a new model of feminist leadership. This happens 
through women’s discursive habituation of non-stereotypical gender roles and 
relations regardless of ideological framework or references. 
 
Introduction 
Since the outset of the Arab Uprisings, women have actively 
engaged in the changing politics of their countries. Women in Tunisia, 
Yemen, Morocco and Egypt, amongst others, have contributed 
                                                            
1 This article is drawn upon data and analysis compiled through a regional 
research project implemented by the Middle East Centre (MEC) at London School 
of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE) in 2013. The project was jointly funded 
by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and Oxfam. 
The views expressed in the report are solely the views of the author. The present 
article does not in any way represent the views of LSE, SIDA or Oxfam-GB. The 
findings presented should not be interpreted as SIDA, Oxfam, or its partners’ 
position. Any errors are the responsibility of the author alone. This article is a 
revised version of a working paper published by the MEC in November 2014, 
available online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-
Series/WomenActivismAMM.pdf. 
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significantly through protests, demonstrations, lobbying and 
advocacy. Yet, women activists, and their voices and networks, 
remain fragile and divided due to an ostensibly Islamic-secular 
division of identity. Political polarisation and the resulting division 
between Islamic women’s organisations and secular feminist 
organisations characterises post-uprisings transitions.  
This is illustrated in the mutual suspicions between the key Islamic 
and secular political actors and the persistent tension between the two 
groups with regard to their different ideological interpretation of 
women’s rights (between sharī‘a and universal international laws). 
Both Islamist women and feminist activists, particularly the elites, 
enhance the binary between Islamic culture and feminism. They 
assume there is no way to reconcile universal feminist principles 
based on international laws with local religious and cultural values 
and practices that have historically been distorted and misinterpreted 
by dominant male religious and political authorities.2 
However, the fragmented political context after the uprisings has 
witnessed the emergence of a new trend of women’s activism that 
may be called a new wave of feminism. This has challenged the 
Islamic-feminist binary and the elitist character of the Arab feminist 
movement.3 After the Arab uprisings, Muslim women have become 
widely engaged in grassroots youth and women’s activism, advocating 
not only for their civil and political rights but also for the civil rights 
of all marginalised social groups. Both religious and non-religious 
young educated women have created a public space for 
communicating their ideas and beliefs and arguing and debating with 
other generations and the older political and feminist leadership to 
affirm their belonging to their community and nations.  
The new trend of mass women’s activism and leadership has 
challenged the Western and national secular feminist assumption that 
women are the biggest losers of the Arab uprisings because their 
political representation in formal politics has not met the international 
criteria of gender equality and also because of the essentialist feminist 
                                                            
2 M. Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences, Oneworld, 
Oxford, 2009; and Z. Salime, Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia 
Law in Morocco, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2011.  
3 N. Sika - Y. Khodary, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Egyptian Women 
within the Confines of Authoritarianism’, in Journal of International Women’s 
Studies 13/5 (2012), pp. 91-100, http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol13/iss5/9 (access 
2/12/2016). 
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view that Islamist political parties’ acquisition of power is the major 
threat to women’s equal rights.4 This assumption is arguably mistaken 
when we look comprehensively at the newly emerged map of 
women’s and youth activism, beyond the singular normative liberal 
feminist view that restricts women’s empowerment to women’s 
representation in formal politics in accordance with universal 
international laws and through gender quotas. However, a gender 
quota, although a facilitating mechanism for women’s political 
empowerment, also entails the risk of serving masculinised patriarchal 
political agendas, as happened with the previous Arab authoritarian 
regimes.5 
Thus, the understanding of women as winners or losers of the Arab 
uprisings has to be defined not just on the basis of the immediate 
outcome of their political and civil engagement during transition 
periods, or of electoral results achieved through institutional alliances 
at formal political levels. It also has to be based on a nuanced 
understanding of the process and dynamics women develop and 
redevelop through experiencing political and social engagement and 
the reflection of these in the forms of power they gain. Being a loser 
or a winner is also determined by women’s capacity to create and 
develop popular constituency to be the major source of legitimacy of 
their leadership and empowerment.6 Otherwise, Arab women leaders 
(whether Islamist or liberal) will remain hostage to the patriarchal 
authoritarian political agendas and at risk of being instrumentalised to 
serve the interests of the State’s political elites. 
                                                            
4 See the article in France News, ‘Women among the Biggest Losers in Arab 
Spring’, http://www.france24.com/en/20131112-women-arab-uprising-violence-
sexual-abuse-egypt-syria-saudi-arabia (access 2/12/2016); also the article in 
Qantara.de, Commentary by Moha Ennaji ‘Arab Women’s Unfinished Revolution’, 
http://en.qantara.de/content/commentary-by-moha-ennaji-arab-womens-unfinished-
revolution (access 15/10/2015). 
5 K. Goulding, ‘Unjustifiable Means to Unjustifiable Ends: Delegitimizing 
Parliamentary Gender Quotas in Tunisia’, in Al-Raida, Issue 126-127 (2009), 
http://www.alraidajournal.com/index.php/ALRJ/article/view/83/82 (access 2/!2/2016); 
H. Senigeur, « Au Maroc, les Islamistes ont bien pour mission de relégitimer le 
roi », Liberation Monde, 2/12/2011, 
http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2011/12/02/au-maroc-les-islamistes-ont-bien-pour-
mission-de-relegitimer-le-roi_778844 (access 2/12/2016), translated by the project 
Moroccan researcher, Hanane Darhour, Sika, Nadine - Khodary, Yasmin, ‘One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back?’ 
6 G. Waylen, Engendering Transitions: Women’s Mobilization, Institutions and 
Gender Outcomes, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
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This article aims to map the diverse range of women’s activism and 
leadership in post Arab uprising countries. It also aims to understand 
how the process of women’s political participation during and after 
the Arab uprisings creates opportunities for the emergence of new 
forms of women’s activism that challenge the elitist ones. It examines 
how women learn and experience their gendered self differently 
reflecting on their own experiences and understanding of the local 
context. Through their involvement in the process of social and 
political change for different intersectional factors (religious, 
sectarian, territorial, socio-economic and others), women learn and 
develop their manoeuvring and leadership skills and become critical 
of the actuality of gender and gender relations in their society. The 
article also reflects on the new form of women’s leadership and how it 
could contribute to redefining and re-strategizing women’s activism 
and empowerment for the longer term effect of social and gender 
transformation in Arab countries. 
This article draws on the analysis and findings of five empirical 
country-level reports conducted in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Morocco 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) in 2013. While neither 
Morocco nor the OPT experienced an uprising, they provide case 
studies which complement the research by examining the effect of the 
Arab uprisings on the models of Moroccan and Palestinian women’s 
activism and leadership. The country research adopted qualitative 
research methodology, generating in-depth diverse analysis using 
multiple qualitative methods, namely: workshops with policy and law 
makers; focus groups (FGs) with women’s and human rights civil 
society organisations and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), as 
well as poor women from urban and rural communities; individual key 
informant interviews with representatives of government and non-
government feminist organisations to cross-check and triangulate data 
and analysis; and semi-structured individual interviews with women 
and men representing the different political and women’s actors who 
influence women’s political participation and empowerment. 
In each country surveyed, field work was conducted in two major 
sites and in each site two local rural and urban communities were 
studied. In the five countries studied, the research team managed to 
conduct FGs with: 474 poor women in poor urban and rural 
communities; 203 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and CBOs 
working on women’s issues, development, human rights and youth 
matters – including CSOs working at either the national or local 
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levels; and 117 individual interviews with government and civil 
society representatives (including men and women). Five workshops 
were also held with policy- and law-makers in the different countries.  
 
Emerging Forms of Women’s Activism and Leadership in Post-
Uprising Arab Countries 
Multiple forms of women’s activism and leadership have emerged 
during the Arab uprisings; some forms are new, while others are older 
and more established. As a result of these engagements, many Arab 
women played a key role in the different political, youth, labour, 
development and religious societal entities that all struggled against 
authoritarian regimes and their oppressive economic policies and 
security systems. For scholar and activist Rabab El-Mahdi, the 
diversity of women’s activism in post-uprising Arab countries 
challenges the hegemonic essentialist understanding of liberal 
feminism that sees itself as ‘the one way to women’s progress and 
betterment’. For El-Mahdi, a women’s movement ‘is not only 
determined as such through the sex of its constituency and 
participants, but also through its goals and declared consciousness’.7 
The diversity in Arab women’s activism also challenges the Middle 
Eastern liberal feminism that presents Islam as particularly sexist and 
anti-feminist.8  
Based on this understanding, this article will shed a light on the 
map of women’s activism emerging in the five Arab countries studied, 
specifying the most influential forms of activism that women have 
undertaken through: well established feminist and Islamist women’s 
organizations; political parties; community-based organisations; 
individual actions; and unregistered youth, women’s, organised labour 
or professional initiatives. Regardless of the nature of the different 
politics driving women’s activism, this difference arguably provides a 
fertile ground for various groups of women to create a wider space for 
civic engagement: by influencing, complementing and strengthening 
each other to achieve their specific goals and interests. 
 
                                                            
7 R. El-Mahdi, ‘Does Political Islam Impede Gender-Based Mobilization? The 
Case of Egypt’, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 11/3-4 (2011), 
pp. 379-396, p. 380. 
8 S. Shaikh, ‘Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice’, in 
O. Safi, Progressive Muslims, OneWorld, Oxford, 2003, pp. 147-162, p.148. 
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Old Established Women’s Activism: The Feminist-Islamic Binary 
and the Question of Feminist Legitimacy 
Most old established feminist organizations in the studied countries 
view international law as the only reference for: protecting and 
safeguarding women’s rights in the constitution and legislation for 
ensuring gender equitable representation of women in formal politics 
through gender electoral quotas; and for countering the threat of 
Islamisation and its conservative cultural heritage. At the same time, 
however, based on both the literature and empirical evidence, many 
Arab feminist organisations shared three major characteristic 
shortcomings, namely: elitism and failure to develop a public 
constituency; being misled by state feminism,9 and driven by donor 
agencies’ policies and agendas.10 
The Islamist parties’ rise to formal political power after the Arab 
uprisings appears to have prompted an awakening of old feminist 
organisations, which have been accused by local people of being 
radical secular and/or elitists opposed to religion. The field work in 
Tunisia and Morocco and to a lesser extent in Egypt and the OPT, 
shows that after the Arab uprisings feminist organisations are divided 
into two groups: radical and pragmatic feminists. The first group tend 
to focus on women’s individual liberties and seeking full gender 
equality. These feminists make an appeal for a cultural revolution, 
explicitly identifying Arab and Islamic culture as the source of 
misogyny in the region. The latter group has developed its pragmatic 
feminist vision reflecting on the historical expansion of Islamic 
women’s activism and they are more concerned about reconciling 
universal feminist principles with local cultural values and practices.  
In Tunisia and Morocco, there are an increasing number of feminist 
activists who have developed a pragmatic feminist approach vis-à-vis 
religion and encouraged dialogue with moderate Islamist women. 
                                                            
9 B. Mhabeni, ‘Arab Women/Arab Culture(s): Reflections on Feminist 
Multicultural Discourse in the Wake of Mona Eltahawy’s “Why Do They Hate 
Us?”’, in Trans-Scripts 3 (2013), pp. 242-258, 
http://sites.uci.edu/transscripts/files/2014/10/2013_03_17.pdf (access 2/12/2016); 
Sika - Khodary, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’; N. Al-Ali, ‘Women’s 
Movements in the Middle East: Case Studies of Egypt and Turkey, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 2002, http://eprints.soas-
.ac.uk/4889/ (access 2/12/2016). 
10 I. Jad, ‘The NGO-isation of the Arab Women’s Movement’, in IDS Bulletin 
35/ 4 (2004), pp. 34-42. 
 Mapping the Forms of Women’s Activism and Leadership ... 165 
 
Against radical elitist feminist discourse in Tunisia, some AFTURD11 
board members have realised the importance of focusing on outreach 
to poor and rural women in interior marginalised regions and to build 
up popular constituencies with poor and rural women, rather than only 
focusing on legal reform pursuing the universality of women’s rights.  
Despite the disappointing constitutional reform process regarding 
women’s rights in Egypt, feminist organisations’ activism flourished 
following the Uprising. During the drafting of the new constitution in 
2011-2012, a coalition of more than 70 secular and liberal 
organisations working on gender issues convened to struggle against 
the Islamist President’s Constitution.12 These organisations called for 
increased women’s representation on both the National Council of 
Women and the constitution drafting committee. The coalition 
incorporated old and new women’s rights’ groups such as the Women 
and Memory Forum,13 Nazra association, Fouada Watch, the National 
Front for Egypt’s Women, and Baheya Ya Masr. These coalitions 
have managed to attract large number of ordinary women who 
participated in protests against the Morsi government for failing to 
protect women’s rights. Baheya Ya Masr coalition for instance 
encompasses youth (men and women) from different backgrounds 
willing and capable of reaching out to various segments of society. 
Recognizing the increasing importance of Islamic groups in power, 
                                                            
11 AFTURD is the Association of Tunisian Women for Research and 
Development whose members were interviewed during the field research in Tunisia. 
AFTURD is one of the old leading liberal feminist organization that was established 
in 1998 and was involved in research and training activities, and advocacy and 
lobbying for legal reform on women’s rights under Ben Ali’s regime. 
12 The coalition was formed in the early days of the revolution and worked to 
formulate a united stand representing predominantly-secular feminist organizations 
in Egypt regarding various political developments. See, for example, the press 
release issued by the coalition against the National council of women and their 
refusal for its continuity: ‘Coalition of Women’s NGOs in Egypt: National Council 
of Women Doesn’t Represent Egyptian Women - Call for Rapid Dissolution’, Nazra 
for Feminist Studies (2011), available at http://nazra.org/en/2013/07/exclusion-
women-political-process-and-constitutional-declaration-should-be-treated, (access 
15 May 2014). 
13 Established in 1995, the Women and memory forum is a leading women’s 
NGO. The Forum convened women’s activists representing different women’s 
groups, institutions and initiatives to discuss the draft constitution and to propose a 
new draft more consistent with international law. The working group included 
women’s rights groups such as ‘Come to write our Constitution’; and ‘the Popular 
committee for writing the Constitution’. 
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Baheya members adopted a pragmatic feminist approach by showing 
interest in listening and debating with religious scholars about Sharia 
and women status and rights. 
Despite the efficacy of advocacy and lobbying strategies by well-
established feminist organisations and coalitions, particularly in 
Morocco and Tunisia, according to the narratives of large number of 
poor women interviewed, old feminist organisations in general still 
lack popular constituency amongst the masses of poor and rural 
women, particularly in remote regions, and their feminist language is 
still not relevant, as well as not understandable by poor uneducated 
women in rural areas. The work of most feminist organisations has 
remained concentrated in urban areas and targeting educated middle 
class women. Most old feminist organizations have failed to adapt 
their liberal feminist discourse into a relevant local discourse that 
resonates with the socio-economic, political and cultural context of 
masses of women. 
Discussions and interviews with liberal feminists reveal that many 
still perceive themselves as the only legitimate feminist group, who 
genuinely defend women’s equal rights based on the universal concept 
of gender equality. The rejection of some radical feminists to integrate 
religion and cultural specificity into their analysis of women’s 
subordination and power relations has narrowed and reduced their 
feminist understanding to a singular notion of women’s rights.14 This 
is illustrated in the narrative of number of liberal feminists 
interviewed who advocate for full gender equality regardless of 
cultural specificity in Arab societies. For example, Saïda Bajjou, a 
Moroccan feminist at the YTTO Foundation, explained: ‘today, the 
Constitution does not really guarantee women’s full equality with men 
as it places the sharī‘a above international conventions’. This 
conceptualisation progresses accordingly along a linear pathway of 
women’s empowerment based on individual freedom and autonomy 
within the international universal framework.  
On the contrary, before and after the uprisings, Islamist women 
managed to expand their political engagement in formal and informal 
politics; some have succeeded in articulating a moderate gender 
agenda and discourse that is complementary to the liberal feminist 
                                                            
14 Mhabeni, Arab Women/Arab Culture(s). 
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discourse, which has become commonly called Islamic feminism.15 
Most importantly, they succeeded in generating a solid constituency in 
poor local communities. Islamic women’s activism and community-
based engagement appears as an important complement to liberal 
feminism’s legislative reform project; in many cases, Islamic 
women’s activism operates at a popular level and enjoys wider local 
legitimacy although both forms of activism are necessary for securing 
and protecting women’s rights. Accordingly, Islamic women activists 
constitute key women players in enhancing women’s political 
participation and empowerment. Except the case of Yemen which has 
not experienced secular-Islamist binary within established women’s 
organizations, this binary exists and is reiterated discursively by and 
among radical liberal feminists and some conservative Islamist 
women’s activists in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and the OPT, and in the 
process, each group homogenises the other. However, the field work 
for this study demonstrated that Islamist women leaders, particularly 
those represent moderate Islamist views, are more tolerant and subtle 
than radical feminists when it comes to discuss the possibilities of 
dialogue and negotiation, and to reconcile on common women’s issues 
such as education, employment, child care and reproductive health.16 
The difference between the various Islamist-secular feminist 
approaches is concentrated in framing the understanding of women’s 
rights, development and empowerment. Islamist women leaders in 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and the OPT emphasize the legitimacy of the 
women’s empowerment approach comes out of a respect for the socio-
cultural specificity of their countries, and by questioning and 
challenging the constructed socio-cultural specificities. On the other 
hand, secular liberal feminists generally consider universal human 
rights conventions and norms such as CEDAW as their source of 
legitimacy. Yet, there is no homogeneity among these two broad 
                                                            
15 Moderate Islamist women follow the discourse of Islamic feminism. This 
discourse pursues the liberation of Muslim women from the traditional patriarchal 
interpretation of the Qur’an. Islamic feminists believe that the women are an equal 
partner of men in society through a gender sensitive re-reading of the Quranic text. 
See more details in Badran, Feminism in Islam; and J. Crétois, ‘Muslim Women 
Redefine Feminism’, in Al-Monitor, 4/4/2013,  
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/04/muslim-feminists-
activism.html (access 2/12/2016). 
16 Evidence of liberal feminists’ intolerance is the unwillingness of radical 
feminists in parts of North Africa to even meet and be interviewed with Islamic 
feminists during the research process. 
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clusters, as each has both radical and pragmatic interpretations of 
women’s rights.  
Throughout discussions with Islamist women in the five countries, 
they clearly downplay the ideological debate on women’s issues and 
prefer instead to be involved in more concrete action and voluntary 
work on the ground. Despite the limitation of the Islamist family 
centred approach in relation to controversial issues such as inheritance 
laws, public-domestic work, sexuality and family planning, the trend 
of pragmatism among moderate Islamist women leaders towards 
encouraging the interpretation of Islam gives a space for developing 
their approach to be more compatible to the universal women’s rights. 
For example, with regard to one of the controversial issue of equal 
rights for women, a female representative of Ennahda Islamist party in 
Tunisia expressed a flexible view towards single mothers by saying:  
 
Secular feminists think that we are against the protection of the rights 
of single mothers. This is not true. Our approach towards single 
mothers is that this social phenomenon is not a free choice taken by 
women...We need to work together to reduce this social problem by 
providing poor women with the material and technical resources they 
need to avoid them being vulnerable.  
 
The feminist rejection to the Islamist women’s discourse is obvious 
in Tunisia and Morocco more than in Egypt, Yemen and the OPT. 
However, more conciliatory feminist voices that encourage dialogue 
and cooperation between Islamist and liberal feminists are often faced 
with considerable ostracism by radical feminist actors who do not trust 
the Islamist political project. Nadia Abu-Nahla, a prominent liberal 
feminist leader in the OPT shared the same view with her counterpart 
liberal feminists in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt that: ‘There is no way 
to work together, we don’t agree on the basics’. Moderate or 
pragmatic feminists on the other hand encourage dialogue with 
moderate Islamist women considering religion as an important 
element for strategizing women’s struggle for their rights. Radia 
Belhaj Zekri, former president of AFTURD in Tunisia, for instance 
stated:  
 
Tunisian progressive feminists should deal with religion in a resilient 
and tactical way, as a sign of respect to Tunisian society. We need to 
encourage the reinterpretation of religion, to avoid leaving the 
Islamists to manipulate the field of religious interpretation. 
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Islamist women’s leaders in Morocco and Tunisia consider the lack 
of dialogue between Islamist and secular liberal women, coupled with 
the unfamiliarity of secular liberal feminists with Islamist women’s 
perspectives and actions on women’s rights and empowerment, as the 
only reason for such disparity. 
The analysis of the various narratives of both Islamist women and 
liberal feminists provokes a middle ground understanding based on 
the experiences of Islamic and non-Islamic women’s activism for their 
rights. Following the concept of ‘plural autonomy’ used by Monica 
Mookherjee (2009),17 Arab women may autonomously utilize diverse 
forms of agency (including non-liberal ones) based on their position 
vis-à-vis cultural structures. Individual women do not only act their 
agency according to liberal standards of self-interest and reason, but 
they are also motivated by the desire to attain certain cultural identity 
that enhances their agency and positionality within their cultural 
context. Within this understanding of how the agency of women is 
multiply constitutionalised, both Islamist and liberal feminists can find 
a way to avoid Islamic-feminist binary and find a common ground to 
reconciliate between universal rights and cultural specificity. 
 
The Newly Emerged Forms of Women’s Activism 
Emergence of young ‘ordinary’ women’s leaders 
Against the mainstream Islamist-feminist binary at macro political 
level, large numbers of young ‘ordinary’ women, defining themselves 
neither as ‘Islamists’ nor ‘secularists’ or ‘feminists’ but as ‘activists’, 
have participated in changing the politics of their countries. They have 
become conscious and enthusiastic about the meaning and the practice 
of democracy and citizenship and they have become involved in civil 
society organisations, political parties and popular protests. ‘Ordinary’ 
women are defined as those women who had no knowledge or 
institutional experience of feminism and had also not been involved in 
politics prior to the uprisings. They are neither influenced by the 
feminist discourses used by the old established liberal and socialist 
feminist non-government organisations, nor by state-sponsored 
feminism, which is narrowly linked to serving the autocratic 
authoritarian regimes. By contrast, the ‘ordinary’ women interviewed, 
                                                            
17 M. Mookherjee, ‘Plural Autonomy - Force, Endorsement and Cultural 
Diversity’, in M. Mookherjee, Women’s Rights as Multicultural Claims: 
Reconfiguring Gender and Diversity in Political Philosophy, Edinburgh University 
Press, Edinburgh, 2009, pp. 61-95.  
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including educated, uneducated, rural, urban, poor and middle class, 
expressed that they were excluded by the two groups.  
‘Ordinary’ women include those who had suffered daily from their 
state’s neoliberal economic policies and oppressive police and security 
sectors. From the early days of the uprisings, particularly in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Morocco and Yemen, these women acted voluntarily as 
political agents aiming to change the politics of their countries. They 
organised collective actions, but not necessarily on the basis of 
‘feminist’ values, or through advocating for women’s rights. Their 
demands went beyond gender (albeit they may affect women and men 
differently) and included political reform, defence of human rights and 
freedoms, advocacy of religious and ethnic communal rights and 
demands for improving working conditions. According to Diane 
Singerman, ordinary people, particularly young women and men, 
revolted against neoliberalism and corruption ‘that transcends national 
boundaries and links young people and other activists, cross-
nationally’.18 
The Arab uprisings created public spaces where those ordinary 
women had access to newer and wider audiences who welcomed their 
voices. In Yemen, a traditional tribal society, one of the biggest 
surprises of the peaceful protests that swept the country in 2011 was 
the visibility and participation of women.19 The research in Yemen 
found that women see their participation as part of a wider struggle 
against broader systems of oppression and in support of justice and 
equality for all Yemeni citizens. Issues of livelihood and insecurity 
emerged at the top of their agendas, along with the poor state of the 
economy, unemployment, inflation and the lack of basic social 
services, such as health care and education.  
Wardah Al-Hashdi, a woman in her early thirties, is strong example 
of how the Yemeni uprising has produced new women’s leaders. Al-
                                                            
18 D. Singerman, ‘Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising’, in 
Journal of Middle East Women Studies 9/3 (2013), pp. 1-27, p. 4.  
19 See ‘Strong Voices: Yemeni Women’s Political Participation from Protest to 
Transition’, Saferworld Report, May 2012, http://www.gaps-uk.org/docs/Strong-
Voices-Yemen.pdf (access 17/11/2014). Estimates suggest that of the protestors in 
Yemen, 30% were women; also see Hakim Almasmari and Mohammed Jamjoom in 
‘Women march in Yemen’s capital’, CNN (17/10/2011),  
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/17/world/meast/yemen-unrest/index.html?iref=allsearch 
(access 2/12/2016). 
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Hashdi is from a tribal family and participated in the uprising by 
providing first aid to injured protestors. She said:  
 
I was a housewife before but I had to go out and help injured youth 
because it is safer for me as a woman, in Yemeni culture that respects 
the presence of women in the conflict areas.20 
 
Today she is one of the leaders of the Raqeeb organization for 
human rights and her life has completely changed. A reflection of the 
new model of women’s activism and leadership was also illustrated in 
Hajja Governorate, a northern mountainous area near Sana‘a. A highly 
unusual incident occurred when a group of rural uneducated women 
decided to block the main road to protest against frequent fighting and 
the widespread availability of guns amongst the rivals, Houthis and 
Islah groups.  
In Egypt, the blogger Asmaa Mahfouz became a key figure in 6 
April Youth Movement, which has played an important role in 
shaping Egyptian politics. She re-interpreted the culture of patriarchy - 
honour and manhood - to encourage Egyptian men to join her in 
protests against dictatorship. She defended her right to protest, saying:  
 
If you consider yourself a man, come with me on 25th January. Instead 
of saying that women should not come, because they will be beaten, 
let’s show a bit of honour, be men, come with me on 25th January.21  
 
Mahfouz was also one of the founders of a group called Egypt’s 
Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution in June 2012. This is one of a 
large number of coalitions that were initiated and led by ordinary 
Egyptian women, religious and non-religious, who had no public 
profile before the uprisings.  
In addition, women’s collective actions against sexual harassment 
in Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia and Morocco are good examples of how 
women contributed to awakening women’s consciousness of their 
gender and sexuality, and their advocacy against exclusion from the 
public sphere. For example, ‘Shoft Taharoush’ (observe sexual 
harassment) is a women’s coalition initiated by young women in 
                                                            
20 An interview conducted by Wameedh Shakir, the Yemen country researcher in 
June, 2013. 
21 The YouTube video of Asma Mahfouz is available at http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgMdsEuk (access 7/9/2014). 
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Egypt. It organised several sit-ins protesting against sexual assault in 
Tahrir Square. Samira Ibrahim22 is a good example of an ordinary 
woman who resisted victimisation by the military dictatorship and 
acted as a publically recognised leader without labelling herself 
‘feminist’. Samira Ibrahim raised a court case against the Virginity 
Test (VT) imposed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF). She advocated against the VT not in the name of freedom of 
sexuality from a western feminist perspective, but as a refusal to be 
subjected to a test imposed by dictators that violates her authentic 
social norms and tradition. In Morocco, female teenagers, who were 
not been involved in feminist movement before the uprisings, have 
initiated an adapted Moroccan version of the Canadian slut-walk, 
called ‘Woman Choufouch’ (You don’t see). The walk fights sexual 
harassment against women and draws attention to the daily hardships 
women experience in the Moroccan public space.23  
Other examples of women’s activism from Tunisia should also be 
cited. Five ordinary women participated in a focus group conducted in 
Douar Heisher, a poor neighbourhood in Tunis.24 These women used 
to be inactive members of the main Tunisian General labour union, the 
Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). Since the Tunisian 
revolution, these women assert that they have become widely engaged 
in the organised protests and demonstrations led by the UGTT, as well 
as being involved in organising and mobilising political and human 
rights campaigns led by the UGTT. Their engagement in the protests 
allowed them to realise their influential role in changing the gender 
politics of society institutions. Women in the UGTT started to 
advocate for gender quotas within the union hierarchy. A woman 
teacher from Tunis and active union member for years noted:  
 
The Tunisian uprising has woken us up to our leadership position 
within the union. We are the ones who mobilise the workers and do 
                                                            
22 See Samira Ibrahim’s story of her struggle against the virginity test, available 
in this link:  
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/120731/samira-
ibrahim-virginity-test-freedom-fighting (access 2/12/2016). 
23 See M. Lahdidi, Woman Choufouch, une marche contre le harcèlement sexuel 
dans nos rues (2012), http://www.maghress.com/fr/albayane/12258 (access 
15/12/2013). 
24 A focus group organized and facilitated by the author in Douar Heisher, a poor 
neighbourhood in Tunis, the capital, in 17/4/2013. 
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everything on the ground, but when it comes to political decisions, we 
are ignored.  
 
An unemployed woman from Douar Heisher, who became an 
active member of the union after the uprising, said:  
 
I was only registered in the union to find a job. Now I have become so 
active. So, the union opened a door for me to be involved in other 
organisations and to create a very good network with other activists in 
youth and women’s groups.  
 
Through these different forms of public participation, Arab women 
learnt how to construct the meaning of citizenship, and as a result to 
construct their gender identity and status. This cannot be fulfilled 
without the protection of their socio-economic and political rights. 
Through women’s intensive participation in protests and 
demonstrations, ordinary women explored, discovered and 
experienced the power of their new voices and influence in their 
countries’ politics. They enjoyed their influential role in everyday life 
encounters. According to the many young women interviewed for this 
project, through their participation in protests they gained greater 
moral and social respect from their male partners, colleagues and 
family members, without publically advocating to transgressing 
existing gender norms. These individual and collective actions 
undertaken by women with no prior normative feminist consciousness 
have encouraged them to question existing gender norms, whether by 
resisting, or by redefining and re-signifying them in a way that restore 
their sense of human dignity.25 
 
Non-feminist women’s leadership in political parties and the 
dynamics of power manoeuvring 
Arab women have also increased their role in political parties, 
particularly Islamist parties. The field research in the various countries 
shows that both moderate and radical Islamist parties have efficiently 
facilitated the political participation of their female members, 
especially in rural and poor communities. This is for several reasons. 
                                                            
25 N. Pratt, ‘Egyptian Women: Between Revolution, Counter-Revolution, 
Orientalism, and “Authenticity”’, in Jadaliyya, 6/5/2013, available at 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11559/egyptian-women_between-
revolutioncounter-revoluti (access 2/11/2016). 
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First, not unlike the previous secular ruling parties, moderate Islamist 
parties such as Ennahda in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party 
(PJD) in Morocco, and to a lesser extent, the Islah party in Yemen, 
Hamas in the OPT and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, were keen 
to gain international legitimacy for their moderate Islamist discourse 
used by their secular counterparts.26 Second, these parties have 
historically relied on women to mobilise local communities, to 
generate a public constituency and more recently, to mobilise voters 
during elections – all of which enabled them to come into political 
power.27 Third, the governing Islamist parties in Morocco, Tunisia and 
Yemen have encouraged women’s political participation as a means to 
strategise their disputes with both secular and radical Salafi 
opponents. Research in Yemen found that the conservative opposition 
Shī‘a Houthi movement is more active in instrumentalising their 
women’s participation in public protests than the leftist Yemen 
Socialist Party (YSP). That being said, this strategy used by both the 
Houthis and the Islah party in Yemen does not necessarily mean that 
they support equal rights for women. Rather, the two conflicting 
Islamist groups recruited women to publicly advocate for their 
political agendas. In Tunisia, Ennahda has also encouraged many 
women members to work in local communities to teach people about 
moderate interpretations of Islam and undermine the political power 
of radical Islamists.  
With the acknowledgment that women were instrumentalised by 
the political parties in general and by Islamist parties in particular,28 
this instrumental dynamic of women’s engagements in political parties 
has opened an opportunity for some individual women’s activists to be 
critical of the conservatism of their political parties, especially with 
regard to women’s rights. Nawal al-Kebsi, a Houthi supporter, noted 
                                                            
26 M. Mohanad - Y. Ayman, ‘The Interaction of Political Islam with Democracy: 
The Political Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a Case Study’, in 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3/11(2013), pp. 144-154. 
27 P. E. Pruzan-Jørgensen, ‘Islamic Women’s Activism in the Arab World’, DIIS, 
February, 2012, available at http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/ 
Policybriefs2012/PB-Islamic-Womens-Activism_web.pdf (access 2/12/2016). 
28 F. S. Kassem, ‘A Cup Half-Full or Half-Empty: Is a “Women’s Spring” 
Inevitable in Democratic Transitions?’, in Is the Arab Awakening Marginalising 
Women?, Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series, Wilson Center, Summer 
2012, available at   
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/-Arab%20Awakening% 
20Marginalizing%20Women_0.pdf (access 2/12/2016). 
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that most of the Houthi leaders are socially conservative towards 
women’s political participation and activism. A similar situation 
applies to Islah women representatives who also affirmed that 
conservative views against women are due to certain religious leaders 
who affect the institutional decisions of the party. 
However, women’s relative positions of power within the different 
Islamist political parties vary. Interviews with Islamist women’s 
leaders in Ennahda and the PJD, and to a lesser extent in Hamas, 
reveal that they relied on their male political leadership to manoeuvre 
for power and to negotiate on gender- and non-gender-related issues. 
Although Islamist women interviewed refuse to call themselves 
feminists, many of them use the women’s human rights discourse 
similar to their feminist counterparts. A woman’s leader in the PJD 
said,  
 
We avoid conflicts by initiating dialogue. We agree on common 
things. We fight for women’s rights and dignity. We call for their 
equal access to decision-making positions, and we combat all forms of 
violence and discrimination against women.29 
 
Yemen’s case differs slightly. Women Islah members have 
prioritised their loyalty to the Islah party over any other institution 
they are involved in. Nabila Saeed, Islah’s media officer, defends the 
importance of her party for achieving her political goals. She views 
her party as the only institution within the Yemeni political and tribal 
context that provides her with social security and also encourages her 
to have access to power dynamics and political leadership. Islamist 
women’s leaders such as Saeed, living in a predominantly tribal and 
patriarchal society and culture, bargain with patriarchal structures to 
achieve their goal of generating their public constituency and 
representation in local communities. 
The trajectory of women’s activism in post-uprising countries has 
been largely influenced by the changing political context of post-
uprising Arab countries and by the changing regional political 
alliances.30 Women’s leaders in political parties (both Islamist and 
secular) have tended to reshape their political and social alliances to 
                                                            
29 An interview conducted with Aicha Kendsi (a representative of the PJD) by 
the Morocco country researcher, Hanan Darhour, in 22/04/2013.  
30 L. Khatib - A. Lust (eds.), Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab 
Activism, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2014. 
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remain in power. Examples include the Islamist women’s leaders 
representing the PJD alliance with the Monarchy in Morocco31 and the 
alliance which some liberal feminists made with the military in 
Egypt.32 In most of the studied countries, these alliances have been 
enacted at the expense of consolidating an independent women or 
feminist agenda and voices based on building public constituency 
among women’s masses. However, the example of Egyptian liberal 
feminists’ alliances with masculinised political forces raises a 
fundamental and critical question: on what political, economic and 
social basis should women shape their political alliances and 
strategize their struggle for their rights?  
Bargaining with patriarchy may be a necessary strategy during the 
process of women’s empowerment in a certain context. However, the 
legitimacy of this strategy is only proven when women leaders, 
whether secular or Islamist, demonstrate their political willingness and 
capacity for power manoeuvring to dismantle such tribal and 
patriarchal structures, and to act as representatives of the masses of 
women rather than the political masculinised elites. Women’s popular 
constituency is the major source of legitimacy for women’s political 
participation and representation both at national and local levels. It is 
this constituency that gives women actual power for political 
manoeuvring with and within state institutions.33 Otherwise, Arab 
women (whether Islamist or liberal) will reproduce their previous 
experience of state feminism and will remain under the control of the 
authoritarian masculinized agendas of political elite.  
 
 
                                                            
31 M. Musbah, ‘Islamist and Secular Forces in Morocco: Not a Zero-Sum Game’, 
in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) comments 51, November 2014, 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C51_msb. 
pdf (access 12/12/2014). 
32 S. Abdel Kouddous, ‘What Happened to Egypt’s Liberals After the Coup?’, in 
The Nation, 1/10/2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/176445/what-happened-
egypts-liberals-after-coup#; J. Traub, ‘The Liberal Dark Side: Why Rationalizing 
Egypt’s Coup as a Necessary Evil is so Self-Destructive’, in Foreign Policy, 9 
August 2013,  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles-/2013/08/09/the_liberal_dark_side_egy 
pt_morsy (access 2/12/2016).  
33 Waylen, Engendering Transitions. 
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Women’s and youth community-based activism challenges old elitist 
feminism  
As the political spaces opened up for civil society during the Arab 
uprisings,34 middle-aged educated women and educated youth were 
among the first social groups to establish community based 
organisations (CBOs) aimed at providing emergency material 
services, as well as awareness raising for poor women and 
unemployed youth living in marginalised slums, neighbourhoods and 
rural areas. In contrast to some old feminist organisations working at 
the national level, the major concern of the newly emerged 
community-based organisations is to focus on and represent the socio-
economic problems and needs of poor women and families and to 
build up the capacity of marginalised groups to manage their 
livelihood. Activists in these organisations rarely describe issues of 
legal reform and representation in macro-politics as priorities.  
Another interesting finding related to recently-emerged CBOs is 
that few of them are registered as women’s organisations. They are led 
by educated middle-aged women, young women and men and the 
major focus of their work is poor families and unemployed youth. 
There are two explanations for this. First, middle-aged religious 
educated women were involved in charity-based activities before the 
uprisings. They then exploited the civic freedom of the uprisings to 
establish their charity-based organisations, as witnessed in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Yemen. Second, new youth leaders embrace the 
transferring of the collective sense of activism from the protests to 
local communities, where concrete forms of activism can be more 
visible and recognised.  
Many youths in Tunisia, Egypt, the OPT and Yemen have managed 
to move beyond ideological, political and gender disparities to focus 
on issues of unemployment, poverty and insecurity and social 
disintegration. A young female representative of a CBO from the 
West Bank emphasised that women’s CBOs are more cooperative 
with each other and they are less influenced by political and 
ideological division between Hamas and Fatah than the big women’s 
NGOs, Islamist and secular feminist alike, working at the national 
level. For her, CBOs’ work requires field activities and daily 
interaction with poor women and their actual needs.  
                                                            
34 Khatib - Lust, Taking to the Streets. 
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The majority of the newly emerged CBOs lack institutional and 
human capacity and work on an ad hoc basis, reflecting the desire and 
willingness to voluntarily serve their local people and community. 
Nevertheless, CBOs have not escaped from the influence of key 
Islamist and secular political players whether discursively or on their 
work. Therefore, CBOs are also polarised, reflecting the broader 
national political and ideological polarisation. They may be grouped 
into two major clusters: the majority are charitable, faith-based 
associations affiliated to Islamist political parties and/or movements; 
the others are development and youth CBOs that belong to secular 
political parties, or old feminist and human rights organisations. 
However, the second group appears less concerned about ideological 
labelling than the first group.  
Despite their different political affiliations, the two groups of 
CBOs work in multiple development sectors such as education, 
environment, health, cultural activities, vocational training and job 
creation in addition to humanitarian assistance. Few, particularly those 
that have relationship with old well established feminist organisations, 
or leftist political parties, work on advocacy, lobbying or awareness-
raising of women’s rights. The majority of newly-emerged CBOs in 
the five countries surveyed are led by local women and men, who 
draw on their familial, tribal and political networks in local 
communities to generate resources to operate their CBOs. 
Due to the persistence of centralised models of local governance, 
CBOs, and particularly their youth leaders, are excluded from 
decision- and policy-making processes and positions by both national 
and local governance institutions and political parties, and are rarely 
consulted in policy development or planning processes. Some Yemeni 
and Tunisian women community activists intimated that CBOs’ lack 
of financial and institutional capacity has forced some community 
leaders to jeopardise their institutional autonomy by linking up with 
political or tribal community leaders to gain material support for the 
continued operation of their small associations. One woman who 
chaired a newly emerged CBO in Tunis said: ‘All these CBOs that 
you found operating properly and they provide material support to 
poor people, they are supported by political parties in order to be their 
mobilising arm in local communities’.35 
                                                            
35 An interview conducted by the author in 7 May 2013 with Dura, the director of 
MA’AN organisation based in Tunis. 
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Within the prolonged context of insecurity, particularly in the OPT 
and Yemen, for young women’s activists working in CBOs, being 
affiliated to political parties provides them with a source of legitimacy 
and security, although it undermines their effective participation, 
autonomy and empowerment. A female community activist from Gaza 
said: ‘We can’t avoid political party frameworks – anything we do 
should be done within a certain political framework. If we start any 
initiative as non-partisan, it will end up under a political party in one 
way or another’.36 In Yemen, lack of access to influential institutional 
tools, social insecurity, political conflict, and the exclusive tribal 
culture in political parties have all had a devastating effect on women-
focused CBOs. Because of this, these organizations have failed to 
remain independent and establish their own civil institutional 
performance and professional careers.  
The field research shows that some CBOs which managed to 
secure funding from donor agencies or large feminist and 
development NGOs, have become more concerned about 
professionalizing their organizations, (i.e. searching for funding to 
recruit professional staff and develop institutional structure and 
network with donor agencies), than working voluntarily in and with 
poor communities. This trend among newly emerged CBOs in post 
uprising countries, is similar to the history of CBOs in the OPT, 
entails the risk of NGOization of CBOs,37 which undermines the 
voluntary and representational spirit of youth activists, and reproduces 
the elitist discourse of development and women’s empowerment.  
Despite the criticism of some Islamist women’s community 
activists of their political parties, they prefer to keep their CBOs 
connected to the Islamist parties in order to legitimise their social 
interventions in local communities. Abeer Abdulrahman, a member of 
the Iṣlāḥ Shūrā Council in Aden, claimed that: ‘Women’s CBOs are 
affected by the agendas of various political forces, either Islamist or 
secular’. Najla Al Houthi, a leading member of the Houthi group, 
                                                            
36 A quotation selected from a focus group with women’s activists in Gaza and 
facilitated by Maisa Shquir in April 2013. 
37 NGOization in the Palestinian context refers to focusing on professionalising 
women’s institutions to meet the institutional requirements of donors, which limits 
the influence of women’s institutions at the local level. Islah Jad (2004) argues that 
NGOization limits the struggle for national causes to projects geared to priorities 
established by international actors and fragments the accumulation of forces for 
social change. 
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admitted that Houthi CBOs are established to serve the political 
agenda of the Houthi movement. Nevertheless, these women argue 
that for women community activists to be affiliated to political parties 
provides them with greater space to work in local communities, 
generating social recognition for their work. 
This is, however, a subtle strategy used by Islamist women to 
mobilise for the political agendas of their political parties. As stated 
by some of the interviewees in Yemen, this strategy gives women a 
wider space to challenge the societal patriarchal and tribal gender 
norms, and create an opportunity to help women to improve their 
education, work and reproductive health, and to fight against domestic 
violence and early marriage. For example, Nabila Saeed of the Islah 
Party in Yemen, and president of a newly emergent women’s CBO 
called Fikrah (thought), declared that after the 2011 revolution tribal 
sheikhs contacted her and other women leaders to discuss political 
issues. 
In the OPT, Tunisia and Egypt, some respondents indicated that 
their CBOs act merely as implementers of development projects and 
programmes for big women’s NGOs that are neither designed by 
them, nor represent the prioritised needs and issues of their local 
communities. However, these larger national organisations, Islamist 
and feminist, are often the only material funding sources available to 
CBOs to operate in the local communities. Although CBOs in 
Morocco face the same institutional problems, the fieldwork shows 
that some of them have developed a different experience. In a focus 
group discussion conducted with representatives of newly emerged 
CBOs in the Sidi Mamoun neighborhood of Casablanca,38 women 
leaders talked about the experience of the newly established coalition 
of the women’s associations of Sidi Mamoun. One said:  
 
The coalition helps us a lot in this respect (means securing funding 
and institutional management) because we’ll be able to do training 
together and learn from each other on many levels. This is how we 
keep our sisterly relations.39 
 
                                                            
38 Sidi Moumen is one of the research sites and it is an urban suburb located in 
northeast Casablanca. 
39 This Focus Group was conducted in Sidi Mamoun-Casablanca in 26 April 
2013 and it was facilitated by the Morocco country researcher, Hanan Darhour. 
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Through this coalition, local CBO women activists plan to get the 
necessary support and training through sharing their experiences together. 
 
Unregistered politically independent youth and women’s community 
initiatives  
Beyond the formally-registered Islamist and non-Islamist CBOs 
affiliated to various national parties and institutions, a small number 
of youth and women’s groups and initiatives emerged which are 
opposed to the widespread political polarization of society institutions. 
These groups and initiatives focus on the actual socio-economic 
problems of their local communities. The fieldwork found that this is 
attractive to many young women and men, who are fed up with the 
Islamist-secular polarization and its socially fragmenting effects. 
This form of activism relies on the individual capacities, 
commitments and contributions of group members, as well as some 
donations from local people. It purposely avoids relying on actors and 
resources from beyond the community, and hence, the activists think 
that this form of activism is the most sustainable because it relies on 
the community’s existing financial, human and institutional capacities 
to organize collective actions. However, in really poor, isolated 
neighborhoods and communities, the resources which can be 
mobilized may be quite scarce – so, the capacity to provide large-scale 
services to many people is severely limited. 
These community-based initiatives tend to be grounded in a 
moderate Islamist, or moderate secular, mindset and they avoid 
factional politics and religion in their civic work. Youth initiatives 
such as ‘Young leadership entrepreneurs’ in Tunisia and the ‘15th 
March: Youth against Division’ movement in the OPT are important 
examples of young men and women exercising their agency in a 
critical and constructive manner by resisting the fragmentation, 
polarisation and elitism fuelled by the traditional political parties and 
big feminist and human rights organisations.  
These youth activists are critical of sex-segregated forms of 
women’s activism and they asserted during the fieldwork that they 
prefer working with youth and development organisations than in 
separate women’s organisations, where they have common issues of 
concern. Young men and women are also critical of the generational 
gap between older political and women’s organisations and youth and 
the centralised form of leadership. Ahlam of the ‘Young Leadership 
Entrepreneurs’ in Tunisia noted:  
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Old feminist organisations do not create a new generation of leaders 
who may threaten their power. These organizations are led by old 
feminists who have a strong network with the international world, but 
they still do not know how to give us, young men and women, a space 
to learn and to develop our skills of leadership.40 
 
A Palestinian female member of the 15th March initiative said: ‘We 
should have a youth quota… to guarantee our right to political 
participation’. Another Palestinian woman activist criticised political 
parties: ‘Old political leaders are the ones who taught youth 
intolerance… in order for them to remain in power at the expense of 
our actual needs and problems’.41 
Another unregistered community initiative led by middle-aged 
women comes from Egypt. Um Ziad belongs to a group of middle 
aged religious women activists who initiated a community-based 
project in Saft Laban, a poor neighbourhood in Cairo. She was 
motivated by her religiosity to serve her local community. She had 
suggested collecting an Egyptian pound each day from small shops for 
repainting the school walls. Men were responsible for distributing 
plastic bags to households and gathering cans and plastics for 
recycling; the money generated from the sale of the recycled materials 
was used to rebuild local community infrastructure. Also, sexual 
harassment of women has become increasingly worrying and 
disturbing in post-uprising Egypt. In the same area of Saft Laban, an 
initiative was developed by local women to fight against sexual 
harassment through religious education. Middle-aged religious women 
talked to teenagers and educated them about how to use the moral 
virtues of Islam to confront such disrespectful practices against 
women.  
As the field research in these five countries indicates, the 
traditional political parties and the large organisations, whether 
Islamist or secular, fail to provide a constructive, conducive 
atmosphere or leadership for aspiring men, women and youth who are 
interested in becoming more politically engaged and often tired of 
divisive identity politics that fragments their society. As a result, these 
                                                            
40 A Skype interview conducted between the Tunisian researcher and Ahlam on 
29 April 2013. 
41 These quotations are selected from the participants of a focus group conducted 
with youth activists in Gaza City on 7 April 2013 by Palestine Country researcher, 
Maisa Shquir. 
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activists seek out and create other more politically constructive spaces 
and initiatives in their own communities where their efforts can 
counter polarisation, fragmentation and exclusion. In so doing, they 
learn to mobilise local resources, work with others, develop, practise 
and shape more accountable and representative forms of leadership 
while contributing to their own community’s development.  
 
Re-Defining and Re-Strategizing Women’s Leadership and 
Empowerment 
The Arab uprisings’ new forms of women’s activism and 
leadership challenge the essentialist feminist argument that women’s 
activism and leadership has to be framed within a common united goal 
of gender equitable social transformation.42 I argue that mobilising 
women’s leadership in the specific context of post-uprising Arab 
countries may need to go beyond the normative ideological framing of 
feminist leadership because there are large numbers of women’s 
activists who consciously and freely prefer to practise their leadership 
beyond the standardised criterion of feminism that is confined to the 
goal of gender equality. Some Islamist women’s leaders rely on their 
religion as a source of reference to struggle against all forms of 
aggression and violence that dehumanize women.  
Within the political, religious, sectarian and territorial divisions in 
the post-uprisings context, the process of women’s political 
participation creates opportunities for women activists to challenge 
stereotypical gender performance. They learn and experience their 
gendered self differently, and as a result, they adapt the performance 
of their gender to respond to the changing context. Many young 
Muslim women activists in the countries studied have demonstrated a 
high capacity to create their own understanding and enactment, and to 
act autonomously and critically. Some young women’s leaders learn 
feminism through their experience of political and social activism. 
This involves understanding the local context and its diversity and 
reflecting on their actual exercise of political agency, where they can 
meet their interest and desire for social and political recognition in the 
local community and/or at the national level. In this context, women’s 
leaders freely and willingly shape the gender goals behind their 
                                                            
42 S. Batliwala, ‘Feminist Leadership for Social Transformation: Clearing the 
Conceptual Cloud’, in CREA-Creating Resources for Empowerment in Action, 
http://web.creaworld.org/files/f1.pdf (access 15/12/2015).  
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activism and leadership through their everyday experience, whether 
they believe in gender equality as an ultimate goal of their exercise of 
agency or not. 
The research also reveals that the legitimacy of any women’s 
empowerment or feminist discourse must be based on how poor 
women think of their rights, empowerment and leadership. Interviews 
with poor women show that they understood their equal rights as 
inseparable from the socio-economic context and in connection to 
their socio-economic well-being, as stated by poor women is ‘to live 
in dignity and earn enough money for decent living’. They actually 
linked their individual rights to rights available to men and other 
members of the family, which make poor women more attracted to the 
Islamist women’s discourse. These gender relational dynamics that 
poor women prioritize should be of major concern to all women’s 
organizations, secularist and Islamist – provided that their discourse 
and strategies of women’s empowerment be responsive to poor 
women’s preferences and gender dynamics in their day-to-day life. 
The contextual understanding of women’s empowerment and 
leadership revealed in this empirical research appears inconsistent 
with the normative feminist understanding of leadership that draws 
upon a particular political standpoint, which basically aims to 
challenge patriarchy. Feminist leadership is concerned about 
achieving gender equality and justice, and it requires leaders ‘to 
undergo a process of personal transformation, consciousness-raising, 
and internalization of feminism’.43 Yet, in the context of post-uprising 
countries, internalising feminism is not necessarily a condition for 
women’s exercise of their agency and leadership, and for building 
their capacity to make social and political change. 
However, feminist leadership is possibly achieved as an outcome 
of non-feminist women’s activists’ habituation or performance of non-
stereotypical gender roles that are situationally encouraged and 
recognised by the public at a certain time and in a certain place. Some 
other women’s leaders may also choose freely to exercise their 
leadership to advocate for ‘authentic’ gender symbolism (norms), 
which are morally defined against ‘western’ gender norms.44 As 
revealed in this research, non-feminist leaders, such as Islamist 
                                                            
43 P. Antrobus, ‘Transformational Leadership: Advancing the Agenda for Gender 
Justice’, in Gender and Development 8/3 (2000), pp. 50-56, p.52. 
44 Pratt, ‘Egyptian Women’. 
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women activists, as well as ordinary women practice non-stereotypical 
gender norms and act equally with men in several domains for the 
purpose of mobilizing Islamist or traditionalist ideology, or meeting 
their personal goals, that do not call for gender equality. According to 
Judith Butler this is ‘a dynamic used by agents to legitimize the 
authority of a certain ideology’.45 Although the performance of non-
feminist leaders does not operate within Butler’s post-structural 
framing of resistance against patriarchy, it successfully contributes to 
redefining and re-signifying gender norms within the moral 
framework of Islamic tradition, as Muslim women consider religion 
and tradition an important source of their empowerment.46 
The Arab uprisings have taught us that non-feminist women’s 
leaders have the potential to transform their political leadership. 
Women’s practice of power manoeuvring within patriarchal and tribal 
society institutions has succeeded in constructing new gender 
practices (roles and relations) that challenge the social and political 
exclusion and marginalisation of women. By focusing exclusively on 
feminist leaders, and on more experienced feminist organisations, one 
risks missing the opportunity of working and building relations with 
these equally important non-feminist women leaders and fostering a 
better and more localised meaning of feminist leadership and 
empowerment. 
The broad spectrum of women’s organizations (faith-based or 
secular), except few of radical elitist feminist groups, agrees on the 
priority of working with and for poor, illiterate and rural women to 
end poverty and socio-economic marginalization. This consensus 
provides an important opportunity for re-framing the approach to 
women’s empowerment. The full spectrum of women’s organizations 
needs to develop a holistic approach where women’s individual socio-
economic, civil and political rights are not perceived as separate from 
the rights of men, children and the elderly within households, local 
communities or at the national level. Focusing exclusively on 
women’s rights in an isolated manner leads to decontextualizing the 
process of women’s empowerment and failing to shape interventions 
that are responsive to local women’s preferences and dynamics of 
action in their day-to-day lives. 
                                                            
45 J. Butler, Undoing Gender, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 42. 
46 L. McNay, Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and 
Social Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
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Conclusion 
While the various post-uprising Arab political contexts required 
women to change the regular performance of gender norms and to act 
differently (for specific contextual political reasons), the new 
performance of gender has the potential to transgress social and 
cultural norms within male dominated political parties and other tribal 
and patriarchal societal institutions. This is illustrated in the repetition 
of the non-stereotypical gender practices and the knowledge and 
capacity women acquire throughout their social and political 
engagement in the public domain. Yet it remains to be seen whether 
the new generation of youth and women activists will manage to 
continue their organizing and mobilizing efforts and build a genuine, 
organic women’s movement which better responds to women’s lived 
realities and their actual socio-economic problems and needs. 
However, the real danger is that the new trend of women activism and 
leadership is easily coopted and instrumentalized by the larger 
political actors and state elites.  
In the specific context of post-uprising Arab countries, I argue that 
to effectively recognise and build women’s leadership capacity and an 
independent women’s agenda, one needs to move beyond the 
normative measures of feminist leadership and to focus on the actual 
experiences and dynamics of activism undertaken by women to gain 
social and political recognition, both in formal and informal politics. 
This approach has the potential to provide a wider space for newly 
emerged women’s leaders to become critical of their individual gender 
histories and their ideological/political orientations. This approach 
also enables women to resist patriarchal gender norms from within 
tribal and male dominated political institutions to meet their interests 
of power and desires for being socially and politically recognised in 
their local communities. 
A focus on gender legislative and policy change at national 
macro-political levels risks excluding the important new women’s 
leaders and their community organisations and initiatives. These play 
a crucial role in reconfiguring gender relations in traditional local 
communities that are barely reached by elitist feminist organisations. 
It is the local constituency that new women’s activists and leaders 
generate through working in and with their local communities that 
gives women actual power for political manoeuvring with and within 
state institutions.  
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Le regard libéré. La militance féminine dans  
le cinéma tunisien postrévolutionnaire 
 
Gina ANNUNZIATA 
 
 
Abstract 
With the fall of President Ben Ali in January 2011, Tunisia regains a liberating 
momentum that involves different aspects of society including the practice of cinema, for 
years subject to constant censorship. Several women filmmakers – as Nadia El Fani, 
Sonia Chamkhi, Hinde Boujemaa – have used this space of freedom to tell and describe 
reality through the stories of women who for various reasons can be called militant. 
 
Après trois ans et demi de gouvernement sous le signe du 
provisoire et du transitoire, en janvier 2014, la Tunisie s’est dotée de 
la Constitution la plus progressiste du monde arabe, ou « les 
citoyennes et citoyens sont égaux devant la loi sans discrimination », 
la liberté de conscience et d’expression sont garanties, et la torture 
physique et morale est interdite.  
Mais après la révolution, et une longue période de turbulences et 
d’inquiétudes, de nombreux problèmes persistent : l’explosion du 
chômage, surtout chez les jeunes, la pauvreté qui persiste dans les 
régions qui ont vu naître la révolte populaire, et les menaces qui 
incombent sur les acquis de la femme. Les artistes et leurs œuvres 
culturelles sont souvent attaqués. La presse aussi rencontre encore des 
difficultés structurelles dans son rôle d’information. 
La Tunisie, premier pays à déclencher le « printemps arabe », lutte 
aujourd’hui pour bâtir une société démocratique, égalitaire, et 
sauvegarder ses traditions d’ouverture et de tolérance. Dans ce 
combat, des cinéastes ont pris leurs caméras pour filmer et raconter 
différentes réalités, à Tunis comme dans les régions périphériques. 
Dans ce nouveau climat, le cinéma tunisien se pose comme un outil 
qui peut aider à mieux comprendre et débattre de ces questions. 
On peut commencer par Nadia El Fani, cinéaste franco-tunisienne, 
née en 1960, d’une mère française et d’un père tunisien, militant 
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communiste parmi les premiers cadres de la Tunisie indépendante.1 
Très proche des groupes de femmes militantes, en 1993 elle tourne un 
premier documentaire Du côté des femmes leaders, consacré aux 
femmes émancipées du Maghreb et, en 2002, elle réalise son premier 
long métrage, Bedwin Hacker dans lequel, dix ans avant la révolution 
en Tunisie et le mouvement du Printemps arabe facilité par la 
diffusion d’internet, Nadia El Fani imagine le web comme un lieu de 
contestation, prévoyant d’une certaine manière l’émergence des 
médias sociaux comme forme de résistance.2 En 2002, la liberté 
d’expression en Tunisie n’est pas qu’un mirage, elle a identifié des 
actes de résistance individuels et locaux et démontré comment Internet 
et la télévision, à travers les images et la communication pourraient 
être des outils de résistance. Kalt, le personnage principal du film, est 
un hacker télévisuel qui refuse l’autorité nationale et qui lance, sous la 
forme d’un dessin animé représentant un chameau, des messages 
subversifs en arabe tunisien sur les ondes de la télévision française. 
Kalt, citoyenne du monde, utilise et reconfigure la technologie pour 
                                                            
1 À son père, un des membres dirigeants du Parti Communiste Tunisien, Nadia el 
Fani a consacré un film, Ouled Lenine (2007), qui trace un portrait particulier des 
militants progressistes dans la Tunisie de l’après indépendance, et qui pose la 
question de leur héritage. 
2 Note d’intention du film : « Pour dialoguer versus Sud-Nord, Kalt jeune femme 
maghrébine, génie de l’informatique, pirate les satellites et brouille les télévisions 
européennes… Mais les services de la DST, pilotés par Julia, son alter ego, sont à sa 
poursuite sur Internet…Bedwin Hacker est né d’une urgence : celle de prendre la 
parole! Ici et ailleurs…Raconter l’histoire de personnages décalés, rebelles, marginalisés 
mais résistants, face cachée de cette société à la fois moderne et réactionnaire qu’est 
l’Afrique du Nord aujourd’hui…Kalt est belle, libre, bisexuelle. Elle vit au milieu d’une 
‘Tribu’ amicale et familiale pleine de vitalité. À l’aide d’un émetteur de fortune, 
depuis Midès, Oasis de montagne du sud tunisien, elle diffuse sur les écrans 
européens un premier télétexte en arabe : ‘Dans le troisième millénaire, il existe 
d’autres époques, d’autres lieux, d’autres vies… Nous ne sommes pas des 
mirages…’. Signé d’un petit logo animé : un dromadaire du nom de ‘Bedwin 
Hacker’. À la DST Julia, alias Agent Marianne, croit reconnaître là une allusion au 
pseudonyme Hacker de Kalt : ‘Pirate Mirage’. Habilement, elle ‘manipule’ Chams, 
son amant, journaliste parti en reportage à Tunis, pour obtenir des informations sur 
le piratage… Tiraillé par Julia avec qui il correspond sur Internet et Kalt qui le 
séduit intensément, Chams préfèrerait ne pas avoir à choisir son camp. Pourtant dans 
cette histoire de politique-fiction, chacun finira par se retrouver ‘de l’autre côté’… Il 
est des défaites qui sont des victoires ! », in Africultures,  
http://www.africultures.com/php/index.php?nav=film&no=296 
(consulté le 2/12/2016). 
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ses propres fins et définit la liberté en ses termes à elle.3 Ce 
personnage inédit pour le cinéma tunisien, offre aux femmes arabes un 
caractère féminin positif, libre et déterminé, qui refuse toute forme de 
conditionnements, et inverse le rapport Nord-Sud : 
 
Depuis le premier de mes courts métrages, mes personnages féminins 
sont plus que libres. Pour moi, banaliser la liberté d’une femme est le 
meilleur moyen de l’imprimer dans la tête des gens au Maghreb. Je 
n’ai pas envie de faire des constats d’échec. Je peux dire que, vivant 
en Tunisie jusqu’à maintenant, comme je suis j’ai vécu. La liberté est 
un combat.4 
 
En été 2010, avant la révolte, avec le même esprit, en mentant sur 
le sujet du film pour obtenir la demande d’autorisation de tournage, 
sans quoi on ne le lui aurait jamais accordé, Nadia El Fani filme la 
Tunisie en plein ramadan, où l’on voit un islam apparent, où la 
pression sociale est plus forte que la dévotion de la foi. En pleine 
révolution, et en plein montage de son film, elle retourne au pays pour 
poser une question directe : et si le vrai changement consistait à 
séparer enfin la politique du religieux ? Elle complète donc son film, 
Ni Allah ni maître, avec les débats sur la laïcité animés par les 
progressistes du pays, puis intitulé Laïcité, inch’Allah! pour calmer les 
polémiques suite à la sortir du film à Tunis. Dans Même pas mal, film 
réalisé en 2012, Nadia El Fani raconte les deux luttes menées pendant 
qu’elle réalisait Laïcité, inch’Allah!: sa lutte contre la maladie et celle 
contre les extrémistes et les attaques violentes dont elle a été l’objet 
depuis sa déclaration d’athéisme à la télévision tunisienne à l’occasion 
de la présentation de son film à Tunis en avril 2011. Même pas mal a 
eu une genèse très particulière. Avec l’avènement de la révolution, 
Nadia El Fani a su qu’elle avait un cancer. Après le 14 janvier 2011, 
et après une opération chirurgicale, elle est retournée en Tunisie pour 
tourner. C’est pendant cette période que sa maladie s’est aggravée et 
qu’elle a dû suivre une chimiothérapie. Dans sa narration 
cinématographique, elle met en parallèle les cellules cancéreuses qui 
habitaient son corps et les cellules islamistes qui se multipliaient en 
                                                            
3 C. McFadden, ‘Technology, Resistance, and Franco-Arab Transculturalism in 
Nadia El Fani’s Bedwin Hacker’, in Contemporary French Civilization 38/1 (2013), 
pp. 1-21. 
4 B. D’Olivier Barlet, « Casser les Clichés. À propos de Bedwin Hacker », 
Entretien avec Nadia El Fani, Cannes, Mai 2002, in Africultures, disponible sur 
http://www.africultures.com/php/?nav=article&no=2511 (consulté le 2/12/2016). 
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Tunisie. Le film est construit d’une façon chronologique avec une 
temporalité très linéaire, scandée par les prises de médicaments qui 
expriment l’idée de l’accumulation. Les titres des chapitres abordés 
sont annoncés par des « placards révolutionnaires », avec des paroles 
qui dénoncent ou qui revendiquent. « Les films » – elle dit – « sont 
nécessaires au débat, dans la Tunisie aujourd’hui » : 
 
Je trouve que Laïcité Inch’Allah! qui exprime ma liberté de 
conscience est profondément respectueux des autres. Même pas mal 
aussi. C’est un film utile, parce qu’il expose les événements aux 
Tunisiens dans une autre démarche, en dehors de l’actualité diffusée 
dans les télévisions. De plus, je voulais que quelqu’un prenne en 
charge la réponse pacifique que l’on peut apporter à ces gens-là. Là est 
toute la différence entre le combat des progressistes et les autres. Le 
film existe pour prendre date.5 
 
La violence des réactions face à la déclaration d’athéisme de Nadia 
El Fani a montré la présence d’un problème de liberté de conscience 
en Tunisie : 
 
Toute la haine à son égard et qu’on voit dans Même pas pal – explique 
la réalisatrice – d’abord, elle vient du fait que je sois une femme, qui 
s’exprime dans son individualité et qui se défend quand on l’attaque. 
Ce n’est pas dans leur logique et leur vision du monde. Au lendemain 
du départ de Ben Ali, deux projets de société sont apparus : un projet 
de société moderne et un autre archaïque.6 
 
À la fin du film, elle dit « la chimiothérapie de la Tunisie risque 
d’être longue », une thérapie que dans l’avis de la réalisatrice n’a 
même pas encore commencé. 
Dans C’était mieux demain, premier documentaire de la cinéaste 
belgo-tunisienne Hinde Boujemââ réalisé en 2012, nous sommes face 
à une réalité tout à fait différente. Tourné sur une période d’un an et 
demi, pendant et à la suite de la révolution tunisienne, le documentaire 
raconte l’histoire d’Aïda, divorcée avec quatre enfants. Aïda a fait de 
la prison en passant aussi par la prostitution, et aujourd’hui se bat pour 
trouver un toit et maintenir les rapports avec ses enfants, placés en 
                                                            
5 « La liberté encore et toujours! », La Presse, 3/3/2013, disponible sur 
https://nadiaelfani.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/la-liberte-encore-et-toujours-la-presse/ 
(consulté le 30/4/2015). 
6 Ib. 
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foyer. À l’image de la Tunisie bouleversée par la révolution de janvier 
2011, elle voit les événements qui se déroulent dans la capitale 
comme une réelle opportunité de changement : 
 
Une révolution – on lit dans les notes d’intention de la réalisatrice – 
c’est un moment unique dans une vie, où le pays que vous avez connu, 
change du jour au lendemain. Les visages et les endroits vous sautent 
aux yeux comme si vous ne les aviez jamais vus. Lorsque j’ai 
rencontré Aida, aux environs du 14 janvier, j’étais comme beaucoup 
dans l’euphorie du moment, animée par le sentiment de vouloir 
raconter ma Tunisie malgré tous les questionnements et les 
incertitudes que je vivais à chaque instant. À chaque heure, j’étais à 
l’affût d’une nouvelle. Un président qui part, des snipers qui abattent 
les gens, un parti unique qui résiste, des manifestants qui rattrapent les 
années perdues de paroles confisquée, des grévistes de la faim… et 
une population oscillant entre l’ivresse de la liberté et la gueule de 
bois de la peur et de l’incertitude. Le 20 janvier, j’aperçois Aïda dans 
la rue. Quelque chose dans son regard et ses paroles m’attire. Elle 
n’est pas comme les autres, car elle n’a pas l’air préoccupée par la 
révolution, elle se faufile près des manifestations sans y prêter 
attention. Je l’aborde. Directement sans aucune gêne, elle me raconte 
sa vie : deux de ses enfants donnés à un orphelinat, son divorce, ses 
larcins. J’ai en face de moi une personne qui n’a plus rien à perdre, sur 
qui la vie s’est acharnée et qui demande à la révolution de lui ouvrir 
les portes d’une nouvelle vie.7 
 
Tous les trois mois Aïda change de maison. Habitations malsaines, 
lugubres qu’elle quitte, flanquée d’un de ses enfants qui souffre d’un 
léger handicap mental, parce qu’elle ne paie plus le loyer. Elle se met 
à la recherche d’un appartement inoccupé, appartenant à un étranger 
décédé (juif, livournais, italien) pour le squatter. Cette révolution est 
pour elle l’occasion inespérée de révolutionner sa vie. Cette femme, 
combattante et effrontée profite du presque chaos social pour défoncer 
les portes se heurtant aux voisins et à des surprises souvent pas très 
heureuses.  
 
Aïda est à l’image de tous les Tunisiens et de Tunis… pleine d’espoir, 
avec une soif de changement sans savoir quelle direction prendre. Pas 
de certitudes. Juste des questions. Les nouvelles continuent à tomber, 
                                                            
7 Hinde Boujemââ, « Note d’intention », disponible sur http://www.trophees-
francophones.org/#!ctait-mieux-demain/cb5c (consulté le 2/12/2016). 
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création de partis, organisation d’une nouvelle vie politique. Tout le 
monde aspire à la justice. Aïda tout comme Tunis. 
 
La vie d’Aïda avec son passé difficile et l’espoir pour son avenir 
ressemble au parcours de démocratisation débuté par la Tunisie après 
ses dernières 50 années de dictature. La révolution, avant laquelle il 
aurait été impossible de tourner un documentaire comme C’était 
mieux demain, a permis de découvrir, au-delà des façades, l’existence 
de plusieurs failles au sein d’une société qui se voulait parfaite. 
La caméra de Hind Boujemââ est pointée sur Aïda tout le temps, 
mais l’avenue Bourguiba et les manifestations sont aussi là. 
 
Elle s’est imposée à moi. Elle était tellement époustouflante car pour 
moi la révolution passe par elle. Elle est l’origine, l’essence même de 
la révolte. Elle était si détruite qu’elle n’a pensé qu’à elle à ce 
moment-là. 
 
Et de rajouter à propos de ces images tournées en prison :  
 
C’était une période de flottement, c’est pourquoi j’ai pu m’introduire 
en prison mais je me demande si je pourrai le faire aujourd’hui. J’ai 
pu me permettre de filmer des choses que je n’aurai jamais pu filmer 
avant. Un tel film n’aurait jamais pu être fait avant. Mais d’ailleurs, la 
révolution est en arrière-plan. Je ne m’y attarde pas beaucoup. Je suis 
restée fixée sur elle pour montrer combien mon héroïne était détachée 
par rapport à ce grand événement historique qui se passait bien, 
qu’elle en avait conscience à sa manière... C’était très important pour 
moi de montrer ce qu’il y avait derrière ce type de femme que l’on 
condamne parce qu’on les voit comme des prostituées, de personnes 
mauvaises. Pour moi, il y a quelque chose dans leur vie qui justifie 
cela. Elle m’a donné envie de fouiller plus.8 
 
L’histoire de Aïda est le symbole des défaillances que le régime de 
Ben Ali a tenté de cacher. Même si elle n’a pas participé aux 
manifestations, cette femme avec son combat a les traits d’une vraie 
militante. 
                                                            
8 11es rencontres cinématographiques de Béjaia. L’espoir entre rêve et utopie, 
L’Expression, 13/6/2013, disponible sur  
http://www.lexpressiondz.com/culture/175703-l-espoir-entre-reve-et-utopie.html 
(consulté le 2/12/2016). 
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Porteur de propos plus directement politiques, le film documentaire 
Militantes (2012) de Sonia Chamkhi9 s’est servi d’un autre procédé : 
des entretiens avec des militantes représentatives de différentes 
orientations politiques, réalisés pendant et après les élections de 
l’Assemblée constituante. Le film tourne autour des portraits de huit 
femmes têtes de liste, à savoir Bochra Belhaj Hamida (Ettakatol), 
Radhia Nasraoui (Parti Ouvrier Communiste Tunisien), Saida Garrach 
(Mouvement des Nationalistes Démocrates), Houda Kéfi 
(Indépendante) Najla Bourial (Parti Démocratique Progressiste), 
Khadija Ben Hassine et Jinène Limam (El Qotb), et Souad 
Abderrahim (Ennahdha). Mais aussi d’autres femmes qui ont pris part 
aux travaux préparatoires des premières élections libres de l’histoire 
de la Tunisie et se sont engagées activement sur la nécessité de la 
participation des femmes tunisiennes à la vie politique. Latifa 
Lakhdhar (vice-présidente de la Haute Instance pour la réalisation des 
objectifs de la révolution), Monia El Abed (chargée des affaires 
juridiques et des relations publiques au sein de l’Instance Supérieure 
Indépendante pour les Élections - ISIE), Faiza Skandrani (présidente 
de l’Association Égalité et Parité), Besma Soudani (présidente de la 
Ligue des Femmes Électrices et observatrice dans les bureaux de 
votes) ou encore Raoudha Karafi (membre du bureau exécutif de 
l’Association des Magistrats Tunisiens).  
 
Les raisons de la réalisation de ce film – souligne Sonia Chamkhi dans 
les notes d’intention – sont objectives. Car pour une Tunisie qui se 
construit, la femme tunisienne sera le vrai baromètre du projet de 
société de cette nouvelle ère de notre histoire : la Tunisie nouvelle ne 
sera ni démocratique, ni moderne, ni progressiste et ne pourra pas 
incarner un tel modèle pour les autres pays arabes et/ou musulmans, si 
la femme tunisienne n’est pas considérée comme une citoyenne à part 
entière. Mais, malgré les acquis de la femme tunisienne, obtenus 
                                                            
9 Sonia Chamkhi enseigne le design image et la pratique audiovisuelle à l’Institut 
supérieur des Beaux-Arts et à l’École des Arts et du Cinéma de Tunis. Elle a écrit et 
coréalisé des courts métrages et participé à l’adaptation de plusieurs longs métrages 
tunisiens. Son court métrage Wara El Blayek (2008) a été sélectionné en compétition 
officielle dans plusieurs festivals internationaux. En 2008, elle sort un premier 
roman, Leïla ou la femme de l’aube (Clairefontaine/ Elyzad, 2007). Elle est 
également auteur de Le Cinéma Tunisien à la Lumière de la Modernité, Centre de 
Publication Universitaire, Tunis, Octobre 2009 et Cinéma Tunisien Nouveau, 
Parcours autres, Sud Éditions, 2002, Prix Zoubeïda B’Chir de l’Essai Scientifique 
2003. 
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depuis l’indépendance, le spectre d’un retour en arrière n’est pas 
dissipé. Donc, ce documentaire se propose d’expliquer déjà pourquoi 
la femme tunisienne est digne d’être l’égale de l’homme et combien 
les femmes qui incarnent cette exigence méritent le respect et la 
reconnaissance.10 
 
Dans son film, Sonia Chamkhi raconte aussi l’engagement des 
militantes pionnières de la cause féminine en Tunisie. Amel Ben 
Abba, Aisha Belabed, Dalila Mahfoud, Badiâa et Bahija Dridi, des 
femmes qui ont pris part à la lutte pour l’indépendance de la Tunisie, 
aux revendications syndicales, à la lutte contre la marginalité, la 
pauvreté et l’ignorance et qui ont payé un lourd tribut à la cause de 
liberté par la prison, ou par le sacrifice de la vie familiale. L’éditrice 
Siham Ben Sedrine raconte comment en 2001, porte-parole du Conseil 
national pour les libertés en Tunisie, interpellée par la police politique, 
omniprésente dans le pays, à sa descente d’avion à l’aéroport de Tunis 
a été incarcérée à la prison pour femmes de Manouba, dans la banlieue 
de Tunis, pour avoir « diffamé le corps judiciaire » et propagé « de 
fausses nouvelles de nature à troubler l’ordre public » à l’occasion 
d’une déclaration sur la situation politique de son pays à la télévision 
arabe basée à Londres. D’autres militantes ont subi la persécution 
policière simplement du fait d’être la femme ou la fille de quelqu’un, 
comme Rhadia Nasraoui, femme du leader Hamma Hamami dirigeant 
du POST. Grâce à une recherche difficile dans les archives 
tunisiennes, Militantes rend hommage ainsi à des femmes dont 
l’Histoire n’a pas reconnu toute l’importance de leur contribution à la 
construction de la nation tunisienne. 
 
Ce film n’est pas seulement réalisé pour faire connaître le mérite de 
ces femmes, la justesse de leur vision porteuse d’un équilibre social 
exigeant, viable et progressiste. Mais aussi pour donner envie aux 
jeunes femmes de s’engager, en leur offrant un modèle de femmes 
tunisiennes – et plus généralement arabo-musulmanes – libres, qui 
pensent, qui ont des programmes politiques et de société égalitaires et 
fédérateurs, qui agissent et se dépensent corps et âme et auxquelles 
elles peuvent s’identifier. Ce sont ces femmes qui m’ont donné l’envie 
de me battre, de faire du cinéma, de m’engager socialement et de 
lutter pour que la Tunisie reste ce pays où les femmes peuvent jouir 
                                                            
10 S. Chamkhi, « Note d’intention du film », disponible sur 
https://moustaches.wordpress.com/tag/conditions-de-la-femme/ (consulté le 
2/12/2016). 
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d’une dignité qui ignore le genre, le sexe et l’appartenance ethnique 
ou religieuse et j’aimerais transmettre, à travers ce documentaire, aux 
jeunes filles et aux jeunes garçons, la justesse et la noblesse de ce 
désir et de cet espoir.11 
 
Sur la question de la mémoire revient aussi Sarah 
Benillouche quelques mois après la Révolution dans le documentaire 
Ciao Habiba (2012). Elle cherche la trace d’une diva tunisienne, 
Habiba Messika, un modèle de femme libre, brûlée par son amant 
dans les années Trente.12 Pour tenter de l’incarner, la réalisatrice 
organise un casting et rencontre de jeunes artistes tunisiens, désireux 
de soutenir son projet. Tourné dans le nouveau climat « post-
révolutionnaire », le film place au centre de la narration le concept de 
liberté, porté puissamment par les femmes, et aussi l’aspiration à une 
société multiculturelle, en évoquant l’époque à laquelle les juifs et les 
arabes se côtoyaient sans problèmes. 
 
Mon cinéma – écrit la réalisatrice – tournant autour de l’errance, de la 
mémoire, de l’exil, de l’identité et de l’utopie, je suis en quête de ces 
cultures orales, de ces musiques, qui me semblent en être porteuses. Je 
vois dans leur transmission, envers et contre tout, une sorte de 
résistance populaire inconsciente au formatage de l’air du temps. Je 
poursuis ce travail autour de la musique judéo-arabe comme mémoire 
commune. Il ne s’agit pas de nostalgie au sens sentimental ou 
folklorique, ni de mystifier une utopique entente entre juifs et 
musulmans, mais il me paraît important de faire émerger une mémoire 
enfouie, pour tenter de dessiner, tant qu’il est encore temps, un 
horizon multiculturel.13 
 
                                                            
11 S. Chamkhi, « Note d’intention du film ». 
12 La réalisatrice tunisienne Selma Baccar a retracé sa vie dans un long métrage 
de fiction La danse du feu (1995). Le film évoque les trois dernières années de sa 
vie, à partir de 1927, rythmées par les soubresauts d'une société en pleine mutation 
et marquées au fer rouge par l’amour que lui vouent Elia Mimouni, un riche 
propriétaire terrien et Chedly un jeune poète. Au cours d’une tournée triomphale à 
Berlin, elle rencontre la star de la musique orientale, l’Irakien Baghdadi, puis s’initie 
à la vie parisienne avec un dandy au charme trouble. De retour à Tunis, l’artiste est 
emportée par le tourbillon frénétique du succès, jusqu’à la tragédie de son assassinat 
par son amant. 
13 S. Benollouche, « Note d’intention du film », disponible sur 
http://www.lesproductionsdugolem.com/site/bio_sarah_benillouche_golem.html 
(consulté le 20/4/2015). 
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Sara Benillouche choisit le Théâtre municipal de Tunis, lieu des 
représentations théâtrales de Habiba, pour filmer les témoignages de 
personnalités artistiques comme les actrices Fatma Ben Saïdane, Raja 
Ben Ammar, Amira Chelbi, Soumaya Boualagui, Amira Rezgui, et les 
chanteuses Sonia M’barek, Amel Mathlouthi, Olfa Souissi, la 
danseuse Malek Sebaï, ainsi que l’historien Ahmed Hamrouni auteur 
d’un livre sur Habiba Messika.14 
Personnage audacieux et transgressif, Marguerite Messika est née 
en 1893 dans le quartier israélite de Tunis dans une famille pauvre. 
Elle apprend à lire et écrire à l’école de l’alliance israélite qu’elle 
quitte après sept ans pour suivre des cours de chant, de solfège et 
d’arabe classique auprès du célèbre compositeur Khemaïs Tarnane et 
du ténor égyptien Hassan Bannan. Bientôt elle prend pour 
pseudonyme arabe Habiba (l’aimée). À partir des années 1920, sa 
carrière théâtrale décolle et joue notamment Le Fou de Leïla, Lucrèce 
Borgia, et la plupart des pièces du répertoire shakespearien. En mars 
1925, elle joue Roméo et Juliette au théâtre Ben Kamla. Elle interprète 
Roméo, alors que Rachida Lotfi, une actrice israélite libyenne, joue 
Juliette. La pièce est montée par Mahmoud Bourguiba, frère du leader 
nationaliste tunisien Habib Bourguiba. Le baiser qu’elle échange avec 
Rachida Lotfi provoque une réaction si forte que la scène est 
incendiée par des spectateurs outrés. Elle provoque une nouvelle fois 
le scandale en 1928 en jouant Patrie, les martyrs de la liberté enroulée 
dans le drapeau tunisien et scandant des slogans indépendantistes pour 
lesquels elle fut arrêtée par les autorités coloniales.15  
Dans sa vie comme dans sa carrière, elle incarnera l’indépendance 
de la Tunisie mais aussi et surtout la liberté des femmes. Presque un 
siècle plus tard, la jeunesse tunisienne connaît son histoire. Dans Ciao 
Habiba, lors d’une manifestation contre le pouvoir en 2011, on voit 
une jeune femme qui reprend les mots des chansons de Habiba 
Messika. 
Les narrations cinématographiques des cinéastes comme Nadia El 
Fani, Sonia Chamkhi, Hinde Boujemaa, Sarah Benillouche montrent 
comment faire connaître les fondements du combat pour la liberté et 
l’égalité se pose comme une exigence. A travers ces films on peut voir 
                                                            
14 A. Hamrouni, Habiba Messika, artiste accomplie, L’Univers du livre, Tunis, 
2007. Sur Habiba Messika voir aussi J. Faivre d’Arcier, Habiba Messika. La brûlure 
du péché, Belfond, Paris, 1998. 
15 B. Blum, De l’art de savoir chanter, danser et jouer la bamboula comme un 
éminent musicien africain, Scali, Paris, 2007, p. 227. 
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toute l’importance de l’image cinématographique pour restituer la 
mémoire politique et témoigner du rôle joué par des femmes en 
Tunisie, où le processus d’émancipation a commencé bien avant les 
révoltes éclatés en décembre 2010. 
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Abstract 
The definitive text of Tunisia’s new Constitution was approved on the 26th January 
2014, three years after the ousting of Tunisian dictator Ben Ali and two years after the 
election of the National Constituent Assembly. In analyzing the transitional process, it 
is interesting to follow the transformations undergone by socially and politically active 
Tunisian women over the last six years, their increasing self-awareness and their roles 
in today’s society. I argue that the female polyphonic choir in the heterogeneous 
Tunisian society contests monolithic views of Tunisian women or Muslim women in 
general, especially challenging post-2011 binary narratives of a successful or 
unsuccessful revolution in terms of women’s rights. This kind of analysis aims at 
stressing the heterogeneity of groups of women, as well as highlighting the emergence 
of new social actors following the 2011 revolution, contextualizing their (individual or 
collective) actions as well as their new approaches. Among them are young 
independent female activists, bloggers or intellectuals; feminist movements and 
associations formed before January 2011; new women’s associations, formed after 
January 2011; peasant and working women or housewives. This distinction serves to 
define and include (social and economic) differences, although such simplification 
does not do justice to the diversity of a society and its transitional faces. Through a 
critique of empowerment as view from feminist associations, as well as a new 
approach coming from new associations like Rayhana, Tunisian women are walking 
towards an interesting feminist path. By considering the multiplicity of different 
groups in contrast to the monolithic view of a generally identified ‘Arab/Tunisian 
woman’, this paper tells the new pulse of a polyphonic choir in Tunisian society.  
 
Introduction 
The definitive text of Tunisia’s new Constitution was approved on 
the 26th January 2014, three years after the ousting of Tunisian dictator 
Ben Ali and two years after the election of the National Constituent 
Assembly. In analyzing the transitional process, it is interesting to 
follow the transformations undergone by socially and politically active 
Tunisian women over the last five years, their increasing self-
awareness and their roles in today’s society. 
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There is a general trend in Western perception, media and academia to 
see women as a homogeneous set1 when in fact each woman and/or 
group of women need to be considered within the cultural complexity of 
Tunisia's society and its multiple walks of life. This kind of analysis aims 
at stressing the heterogeneity of groups of women, as well as highlighting 
the emergence of new social actors following the 2011 revolution, 
contextualizing their (individual or collective) actions as well as their 
new approaches. From this perspective it seems appropriate to distinguish 
among: 
- young independent female activists, bloggers or intellectuals; 
- feminist movements and associations formed before January 
2011; 
- new women’s associations, formed after January 2011;  
- peasant and working women or housewives. 
This distinction serves to define and include (social and economic) 
differences, although such simplification does not do justice to the 
diversity of a society and its transitional faces. 
The struggle for women’s rights after January 2011 (first for the 
right to have greater representation in the October 2011 elections, then 
for the respect of women’s rights in the Constitution draft during 2012 
and 2013) has led to good results in the new Constitution, with article 
20 stating equality rather than complementarity for women; article 33 
guaranteeing female representation in elections; article 45 on equal 
opportunities and the application of ‘the necessary measures to 
eradicate violence against women’. However, the types of forbidden 
discriminations remain unspecified and men are still privileged in 
matters of inheritance. 
It is necessary to continue to follow and understand the effective 
changes linked to the emergence of women within the family, politics, 
society, and the work sphere, which can only be done by considering 
the multiplicity of different groups in contrast to the monolithic view 
of a generally identified ‘Arab/Tunisian woman’. 
 
Problematizing neo-orientalist perspectives through a polyphonic 
choir of women 
The ongoing transitional political process in Tunisia demonstrates 
the transformation undergone by socially and politically active 
                                                            
1 L. Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2013. 
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Tunisian women over the last five years, their increasing self-
awareness and their roles in today’s society. Through the intersection 
between post-colonial perspective and feminist criticism, this analysis 
of women in the heterogeneous contemporary Tunisian society aims at 
deconstructing the mainstream discourse on stereotyped 
understandings of Muslim Women.2 This general trend to consider 
women in the Arab world as a homogenous set, which also has been 
called ‘gendered orientalism’, is constitutive of the perpetuation of 
hegemonic and colonial identity.3 
Post-colonial analysis reads this persistent and vague definition of a 
Muslim Arab woman and the post-20114 meta-narratives as a form of 
neo-Orientalism,5 which seeks to define – today as before – the 
geopolitical order of the area in question, by virtue of humanitarian 
and security principles in defense of women’s rights. This trend sees 
women as a socially homogenous group and prevents the emergence 
of key elements for the definition of individual, collective and 
multiple identities, such as generation, social class, as well as political, 
cultural and sexual orientation.6 Contemporary neo-orientalism, which 
sees binarism, dichotomies and epistemic violence reflected in the 
analysis of the contemporary female world, demonstrates the 
ignorance surrounding the heterogeneous female societies in the Arab 
region, where different aspects such as inter-generational differences, 
political militancy or on the contrary political apathy, geographical 
and subjective factors are key aspects to understanding the variety of 
women subjects and their positioning. I refer to women’s presences as 
protagonists of changes, in the three-fold attempt to normalize their 
presence – referring to neo-orientalist astonishment at ‘Arab women’s’ 
participation in revolts, politics, arts, society – as a part of the process 
to combat stereotypical analysis and to highlight their very special 
contribution. 
                                                            
2 L. Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle 
East, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998.  
3 M. Yeğenoğlu, Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of 
Orientalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
4 R. Pepicelli (ed.), Le donne nei media arabi, Carocci, Roma, 2014, pp. 6-16.  
5 R. El-Mahdi, ‘Orientalising Egyptian Revolution’, in Jadaliyya, 11/04/2011, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1214/orientalising-the-egyptian-uprising (last 
access 13/11/2016).  
6 L. Abu-Lughod, ‘Orientalism and Middle East Feminist Studies’, in Feminist 
Studies 27/1 (2001), pp. 101-113.  
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In order to map a polyphonic choir of women’s groups, not 
necessarily in conflict but rather in constant debate, I distinguish in 
this paper between different groups, contextualizing them in the 
heterogeneous framework of Tunisian society. I emphasize the 
emergence of new women’s associations after January 2011, and the 
innovation that they brought about at both the political and social 
levels. This original research is based on the information gathered 
during fieldwork carried out in 2012 and 2013, and shows the new 
mosaic following the 2011 revolts. During the first four months of 
2012, I met and interviewed people from 10 different women’s 
associations, including both old feminist associations and newly 
founded ones, and the results are part of my post-graduate dissertation 
at “L’Orientale” University.7 Since then I have been directly involved 
in an international cooperation project8 with a group of women, and I 
have witnessed the formation of a new association in Jendouba, a city 
in northwest Tunisia. 
My paper is divided into three parts. First, I will briefly describe 
the political framework in contemporary Tunisia. I will mention the 
problematic path of the National Constituent Assembly towards the 
definitive approval of the Constitution, mainly focusing on the articles 
concerning women, and emphasizing how the latter have been active 
actors in this transitional phase and how they maintained a prominent 
position on the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Second, I will introduce the different groups of women I analyze. 
They all protested side by side with men, creating a single transverse 
movement, which transcends differences of sex, status, religion, and 
political factions as well as geographical provenance. By focusing in 
particular on the new associations born after 2011, I will also 
underline the tendency to ignore this polyphonic choir. I will contend 
that these associations represent the expression of a new pulse for 
participation in the country’s political life.  
                                                            
7 M. Bellingreri, Women Association in Tunisia, Master’s Degree in ‘Sciences of 
History, Languages and Cultures of Arabic Counties and Mediterranean Sea’, 
University of Naples “L’Orientale”, 2012. Methodology of Participatory Research: 
individual and groups interviews, participant observation, logbook, documents’ and 
press analysis, visit to associations’ places and library of Université Feministe Ilhem 
Marzouki. 
8 International Cooperation Project, co-founded by EU Commission in Tunisia 
and implemented by Italian NGO Cospe and Tunisian NGO AFTURD, « Centre 
Femmes Solidarité: soutien et inclusion de la femme rurale », May 2012-May 2014, 
Jendouba, Tunisia.  
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Tunisia and its Constitution in the Transitional Political Process 
The National Constitution Assembly (NCA) approved the 
definitive text of Tunisia's new Constitution on the 26th January 2014, 
three years after the ousting of Tunisian dictator Ben Ali and two years 
after the elections of the NCA. Tunisian legislative elections occurred 
on the 26th October, followed by presidential elections on the 23rd 
November 2014. The path towards the final approval and the elections 
passed through many political crises, such as those that occurred after 
the two political assassinations in Tunisia in 2013.9 
The assassination of assembly member Mohamed Brahmi on 25th 
July 2013 led a number of opposition NCA members to boycott the 
work of the NCA and demand its dismantlement.10 The national 
dialogue initiative made the commitment to preserve the NCA and help 
ensure the success of its work. In addition to the national dialogue and 
the consensus reached, judges, human rights advocates and journalists 
also played a role in amending constitutional provisions.11 
The struggle for women’s rights after January 2011 is not negligible: 
first for the right to have greater representation in the October 2011 
elections, then for the respect of women’s rights in the Constitution draft 
during 2012 and 2013. This struggle has led to good results in the new 
Constitution, with article 20 stating equality rather than complementarity 
for women; article 33 guaranteeing female representation at elections; 
article 45 on equal opportunities and the application of ‘the necessary 
measures to eradicate violence against women’. However, the types of 
forbidden discriminations remain unspecified. For instance, men are still 
privileged in matters of inheritance. 
                                                            
9 Chokri Belaid, leader of Popular Front, was killed on the 6th February 2013, 
while his colleague and comrade Mohammad al-Brahmi was killed on the 25th July 
of the same year. Perpetrators involved in both killings pointed to links between 
Lybian Islamic Fighting Groups, Ansar al-Sharia and al-Nahda Movement.  
10 M. A. Jaidi, ‘The Collective Making of a Constitution’, in Jadaliyya, 10/06/ 
2014, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17860/tunisia_the-collective-making-
of-a-constitution (last access 13/11/2016). 
11 The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 
2015 is to be awarded to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet which comprised: the 
Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail), the 
Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA, Union 
Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat), the Tunisian Human Rights 
League (LTDH, La Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme), and 
the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie). 
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On the 58th anniversary of the promulgation of the Personal Status 
Code enacted on the 13th August 1956, Tunisia celebrated National 
Women’s Day. The National Constituent Assembly held a conference 
on the drafting of a law to fight violence against women, a further step 
towards consolidating Tunisian women’s rights and addressing their 
existing problems, since the application of these laws still lacks 
efficiency. The new draft law will reinforce article 45. The law on 
violence against women, including domestic violence, has been 
approved by the Tunisian Parliament on 26th July 2017.12 
Out of the 217 new representatives at the last legislative elections 
in 2014, 69 were women, i.e. 31,3% of the Assembly of the 
Representatives of the People.13 Women appointed as leaders of 
parties before the elections were a minority,14 thus betraying what was 
previously announced15 and threatening the principle of equality 
between men and women, as stated by article 46 of the newly 
approved Constitution. 
Therefore, despite the work of women active both before and after 
2011, ambiguities, contradictions, and discriminations are still matters 
of concern for civil society and the private spheres: ‘the involvement 
of women in the public realm has not been accompanied by more 
involvement of men in the private sphere’,16 nor by the reduction of 
violence. In particular, an important gap still exists between formal 
achievements and substantial change: the obligatory nature of 
instruments included in the Constitution’s articles does not guarantee 
an actual obligation of achieving results. 
                                                            
12 Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/27/tunisia-landmark-step-
women-violence.  
13 M. Ben Hamadi, « Les femmes élues à l’Assemblée des Représentantes du 
Peuple », in Huffpost Maghreb, 30/10/2014,  
http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/10/30/tunisie-assemblee-femmes_n_6075982.html 
(last access 13/11/2016).  
14 S. Lutyens, « Elections : après avoir soutenu la parité horizontale, des partis 
proposent une minorité des femmes tètes des listes », in Huffpost Maghreb, 
19/08/2014, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/08/19/tunisie-parite-horizontal_ 
n_5690997. html?utm_hp_ref=maghreb&ncid=tweetlnkushpmg00000067 (last 
access 13/11/2016).  
15 Vote on the 1st March 2014 on absolute horizontal parity in article 23bis: 
http://majles.marsad.tn/fr/vote/5362543112bdaa078ab82510# 
(last access 13/11/2016).  
16 O. K. Ben Hassine, ‘Personal Expansion versus Traditional Gender Stereotypes: 
Tunisian University Women and ICT’, in Ikene Buskens - Anne Webb (eds.), Women 
and ICT in Africa and the Middle East, Zed Books, London, 2015, p. 88.  
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This brief description of the political framework in the transitional 
phase after the 2011 revolution takes into account how women’s 
struggles as well as their political and civil achievements reinforced 
their presence in society. Furthermore and being aware of their 
persistence in the struggle throughout the country’s political history 
through their constant presence in national independence movements 
and the post-independence struggle for civil and political rights, this 
account also helps to de-homogenize the picture of an ‘Arab 
woman’, contextualizing Tunisian women within their history. 
Tunisia had in fact its most secular and modernist governance under 
its first President Habib Bourghiba, father of the nation, who made 
revolutionary reforms to the Code of Personal Status (CPS), which 
included abolishing polygamy, creating a judicial procedure for 
divorce, requiring marriage to be based on the mutual consent of 
both parties and obliging wives who had a source of income to 
contribute to the family’s expenses. In addition, Bourghiba granted 
women equal rights to access education and participation in the 
workforce. A stereotyped understanding of Muslim women tends to 
overlook the nuanced view of different Arab countries where 
national postcolonial histories differ politically, legally, culturally 
and socially.  
 
Tunisian Women: multiplicity in a mosaic 
The whole constituted by all Tunisian women forms a ‘mosaic’, as 
described by Nacyb Allouchi,17 president of the newly formed 
association Rayhana,18 in Jendouba. Within its own specificity and 
autonomy, each piece of the mosaic plays an important role when 
looking at the whole picture. In 2012, many women opposed Nahda’s 
attempt to define women as complementary rather than as equal to 
men. If complementarity does exist, it relates to the work of the 
different groups of women that make up the multifaceted mosaic. In 
fact, despite their differences, they make a common effort to 
contribute to the growth of their country, to its political and social life, 
going beyond the struggle for the achievement of women’s rights. The 
gender perspective, which urges on the fight for the affirmation of 
                                                            
17 Interview with Nacyb Allouchi, from the city of Jendouba, who is the co-
founder and president of the association Rayhana, August 2014.  
18 Rayhana has a Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/association. 
rayhana? Fref =ts.  
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one’s formally acquired rights, needs to be understood within a 
framework of political and social struggle, where rights are not 
excluded but rather included. 
The following analysis aims at highlighting the diversity and 
heterogeneity of various groups, in contrast to a homogenous entity, 
embracing the emergence of new social actors within the multi-faceted 
elements of the mosaic. It further contests Eurocentric/neo-Orientalist 
epistemologies which tend to emphasize difference as a space of 
conflict in the Arab world where instead multiplicity is a fertile terrain 
for debate. It starts with a general distinction between different groups 
and then takes a closer look at the associations born following the 
ousting of the dictator Ben Ali. From this perspective, it seems 
appropriate to distinguish between: 
-Young independent female activists, bloggers or intellectuals, who 
have often had a wide international following and resonance, which 
sometimes made them the only spokespersons for the female Tunisian 
world; 
-Feminist movements and associations formed before 2011, 
inspired by European left-wing ideology, with their perspectives, new 
contributions, and inevitable inter-generational conflicts; 
-New women’s associations, formed after January 2011, and 
sometimes connected with parties and cooperation projects, both 
religious and secular. I will contend that they are the most 
significant and innovative answer to the revolutionary process, 
thanks to the newly acquired freedom of association and freedom of 
expression; 
-Peasant and working women or housewives, often illiterate and 
sometimes extremely politicized. This group also includes single 
mothers, who are concerned about their Country’s political life, 
despite living at the margins of the political sphere. 
It is important to point out that this division does not intend to 
separate the pieces of the mosaic. Rather, through the description of 
different women and their diverse positioning in the socio-political 
context, it seeks to emphasize the cultural complexity of Tunisian 
society and its multiple walks of life, thus problematizing the 
monolithic view that crystallizes women’s identities in the Arab and 
Tunisian world. 
The present analysis also considers irrelevant the distinction 
between secular and religious women, an element that is often used as 
a means of speculation and separation by internal and external 
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political and feminist forces for power interests,19 where separation is 
also intended as a colonial controlling device. The meters of analysis 
are instead the different modalities that women adopted in their action 
and participation, and the generational gap that emerged with the 
revolution. Furthermore, the religious spectrum does not always seem 
suitable to understanding the real significance of the new social 
dynamics that emerge when looking at the distinction between the 
associations operating during the dictatorship and the newly born 
associations. We can then differentiate between women who have 
worked for decades as political opponents under the dictatorship from 
women who only recently made their appearance on the political, 
social and associational world. 
 
Bloggers and Individual Actions. The Case of Amina Sboui 
Young independent female activists and bloggers, who have 
received much attention abroad and have been appointed by 
international public opinion as the sole spokespersons for the female 
Tunisian world, represent the first piece of the mosaic. One of the 
most well-known is Leena Ben Mehni, author of the blog ‘A Tunisian 
Girl’,20 and of the first publication that carries the same name. Her 
intense work over the last six years and long before January 2011 and 
her strong public denunciation cost her threats from extremist groups, 
which have forced the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior to give her an 
escort since August 2013. Another very well-known blogger is Fatma 
Riahi, with her blog ‘Arabicca’.21 She was in prison in 2009 and was 
supported by a campaign advocating her freedom. Another activist and 
young woman is Amina Sboui, who became internationally known in 
2013 as Amina Tyler or Amina Femen. Over the last few years, these 
three women have drawn more attention from abroad than in their 
own country among other Tunisian women. Their point of view has 
often been adopted as representative of the whole of Tunisian women, 
or even of Tunisian society, contributing to confirm what Rabab al-
Mahdi has expressed in her article ‘Orientalizing the Egyptian 
                                                            
19 A. Muhanna, ‘Islamic and Secular Women’s Activism and Discourses in Post-
Uprising Tunisia’, in Maha El Said - Lena Meari - Nicola Pratt (eds.) Rethinking 
Gender in Revolutions, Lessons from the Arab World, Zed Books, London, 2015, pp. 
205-232.  
20 L. Ben Mehni, A Tunisian Girl, Blogueuse pour un printemps arabe, Indigene, 
Paris, 2011.  
21 Blog of Fatma Riahi: http://fatmaarabicca.blogspot.com/.  
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Revolution’. In fact, I believe that the analysis the Egyptian activist 
and researcher has made about her country can be applied to Tunisia 
as well. 
The academic world, media, journalists, local elites, all read with 
amazement and surprise the events of the ‘spring uprising’, as it has 
been called, once more triggering the narrative that distinguishes 
between ‘we’ (the West) and ‘they’ (the East).22 According to this 
narrative during the ‘Arab Spring’, in the end, ‘they’ – the Egyptian 
and Tunisian activist women – are not very different from ‘us’; they 
are young and independent, they are ‘modern’ and non-violent. 
Through the Internet, they write and testify in a foreign language 
about what is happening in their country. The narrative of events is 
often based on what is found in these blogs and on what these well-
known bloggers declare. Once these countries have made their own 
‘revolutions’, commonalities are finally underlined, while a vast 
majority of voices remains unheard due to the emphasis placed on 
these representatives of ‘modern’ revolutions. 
I will make a few brief considerations starting from the latter case 
of Amina. On 11th March 2013, Amina Sboui was the first Tunisian 
woman to post a photograph of herself nude from the waist up on 
Facebook, with the phrase ‘My body is mine and not the source of 
anybody’s honor’ in Arabic. The photo was seen as scandalous and 
evoked strong controversies within Tunisian society comparable to the 
nude self-portraits of the Egyptian woman Aliaa Magda Elmahdy two 
years earlier. Between March and September 2013, the case of Amina 
Tyler often catalyzed the attention of the media and general public, 
diverting it from the correct understanding of events. Instead of 
listening to the multiplicity of existing voices, the mechanism of 
stereotypes and prejudices that embraces the ‘Arab woman’ is 
repeated, directly disconnecting Amina’s personal episode from the 
political events of the country. A different reading of Amina’s case 
would need to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the 
country’s contemporary political events and to listen directly to her 
story. Decontextualizing her story led to a mystification of her action, 
especially because it was made by a woman. In fact, the month 
preceding the publication of Amina’s picture on Facebook, the leader 
of the Popular Front, Choukri Belaid, was assassinated. According to 
                                                            
22 R. Al-Mahdi, ‘Orientalizing Egyptian Revolution’, in Jadaliyya, 11/04/2011, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1214/orientalising-the-egyptian-uprising 
(last access 13/11/2016).  
 Tunisian Women: A Polyphonic Choir in a Heterogeneous Society 213 
 
 
Amina,23 the shock that she personally underwent triggered the 
decision to take the fight to an extreme level. In addition, she claimed 
to be representing the feelings of the whole country. Amina is a 
teenager who prevented her classmates from regularly attending their 
class in order to protest in January 2011. After the murder of Choukri 
Belaidi, she believed that other citizens should also commit extreme 
actions in the same vein as hers. She chose this kind of personal 
protest to challenge the extreme violence that she perceived in her 
country. However, the murder of the leader of the Popular Front 
generated collective and spontaneous reactions, extreme in their own 
way when related to the cultural background, which are of more 
importance than Amina’s individual battle. 
According to estimates, during Chokri Belaidi’s funerals, about one 
million citizens from all around the country reached the cemetery. 
What’s more, for the first time in an Arab-Muslim country, women 
took part in the procession and escorted the body all the way to the 
cemetery, participating in the funeral service, from which they are 
traditionally excluded.24 
Remembering these events responds to an important historical 
necessity of understanding individual stories within the contemporary 
socio-political order. On the contrary, Amina’s case has been 
overemphasized and distorted internationally. In fact, her case has 
been discussed as an ‘exceptional’ and extreme act made by a vaguely 
defined ‘Arab woman’. An Arab woman was simply in the nude. Her 
being in the nude is a revolutionary act that needs to be 
acknowledged: 
 
C’était un mélange d’excitation et d’appréhension. La question 
lancinante « pourquoi je fais ça ? » revenait sans cesse, toujours cette 
petite voix de la sagesse qui me rappelait que j’avais une famille 
attachée aux traditions… et puis la nudité de la femme arabe c’est 
quand même le gros tabou!25 
 
                                                            
23 Interview with Amina some days after she released the photo, Tunis, 19th 
March 2013. 
24 Z. A., « Funerailles de Chokri Belaid : Beaucoup de femmes au cimetière aux 
cotés des hommes », in Kapitalis, 08/02/2013,  
http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/14372-funerailles-de-chokri-belaid-beaucoup-de-
femmes-au-cimetiere-aux-cotes-des-hommes.html 
(last access 13/11/2016).  
25 A. Sboui, Mon corps m’appartient, Editions Plon, Paris, 2014, p. 12.  
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As Amina remembers in her book, many Arab women are in the 
nude in movies and video clips, but in her case it is the message on her 
nude body, like graffiti on a wall, that is revolutionary: ‘My body 
belongs to me and it is not the source of anyone’s honor’. This 
message mixes her personal story with the culture of her family and 
country, her courageous political involvement as a student, and the 
strength and shock she experienced after episodes of political violence 
in her country.   
On 1st August 2013, an Italian RAI television troupe went to film 
Amina’s liberation and her return home26 in order to interview her and 
to continue following her story. This event occurred at the same time 
as other youngsters were protesting in front of the NCA with regard to 
the political murder of Mohammed Brahmi on the 26th July. 
Nevertheless, this latter episode did not find enough space in the 
Italian press for a detailed analysis, showing again how Western media 
feed on ‘nudity’ and ‘extremism’ more than on a daily understanding 
of political and social events in the ‘Others’ countries.  
This is not to say that we should not talk about Amina or listen to 
her story or follow her journey. However, we should not lose sight of 
the bigger picture of events, in order to avoid reiterating the 
mystification of Arab women’s rights or of their evasive and 
scandalous acts, nor should we determine the paths they choose to 
follow for themselves. This kind of narrative deliberately avoids 
talking about other forms of struggle through which rights can be 
achieved. For instance, it excludes the daily actions that associations 
of women carry out to oppose social taboos concerning the body, 
sexuality, violence, and marriage. 
On the one hand, such decontextualized sensationalism tends to 
overemphasize gestures that are considered immoral by the Muslim 
community; on the other hand, it underestimates the daily acts that we 
could consider revolutionary in relation to Tunisian women’s 
communities of provenance, such as those acts that the women of 
newly-formed associations carry out every day, but which are not 
nude, public or extreme enough to be listened to by the West. In other 
words, abroad Amina became the symbol of a struggle in which 
women and feminist associations are already engaged at home by 
other means. For instance, the fact that many women from the Muslim 
world have expressed their discontent with Amina’s actions illustrates 
                                                            
26 Amina tells this episode in her own book: Sboui, Mon corps m’appartient, p. 52. 
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how they did not feel represented by the message she attempted to 
launch.  
The media phenomenon that concerned Amina had a negative 
impact on Amina’s life itself. She has been de-individualized as a 
young woman in the press; she has been under constant pressure for 
months, to which she responded with a strong temperament. It was not 
understood that her arrest on the 19th May, 2013 was a loss for the 
country in terms of civil and libertarian rights. However, going beyond 
the phenomenon itself, Amina’s arrest was unjust, just like many other 
arbitrary arrests that posed a threat to freedom of expression.27 But 
Amina also determinedly dealt with this latter episode of her life in 
Tunisia, before leaving for France: she offered the proceeds of her 
publication to her fellow female prisoners.  
In conclusion, reading and emphasizing individual voices of 
bloggers and activists responds more to a tendency to mystify 
uncommon events, as Europe and the western world often do, rather 
than really understanding the Arab world and its changes, especially 
among women. Only by listening to the multiplicity of voices of 
women in relation to the global context will we be able to better grasp 
the real change that is taking place. 
 
Women’s Feminist Associations. What Kind of Empowerment? 
Feminist movements and associations such as the ATFD (Tunisian 
Association of Democratic Women) and AFTURD (Association of 
Tunisian Women for Research on Development)28 are registered 
independent associations and NGOs and differ from the new 
movement for a few reasons. First, they were created under the so-
called ‘State Feminism’ or ‘Institutional Feminism’ inaugurated under 
Bourghiba. After 1987, their identity shaped itself around their 
opposition to Ben Ali’s regime. The latter exploited the issue of 
women’s rights, adopting it as a weapon against the chief enemy of 
the state, fundamentalist Islam. On a social level, while approving 
women’s rights formally, Ben Ali never took action to make the 
substantial changes necessary to enact them. On a legal level, it meant 
                                                            
27 S. Alba Rico, ‘Amina en Tunez: otra historia ejemplar’, in Tunisia in Red, 
01/06/2013, http://www.tunisiainred.org/tir/?p=2629 (last access 13/11/2016).  
28 All information regarding both associations which I have described in depth in 
my Master thesis are available at their own websites: ATFD, 
http://femmesdemocrates. org.tn/ and AFTURD: http://www.afturd-tunisie.org/ 
acceuil/.  
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it was impossible for women to enjoy their rights. The single-party 
state reproduced the patriarchal system and women’s associations 
were often only elitist groups or state unions (such as the UNFT, the 
National Union of Tunisian Women, founded by Bourghiba at the end 
of 1950s), working as a political shelter rather than promoting social 
mobilization. The isolation, the lack of media support, and the lack of 
free communication with the outside world,29 during the long 
dictatorship, weakened and devitalized these associations. Following 
the revolution, both women’s associations as well as other 
associations30 have undergone a new phase of development and their 
numbers have grown. This phenomenon is only partially due to the 
general freedom that they acquired after Ben Ali’s flight. In fact, 
another reason for their growth is that secular feminists feared that the 
advancement of Islamism would cause a regression in the long march 
for the achievement of women’s rights. For decades, Islamic parties 
were repressed together with the freedom of religious expression. 
With the fall of the regime, they sprang up again, both peacefully and 
with extremist tendencies, oftentimes with the result of building up 
more pressure on women.31 Therefore, women felt the need to team up 
in order to protect the rights hitherto achieved with the Code of 
Personal Statute in the post-colonial era, despite obstacles posed by 
dictatorships and authoritarianisms. According to one of the women I 
interviewed, following the ousting of the dictator, the next step should 
be a cultural revolution able to transform the status of women, because 
they are still, in her words, a ‘shop window’ of the State: « On doit se 
battre pour l’espace public. Rien est gagné ».32  
                                                            
29 I. Marzouki, Femmes d’ordre ou désordre de femmes ?, Noir sur blanc, Tunis, 
1992, pp. 5-10. 
30 N. Bousidi, ՙBath 100 jamiyya jadida՚, in al-Shuruq, Tunis, 3rd July 2011.  
31 http://bulletinoftheoppressionofwomen.com/2012/09/06/tunisian-women-activ 
ists-assaulted-by-salafists/: this is just one of the cases reported by the press. The 
number of physical and verbal attacks in the last four years  is innumerable: one of 
the most known cases exploded in November 2011 and throughout 2012 at the 
University of Manouba, Tunis, with Salafists groups pressuring women to wear the 
niqab at University: http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/l-enquete-de-l-obs/20120202. 
OBS0453/tunisie-les-salafistes-contre-les-femmes.html (last access 13/11/2016). 
Many of these episodes as well as women’s lives in the face this attempt at Islamist 
control can be found in M. Kilani, Quaderni di una rivoluzione, Il caso tunisino e 
l’emancipazione del mondo contemporaneo, Elèuthera, 2014, pp. 225-267.  
32 Interview with Soha Ben Othman, ATFD’s militant, Tunis, the 16th January 
2012.  
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Over the past thirty years, feminists have been culturally marginal, as 
well as socially elitist and politically extremist.33 This led to a sort of self-
censure, which prevented the movement from growing. Furthermore, 
over the last four years, the attempt to overcome this self-censure 
intermingled with the fear of a new censure, due to the fact that the 
Islamic party took charge of the country, as well as to the social pressure, 
violence and threats carried out by the Salafists. Nevertheless, since 2011, 
feminist associations have been receiving more support and have been 
able to develop a few projects. This has been possible especially thanks 
to funds that were previously blocked and that are now available to them, 
as explained by Soha Ben Othman, a militant of the ATFD.34 
It is important to note that these associations historically depended 
upon left-wing parties. This caused them to adopt in their actions 
dynamics proper to party politics, giving priority to political factors 
rather than to social ones. With the approval of the new Constitution 
and the articles 20, 33 and 45 perceived as formal political 
achievements by feminist movements, the risk is that the State will 
reproduce a form of paradoxical ‘State feminism’, where the State will 
formally promote women’s rights as a way to exert its control on their 
emancipation and feminists will eventually fall into the trap, forgetting 
social and economic inequalities as causes for the gender imbalances 
present in society. Such intrusion of the State in the public and 
political sphere is in certain respects shaped by the funds offered by 
the European Union, as the latter often reiterates a unilateral and 
decontextualized view of women in Arab countries. The fate of the 
entire movement is thus at stake because it risks to become NGO-
ized.35 For instance, AFTURD was able to extend its action to rural 
areas outside of Tunis thanks to funds received through projects for 
international cooperation.36 In fact, one of their objectives following 
                                                            
33 Marzouki, Femmes d’ordre ou désordre de femmes?, pp. 5-10. 
34 Interview with Soha Ben Othman, ATFD’s militant, Tunis, the 16th January 
2012. 
35 G. Daniele, ‘Tunisian Women’s Activism after the January 14 Revolution: 
Looking within and towards the Other Side of the Mediterranean’, in Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 15/2 (2014), pp. 16-32: http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/ 
vol15/iss2/2. 
36 Project CIDEAL-AFTURD, co-financed by EU, in the city of Kef: 
« Promotion de l’égalité à travers le renforcement de la société civile et la 
participation des citoyennes et citoyens au processus démocratique dans le Nord-
Ouest tunisien » and project COSPE- AFTURD, co-financed by the EU, in the city 
of Jendouba: « Centre Femmes Solidarité: soutien et inclusion de la femme rurale ». 
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the flight of Ben Ali was to operate in areas hitherto considered 
‘marginal’. However, their ignorance about the territory where they 
intended to intervene caused clashes that we can define as 
generational between left-wing militants from the capital and some of 
the new associations. Such disagreements can be seen as a 
consequence of the changes that occurred following the fall of the 
dictatorship. The feminist militants are going through a transitional 
phase that takes them outside of the bureaus and tribunals of the 
capital and into other regions of their country where they form up new 
associations fostering social and political engagement. 
These militants often support their actions in the less known regions 
of the country through a vocabulary that is generally well received 
when applying to European funds for international cooperation, such as 
the concept of women’s empowerment. This language appears to be 
suitable to the international institutionalized discourse on human rights 
and the ‘participation of poor people to development’ but is often 
distant from the Tunisian women of these regions. 
The relationship between the feminist associations and the Tunisian 
women living both in the capital and in other regions of the country is 
sometimes shaped around a mechanism used by the West for women 
of the ‘third world’ that post-colonial feminists have denounced. It 
consists of the process of essentialization that lies behind the 
institutionalized approach of women’s empowerment, which sees 
women as a homogenous and monolithic category in need of rescue 
and help. This approach does not take into account women’s diversity, 
nor does it consider the existent power differentials between women, 
or the relationships of power that envelops them all:37 the ‘power 
over’ prevails over the ‘power with’. 
As stated by Rowlands, empowerment ‘must also include the 
processes that lead people to perceive themselves as able and entitled 
to make decisions’,38 being co-creators and co-participants of 
processes rather than being beneficiaries of results. Empowerment is a 
process where women are involved and results cannot be forecast or 
prescribed. Furthermore, results are not always the same due to the 
                                                            
37 A. Ferguson, ‘Empowerment Development and Women’s Liberation’, in Anna 
Jonasdottir - Kathleen B. Jones, The Political Interests of Gender Revisited. Redoing 
Theory and Research with a Feminist Face, United Nations University Press, New 
York, 2009, pp. 85-103. 
38 J. Rowlands, Questioning Empowerment. Working with Women in Honduras, 
Oxfam, London, 1997, p. 16.  
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subjective and geographical elements in which these processes 
inevitably incur. A standardized notion of empowerment ignores the 
intersectional nature of power which constitutes these relationships, 
and the ways in which racism, class, and patriarchy are articulated and 
reinforced, creating inequalities between different groups of women. 
Post-colonial literature contends in this analysis that the beneficiaries 
of these forms of institutionalized empowerment are the less 
marginalized women, and that women rights’ lack localization and 
contextualization.  
The origin of the concept of empowerment is found within Feminist 
thought, within Gandhi’s thinking, as well as within the Black Power 
movement.39 It has been spread in social protest movements and 
developing feminist theory during the 1980s. In the 1990s, the concept 
became gradually more institutionalized in the political vocabulary of 
governmental or non-governmental organisms until its success reached 
the United Nations Cairo Conference on Population and Development 
in 1994. In its first conceptualization, the term empowerment is a 
complex and multidimensional process which includes both the 
individual and collective functions of power. Over the course of its 
development during the last two decades, the concept adopted by the 
mainstream discourse of the United Nations has been accompanied by 
an individual notion of power and the fundamental transition has been 
that from ‘liberating empowerment’ to ‘liberal empowerment’,40 
critically paving the way for new associations. The latter-refusing the 
ideology behind the Western feminist model as well as keeping their 
distance from the dynamics of the left-wing parties-represent in the 
Tunisian context a new post-dictatorship model, able to pose a serious 
threat to the image of women as a ‘window-shop’ and to ‘State 
Feminism’. It seems that, as I will show in the next paragraphs, women 
from newly formed associations are re-writing, through their ‘politics of 
doing’41, the concept of empowerment which has been recently 
                                                            
39 A.-E. Calvès, « Empowerment: généalogie d’un concept clé du discours 
contemporain sur le développement », in Revue Tiers Monde 4 (2009), pp. 735-749 
and B. Solomon, Black Empowerment: Social Work in Oppressed Community, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1976.  
40 C. Sardenberg, ‘Liberal vs Liberating Empowerment: a Latin American 
Feminist Perspective on Conceptualising Women’s Empowerment’, in IDS Bulletin 
39 (2008), pp.18-25. 
41 Interview with Nacyb Allouchi, president and co-founder of association 
Rayhana, August 2014.  
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imposed from the top down: power is not to be given from the outside, 
it is to be valorized from within. 
 
New Tunisian Women’s Associations. The Pulse of Post-
Dictatorship Times 
Since 2011, the rise of a constellation of more than five-thousand 
associations of various kinds is the result of the absence of democracy, 
which characterized the reign of the regime. Associations are a means of 
social expression, which addresses both the society and the system of 
representation, which works as mediator with the state. The new 
women’s associations are today the new social and political actors in 
society, with diverse and specific vocations, together with the feminist 
opponents to the regime that I described in the previous paragraph. All 
associations formed after 2011 are now legally registered in Tunisia and 
try to achieve their objectives and goals, continuing missions and 
projects. Giving some of these women’s associations greater 
representation and visibility would reinforce a broader vision of the 
heterogeneity of Tunisian society and clarify in further detail the various 
roles and positions in the polyphonic choir of Tunisian women’s voices. 
Among the various women’s associations – formed in 2011 and in 
2013 – are Voix des femmes in Tunis, the capital, while others such as 
Nour in Tataouine, in the south, and Rayhana in Jendouba, in the 
west,42 are in ‘marginalized’ areas, isolated for years from the 
country’s political, social and cultural center. One of the achievements 
of the revolts in 2011, which also needs to be noted in a Western 
analysis of revolutions and changes in Arab countries, has been the re-
appropriation by Tunisian citizens of their own country.43 It was 
previously hard to travel across Tunisia because of the police controls 
and the fear that reigned in the country. Following the revolts, part of 
the civil society from Northern Tunisia and the capital started to 
discover the internal and border areas of their country. Tataouine is not 
far from the border with Libya, while Jendouba, in the northwest, is 
close to Algeria. Thus, they are different socially and economically 
from the capital. However, this geographical distribution highlights 
                                                            
42 I personally met and interviewed people from the first two associations, Voix 
des femmes (Voices of Women) and Nour (Light) and then followed the third one, 
Rayhana, between 2012 and 2013; it is composed of a group of women with whom I 
worked on the COSPE–AFTURD project. While not living anymore in Tunisia, 
during 2014 and 2015, I interviewed them again via Skype. 
43 Kilani, Quaderni di una rivoluzione, pp. 35-40. 
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the importance given to new associations in marginalized areas, unless 
these regions remain invisible to an external eye. They represent a 
form of new hope for the political and social life of citizens in these 
regions. By emphasizing the geographical distribution of Voix des 
femmes, Nour, and Rayhana I also want to express my view on 
associations in Tunisia, and valorize emergent actors as opposed to the 
voices that are already well known and have been heard by the West 
and by international actors, as I showed in the paragraph on bloggers 
and Amina. As is inherent to this kind of qualitative feminist research, 
the value given to the associations corresponds also with the empathic 
relationship and the connection that I have established with their 
members. Since the first interviews in January 2012 I have maintained 
a constant rapport with women in the field, which has allowed me to 
be continuously updated on the life of these associations. All these 
women’s associations used to consider feminist associations such as 
ATFD and AFTURD as the preeminent interlocutors in the field of 
political campaigns and in the effort to rethink and strategize the 
campaign for equal opportunities for women in the country. Voix des 
Femmes (Voices of Women), was one of the first associations founded 
after January 2011 and it includes both men and women, activists from 
humanitarian associations that came together. The presence of men 
shows that there is no conflict against men as such. Their focus is 
women’s inequality in the labor market, unemployment, and political 
participation, and they fight against the marginalization of women and 
for women’s leadership, working around and with women workers and 
peasants, female students, and women who actively participate in 
political life. These kinds of actions move towards the promotion of 
citizenship and involvement in politics, as Ikram herself did during the 
revolts of January 2011. And now:  
 
It’s time to build and to do, I don’t have to be in the streets, and it’s 
not my work. My work is to invest in women, in the future. Maybe 
people do not see our work because it will have an impact in 10 years 
but I believe firmly this is a great contribution. That’s how I built the 
association, even if our vision at the beginning was not so clear.44 
                                                            
44 A. Belli, ‘Uno sguardo di genere sull’attivismo tunisino: frammenti di un 
mondo in fermento’, unpublished, 2016. I have translated into English Ikram Ben 
Said’s words from Alessia Belli’s essay.  
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The highlights of the association are intellectual heterogeneity, 
which represents a plus, and its pragmatism and professionalism, 
where creativity and the ability to negotiate are evident. The initiatives 
that have been hitherto undertaken include: seminars on gender issues; 
conferences for the exchange of ideas on the different views that Islam 
holds about women; awareness campaigns on the eve of political 
elections in Tunisia’s different governorates, in particular in areas, 
factories and places where there was a significant presence of working 
women. These campaigns took place between the summer and autumn 
of 2011 and the months before the legislatives and presidential 
elections between October-November 2014. All these actions were 
also carried out by the old feminist associations mentioned above, 
which also organized similar initiatives for political elections and 
reached the extreme corners of the country, such as Tataouine. In 
Tataouine, in 2011, the first women association in the south of Tunisia 
was formed: Nour. Tatouine is situated at the gates of the southern 
desert, and it is the southern-most town in Tunisia, a few kilometers 
away from Libya. The sociocultural situation is thus very different 
from the capital and from other cities. During the first interview, the 
president of the association Nour, who has often been to the capital, 
stated that ‘women in Tataouine don’t have any rights, and nothing is 
granted to them, except the obligation to stay segregated at home, 
especially after sunset’.45 Nour mostly addressed unemployed women 
or women without identity cards, offering information and 
suggestions. Thanks to the leadership of its founder, Sabrine Wafi, 
Nour also took part in several training workshops. The association, 
thanks to a few private funds, is an employment opportunity for its 
members, but cannot guarantee a stable working position. When I first 
went to the association, I noticed that the women working at the 
counter were both offering a service and at the same time taking 
advantage of it: 
 
We graduated from university with degrees in sociology or economics, 
and the association represents the only alternative to unemployment 
after graduation, which would mean a life as housewives and only 
family duties. Our degrees, achieved in other cities in the South like 
                                                            
45 Interview with Sabrine Wafi, president and founder of Nour, Tunis, the 20th 
January 2012. 
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Gabes, do not offer any opportunity in the area where they are from. 
The association is a work opportunity in the field of expertise.46 
 
Kabeer47 refers to empowerment as the expansion in people’s ability 
to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was 
previously denied to them. The encounter with this association is 
important to understand the situation in Tunisia, where women tend to 
preserve their traditional roles within their families. This is not only due 
to a patriarchal mentality, to religion or to family impositions, but also 
to unemployment. Certainly these two aspects walk hand in hand, one 
being a consequence of the other. Therefore, the simple dynamic which 
needs to be understood is: were the country’s economy to improve and 
unemployment to decrease, especially among women, especially in the 
south, an important number of educated women would respond 
positively to the needs of the labor market, thanks to the new 
competences  they acquired during their experience at the association. 
Despite sharing a liberal attitude, which characterizes ATFD, and while 
being inspired by the documents and the workshops that AFTURD 
offered them in Tataouine, Nour keeps away from the secularist 
ideology adopted by the two main feminist associations of the capital. It 
instead identifies itself with the Arab-Muslim ideology of the country, 
taking up a position within the feminist Muslim current, which sees 
Islam as the source of inspiration from which they draw their rights. 
Since these women believe in Islam, they have to negotiate their 
religious beliefs with their associations, where they are required to find 
a balance between ‘secular’ rights, as provided by the Constitution, and 
an actual society far removed from these formal acquisitions. 
In Jendouba, the women of Rayhana first met and began to work 
together during an international cooperation project titled ‘Centre 
femmes Jendouba: soutien et inclusion de la femme rurale’, organized 
by a partnership between the Italian NGO COSPE and AFTURD, co-
financed by the European Union Commission.48 In order to avoid the 
                                                            
46 Group interview with Mariem Zarizir, financial administrator; Lobna Assaqay, 
receptionist; Sana Dubbabi, social worker; Selwa Bu Khashem, communication and 
media employee, Tataouine, the 9th February 2012. 
47 N. Kabeer, ‘Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment’, in 
Discussing Women’s Empowerment-Theory and Practice, Sida Studies 3, Novum 
Grafiska, Stockholm, 2001, pp. 17-57.  
48 The project on the websites of both NGOs, AFTURD: 
http://www.afturd-tunisie.org/espace-tanassof/centre-femme-solidarite/, and COSPE: 
http://www.cospe. org/progetto/un-nuovo-centro-per-le-donne-di-jendouba/.  
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dispersion of the individual skills that these women had acquired, they 
decided to organize themselves into an association independent from 
these NGOs. Despite the fact that Rayhana still needs external 
funding, it is important to analyze the process that brought the 
association to become autonomous from projects of cooperation. The 
cooperation project aimed at the creation of a centre for women, 
whose activities would guarantee the sustainability of the centre upon 
conclusion of the project in order to have access to funding. Finally, 
the tools provided during the workshops, as part of the project itself, 
shaped the association’s members’ consciousness of being 
autonomous from the NGOs that organized the project. 
After working together for one year, Rayhana and AFTURD 
founded the first centre for women, Espace Femmes Rayhana, in 
Jendouba in October 2013. However, even though AFTURD rejected 
the creation of a new association separate from the project, Rayhana 
decided to break away and opened a new headquarter. One of the 
episodes that tells us about the differences, inter-generational conflicts 
and changes in the regions outside the capital Tunis took place during 
the opening of the center for women, before the two associations split 
up. A group of young girls, belonging to a sports group at the centre, 
put on a performance: the goal of the performance was to invite 
women at the opening to join the center’s sports activities. One of 
these girls, who was wearing glasses, stood up and gave a lesson to 
the rest of the students, who were sitting down in a class, about 
women and their rights. The ‘students’ pretended to become bored and 
started to yawn. At some point, they decided to put on contemporary 
music and they started to dance to it, inviting the surprised teacher to 
dance with them. This short performance was criticized by the 
feminist association AFTURD, declaring it ‘without political 
significance’. On the contrary, the message was clear and was a 
parody of their top-down approach which the younger girls wanted to 
show as ridiculous or at least inappropriate to women of this region. 
Rayhana describes their new methodology of empowerment – in 
contradiction with old feminist associations’ approach, which is more 
similar to a standardized European approach – as a new spirit 
overcoming the idea of rescuing women in marginalized areas. They 
prefer to understand and enact empowerment practices as a 
transmission of competences, the production of a savoir faire, the 
implementing of an activity in society, a form of teamwork aimed at 
rendering society dynamic and at criticizing patriarchal norms. This 
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new line is also based on a gender transversal approach to 
empowerment, which valorizes adequate and equal exchange of 
competences, information and knowledge at a regional and 
international level. Furthermore, Rayhana also represents a very 
intimate place for expression between women where they can also 
release their bodies from external pressures. Rayhana’s women see 
their space as a meeting point as well as an opportunity to connect to 
places different from their house or their working position. These 
physical spaces were non-existent in Jendouba, but now they shape 
new spaces of belonging in post-revolution and transitional Tunisia. 
These spaces are not a new form of confinement; rather they serve 
women’s purposes to become more and more involved in public life.  
The proliferation of associations and initiatives is an important 
index of a global evolution of society rather than only of the 
development of a feminist consciousness, an aspect which has not 
been sufficiently considered by a Western perspective influenced by 
dichotomous views of a successful or unsuccessful revolution in terms 
of it Islamic or secular gains or results. However, I expect these 
women’s associations to promote a different method of understanding 
the global political debate. Their presence is perceived as different, a 
presence that disrupts other political approaches because women’s 
political management can be – and must be – different. Those women 
who created associations perceived the need for the latter to be 
political subjects, capable of making new proposals for the cities and 
for the country as a whole: 
 
We want to have and give opportunities. We want to think together 
about political elections and raise awareness. We try to interact with 
people and we have a lot of responsibilities. There are many divisions 
amongst women, there is this tendency not to be involved in politics 
because we have lost our trust. But the politics of doing and the 
practice of daily work makes us militants: only the context has 
changed.49 
 
Working Women, Peasants and Housewives: The Last Piece of the 
Mosaic?   
Finally, there are the women who on the surface are less active on 
the political and social scene, because they are not directly connected 
                                                            
49 Interview with Sawsen Gharbi, co-founder and administrator of Rayhana, and 
Fathia Ghanjati, co-founder and animator, August 2014.  
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to associations nor are they active through the Internet, yet they 
represent another important piece of the mosaic. This group includes 
women working in factories or in the fields, as well as unemployed 
women who take care of the house and the family. They often are 
women of different social and cultural classes, not just peasants or 
factory workers, and at the same time mothers and sisters of young 
boys who emigrated to Italy and France. Meeting all these women 
helped me to understand more deeply and to praise the work carried 
out in the associations. I gathered information about these final groups 
through interviews made during my fieldwork in 2012–2013, in 
particular in Jendouba. Most of the women I interviewed took part in 
the revolts in 2010 and 2011 and now work in small or middle-sized 
enterprises, in factories or in the fields. This group also includes the 
mothers of migrants and of those who were lost at sea50 during the 
journeys from Tunisia to the Sicilian coast during 2011 and in the 
shipwreck that took place between the 6th and 7th September 2012.51 
By including this last piece of the mosaic, I wish to add two 
fundamental parameters to my observation and analysis. First, 
although these agriculture- and factory-working women, housewives, 
and single mothers – often illiterate and sometimes extremely 
politicized – are the most marginalized from the public sphere, they 
are nonetheless concerned about and involved in their country’s 
political life, once more validating the argument that further 
knowledge of the country and of the heterogeneous groups of women 
that exist within it is required to understand and eventually analyze the 
dynamics of gender. For instance, it is relevant to cite the case of the 
mothers and sisters of the missing migrants. Even though they have 
never gathered into an association,52 these women brought forward a 
campaign where they were not only protagonists of protests in front of 
the Italian embassy in Tunisia,53 but were also at the head of a 
delegation to Italy that directly challenged the institutions, demanding 
                                                            
50 All the calls and letters are published at: http://www.storiemigranti.org/spip. 
php?article1047.  
51 « Naufrage au large de Lampedusa : 56 immigrés sauvés », in Liberation, 
7/09/2012, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2012/09/07/naufrage-au-large-de-lampe 
dusa-54-immigres-sauves_844618 (last access 13/11/2016).  
52 Just recently an association gathering families of missing migrants at sea was 
formed, but I did not include it, as it is not a women’s association. 
53 Tunisie: « Sit-in des familles des disparus devant l’ambassade d’Italie », in 
Babnet, 11/01/2013, http://www.babnet.net/cadredetail-58961.asp (last access 
13/11/2016) and video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kr8Y2ImpY0. 
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news about their sons.54 Therefore, on the one hand they publicly 
conveyed a private grief, demanding a communitarian responsibility. 
On the other hand, they challenged European policies on migration, 
which cause all these deaths in the Mediterranean Sea by refusing to 
grant entrance visas to migrants. 
Their march has been accompanied by associations of Italian 
women, such as the ‘2511’, which have supported their campaign. 
Their gathering was spontaneous and resulted from one of the 
achievements of 2011, consisting of the opportunity to appear in the 
public sphere, to manifest their dissent and their needs. 
The second factor recalls the analysis of the NGO-ization in 
Tunisia, as these women are often the beneficiaries of projects of 
international and local cooperation. They are in short the women who 
should be ‘empowered’ through these projects. Even before becoming 
the object of the benefits provided by the cooperation projects, they 
took part in the revolution, in the protests and in the political elections 
of 2011. Despite being considered the most invisible women in 
Tunisia, it is important to point out that almost all of Tunisia’s 
agricultural output is the result of women’s backbreaking labor. They 
account for 70 to 90 per cent of the country’s farming workforce. 
These women see very little of the wealth derived from their efforts. A 
woman in Tunisia may receive around five dollars for an entire 10-
hour workday, despite playing a crucial role in the country’s 
agricultural industry, and in fighting poverty and hunger. Their 
contribution to the economic life of the country goes hand in hand 
with their participation in political life, which still remains 
discontinuous and rare compared to some of the groups in the capital. 
Welcoming this spontaneous activism and will to participate in 
political life seems to be useful in implementing the work of newly 
formed associations. Just as they did during the 2011 elections, before 
the elections in October 2014 the associations worked to promote 
awareness campaigns across the country, often addressing illiterate 
women or those who did not have a national identity card.  
The complementarity between associations and the rural areas or 
minor cities, where there is still a need for spaces to meet and promote 
public participation in social and political life, is a clear sign of a 
change that is taking place. It is also an index of the willingness to 
                                                            
54 ‘Lettera video delle madri e delle famiglie dei migranti tunisini dispersi a 
Giusi Nicolini, sindaco di Lampedusa’, http://www.storiemigranti.org/ 
spip.php?article1053 
228 Marta BELLINGRERI 
actively and creatively renegotiate the presence of those social rights 
that have already been achieved, and those that are still pending 
between formal and substantial changes.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I argue that the female polyphonic choir in the 
heterogeneous Tunisian society contests monolithic views of Tunisian 
women or Muslim women in general, especially challenging post-
2011 binary narratives of a successful or unsuccessful revolution in 
terms of women’s rights. The exploration of the female world through 
individual actions, feminist associations and new associations in the 
post-revolutionary period aims at showing how the complexity and 
multiplicity of subjective and political experiences, in different 
geographical contexts, constitutes a counter-discourse to a simple 
understanding of women in the Arab region. Through a critique of 
empowerment as a view from feminist associations, as well as a new 
approach coming from new associations like Rayhana, Tunisian 
women are walking towards an interesting ‘co-creation of the 
environment and creation of their own selves’.55 
A new understanding of the phenomenon in this important period 
of transition puts the events in explicative contexts and links every 
element within a scheme that includes all the actors. The most evident 
aspect is the impact that the country’s socio-political as well as 
cultural situation has had on the emergence of new associations. 
Critiquing the neo-orientalist perspective, which tends to homogenize 
women’s achievements or failures to the West, a deep insight into 
women’s diverse experiences tells of progressive changes and an inter-
generational debate growing throughout the network of associations. 
Undeniably, the country’s independent activist bloggers and the 
associations of historical militants made a change on their own. But 
now it is important to pay attention to the new emerging associations, 
still less visible, which are breaking new ground and enacting changes 
in all dimensions. The women of these new associations are 
protagonists of the changes that started in 2011. They are the new 
pulse of the multiplicity of voices in a polyphonic choir that is still to 
be discovered, given voice and narrated. 
 
                                                            
55 Ben Hassine, ‘Personal Expansion versus traditional gender stereotypes: 
Tunisian university women and ICT’, p. 89. 
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Abstract 
This paper is based on the narratives of a group of Egyptian mothers whose 
sons were killed during the 25th January demonstrations in Egypt in 2011. I 
examine the narratives of this group of martyrs’ mothers whether those that 
appeared in Talk Shows in the mainstream media, or in Youtube videos 
commemorating their sons, or in Facebook pages which they created to remember 
their martyred sons, or videos depicting the mothers’ speeches and actions during 
protests, or photographs depicting their powerful iconic status and hence great 
influence on revolutionaries as ‘mothers of martyrs’. I argue that their narratives 
are simultaneously narratives of resistance and empowerment. Some of those 
mothers – although they were still mourning the deaths of their sons – participated 
in the protests that led to the overthrowing of Mubarak on the 11th February. I 
believe that both those who participated ‘politically’ and those who told their/their 
sons’ stories inspired other protestors, attested to the injustice of the regime, its 
use of excessive violence against the protestors and therefore signalled its loss of 
legitimacy. Even after Mubarak stepped down, under the rule of the military they 
continued to act as reminders of the atrocities committed by the regime and the 
need for bringing justice for the blood of the martyrs. I argue that the actual and 
symbolic presence of the martyrs’ mothers played a unifying role in the society. 
They unified protestors in spite of ideological and religious diversity against a 
common tyrannical regime. The voices of the martyrs’ mothers or the ‘mothers of 
the revolution’ continue to counter dominant myths propagated by the counter 
revolution about the revolution and its martyrs. Since both the ‘mother’ and the 
‘martyr’ are archetypes that trigger certain feelings in the Egyptian collective 
unconscious; hence, making their voices heard can counter the counter 
revolutionary discourse which represents the revolutionaries as immoral, paid, 
traitors of the nation and who do not represent ‘the people’.  
 
Introduction 
Two words come to my mind when I think of Egypt’s political 
martyrs over the last few years: appropriation and erasure. The 
memory of martyrs has been used in different ways by the state and 
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political groups to ‘reconstruct events in the popular imagination’.1 It 
has been part of the struggle over power. During their opposing 
presidential election campaigns, the two candidates Morsi and Shafīq 
used images of Mina Daniel, the Maspero martyr, as a mascot. In an 
attempt to present himself as ‘the president of the revolution’, Morsi 
invited the families of the martyrs to the presidential palace after he 
was elected.2 When the transitional government in November 2013 
built a monument in Tahrir square, it announced that it is erected in 
commemoration of the martyrs of the 25th January and 30th June  
revolutions. The state, by doing so, wanted to equate between 25th 
January and 30th June, affirming that 30th June is a revolution, leaving 
out and thus erasing the memory of martyrs of the Mohamed 
Mahmoud battles, the Maspero massacre and the Port Said Stadium 
massacre. The government wanted to ‘differentiate between those who 
have died for a cause deemed worthy, and dissidents who do not get 
the honour of being described as […] “martyr[s]”, but are labelled 
“baltageyya” (thugs), “terrorists” or “conspirators”’.3 
The last temporary government and the counter-revolutionary 
forces before it has been keen on erasing certain facets of collective 
memory and re-writing the story of Egypt ever since the revolution 
erupted. The 25th January martyrs represent the main actors in that 
story and an integral part of that memory.4 To eradicate martyrs’ 
memory, some claim that the Victims Fund for Families of the 
Martyrs and the Injured has been used to bribe families in order to 
passively accept the deaths of their sons. The state has also made 
numerous attempts to disrepute the memories of martyrs who were 
regarded as iconic – and by relation taint the revolution.5 Khaled Sa‘īd 
is a clear example. On one hand, in the months leading up to the 25th 
January revolution, it is the disfigured picture of 28 year old Khaled, 
who was beaten to death by the police in Alexandria and which 
became emblematic of Egypt’s problems under Mubarak, that can be 
regarded as the initial spark for the revolution. To counter this iconic 
status of Khaled the counter-revolution propagated an opposing 
                                                     
1 L. Gribbon, ‘On Owning the Memory of the Martyrs’, in MadaMasr, 25th 
January 2014, pp. 1-3, p.1, http://www.madamasr.com/content/owning-memory-
martyrs. 
2 Gribbon, ‘On Owning the Memory’, p. 2. 
3 Ib., p. 2. 
4 Ib., p. 1. 
5 Ib., p. 2. 
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representation of him as a hashāsh or drug addict. Heroic youth such 
as Wael Ghoneim and Ahmed Doma who played key roles in the 
mobilization for the protests leading up to the 25th January revolution 
are being persecuted, and systematically portrayed as unpatriotic 
figures.  
Martyrs have been ‘imbued with contradictory meanings, vices, 
virtues’, to the extent that even the causes of their deaths have been 
turned into ambivalent events.6 According to Al-Masry Al-Youm’s 6th 
February account, Sally Zahran (the well-known female icon of the 
revolution) had died from being clubbed on the head by regime thugs 
on her way to Tahrir Square on 28th January.7 Her family, however, 
publicly contradicted the story of her death on 24th February 2011, 
denying the cause of her death and claiming that ‘she had been trying 
to leave home to join the demonstrations against her mother’s wishes 
and had either jumped or fallen from the family’s […] balcony while 
trying to leave’.8 Many believed that her family was ‘compelled by 
forces sympathetic to the old regime to issue a denial of the heroic 
martyr story’.9 This denial which conflicted with the iconic image of 
Sally – killed in battle – discredits Sally and therefore serves anti-
revolution propaganda. 
As a result of these strategies of erasure, martyrs have been reduced 
to mere numbers and one way of going beyond this reduction is to 
give due attention to the feelings of loss that those martyrs’ families 
experience. I examine the visual and audiovisual narratives of a group 
of martyrs’ mothers whose sons died on 28th January, the ‘Friday of 
Rage’, a day which left the Security Forces broken after four days of 
trying to subdue demonstrations. My aim is to uncover the different 
strategies used by mothers to cope with their experiences of loss and 
grief. I argue that their diverse attempts to deal with and survive their 
grief, are simultaneously acts of resistance to the counter-revolution’s 
increasing erasure of the martyrs from collective memory. In their 
case, mourning – far from being a passive activity – emerges as an 
active occasion for self-discovery and empowerment. They rediscover 
                                                     
6 Gribbon, ‘On Owning the Memory’, p. 1. 
7 W. Armbrust, ‘The Ambivalence of Martyrs and the Counter-revolution’, in 
Fieldsights - Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology Online, 8/5/2013, pp. 1-4, p.2, 
http://culanth.org/fieldsights/213-the-ambivalence-of-martyrs-and-the-counter-
revolution (access 2/12/2016). 
8 Armbrust, ‘The Ambivalence of Martyrs’, p. 3. 
9 Ib. 
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previously hidden aspects of their identity as public speakers, 
activists, leaders who inspire the masses. By engaging in acts of 
resistance, going beyond mere mourning, and by channelling their 
grief instead into positive action, the mothers emphasize their 
subjectivity and agency. 
I have divided the different forms of mothers’ engagement in 
resistance into: ‘Activist resistance’ or resistance by being physically 
present in protests, ‘Verbal resistance’ in the media (on T.V. talk 
shows), ‘Digital resistance’ through representation of the martyr in the 
digital media namely YouTube videos and Facebook.  
Guwāya Shahīd [Inside Me there is a Martyr] is the title of an 
anthology on the 25th January revolution’s graffiti.10 This title 
describes best the experience of mothers of the martyrs, who are 
(metaphorically) still inhabited by their sons: they gave birth to them, 
and in dying the mothers repossess the issues and ideas that moved 
their sons most. Paradoxically, in losing their sons they cling to the 
very aims of a revolution that took their sons away from them.  I argue 
that the main frames of the 25th January revolution have an afterlife in 
the mothers’ words and actions. The mothers not only reiterate the: 
Karāma (Dignity), Ḥurriya, (Freedom), ‘Adāla Ijtimā‘iyya, (Social 
Justice), but they also extend and reinvent them. My reading of the 
mother’s relationship to the martyred son is informed by Suad 
Joseph’s approach which focuses on kinship and interfamily 
dynamics, specially the mother-son relationship.11 She conceives the 
subject as: 
 
A reticulation of sites, a shifting networks of meaning and interaction. 
The subject is constantly re-consolidating, re-configuring in relation - 
a notion of subjectivity that is always in motion, always in relation. A 
constant re-figuring locates the subject in the processes of re-figuring 
the sites of re-figuring. Relationships constitute those locations.12 
 
 
                                                     
10 H. Helmy, Guwāya Shahīd: Fan Share‘e al-thawra al-missriyya [Inside Me 
there is a Martyr: Street Art of the Egyptian Revolution], al-‘Ein Publishing House, 
Cairo, 2013. 
11 S. Joseph, ‘My Son/Myself, My Mother/Myself: Paradoxical Relationalities of 
Patriarchal Connectivity’, in Suad Joseph (ed.), Intimate Selving in Arab Families: 
Gender, Self and Identity, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1999, pp. 174-190. 
12 S. Joseph, ‘Thinking Intentionality: Arab Women’s Subjectivity and Its 
Discontents’, in Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 8/2 (2012), pp. 1-25. 
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Sacrifice, Motherhood and the Politics of Mourning  
Mater Dolorosa or ‘mother of sorrows’ is a monument depicting 
protective, sorrowing mothers sculpted by Kӓthe Kollwitz to 
commemorate the sacrifice of mothers during WWI. Sara Ruddick 
describes Mater Dolorosa as such:  
 
Scrounging for food to keep her children alive, weeping over the body 
of her son, nursing survivors, sadly rebuilding her home, reweaving 
the connections that war has destroyed - as she grieves over her 
particular loss, she mourns war itself.13  
 
The ‘mother of sorrows’ tears are caused by the destruction of 
‘women’s work’ brought about by war and violence. Yet, despite her 
pain, she instils life in everything around her, ‘hold[ing] lives 
together’.14 For Ruddick, ‘the world seen through mourning women’s 
tears suggests the blessings of peace’; as such, the ‘mother of sorrows’ 
is representative of maternal peacefulness.15 She regrets that weeping 
women will be too wrecked for a political response and poses the 
question: ‘how can suffering be made effectively political?’ In other 
words, how can suffering become an agent of change? Only through 
effective representations of suffering can suffering become political. 
Protests that can be regarded as ‘effective’ are those that ‘display in 
public emotions that have been relegated to a ‘private’, apolitical 
world’.16 
In some contexts (as in Iran during the war), mothers were not only 
expected to be the resilient keepers of the hearth while men go to 
battle, but they were also expected to give their sons to the state to die 
in the war. When they die there, they were expected to be strong 
mourning mothers, to be ‘Mary figures holding their sons in a “pieta”, 
                                                     
13 S. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace, Beacon Press, 
Boston, MA 1989, p. 142. 
14 S. Ruddick, ‘Women of Peace: A Feminist Construction’, in Lois Ann 
Lorentzen - Jennifer E. Turpin (eds.), The Women and War Reader, New York 
University Press, New York-London, 1998, pp. 213-226, pp. 215-216.  
15 Ruddick, ‘Women of Peace’, p. 216.  
16 Idem. Ruddick cites the example of the Madres of Argentina who protested 
because of the disappearance of their children, as an example of ‘effective 
representations of suffering’, as they display what traditionally belongs in the private 
sphere in public. As they paraded in a central square, they wore ‘as kerchiefs diapers 
on which they embroidered the names of the disappeared children’. 
238 Rania ABDELRAHMAN 
 
a stance of mourning frozen in time’.17 In order to mobilize the Iranian 
people on such a large scale for the war, the state promoted a culture 
of martyrdom. This culture rendered women, from the state’s point of 
view, ‘only visible as mourners’ which excluded mothers without 
martyred sons/husbands. It also excluded mourning discourses that 
deviated from the state’s dominant discourse of strong mourning 
women who were ‘bound to the cemetery, alone, with very well-
scripted and acceptable lines of lament’.18  
Apart from the ‘mother of sorrows’ as symbolic of peace and the 
resilience of Iranian mourning women in ‘unending pieta[s]’,19 
mourning women in different parts of the world have used their 
suffering as an agent of change. ‘Las Madres de La Plaza de Mayo’ 
are mothers whose militancy was against forgetting those who 
disappeared during the years of political dictatorship in Argentina. In 
Chile, the ‘Mothers of the Association of Families of the Detained-
Disappeared’ questioned their government regarding the 
disappearances of their children and relatives during periods of 
political turmoil.20 ‘Women in Black’ is an international movement of 
women of all nationalities that protest against war, the arms industry, 
racism, human rights abuses, violence against women, wars of 
aggression.21 They ‘stand silently […] holding banners that invite 
people’s participation: “Dress in black, mourn the victims, stand for 
peace”’. The black clothing or ‘mourning attire’ signals not only 
women’s right to mourn but that it is also their civic duty. According 
to nationalist and patriarchal fantasy the ‘mother of the nation’, the 
lamenting mother proudly gives up her son to the ‘nation’s military 
pursuits’. However, the ‘Women in Black’: 
 
Undermine the normative role stereotypically assigned to women by 
nationalism and patriarchy […] by re-embodying the ambiguous sign 
of mourning outside the sanctioned boundaries of the home […and] 
                                                     
17 R. Varzi, ‘Iran’s Pieta: Motherhood, Sacrifice and Film in the Aftermath of the 
Iran- Iraq War’, in Feminist Review 88 (2008), pp. 86-98, p. 96. 
18 Ib., p. 94. 
19 Ib., p. 96. 
20 B.P. Libed, ‘Mothering and Militarism: Forging a New Feminist and 
Nationalist Consciousness’, in Dekada ’70 and Activist Mothers: A New Look at 
Mothering, Militarism and Philippine Martial Law, Thesis 2010, pp. 53-79, p. 54. 
21 A. Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics of Mourning: Feminist Ethics and 
Politics in the Age of Empire’, in Historein 5 (2005), pp. 40-57.  
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being radically disloyal, instead of unconditionally supportive, to their 
men in time of war.22 
 
The Women in Black’s untypical involvement in politics or their 
politics of mourning drives us to reimagine the endless possibilities of 
women’s political participation in the future and drives us to re-
envision politics itself. By  
 
Resisting what has been categorized as ‘mourning’ in its normative 
connections to the feminine and the patriotic, ‘Women in Black’ leave 
open a space for a politics-to-come, for a renewed anti-racist, anti-
colonialist, and anti-militarist feminist protest against biopolitical 
production of life as bare life.23  
 
A woman as ‘icon of the nation’ is a well-known image in Egyptian 
history, political rhetoric, art, nationalist songs and poetry. It is a 
cultural construct. Its message was used by Egyptian women as a means 
to affirm their political agency and to demand for their rights. Ṣafiyya 
Zaghlūl, wife of nationalist leader Sa‘d Zaghlūl used motherhood 
imagery to establish a political role for herself. She shaped her public 
image to the extent that she came to be known and acquired the title of 
the mother of Egyptians, Umm al-Miṣriyyīn.24 Nationalist women used 
‘their motherhood roles in their political activism’ and ‘carved a space 
for themselves in the public and political realms’.25 The relationship 
between discourses emphasising the iconicity of mothers and women’s 
agency is found in other areas of the region. In the Palestinian context, 
for example, Peteet argues that:  
 
While a nationalist discourse celebrated [mothers] as icons of the 
nation, emblematic of the suffering and losses of the Palestinian 
people, mothers were crafting an agential location for themselves in a 
movement that did not directly recruit them as or position them as 
crucial actors.26 
                                                     
22 Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics’, p. 41. 
23 Ib., p. 52. 
24 Z. Zaatari, ‘The Culture of Motherhood: An Avenue for Women’s Civil 
Participation in South Lebanon’, in Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 2/1 
(2006), pp. 33-64, pp. 55-56. 
25 Zaatari, ‘The Culture of Motherhood’, p. 56. 
26 J. Peteet, ‘Icons and Militants: Mothering in the Danger Zone’, in Signs 23/1 
(1997), pp. 103-129, p. 114. 
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In the Egyptian context, like the Palestinian one ‘women, as agents 
and subjects, negotiate the meaning of official, nationalist, maternal 
imagery’.27 The subjectivity of the women in the mothers’ narratives 
examined here drives us to question the one-sidedness of the dominant 
imagery. In the context of women’s civil participation in Southern 
Lebanon, Zaatari argues that despite the differences between the 
women she interviewed, they all placed ‘a great deal of importance on 
the woman as “mother” of her family and of her “society”’.28  
This ‘elevation of the role of motherhood to the realm of sanctity’ 
can be limiting but it’s also very liberating, since the emphasis on the 
mother role ‘allows [women] the flexibility outside the realm of the 
domestic’.29 Their roles as mothers permit them to ‘deploy idioms of 
kinship with “strangers” or authoritative figures, providing them with 
the “uncontested” access to the public domain as mothers of all’. This 
motherhood discourse allows women to be culturally and politically 
active in their community.30 Women in Southern Lebanon thus used 
the ‘culture of motherhood’ to their advantage, enabling them to go 
beyond religious/cultural boundaries and ultimately ‘transform[ing] 
the women themselves and the public space’.31  
Coexisting with the discourse of mothers as national icons in Egypt 
is another dominant discourse: of mothers as patient and sacrificing. In 
the Middle East ‘cultural notions of motherhood, and of mothers as 
sacrificial and devoted’ are pervasive and the Islamic belief ‘elevates 
mothers to near saintliness and exhorts believers to honour mothers’.32 
An Egyptian mother is expected to sacrifice for the sake of her family, 
and patiently bear her pain without complaint.  
Such selflessness/sacrifice is perceived as ‘natural’ and mothers 
seem to be elevated on account of their sacrifices. For some time after 
the revolution, the attention given by the different political powers and 
the media to the ‘mothers of martyrs’ endowed the ‘mother of martyr’ 
with reverence, gave meaning and public recognition to maternal 
sacrifice. Mothers of martyrs came to be regarded as icons of 
sacrifice. A few questions come to my mind: Are ‘mothers of the 
martyrs’ expected to patiently and quietly lose their sons? Are they 
                                                     
27 Peteet, ‘Icons and Militants’, p. 110. 
28 Zaatari, ‘The Culture of Motherhood’, p. 34. 
29 Ib., p. 36. 
30 Ib., p. 34. 
31 Ib., p. 58. 
32 Peteet, ‘Icons and Militants’, p. 106. 
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expected to be as selfless and sacrificing for their nation as they are 
for their families? How can those mothers as agents and as subjects 
negotiate the meaning of maternal sacrifice?  
I believe that the ‘mother of martyr’ status is simultaneously 
empowering and imprisoning. It gives power to a mother when she – 
emphasizing her agency – acts and makes her voice heard thus 
appropriating her newly acquired status. Khalid Sa‘īd’s mother is a 
case in point: she voices her opinion about imprisoned youth in the 
media, in public and even to former President Morsi himself.33 It is 
also limiting when a mother – identifying with the naturalised 
discourse of the sacrificing mother – passively accepts her loss and 
becomes imprisoned in her own private mourning. The two states are 
not mutually exclusive, but coexist and the mothers experience both 
with varying degrees. 
The ‘mothers of martyrs’ whose narratives are examined here 
deviate from the flatness of Ruddick’s helpless model of the ‘mother 
of sorrows’: sacrificing, weeping, mourning passively, surrendering 
her son to the state and accepting her loss. On the contrary, the 
mothers of 25th January martyrs represent a much more complex 
model of mourning mothers as they stand in opposition to the state. 
And unlike the ‘Women in Black’ (who challenge maternal sacrifice 
both to the nation and the state), they politically oppose and challenge 
the state but sacrifice their sons to the nation rather than to the state. 
Finally, unlike the Palestinian ‘mothers of martyrs’ sacrifices that 
have always been supported by the Palestinian authorities, the 
sacrifices (and mourning) of the mothers of 25th January martyrs have 
never been encouraged by the authorities.  
The ‘mother of the 25th January martyr’ carries her martyred son 
inside her in a state of eternal pregnancy. It is true that patriarchal 
societies institutionalised motherhood as a tool to control women, and 
in order to sustain structures of domination, especially that ‘proper’ 
motherhood was defined by men.34 However, the motherhood of the 
martyrs’ mothers (under discussion) is not a limited role that detracts 
from a woman’s identity; rather, it is open enough to add to her 
                                                     
33 N. Hemeda - S. Ashour ‘Interview with a Martyr’s Mother: Khaled Said’s 
Mother Talks about June 30th and the End of the Muslim Brotherhood’, translated 
from Arabic by Lamees Al Sharqawy, pp. 1-4, http://en.hoqook.com/post/536674 
13528/interview-with-a-martyrs-mother-khaled-saids (access 2/12/2016). 
34 A. Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution, W.W. 
Norton & Company Inc., New York-London, 1995.  
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identity, rather than subsume that identity. In the diversity of their 
mourning narratives, the mothers’ forms of mourning contrast with the 
oneness of state or official discourses on mourning women, such as 
the dominant discourse of strong mourning mothers in Iran. 
 
The Mothers of Martyrs in Resistance 
Activist Resistance 
Khaled Sa‘īd’s Mother: Mother of the Revolution 
Khalid Sa‘īd’s mother – who played a very important role in 
mobilizing and inspiring the revolutionaries during the 25th January 
demonstrations, sit-ins, marches and funerals of martyrs of the 
revolution – can be regarded as representative of the ‘activism of 
mourning’. Athanasiou defines it as ‘public and collective formations 
by which trauma is addressed in all its affective, social, and political 
or biopolitical implications, intimacies, and limits’.35 She channels her 
own personal grief into public action. By participating in 
demonstrations and funerals, she is simultaneously mourning the 
death of her son and the murder of other youth, objecting to what 
happened to her son and to the atrocities committed against other 
youth. She experiences both personal and collective trauma, and reacts 
to those traumas on emotional, social and political levels. 
I will refer to two photos that reveal her politics of mourning: her 
use of her status as mother of the martyr to engage in political actions. 
In the first photo (figure 1), Sa‘īd’s mother is warmly embracing Wael 
Ghoneim, the administrator of the ‘We are all Khaled Sa‘īd’ Facebook 
page.36 The photo is loaded with symbolism: the mother of Sa‘īd 
whose murder was the initial spark for the 25th January revolution 
hugging Wael whose weeping during a TV interview after seeing 
pictures of the revolution’s martyrs, brought millions to the streets to 
demand Mubarak leave office. 
The mother’s physical gesture here is an instance of ‘other 
mothering’ when ‘an act of maternal caring [is] extended 
communitywide’.37 ‘Other mothering’ is when mothering extends 
beyond the home and beyond actual kinship ties. The events of the last 
few years from protests, to the violence practised against the 
                                                     
35 Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics’, p. 42. 
36 ‘Egyptian Wael Ghonim, a Google marketing manager, hugs the mother of 
Khaled Said’, Photo:APPhoto/AhmedAli.http://www.bbc.co.uk/staticarchive/6b450c 
53223bd410ff17090144e7c2cd689321ff.jpg (access 2/12/2016). 
37 Peteet, ‘Icons and Militants’, p. 121.  
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protestors, and to the death of youth that is its outcome, foregrounded 
the role of ‘other mothering’ in the context of violence, which 
‘overturns the semblance of a home-feminine/front-masculine 
equation’, thus ‘renegotiating the meaning of motherhood’.38 Her 
newly acquired role and status is apparent during the protests, when 
mothers of martyrs generally and the mother of Sa‘īd in particular 
were popularly regarded as ‘mothers of the revolution’. Youth, for 
example, in Tahrir square would go to greet Khalid Sa‘īd’s mother. 
 
Fig. 1 
 
   
Equally symbolic and an instance of ‘other mothering’ is her 
supportive embrace of Mina Daniel’s mother in another photo, another 
iconic martyr, who died in the Maspero massacre (figure 2).39 The two 
photos are very telling: her stance in support of the revolutionary 
youth (Wael Ghoneim) and the families of the victims of the regime’s 
police (Mina Daniel’s mother), represent her attempt to attain justice 
for the blood of her son. By supporting them she is supporting a 
revolution that promises to bring about the end of a regime that was 
responsible for the death of her son and other Egyptian youth. 
 
 
                                                     
38 Peteet, ‘Icons and Militants’, p. 121. 
39 Nadia Beshara (L), mother of Mina Daniel, and Leila Said (R), mother of 
Khalid Said, embrace at the Daniel family’s home on the outskirts of Cairo,  
23/10/2011, in  http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middleeast/egypt 
/111021/mothers-the- revolution (access 2/12/2016). 
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Fig. 2 
 
 
Thus, Sa‘īd’s mother created an agential location for herself in a 
revolution that was mainly mobilized by youth, and a society that 
didn’t locate mothers of martyrs as central actors, but merely idealised 
and honoured them as icons of maternal sacrifice (and only for some 
time before the counter-revolutionary forces suppressed them together 
with memories of the martyrs). The fact that she creates for herself 
such an important public and political role testifies to the view that 
mourning implies acceptance that ‘by the loss one undergoes one will 
be changed, possibly forever’, and that mourning ‘has to do with 
agreeing to undergo a transformation […] the full result of which one 
cannot know in advance’.40 
 
Anonymous ‘Mother of the Martyr’: from Icon to Agent  
‘For the sake of this woman the revolution did not end!’ (Min ajl 
hadhī al-mar’a lam tatawaqaf al-thawra) is the title given to one of 
the videos uploaded on YouTube of this mother in Tahrir square.41 
The title testifies to her influence on the crowd and proves how 
inspirational her words were. Like all leaders, she typically stands on 
a pedestal, invoking and practically screaming the need to bring 
retribution. She voices one of the main frames of the revolution: 
justice for the blood of the dead. Significantly, she holds in her hand a 
full-page feature of eleven martyr faces published in the newspaper 
                                                     
40 J. Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Verso, New 
York-London, 2004, p. 21. 
41 ةروثلا فقوتت مل ةأرملا هذھ لجا نم - YouTube.flv (Accessed: Saturday, 15th August 
2015). 
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Al-Masry al-Youm on 6th February. In response to a man from the 
crowd who tells her: ‘Don’t be upset. Have faith in God! Your son is a 
martyr!’  
She screams back (now addressing the crowd gathering around 
her):  
 
You shouldn’t give in. I am not upset about him, I am upset from 
those who killed them and from those who did nothing about their 
death. They want you to give in. But you must not keep quiet. Don’t 
give in! Down with Mubarak! (She starts cheering while crying at the 
same time). 
 
Even though according to Freudian psychology ‘letting go’ is what 
distinguishes normal mourning from abnormal ‘melancholia’, yet like 
the ‘Women in Black’, the mourning woman here refuses to ‘let go’ or 
get over her loss, and her mourning in public is ‘a historically situated 
practice of dissent and alternative responsiveness in our present world 
such as it is now’.42 
She invokes the crowd to continue the resistance and instead of 
mourning the loss of her son only, she mourns the loss of other youth: 
‘I am not upset about him, I am upset from those who killed them’. 
Thus, her mourning ‘generalises the grieving at the same time that it 
makes it more acute’ which makes it more powerful and effective in 
mobilizing the crowd because  
 
Although the problem of loss is always this loss, this person or 
relative I knew and loved, it is also […] all those who are injured or 
destroyed by the peoples and nations who wage war.43  
 
Moreover, in her mourning ‘the individual loss is not absorbed by 
the more generalised loss; instead they become inextricable from one 
another’.44 Not only does her public mourning represent an act of 
resistance against the particular political regime of Mubarak, but her 
emotional mourning performed in public is akin to the way ‘Women 
in Black’ 
 
                                                     
42 Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics’, p. 48. 
43 J. Butler - A. Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political, 
Polity, Cambridge-Malden, 2013, pp. 142-143. 
44 Ib., p. 143. 
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Through their political-performative gestures of affect […] not only 
compel gender, kinship, and national intelligibility into a severe crisis, 
but they also unsettle the very boundaries of the political.45 
 
Thus, her public expression of emotions or emotional performance 
of mourning opens up the boundaries and broadens the limits of the 
political. Her opposition to Mubarak’s regime is also most politicized 
because she is opposing her own state, thus breaking away from the 
dominant norm of the ‘women of sorrow [who] are meant to accept 
their suffering, protesting only against enemy aggressors’.46  
The mother’s actions here are proof that ‘effective representations 
of suffering both deploy expectations of womanliness and violate 
them’. Although she does not stop crying (fulfilling expectations of 
womanliness) yet she does not shy away from standing on a high 
pedestal (violating expectations of womanhood). As a result, her 
demonstration of suffering prompts ‘the sympathies that mourning 
tends to elicit but in a context in which passive or sentimental witness 
becomes difficult’.47 Her audience do not simply ‘sympathise’ with 
her loss, but they are driven (by her representation of suffering) to 
take a stand and to act upon it. Thus, her emotional mourning shows 
that ‘women who act as women in public spaces transform the 
passions of attachment and loss into political action’, and more 
importantly ‘transform the woman of sorrow from icon to agent’.48 
 
Digital Resistance 
Ahmad: The Groom of the Revolution 
Ahmad Ihab’s mother creates a Facebook page that she calls ‘Om 
El-Shaheed’ (Umm al-Shahīd) ‘Mother of the Martyr’, which contains 
images tracing Ahmad’s life from childhood, to marriage and to 
death.49 She posts his photo at school, in disguise clothes as a child, 
and other photos of him as a young man throbbing with life. One of 
the photographs she posts of Ahmad is his enlarged photo, placed on a 
car in the procession during his funeral. In it, Ahmad looks very 
cheerful, in an orange shirt. Significantly, it is the same one that 
appeared in the full-page feature of the eleven martyr faces published 
                                                     
45 Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics’, p. 43. 
46 Ruddick, ‘Women of Peace’, pp. 216-217. 
47 Ib., p. 216. 
48 Ruddick, ‘Women of Peace’, p. 217. 
49 www.facebook.com/Om El-Shaheed.  
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in the newspaper al-Masry al-Youm. The image of martyrdom 
represented in this newspaper page is immediately evoked at viewing 
Ahmad’s photograph, and is an immediate and effective reminder of 
revolutionary meaning. 
Ahmad is known as ‘arīs al-thawra’ (‘The Groom of the 
revolution’), as he was married only one month before he died on the 
28th of January. His wedding photo with his mother – not his bride – 
together with her photo looking very cheerful with a pink head scarf 
on (also carrying his wedding photo) in a protest after his death, is 
very telling (figures 3 and 4). In Islam, eternal life and honour are 
bestowed upon the martyr. So in Palestine, where ‘funerals dramatized 
sentiments that were decidedly celebratory, and thus defiant, in the 
face of death and collective loss and asserted community solidarity 
despite wrenching adversity’, a mother ululates at the funeral of her 
martyred son.50 This explains the celebratory spirit in figure 4. In 
dying, he is as happy as a groom, awaiting a new life in heaven. Not 
only that, the mother’s celebration of Ahmad’s martyrdom is an act of 
defiance at the forces that caused his death.  
 
 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 
      
 
The mother’s creation of ‘Om El-Shaheed’ is an act of defiance on 
more than one level. She resists Mubarak’s regime and the fate (of 
death) it imposed on her son by providing him with an alternative 
                                                     
50 Peteet, ‘Icons and Militants’, p. 115. 
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eternal existence in virtual space. It is also a resistance of the counter-
revolution’s intentional erasure of the memory of martyrs and 
exclusion of martyrs’ families from the media in recent years. Her 
facebook page represents an alternative space where she can infinitely 
tell her/her son’s story, to an endless number of people. It is a space 
where communal mourning also takes place: this is represented in the 
comments and responses of her friends whenever she chooses to 
remember her son by posting one of his photos.  
 
Tarek: A Vision of Social Justice 
Eternally pregnant with their sons, the mothers reiterate the causes 
and aims of the revolution that motivated their sons to protest most. 
This is reflected in the testimony of Tarek’s mother, which is part of a 
documentary video made up of Tarek’s photos at different stages of 
his life, that tells his story, which she uploads on YouTube. Her 
testimony is very powerful because it is eloquent and genuine.51 She 
starts to talk about Tarek by explaining that he was living 
comfortably, yet he ‘saw how young men of his age suffered to find a 
job, and waited for years to save enough money to be able to get 
married!’52 Her empathetic tone shows that she identifies with those 
young men’s ideas, and is thus spreading and preaching one of the 
main frames of the revolution, namely: Social Justice. However, this 
is not simply her son’s voice and perspective that is being 
communicated to us by her, nor is it entirely hers, for 
 
Grief displays […] the thrall in which our relations with others hold us 
[…] in ways that often interrupt the self-conscious account of 
ourselves we might try to provide, in ways that challenge the very 
notion of ourselves as autonomous and in control.53  
 
Tarek’s mother also relives his experiences and imagines the 
agonies he must have went through even after his death - as a body. 
Impregnated with their sons, the mothers try to imagine what the 
                                                     
51 V. Das, ‘Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain’, in 
Daedalus, 125/1 (1996), pp. 67-91, pp. 80-81. Das argue that grief leaves its mark 
not only on the body of a mourning woman but also on her language, which ‘bears 
witness to the loss that death has inflicted’. She also refers to the ‘excess of speech 
in the mourning laments’ of Punjabi women, which ‘stands in stark contrast to the 
behaviour of men’ who ‘in the case of death […] become mute’. 
52 شطقلأا فیطللا دبع قراط دیھشلا يركذ.wmv - YouTube.flv (Accessed 18/8/2015).  
53 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 23. 
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youth went through at different stages of their disappearance. In doing 
so, her narrative revives the pain of the nation as such: the loss that 
‘one cannot “get over”, one cannot “work through”, which is the 
deliberate act of violence against a collectivity, humans who have 
been rendered anonymous for violence’.54 Thus, she gives paramount 
importance to the search for his body and how they miraculously 
found it. She says that:  
 
A man – by chance – who was looking for the corpse of his relative, 
and was shown Tarek’s corpse as his relative’s, found Tarek’s ID in 
his pocket! Imagine?! For over a month, no one bothered to look in 
this corpse’s pocket?! (Emphasis hers.) 
 
This last revelation foregrounds the ‘interdependence’ of not only 
our lives but our bodies too: her reclamation of her son’s body was 
dependant on another’s reclamation of his relative’s body. Likely, the 
improvement of the life conditions of other youth of Tarek’s age 
depended on Tarek’s participation in the revolution (which involved 
risking his body and life). This reveals that:  
 
Relationality [is] not only […] a descriptive or historical fact of our 
formation, but also […] an ongoing normative dimension of our social 
and political lives, one in which we are compelled to take stock of our 
interdependence.55 
 
Her narrative drives us to view mourning as  
 
An ethical and political reflection on what it means to be responsible to 
the memory of the lost other, the one whose suffering and loss is 
expropriated (the enemy, the marginal, the foreign, the illegal immigrant, the 
other).56  
 
Responsibility to the memory of the lost other is revealed in her 
narrative. The ‘other’ here is the socially marginalised poor classes. It 
is revealed in the use of ‘someone’ instead of her son’s name. 
                                                     
54 J. Butler, ‘Afterword: After Loss, What Then?’, in D. L. Eng - David 
Kazanjian (eds.), Loss: The Politics of Mourning, University of California Press, 
Berkley, CA 2003, pp. 467-473, p. 468. 
55 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 27. 
56 Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics’, p. 42. 
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‘Someone’ can refer to the numerous poor youth who lost their lives 
during the early days of the revolution. 
 
Resistance in the Media 
Ziad: The Artist as Philosopher 
Sawsan’s narrative represents the selflessness of the martyrs: Ziad 
sacrificed his life because he wanted a better Egypt; he wanted things 
to improve for the people.57 He is presented as a thinker and an artist. 
Her words communicate this selflessness powerfully: ‘Martyrs didn’t 
just die. They died because they felt that in risking their lives they 
would actually improve people’s living conditions and bring about 
freedom’. He is an embodiment of those ‘practices of resistance which 
involve dispossessing oneself as a way to dispossess coercive 
powers’.58 ‘Horreya’ or Freedom is the main revolutionary frame 
communicated in her narrative. She represents a determination to 
embrace this freedom when she refuses to give in to blackmail. She 
announces on TV (during the Talk Show she and her husband 
appeared in) that they were threatened and told not to talk to the 
media, but she did so in spite of all the threats. They were even 
promised to get their son back, at a time when – she discovers later – 
he was already dead.  
Sawsan’s silences (which are frequent during the long interview) 
drive us to question the possibility of representing pain and point to 
the limits of language before human pain. Her narrative, ‘by exposing 
the condition by which disaster wrecks language’ does not give voice 
to those who are voiceless, but integrates ‘the bewildered muteness of 
the survivors’.59 Her narrative – slow paced, contemplative and filled 
with silences – registers the survivor’s bewilderment and muteness at 
the unspeakable violence committed by the security forces against the 
youth protestors. Their violence represents the ‘disaster’ that befell the 
nation at large and her family in particular, and although she did 
witness the killings in the demonstrations like many Egyptians in the 
media, yet she is a first-hand ‘witness’ to what befell her own son. She 
is a ‘survivor’ of her son’s death. Her narrative is a survivor’s 
testimony which has to have a listener, represented here in the 
                                                     
57  ءزج 2011 07 02 ةقلح ریانی 25 ةروث ءادھش دحأ ریكب دایز دیھشلا ةرسأ يلذاشلا ىنم اءاسم ةرشاعلا
2 00  - YouTube.flv (Accessed 19 /10/2015),  ریكب دایز دیھشلا ةرسأ يلذاشلا ىنم اءاسم ةرشاعلا
دھش دحأ ةروث ءا25  ةقلح ریانی02 07 2011  ءزج3 00 - YouTube.flv (Accessed 18/8/2015). 
58 Butler - Athanasiou, Dispossession, p. 146. 
59 Athanasiou, ‘Reflections on the Politics’, p. 46. 
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audience who are watching the program. The TV program can be 
regarded as a chance to involve the community at large in an act of 
‘public witnessing’ which transforms a ‘bad death’ – un-mourned and 
un-witnessed – into a ‘good death’.60 
 
Conclusion 
Grief is not only a tool enabling mourning women to enter the 
patriarchal public sphere, but it is also a way of reaching a wider 
audience (thus resisting forgetfulness of the revolutionary mottos). 
Through their physical presence in Tahrir Square, the new social 
media space, and the regular media, the mothers attained this.  
Most of the martyrs (whose mothers’ narratives are examined here) 
were not needy. They belonged to middle – upper middle classes. As 
they themselves were not poverty stricken, their martyrdom should be 
regarded with deep reverence, for not only did they participate in a 
fight that was not primarily theirs but they also died for their cause. As 
such, their selflessness comes to the fore.  
Mourning mothers created political space(s) in which they 
challenged the state’s power and authority. In these spaces of 
resistance, they converted and employed their grief into a plea for 
justice and human rights of other citizens in their society. Whether 
these spaces were the squares or the new media – represented in 
Facebook or Youtube documentaries – the mothers became agents of 
change. 
The martyrs’ mothers had the choice to object and speak out 
against the violence practised against their sons or to be silent, let go 
and let their sons and their maternalism become mere ‘victims’ of 
state/police violence. They sacrificed their sons to the nation but not to 
the state. In fact, the state (represented in the different governments 
that ruled Egypt since the revolution erupted) was rarely on their side. 
Moreover, whereas the iconic status of Egyptian mothers in general is 
stable and persistent, the iconicity of the mothers of January 25th 
martyrs is variable. It varies with the passage of time and as the state’s 
position varies towards the revolution, a position which determines 
who is perceived as patriotic and who is perceived as a traitor. This 
relativity is no more apparent than in the media (which reflects the 
state’s position): the media moved from a preoccupation with the 
revolution’s ‘mothers of martyrs’ to utter negligence and from an 
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admiration of their sons’ patriotism to suspicion regarding their 
patriotism.  
In the two years following the revolution the numerous mothers of 
the martyrs protested frequently for the trial of the killers of the 
martyrs. Today – at a time when Egyptians have either forgotten the 
revolution, or are blaming it for Egypt’s economic troubles, or regard 
it as a conspiracy – the mothers of martyrs, are still waiting for 
retribution, especially that qiṣāṣ (justice for the blood of the martyrs), 
is still an unfulfilled demand of the parents of martyrs. The group of 
mothers examined here are part of this general struggle by ‘mothers of 
the martyrs’ for the rights of their sons. And in telling and preserving 
the history of their martyred sons, they are also telling the history of 
the revolution. As such, they can be regarded as the revolution’s 
guardians: saving it, its causes, mottos, and aims from forgetfulness.  
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Abstract 
By all accounts, women played a prominent role during the mass protests of 
2011 in the MENA region. As a result, they were highly visible in public places 
usually claimed by male authorities. While women’s participation was initially 
praised and honoured, domestically as well as internationally, soon after the ousting 
of the former rulers, attempts were made to push defenders of women’s rights out of 
the public sphere back into the private sphere. In the transitional period, women 
were not only marginalized in the political decision-process but were also, as 
protesters in public space, subjected to harassment, sexual violence and other 
instruments of political intimidation. This phenomenon is best documented in Egypt, 
thus this paper will focus on the reactions to and explanations of increased gender-
based violence in this country. In response to both the significant rise in sexual 
assaults and the inadequate reactions on the part of political authorities, a number of 
organizations, groups, and campaigns emerged to provide protection for female 
protesters, to offer psychological support to the victims, to document the cases, 
and/or to press for a fundamental solution to the ‘social-culturally embedded 
problem’. The official reactions demonstrate that a real change in gender policies 
and political participation is far from welcomed. 
 
Introduction  
Sexual/Sexualized Harassment in Egypt – A Complex Issue to 
Conceptualize and Frame 
By all accounts, women played a prominent role during the mass 
protests of 2011 in the MENA region. Photographs from the streets 
and squares transmitted their challenge against persistent stereotypical 
images of traditional gender roles: women were very clearly seen and 
heard demonstrating side-by-side with men in the public sphere that so 
far had been largely marked out as masculine and where women were 
expected to behave within the confines of their defined gender 
category as females. However, this situation began to change as soon 
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as the battle for control and legitimacy started following the ousting of 
the former rulers. Whereas women’s participation was initially praised 
and honoured, domestically as well as internationally, now attempts 
were made to push women protesters out of the public arena back into 
the private sphere. In the transitional period women were not only 
marginalized in the political decision-process but were also, as 
protesters in public squares, subjected to harassment, sexual violence 
and other instruments of political intimidation. Yet, despite post-
revolutionary conservative backlash and a surge of gender-based 
violence, women’s rights activists have continued to assert their claims.1  
This paper will focus on Egypt, where the so-called ‘phenomenon’ 
of ‘sexual harassment’ (al-taḥarrush al-jinsī) has become a major 
issue of national concern and a dominant topic in the media coverage 
of the activities of women’s rights supporters over the past three years 
– often at the expense of other important women’s rights issues, as 
some observers comment.2 According to several studies, surveys, and 
reports, sexual harassment, ranging from verbal and non-verbal 
molestation to rape, has escalated to unprecedented levels in the post-
Mubarak era. News agencies frequently refer to the results of a survey 
conducted by UN Women in 20133 that do indeed sound dramatic. But 
simply talking of more than 99% of Egyptian women having 
experienced ‘some form of sexual harassment’ (in 2012) rather 
                                                            
1 For an overview of the development described see, in general, the essay by N. 
Al-Ali, ‘Gendering the Arab Spring’, in Middle East Journal of Culture and 
Communication 5/1 (2012), pp. 26-31; for Egypt (and further references for ‘women 
and the Arab Spring’), R. Badry, ‘Against all Odds – New Tendencies in Egyptian 
Feminism (2011-2013)’, in Hemispheres 29/3 (2014), especially pp. 5-7, 22-25. 
2 C. Froböse, ‘Women are a Red Line! Sexualisierte Belästigung und 
Frauenrechte im “post”-revolutionären Ägypten’, in D. Filter - E. Fuchs - J. Reich 
(eds.), Arabischer Frühling? Geschlechterpolitiken in einer Region im Umbruch, 
Centaurus, Hamburg, 2013, pp. 175-176. Comment of Dr. Rabab El Mahdi, 
professor of political science at the AUC, as quoted in S. El Masry, ‘The 
Proliferation of Women Initiatives’, in Daily News Egypt, 28/11/2012, 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/11/28/the-proliferation-of-women-initiatives/ 
(accessed 2/12/2016). 
3 For a link to the survey by UN Women, to be precise ‘United Nations Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women’, entitled ‘Study on Ways and 
Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt: Results/Outcomes and 
Recommendations Summary’ see, HarassMap, ‘Sexual harassment myths’:  
http://harassmap.org/en/resource-center/harassment-myths/ (accessed 18/03/2015). 
As indicated by the respondents, the most common manifestation of SH is touching, 
followed by whistling and verbal abuse. 
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obscures the issue and is more misleading than clarifying.4 It comes as 
no surprise that a closer look at the publications and statements 
reveals that the issue is much more complex, not only as regards the 
understanding and perceptions of the term sexual harassment but also 
regarding the framing of the issue, that is whether the social 
phenomenon of sexual harassment (henceforth SH) is interpreted in a 
reductionist manner or fairly comprehensively. Either way, choosing 
one explanatory approach over another has a far-reaching impact on 
the way appropriate solutions to the problem are envisioned. Roughly 
speaking, two major tendencies can be discerned. Organizations or 
groups which are part of or close to the regime, among them the so-
called ‘QUANGOS’ or ‘GONGOS’,5 often refer to the problem as a 
social evil, a ‘cancer-like disease’6 that once removed will result in the 
recovery of the whole body of the nation. More than once the 
proponents of this kind of reasoning have shifted the focus of attention 
                                                            
4 See, for instance, the following articles: ‘99.3% of Egyptian Women Experienced 
Sexual Harassment: Report’, 28/04/2013, in http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/ 
28/99-3-of-egyptian-women-experienced-sexual-harassment-report/; E. Abdelkader, 
‘99.3% of Egyptian Women, Girls have been Sexually Harassed’, 06/04/2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/engy-abdelkader/99-percent-of-egyptian-women-girls 
-have-been-sexually-harassed_b_3373366.html; M. Shalaby, ‘When Sexual 
Harassment Becomes a Barrier to Development’, Issue Brief 12.23.13, Rice 
University’s Baker Institute, Houston, Texas, 2013, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/ 
research/issue-brief-122313-when-sexual-harassment-becomes-barrier-development/ 
(all sites accessed 2/12/2016). 
5 This is the abbreviation for ‘Quasi-non-governmental organizations’ or 
‘Governmental NGOs’ - a widespread phenomenon in the MENA region. For Egypt 
cf. e.g. M. Tadros, The Politics of Mobilising for Gender Justice in Egypt from 
Mubarak to Morsi and Beyond, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, 
(April) 2014, p. 11, who gives the Egyptian National Council for Women (NCW) 
and the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (ECCM) as examples for a 
‘hybrid’ between QUANGO and GONGO. For a more balanced assessment of the 
NCW, cf. H. Elsadda, ‘Women’s Rights Activism in Post-Jan25 Egypt: Combating 
the Shadow of the First Lady Syndrome in the Arab World’, in Middle East Law and 
Governance 3 (2011), p. 93. 
6 Cf. the 2007 study of the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights (ECWR), which 
was entitled ‘Sexual Harassment … Social Cancer’ and ‘Collected Complaints from 
3000 Women and Girls’: ‘Sexual Harassment … To Where?’, 06/11/2012, 
http://ecwronline.org/?p=1026 (accessed 26/03/2015). For a critical assessment of 
the position of the ECWR and an analysis of its discourse focusing, as other 
organizations of the ‘NGO establishment’, on ‘respectability and security’ see also 
the most informative article by P. Amar, ‘Turning the Gendered Politics of the 
Security State Inside Out? Charging the Police with Sexual Harassment in Egypt’, in 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 13/3 (September 2011), pp. 317-318. 
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by pinpointing the immorality of young, socio-economically 
marginalized men. Consequently, what they chiefly diagnose are 
socio-economic causes of the crisis while either neglecting or 
minimizing the gender-political dimension, i.e. the use of SH as a 
political tool to maintain the neo-patriarchal system – a strategy used 
by Mubarak as well as his successors. As a result, apart from 
educational measures, the solution lies for them in imposing harsher 
laws and strengthening the security state apparatus with the primary 
aim of averting potential damage to the economy and to the image of 
the state. The opposite view explains the increasing levels of violence 
against women (hereafter VAW) as a problem embedded in social 
structures and patriarchal gender hierarchies; so in this view, legal and 
enhanced security measures would only remedy the symptoms rather 
than offer any lasting solution. Nevertheless, such interventions could 
be seen as a first useful step – that is if their intention is not solely to 
strengthen the state. But in the long run, a systemic change is needed.7 
Adherents to this second position, among them independent NGOs 
such as El-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence and Torture (henceforth El-Nadeem), do not turn a blind eye 
to state-imposed sexual aggression.8 
 
Sexual Harassment and Street Harassment - What’s in a Word? 
The term SH is a relatively new concept, originally coined by 
Western feminists in the mid-1970s. By the 1990s it had started to 
enter the global South with the internationalization of the ‘women 
question’. SH is seen as one specific form of VAW or ‘Gender-based 
                                                            
7 See also E. Ambrosetti - N. Abu Amara - S. Condon, ‘Gender-Based Violence 
in Egypt: Analyzing Impacts of Political Reforms, Social, and Demographic 
Change’, in Violence against Women 19/3 (2013), p. 401: ‘…the mere existence of 
laws does not necessarily affect hegemonic perceptions and patriarchal norms’ (see 
also p. 415). 
8 El-Nadeem, established in 1993, expanded its activities in the 2000s as the 
‘baltagi-effect’ (referring to thugs paid and deputized by police and security forces 
to terrorize protesters) began to take on its ‘deeply gendered and sexualized 
character’ (Amar, ‘Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out?’, 
p. 312). Independent NGOs such as El-Nadeem reveal and openly criticize the 
repressive power of the security state; they have done so before and after 2011. On 
the beginnings of El Nadeem see also N. Al-Ali, Secularism, Gender, and the State 
in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women’s Movement, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 2005, pp. 169-171. For an update cf. the official website: 
https://alnadeem.org/en/node/23 (accessed 27/12/2013).   
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Violence’ (hereafter GBV) – expressions that have been popularized 
since the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Elimination of VAW’ by 
the United Nations General Assembly in December 19939 which in 
turn has given rise to regular UN-sponsored worldwide campaigns on 
the part of human rights organizations and to a great number of 
publications ever since.10 Article 1 of the 1993 UN resolution defines 
VAW as ‘… any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is 
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering 
to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’. 
Article 2 distinguishes three contexts of VAW: the family, the general 
community and the state (‘violence perpetrated or condoned by the 
State’). SH is mentioned in the second category – next to ‘rape, sexual 
abuse, intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution’. Following this widely 
used definition SH is a broad concept and encompasses ‘physical, 
sexual and psychological violence’ occurring in the private, semi-
public and public sphere. It includes unpleasant verbal and non-verbal 
behaviors, for example, as in the Egyptian context, obscene gestures 
and remarks, as well as unwanted physical contact that can take the 
form of touching and groping but also of brutal sexual assaults such as 
gang rape.  
Up to a point I agree with a number of anthropologists who 
consider attempts to extend the term and concept of VAW to cover 
forms of symbolic, structural, psychological and other forms of 
violence as problematic. Such an inclusive definition provokes 
ambiguity and carries the risk of undermining the differences between 
                                                            
9 For the text of the Declaration, see United Nations General Assembly, 
‘A/RES/48/104. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’, 
20/12/1993: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm 
(accessed 24/03/2015).  
10 Academic publications on VAW in the MENA region coincided with the 
gradual lifting of the taboo on discussions on the topic in the 2000s. Until recently, 
most works focused on VAW in the family and at the workplace. See, for instance, 
D. Ghanim, Gender and Violence in the Middle East, Praeger, Westport, 
Connecticut, 2009; M. Ennaji - F. Sadiqi (eds.), Gender and Violence in the Middle 
East, Routledge, London - New York, 2011; Z. S. Salhi (ed.), Gender and Violence 
in Islamic Societies: Patriarchy, Islamism and Politics in the Middle East and North 
Africa, I.B. Tauris, London - New York, 2013. 
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violence, violation and cruelty.11 Imprecise distinctions can be even 
more problematic in the legal area, for example, in the case of 
punishments that are out of proportion to the severity of the actions 
committed. At least in times of ‘revolutionary transition’ and in the 
instances of the use of GBV as a political tool it seems helpful to 
focus on the physical dimension of hurt (including its intended 
psychological effects and its function), and on the question of 
legitimacy in the eyes of society.  
To this end I will concentrate in the following on the phenomenon 
of street (or public) harassment in Cairo before and after 2011 as this 
sort of abuse has been particularly relevant to the calculated exclusion 
of female protesters from the public sphere. Cairo is chosen for three 
reasons: First, Cairo, and in particular Tahrir Square and its vicinity, 
has been the epicenter of mass demonstrations and protests, and most 
cases of brutal sexual assault have occurred there. Second, there is 
abundant material and very good documentation of politically 
motivated public harassment there. Third, most formal and informal 
(grassroots) anti-harassment initiatives were established there and 
center their activities on the capital.  
It is worth noting that giving primary attention to male-to-female 
harassment does not imply ignoring the fact that men, too, are victims 
of SH, in public spaces and also in custody. But this phenomenon, 
which can be seen as a result of the nexus between body (sexuality) 
and power (politics) and as characteristic of stereotypical images of 
masculinity and femininity held in heteronormative patriarchal value 
systems, is rarely studied and discussed, among other reasons due to 
the reluctance of men to speak about their experiences.12  
Street or public harassment (henceforth STRH/PUH) is widely 
considered as a subcategory of SH. In the contemporary Egyptian 
context, but not only there, the term refers to two dimensions: First, to 
                                                            
11 For the discussion among anthropologists, see the article of P. Zuckerhut, 
‘Feminist Anthropological Perspectives on Violence’, in Ennaji - Sadiqi, Gender 
and Violence in the Middle East, pp. 13-25, especially pp. 15-16. 
12 M. Tadros (Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent 
Transitions: a Case Study from Egypt, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 
June 2013, pp. 13-15) mentions El-Nadeem as one of the few human rights 
organizations, which also document men’s experiences of sexual assault. For shorter 
notes on male exposure to sexual harassment see HarassMap - Youth and 
Development Consultancy Institute (Etijah) (eds.), Towards a Safer City: Sexual 
Harassment in Greater Cairo: Effectiveness of Crowdsourced Data, HarassMap, 
Cairo, 2014, p. 30.  
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a widespread phenomenon that women from all walks of life and age 
groups experience on an almost daily basis in the streets or on public 
transportation; second, to political violence against oppositional 
forces.13 In both cases, STRH hinders women’s mobility and impedes 
their access to public spaces, and thus may limit their legitimate right 
to political participation. In contrast to other forms of harassment, 
perpetrators (i.e. passers-by unknown to the targeted person) easily 
blend into the anonymous masses. As is the case for GBV and SH, 
there is no universal definition for STRH, but a certain consensus 
exists that it includes physical, sexual and psychological abuse.14 The 
distinction between the public and semi-public sphere implies the 
exclusion of SH at the workplace or in educational institutions. In 
addition, it is helpful to differentiate, as for example Mariz Tadros has 
done in her numerous publications on GBV in Egypt, between socially 
and politically motivated PUH, though this distinction may be blurred 
                                                            
13 Froböse, ‘Women Are a Red Line’, p. 183.  
14 The definition of cultural anthropologist M. Di Leonardo is often mentioned as 
one of the first definitions of STRH. It reads as follows (‘Political Economy of 
Street Harassment’, in Aegis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women, 
(Summer) 1981, pp. 51-2): ‘Street harassment occurs when one or more strange men 
accost one or more women whom they perceive as heterosexual in a public place 
which is not the woman’s/women’s worksite. Through looks, words, or gestures the 
man asserts his right to intrude on the women’s attention, defining her as a sexual 
object, and forcing her to interact with him’. Di Leonardo emphasized the difference 
between harassment and ‘badinage, the friendly give-and-take’ (cf. mu‘ākasa, 
‘flirting’ in the Egyptian context): ‘The distinction between badinage and 
harassment is that a woman can start or stop badinage on her own time; it is a 
mutually agreed-upon interaction’. Di Leonardo proposed (p. 56) ‘consciousness-
raising as the first task to help women and to recognize for what it is, to overcome 
the myth’ (cf. p. 55 – of ‘enticing clothing’); further, she saw the ‘ask of 
information-gathering’ and ‘thinking creatively about strategies for fighting back’ 
(p. 56) and also warned against trivializing the matter. For other definitions see, for 
instance, N. Ilahi, ‘Gendered Contestations: An Analysis of Street Harassment in 
Cairo and its Implications For Women’s Access to Public Spaces’, in Surfacing - An 
Interdisciplinary Journal for Gender in the Global South 2/1 (May 2009), pp. 58-61; 
C. Froböse, Soziologische und sozialpsychologische Aspekte von sexueller 
Belästigung an Frauen in Ägypten: Geschlechterzuschreibungen als Platzanweiser 
für Frauen und Männer in Ägypten, LIT-Verlag, Berlin, 2011, pp. 47 ff.; F. M. 
Peoples, ‘Street Harassment in Cairo: A Symptom of Disintegrating Social 
Structures’, in The African Anthropologist 15/1&2 (2008, publ. 2011), pp. 4-6. 
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due to the anonymity and impunity of harassers in protest spaces as 
well as the possible mixture of motives behind a particular attack.15  
Tadros emphasizes that there are important similarities between 
both kinds of GBV: first, in terms of the underlying values and norms 
informing male behavior (such as notions of power and dominance, 
which are played out on women’s bodies); second, in terms of the 
reactions, especially when framed by social norms that condone 
assault (such as the resilient logic of blaming the victims for the assault 
that often results in a ‘culture of silence’ regarding incidents for the 
sake of ‘protecting honor’ and ‘preventing community shame’).  
The main difference between socially and politically motivated 
PUH relates to the question of accountability. Political violence is 
usually premeditated, organized and orchestrated, whereas this is not 
necessarily the case with socially motivated GBV that can be the quasi 
spontaneous outcome of a kind of mass hysteria. Politically motivated 
sexual assaults occurred particularly in public places where protests 
took place (‘protest spaces’) before and after 2011. However, the 
question of whether all ‘mob assaults’ were politically motivated or 
not, and if so, who was behind them, remains a highly controversial 
issue among activists and observers alike. Nonetheless, one should not 
forget that spreading confusion, doubt and insecurity has always been 
part of the divide and rule strategies of political authorities.   
In the next sections, I will first give a brief survey of the incidents 
of STRH before and since 2011. Then I will turn to a selection of 
innovative anti-harassment initiatives, which are divided into three 
categories according to their respective approaches (or reactive 
patterns) to dealing with increased GBV: women’s and/or human 
rights NGOs, (informal) vigilante groups and those using forms of 
silent protest. Finally, I will acknowledge and highlight the effects and 
achievements of the constant pressure exerted by independent civil 
society actors.  
 
 
 
                                                            
15 See, also for the following, M. Tadros, Reclaiming the Streets for Women’s 
Dignity: Effective Initiatives in the Struggle against Gender-Based Violence in 
between Egypt’s Two Revolutions, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 
Brighton, (January) 2014, pp. 10-11; eadem, Politically Motivated Sexual Assault, 
pp. 6-7, and for the motives behind politically motivated STRH (pp. 16f.) and for the 
public norms, values and perceptions (pp. 18-22). 
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Street Harassment before 2011 
Street harassment is not a new phenomenon in Egypt, though it was 
not termed taḥarrush until recently. It already existed at the beginning 
of the 20th century, as indicated, for example, by a remark of the well-
known feminist and writer Malak Ḥifnī Nāṣif (1886-1918) on verbal 
and physical harassment of women in Cairo’s streets.16 At the time of 
her writing, there was widespread anxiety over growing female 
visibility throughout urban space, over women’s claim of physical 
space, and finally the social manifestation of a local, modern 
femininity, which seemingly increased after the 1919 national 
uprising, i.e. at the very moment when gendered (female) visual and 
linguistic representations of the nation became more widespread.17  
Without doubt, however, STRH has been on the increase over the 
past decade. As a social phenomenon the surge in STRH correlates 
with immense structural, institutional and spatial transformations that 
have been taking place since the late 1980s and, in particular in the 
1990s when the detrimental consequences of the Infitāḥ (economic 
‘opening’) policies for the great majority of the population could no 
longer be ignored. The dramatic changes (among other things, rising 
unemployment, migration, alteration in traditional family structures, 
greater visibility of women as a result of their mass entry into colleges 
and into various fields of employment) had, as several researchers 
underscore, an impact on patriarchy as a defining system for the 
relationship between men and women. Against this background STRH 
can be identified as a ‘symbolic reclaiming of challenged masculinity 
in public’.18 At the same time Cairo’s cityscape underwent a great 
                                                            
16 M. Hifni Nasif, Über die ägyptische Frauenfrage, Constantinople, 1926, p. 14, 
as quoted in R. Kreile, Politische Herrschaft, Geschlechterpolitik und Frauenmacht 
im Vorderen Orient, Centaurus, Pfaffenweiler, 1997, p. 247. 
17 M. Booth, ‘Un/safe/ly at Home: Narratives of Sexual Coercion in 1920s 
Egypt’, in Gender and History 16/3 (Nov. 2004), p. 744. (Booth analyzes the 
emergence of a genre of writing that she calls ‘simulated memoirs’; she argues that 
the implicit presence of bodily coercion in these texts demonstrates the above 
mentioned anxiety about female visibility). For a thorough study on the 
interconnection of nationalism, gender, and politics cf. B. Baron, Egypt as a Woman: 
Nationalism, Gender, and Politics, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2005. 
18 Cf. D. Kandiyoti, ‘Fear and Fury: Women and Post-revolutionary Violence’, 
10/01/2013, in http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/fear-and-fury-
women-and-post-revolutionary-violence (accessed 18/02/2014). Kandiyoti remarks 
a global trend: ‘We are witnessing a profound crisis of masculinity leading to more 
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transformation as a result of neoliberal policies. Its urban landscape 
has become progressively exclusionary and segmented, and tendencies 
toward social closure and class segregation have become obvious. 
Seen from this perspective STRH may also have a class-specific 
component.19 After being a taboo for years, incidents in 2005 and 
2006 marked the beginning of extensive public debates on harassment, 
initially in the blogosphere, then in conferences, seminars, newspapers 
and magazines. This increase in public attention first generated 
research, initiatives and campaigns and finally led to a greater 
readiness to speak out publicly on personal experiences with PUH. 
The so-called ‘Black Wednesday’ in May 200520 can serve as an 
example of political violence: women were attacked in the midst of an 
anti-Mubarak demonstration. Perpetrated by both plainclothes 
policemen and hired baltagiyya, these attacks were specifically aimed 
at disrupting the protests and terrorizing female protesters, a tactic 
which continued to be used in the revolution of January 25th. Other 
incidents, examples of socially motivated STRH, were reported from 
                                                                                                                                           
violent and coercive assertions of male prerogatives where the abuse of women can 
become a blood sport (…)’.  
19 For the transformation of Cairo’s city-space and its consequences see the 
excellent study by A. de Koning, ‘Gender, Public Space and Social Segregation in 
Cairo: Of Taxi Drivers, Prostitutes and Professional Women’, in Antipode 41/3 
(2009), pp. 533-556 (with a focus on socially and intellectually distinguished young 
female upper-middle-class professionals and how they navigate Cairo’s public 
spaces, both the safe spaces of the upscale coffee shops and the open spaces of the 
streets; on STRH cf. pp. 545ff.); cf. also the spatial-sociological field research by T. 
Beutling, Gendered Spaces Kairo: eine interkulturelle raumsoziologische Analyse, 
KISDedition, Cologne, 2013, particularly pp. 79-103 (includes several photos). For 
the ‘Intersection of Gender, Race and Class with Street Harassment’ cf. also Ilahi, 
‘Gendered Contestations’, pp. 61-63. 
20 The subsequently mentioned incidents have been described in several 
publications; for more details see, for instance: Peoples, ‘Street Harassment in 
Cairo’, pp. 6-7; Froböse, Soziologische und sozialpsychologische Aspekte von 
sexueller Belästigung an Frauen in Ägypten, pp. 55-60; N. Ebaid, Sexual 
Harassment in Egypt - A Neglected Crime: An Assessment for the Egyptian 
Government Performance in Regard to the Sexual Harassment in Egypt, The 
American University in Cairo/Egypt, Cairo 2013; Ilahi, ‘Gendered Contestations’, p. 
59; S. Carr, ‘Sexual Assault and the State: A History of Violence’, in Mada Masr - 
The Morning Digest, 07/07/2014: http://www.madamasr.com/content/sexual-
assault-and-state-history-violence (accessed 08/07/2014); N. Abu Amara, « Le débat 
sur le harcèlement sexuel en Égypte : une violence sociale et politique », in 
Égypte/Monde arabe, Troisème série, 9 (2012), pp. 119-135: 
http://ema.revues.org/3012 (accessed 26/03/2015). 
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2006 onwards: during the post-Ramadan celebration of ʿĪd al-Fiṭr in 
2006, a ‘mob of men’21 attacked females in front of a cinema in 
downtown Cairo. As this attack was filmed by individual observers 
and posted on the Internet, male-to-female harassment in Cairo gained 
national and international attention. Other group assaults (‘mob 
outbursts’ of STRH) took place repeatedly over the two main religious 
national holiday festivities, ʿĪd al-Fiṭr and ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā, in the 
following years. 
In 2008, the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights (ECWR), which 
had initiated its ‘Safe Streets for everyone’ campaign three years 
before, carried out the first in-depth study on SH (defined in the broad 
sense) in Cairo.22 The survey helped to refute prevalent myths on SH, 
such as that women or girls are attacked because of the way they 
dress; that sexual violence takes place at night, and that harassment is 
not widespread. Nevertheless, conservative forces would continue to 
see SH as the result of inappropriate dress and behavior and 
recommend veiling as prevention. It is striking that most 
recommendations were addressed to women, not to men. Also in mid-
2008, a harassed woman managed to take the offender to a police 
station and file charges against him. Three months later, and for the 
first time in Egypt, the offender was sentenced to three years in prison 
in addition to a fine on charges of sexual assault. This case set a 
precedent and encouraged others to pursue charges against sexual 
attacks. However, it is also worth noting that this woman’s action was 
followed by a smear campaign in the media.23 The state authorities 
first refused to admit the existence of a problem; they did not alter 
their position until it became apparent to them that, as Amar argues, 
‘(…) civil society organizations were ignoring the role of the police 
and the security state in the generation of sexualized violence’.  
                                                            
21 On ‘gendered tropes’ like this see S. Ellman-Golan, Deconstructing 
Discourse: Gender and Neoliberal Orientalism in the Egyptian Revolution, Barnard 
College/Columbia University, Department of African Studies and Human Rights 
Studies (BA-thesis), New York, 2014, pp. 7, 16f., 31; Amar, ‘Turning the Gendered 
Politics of the Security State Inside Out?’, p. 321 and passim. 
22 For a link to the full text of this survey see note 3 above; for an outline of the 
main results, cf.: Froböse, Soziologische und sozialpsychologische Aspekte, pp. 66-73; 
Ilahi, ‘Gendered Contestations’, pp. 59-60; Peoples, ‘Street Harassment in Cairo’, pp. 4-8.  
23 Amar, ‘Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out?’, pp. 319f. 
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As a result, the issue of SH was politicized, reduced to questions of 
people’s morality, and exploited for the justification of extended 
brutal ‘security’ measures.24  
Suggested reasons for the problem often mentioned during the 
public debate in Egypt during these years included sexual frustration, 
economic hardship, decline in moral standards, a lack of law 
enforcement, the role of the media.25 
The year 2010 witnessed two remarkable attempts to raise the 
awareness of PUH; both were able to reach a broader audience. The 
release of the movie Cairo 678 illustrates the dramatic social and 
psychological consequences for harassed women in three concrete and 
realistic cases, each of them representing a woman from a specific 
class background. The story of one of the protagonists alludes to the 
above-mentioned story of the first woman who made headlines in 
2008 when she succeeded in bringing her case to court.26 At the same 
time the grassroots initiative HarassMap was established. This initiative 
does not simply collect data and place it on a map in order to try to 
identify ‘hotspots’ of STRH but also provides offline interventions in 
the form of street discussions or the presentation of quantitative and 
qualitative surveys to raise public awareness of the problem.27  
 
Street Harassment in the Post-Mubarak Era 
Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, STRH increased in intensity 
and frequency. Politically motivated harassment regularly occurred in 
                                                            
24 Amar, ‘Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out?’, p. 319. 
25 For more details cf., for instance, Ilahi, ‘Gendered Contestations’, pp. 63f.; 
Peoples, ‘Street Harassment in Cairo’, pp. 2, 15-17. 
26 On the movie Cairo 678 cf. e.g. the following newspaper articles: N. El-
Hennawy, ‘678: Sexual Harassment in a Movie’, in Egypt Independent, 17/12/2010, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/273544; W. Eskandar, ‘678 Unveils One of 
Egypt’s Taboos’, in Al-Ahram English, 20/12/2010, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/2120.aspx; A. Heine, ‘Controversial Egyptian 
Movie 678 Wins Several Awards’, in Daily News Egypt, 22/10/2012, 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/tag/678/ (all accessed 01/09/2014). 
27 On HarassMap (apart from a self-description of their work on 
http://harassmap.org.en/what-we-do/ and in HarassMap - Etijah (eds.), Towards a 
Safer City, pp. 11f.; cf. L. H. Skalli, ‘Young Women and Social Media against 
Sexual Harassment in North Africa’, in Journal of North African Studies 19/2 
(2014), pp. 250f.; M. Tadros, Database of Collective Actors Involving Men Tackling 
Gender-Based Violence in Public Space in Post-Mubarak Egypt, Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, (July) 2013, pp. 7, 16-18. 
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Tahrir Square and its vicinity.28 The attacks were disconcerting for the 
protesters, and various speculations on the perpetrators and their aims 
circulated. It may suffice to refer to a few major incidents that were 
extensively reported and generated further protests.29 
The first widely published incident of sexual assault on women 
protesters occurred on 9th March 2011. A group of women protesting 
in Tahrir Square, demanding recognition of equal rights for women in 
the next constitution, were exposed to sexualized attacks. On the same 
day the military police arrested and detained at least 18 of the women, 
17 of whom were then subjected to torture and forced to undergo 
‘virginity tests’ and threatened with prostitution charges – a strategy 
that the former regime had already used to discourage people from 
empathizing with dissident women. The then commander-in-chief of 
the SCAF, the current President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, defended the 
use of the ‘tests’, and he was not alone in his belief that female 
protestors bore sole responsibility for these attacks.  
What came to be known as the ‘blue-bra-incident’ happened in 
December 2011 near to Tahrir Square: photos and a video-clip of this 
brutal attack distributed on the Internet show how an unarmed young 
female activist (covered by an abaya) is severely beaten, kicked, 
dragged, and stripped by three riot policemen, so that the upper part of 
her body is exposed. The blue bra turned into an iconic symbol that 
took thousands of women to the streets in solidarity with those 
protesting. In addition, the incident inspired several works of art: a 
Moroccan painter depicted the oppressors as gorillas; and a cartoonist 
                                                            
28 For a chronology of the incidents and a collection of testimonies of the victims 
of the assaults, cf. the report prepared by El Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Violence and Torture – Nazra for Feminist Studies – New Women 
Foundation, Sexual Assault and Rape in Tahrir Square and its Vicinity: A 
Compendium of Sources, February 2013. For a link to the report and to the 
compendium of testimonies: http://nazra.org/en/node/229 (accessed 27/03/2015). 
For recent reports cf. notes below. 
29 For the following incidents cf. Tadros, Politically Motivated Sexual Assault, 
pp. 9-10 and passim; Ellman-Golan, Deconstructing Discourse, pp. 36f., 42ff., 58ff.; 
M. Abaza, ‘Gender Representation in Graffiti Post-25 January’, in Mikala Hydlig 
Dal (ed.), Cairo: Images of Transition. Perspectives on Visuality in Egypt 2011-
2013, transcript, Bielefeld 2013, pp. 250-251; Abu Amara, « Le débat sur le 
harcèlement sexuel en Égypte », §§ 20-21.  
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imagined how the victim could take revenge on one of her attackers in 
a ‘superwoman style’.30 
A series of similar incidents took place in 2012 and 2013, especially 
during major protests on International Women’s Day, the anniversary 
of the 25th January revolution, and anti-regime demonstrations. 
Between 28th June and 7th July 2013, during the massive protests on 
Tahrir Square that saw the ousting of the former President Mohamed 
Morsi, 186 cases of sexual assault and rape were reported.31  
 
‘Fighting Back’ – The Emergence of New ‘Anti-Harassment’ 
Initiatives in Egypt  
The escalation of political violence after the revolution generated a 
proliferation of citizen activism in favor of women’s rights, with due 
regard to the fundamental, unconditional rights of dignity and bodily 
integrity. Several of these new anti-harassment initiatives demonstrate 
that more and more young activists are not going to accept any 
restriction of their freedom of mobility in public space. Three 
categories of reactive patterns can be distinguished based on the focus 
of their activities.  
 
Human Rights and/or Women’s Rights NGOs: The Example of 
‘Nazra for Feminist Studies’ 
Nazra for Feminist Studies, hereafter referred to as Nazra, can 
serve as an example for a number of independent human rights and/or 
women’s rights organizations, such as the afore-mentioned El-
Nadeem, which had come into existence before 2011, but expanded 
and intensified their efforts after the January 25th revolution. Since 
                                                            
30 R. Badry, ‘Körpersprache, Macht und Geschlecht in Zeiten sozialen Umbruchs 
- Bilderwelten aus dem “Arabischen Frühling”’, in Hemispheres 28 (2013), pp. 
150f. With further references to photos of the works of art; for these see also 
illustrations in Abaza, ‘Gender Representation in Graffiti Post-25 January’.  
31 Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies – Nazra for Feminist Studies (eds.), 
‘Human Rights Violations against Women in Egypt’: http://www.cihrs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Human-rights-violations-against-women-in-Egypt.pdf 
(accessed 27/03/2015). The same report mentions other brutal human rights 
violations, in particular the killing of more than 1,000 persons following the 
intervention of security forces against pro-Morsi demonstrations. With respect to 
these crimes see also the joint call of CIHRS, Nazra and a dozen of other national and 
international human rights organizations: ‘Egypt: No Acknowledgment or Justice for 
Mass Protester Killings, Set Up a Fact-Finding Committee as a First Step’, in CIHRS 
10/12/2013: http://www.cihrs.org/?p=7670&lang=en (accessed 10/12/2013). 
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then they have continuously reported on and combatted 
women’s/human rights abuses using diverse (traditional as well as 
innovative) online and offline activities, often in cooperation with 
other independent NGOs and groups.32 
Nazra was formed by a group of young activists in 2005 and 
officially registered in December 2007. The organization defines itself 
as a group whose aim is to build an Egyptian feminist movement as its 
members believe that feminism and gender equality are political and 
social issues affecting freedom and development in all societies. The 
organization works to popularize these values in both the public and 
private spheres. To this end they have launched various programs, 
initiatives and activities, such as: knowledge production based on 
research, documentation, monitoring and analysis of methodologies. 
This work includes position papers on recent political events and 
decisions, joint declarations with other groups and associations they 
are cooperating with, and the submission of reports and articles 
including empirical data on discriminatory practices in Egypt and 
other countries of the MENA region. In addition, they assist women in 
the political arena. Giving support to ‘Women’s Human Rights 
Defenders’ through legal, moral, and medical interventions is one of 
the key fields for their activities. Since the surge of SH in the public 
domain in the post-Mubarak era, Nazra has continuously documented 
the violations and recommended appropriate counter-measures. On the 
basis of its gender approach Nazra seeks to provide an in-depth view 
of the nature of such violations, as opposed to simply producing 
overly quick, reductionist explanations of the problem. For the 
                                                            
32 On Nazra see Badry, ‘Against All Odds’, pp. 18-22; Skalli, ‘Young Women 
and Social Media’, pp. 249-250. Nazra cooperated, for instance, with the following 
organizations and groups (cf. their joint statements and reports): El-Nadeem, CIHRS, 
OpAntiSH (cf. remarks below); New Woman Foundation/NWF (cf. note 53 in Badry, 
‘Against all Odds’, p. 20), Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR, 
independent human rights organization, established in 2002; for more information 
on their programs and publications cf. http://www.eipr.org/en/), the Women and 
Memory Forum (WMF, founded in 1995, among others by Hoda Elsadda, professor 
of English and comparative literature at the Cairo University, and composed of a 
group of women academics, researchers and activists; cf. http://www.wmf.org.eg 
apart from their presence on Facebook and Twitter), and Center for Egyptian 
Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA, founded in 1995, registered in 2003 as an 
NGO, with a focus on raising legal awareness and campaigning on the equality of 
women before law), cf. http://www.cewla.org/about_us.php (only in Arabic). All 
URL: last access on 27-28/03/2015. 
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members of the organization, SH and assault, which have been in 
evidence for a very long time, are a socially and culturally embedded 
problem that has only become clearer because of the unstable situation 
following the fall of Mubarak. As a result, the discussion on VAW 
over the past few years cannot be limited to the general lack of 
security in public spaces and to certain actors’ attempts to terrorize 
women protagonists. On 3rd July 2013, for instance, Nazra and other 
independent groups published a joint declaration entitled ‘Brutal 
sexual attacks around Tahrir and the unprecedented decadence in the 
reaction of Egyptian authorities…’ with a report on the increase in the 
number of assaults in the week surrounding the ousting of President 
Morsi.33 The signatories vehemently criticized the fact that SH is not 
criminalized, and that rape using objects or hands is classified merely 
as assault; that the issue is not addressed in schools either, where the 
curriculum reinforces traditional gender roles; and that there is a 
culture of impunity at state level with assailants rarely facing any 
consequences. Moreover, the security forces are said to compound the 
problem as both the police and military have been involved in sexual 
violence against women (i.e., harassment, rape, ‘virginity tests’). That 
is why the activists did not wait until the government tackled the 
problem – they organized themselves, and sent volunteers to rescue 
women from sexual assault, ran hotlines and provided help to the 
victims of the criminal acts. In an earlier position paper which also 
dealt with the increasing sexual violence in the public sphere, the 
signatories emphasized their rejection of the monopolization of 
women’s issues by a ‘specific set of women, whether those working in 
institutional frameworks (e.g., NCW) or in rights groups that are 
active only in some spheres’.34 The position papers accentuate that the 
problem of sexual assaults can only be solved when it is rightly 
termed a crime of violence and discussed as part of a larger public 
debate over its interrelation with the societal view of women and their 
                                                            
33 ‘Iʿtidāʾāt jinsiyya waḥshiyya fī niṭāq al-taḥrīr wa-inḥiṭāṭ ghayr masbūq fī radd 
fiʿl al-suluṭāt al-miṣriyya…irtifāʿ ḥaṣīlat al-iʿtidāʾāt al-jinsiyya ilā 101 ḥālat fī 
aḥdāth 30 Yūniyū. Bayān mushtarak’ [Brutal sexual attacks around Tahrir and 
unprecedented decadence in the reaction of Egyptian authorities … increase of 
sexual assaults reaches 101 cases during the 30th June incidents],  
http://nazra.org/node/243 (accessed 11/11/2013). 
34 ‘Position Paper on Sexual Violence against Women and the Increasing 
Frequency of Gang Rape in Tahrir Square and its Environs’, Research paper, 
http://nazra.org/en/node/200 (accessed 02/09/2013). 
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bodies as being inferior to men and theirs. In brief, cultural norms 
need to undergo long-term change through awareness campaigns all 
over the country.  
Nazra’s overall purpose is to initiate a new gender discourse and 
spread alternative, non-conventional knowledge. They envisage a 
‘holistic’ approach and solution – a cultural, normative and structural 
change, not only a change of government. 
 
Informal Vigilante Groups  
A number of initiatives decided to send teams of volunteers to 
protest demonstrations in order to intervene directly and to stop 
assaults: OpAntiSH, Tahrir Bodyguards,35 Shuft Taḥarrush (I Saw 
Harassment), Baṣma (Imprint),36 and other informal groups that were 
formed in most cases in 2012. Operation Anti Sexual Harassment, in 
Arabic Quwwa ḍidd al-taḥarrush, but better known under the 
abbreviation OpAntiSH, was established in November 2012 by 
volunteers as a direct answer to the multiplication and intensification 
of (premeditated forms of) ‘gang’ SH and assaults on women. It first 
appeared on Tahrir Square at the end of November 2012, during 
protests against President Morsi’s constitutional declaration alongside 
other vigilante groups formed earlier that year. Supported by a 
coalition of organizations like HarassMap and EIPR, the group 
intervened in particular – under the slogan ‘A safe square for all’ – 
during major demonstrations such as the anniversary of the 25th 
January revolution. Alongside setting up rescue squads OpAntiSH 
makes use of other methods to combat STRH: they conduct outreach 
and publicity campaigns to raise awareness of such crimes, and 
                                                            
35 On OpAntiSh see https://www.facebook.com/opantish (accessed 28/03/2015), 
and on Tahrir Bodyguards (started their interventions in December 2012; also 
organized free self-defense classes for women) https://www.facebook.com/Tahrir. 
Bodyguards (accessed 11/11/2013) and https://ar-ar.facebook.com/Tahrir. 
Bodyguards (28/03/2015) – with the last entry on 10th June 2014; more recent 
entries on the Twitter account of the organization. Cf. also Tadros, Reclaiming the 
Streets, pp. 16-18; and eadem, Database, pp. 23-25 for OpAntiSh; on Tahrir 
Bodyguards, ‘Shoft Taharosh’, OpAntiSh, etc., see also D. Tannir - V. Badaan, 
Women and Participation in the Arab Uprisings: A Struggle for Justice, Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), ECSWA, New York, 
(December) 2013: E/ESCWA/SDD/2013/Technical Paper.13 (Online available), pp. 
11-12.  
36 On Basma and Shuft Taharrush see Tadros, Reclaiming the Streets, pp. 12-14 
and pp. 14-16 respectively.   
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provide legal, medical and psychological support. For this purpose, 
they divided their actions over the past years into three interconnected 
fields: first, the ‘intervention or confrontation (ishtibāk) team’, 
responsible for rescuing the woman in danger; second, the ‘safety 
team’, taking care of the victim or targeted woman by delivering her 
to a safe place and providing her with first aid (basic medical and 
psychological help),37 while another group of volunteers functioned as 
silent observers with the responsibility of filming the attacks in order 
to produce awareness raising and/or documentation material (such as 
flyers, distributed by other volunteers), and later analyze the way the 
assaults operate and develop intervention strategies. Finally, the 
‘control or operation room’, consisting of the ‘core group’, took care 
of the coordination of the different teams and kept them informed on 
the calls received through the group’s hotline. All OpAntiSH teams 
included both male and female volunteers, and females who wanted to 
join the intervention team were not excluded on the pretext that it 
would be too dangerous for them. Only a few specific roles that 
involved direct contact with the rescued person immediately after the 
attack were for obvious reasons strictly filled by women. This 
differentiates OpAntiSH (and Shuft Taharrush) from other vigilante 
groups as it is indicative of their ‘gender justice’ or ‘partnership’ 
position. Moreover, in contrast to other vigilante groups, OpAntiSH 
tried to avoid violence as much as possible and did not aim at 
punishing the harassers. They refuse, as they say, to reproduce 
patriarchal discourses, attitudes and practices. The group is firmly 
opposed to any moralizing, blaming or idealizing discourse. In 
accordance with their slogan, the group perceives the protection of 
women from attacks on their bodily integrity as a way of creating 
safer public spaces for their political participation as well as putting 
up resistance to attempts by different societal and political forces to 
exclude women from the public sphere altogether. 
 
Silent Protests and Awareness-raising Initiatives – Nefsi and 
Street Performance 
Other groups used short effective messages, written or painted, to 
raise awareness on the phenomenon of STRH.  
                                                            
37 Nazra is said to have provided the volunteers with the necessary training on 
how to deal with the victims. 
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In May 2012 independent activists launched the initiative Nefsi 
meaning ‘I wish/want’.38 Quite spontaneously, as it seems, the core 
group decided to form human chains, standing in silence in public 
places which were deemed notorious for STRH – while holding simple 
sheets of paper bearing messages. Three human chains were organized 
in 2012, one of them together with Basma in the Cairo metro.39 
Volunteers joined the campaign, others were mobilized via Facebook. 
The messages were in Egyptian dialect, and intended to start a dialogue 
with and/or spark conversation among passers-by. Some of the 
messages read as follows: (a young girl together with a completely 
veiled woman wrote on their sheet) ‘I wish you’d admit that you harass 
[women]’ and ‘I wish I could feel safe in streets’; ‘I wish I could walk 
around without being hurt by inappropriate words’ was the message of 
a young unveiled woman with glasses. And a young man wrote: ‘I wish 
I didn’t have to escort my sister everywhere’. The campaign was 
supported by the global UN project ‘Safe Cities’. One of the founders 
of the group stressed in an interview that she considers the phenomenon 
of SH to be political, namely as the intentional, systematical use of 
violence against women to scare them.40 
Among the most prominent artistic means since the beginnings of 
the protests in January 2011 have been graffiti and other forms of 
street art.41 Two participatory campaigns, Graffiti Harimi (Female 
                                                            
38 Cf. Tadros, Database, pp. 26-28. ‘“I Wish…” UN Women Captures One 
Street Campaign against Sexual Harassment in Egypt’, in UN Women 31/05/2012: 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2012/5/i-wish-un-women-captures-one-
street-campaign-against-sexual-harassment-in-egypt (accessed 01/09/2014). See also 
for the ‘Transit Campaign’, in which Nefsi as well as Basma participated, ‘From 
Play-Acting to Real Life Action: A Journey to End Harassment on Public Transit in 
Egypt’, in UN Women 27/02/2013, http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/ 
2/from-play-acting-to-real-life-action (accessed 22/03/2015). On Nefsi, Basma and 
Nazra see A. Bajec, ‘The Persistent Battle against Rampant Sexual Harassment in 
Egypt’, in Third World Resurgence 266/267 (October/November 2012), pp. 64-65, 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2012/266-267/women1.htm (accessed 
01/09/2014). 
39 Basma was one of the first initiatives to become very active in undertaking 
security patrols in subway stations. Cf., for instance, the report of A. Van den 
Berghe, ‘Cairo Women Bring Men Back on the Rails’, in Inter Press Service – News 
Agency, 14/11/2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/11/cairo-women-bring-men-
back-on-the-rails/ (accessed 01/09/2014). Cf. https://ar-ar.facebook.com/ 
Imprint.Movement.eg (accessed 28/03/2015). 
40 Tadros, Database, p. 26. 
41 Cf. Badry, ‘Körpersprache, Macht und Geschlecht’, pp. 152-154. 
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Graffiti)42 and its successor Women on Walls (WOW)43 were launched 
to give women ‘a voice’ in the public spaces, in particular to integrate 
them in a scene that had largely remained a male space. The graffiti, 
stencil and mural motifs included pictures addressing the topic of the 
sexual abuse of women. One mural, entitled ‘The Circle of Hell’ 
depicts a girl or woman threateningly surrounded by a group of men 
and thereby alludes to an uncontrolled ‘mob’ or ‘gang’ who are going 
to commit sexual violence – a crime that has taken place several times 
during protests in Tahrir Square or other public squares over the past 
years, as outlined above.44 The Danish-funded project WOW was 
initiated by the Swedish journalist and street art documentarian Mia 
Gröndahl and the local cultural manager Angie Balata. Whereas the 
first campaign took place in four major Egyptian cities in April 2013, 
the second edition in February 2014 only ran in Cairo (with fewer 
participants) due to limited funds.45  
‘Shout Art Loud’ is an interactive documentary on diverse arts in 
Egypt that illustrates how theatre, dance, music and graffiti are used to 
tackle the issue of VAW.46  
                                                            
42 See Chapter ‘Women Power on the Wall’, in M. Gröndahl, Revolution 
Graffiti: Street Art of the New Egypt, The American University in Cairo Press/AUC 
Press, Cairo, 2012, pp. 132-139. 
43 https://www.facebook.com/womenonwalls/info (accessed 16/09/2014); N. 
Barakat, ‘Women on the Walls’, in Al Ahram Weekly, 05-03-2014, http://weekly. 
ahram.org.eg/News/5610/30/Women-on-walls.aspx; M. Patry, ‘Egypt Confronts 
Sexual Harassment’, in The Huffington Post 17/07/2014, http://www.huffington 
post.co.uk/melody-patry/egypt-confronts-sexualharassment_ b_5591945.html; M. El 
Nabawi, ‘“Women on Walls” Campaign Empowers Women via Street Art’, in Egypt 
Independent, 09/04/2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/women-walls-
campaign-empowers-women-street-art (all accessed 2/ 12/2016). 
44 ‘[O]ne of the most telling works’, according to J. Van de Bildt (‘Revolutionary 
Graffiti in Egypt: Resistance and Commemoration’, in Tel Aviv Notes 7/24, 26th 
December 2013, p. 3, www.dayan.org), is a stencil that portrays the profiles of three 
women, the first of them unveiled, the second with ‘hijab’, and the third one 
completely covered except the eyes; the accompanying text reads, ‘Don’t label me’. 
The article also mentions other artistic movements focusing on women’s 
empowerment. 
45 A. Bajec, ‘Can Graffiti Remake Egypt’, in Women in the World (WITW), 
19/02/2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2014/02/19/can-graffiti-
remake-egypt.html (accessed 16/09/2014). 
46 For a link to ‘Shout Art Loud’, a web documentary by M. Patry, see: ‘Shout Art 
Loud: A “Living Report” on Art and Sexual Violence in Egypt’, in Index on 
Censorship, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/shoutartloud/  (accessed 16/09/2014). 
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Though all the artists involved in such performances were 
apparently convinced that art is able to trigger discussion in society, 
and can challenge perceptions and raise awareness, they had to admit 
that cultural means could only effectively combat STRH in 
combination with political initiatives.47 For this reason, WOW, for 
instance, worked together with other organizations and groups, such 
as Nazra and HarassMap, during its second campaign. 
Another quite unusual activity by Egyptian standards was the 
organization of mixed gender bike rides in 2014 – seemingly not only 
with the aim of breaking gender stereotypes but also of reclaiming 
public space in an alternative way.48  
 
Are We Seeing the First Results of Constant Pressure by Civil 
Society Actors?  
In June 2014, shortly before leaving office, Egypt’s interim 
president, Adly Mansour, passed an amendment to the Penal Law of 
1937 that for the first time in Egyptian history criminalized SH.49 As 
women’s rights activists and lobbyists had repeatedly, but in the end 
always unsuccessfully, developed proposals and even drafted laws in 
this direction in the previous years, the final modification of the Penal 
                                                            
47 M. Patry, ‘Egyptian Artists Declare War on Sexual Harassment’, in Index on 
Censorship, 15/05/2013, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/05/egyptian-
artists-declare-war-on-sexual-harassment/ (accessed 16/09/2014). 
48 ‘From Bike Rides to Pink Ribbons, Egyptian Anti-Violence Campaigns Create 
Ripples across the Country’, in UN Women 19/11/2013, 
http://www.unwomen.org/ca/news/stories/2013/11/ (accessed 18/02/2014). Cf. also 
for a note on the bike rides as well as on WOW: M. El Nabawi, ‘Bigger, Bolder, 
Brighter: The Women on Walls Graffiti Campaign’, in Mada Masr, The Morning 
Digest, 14/02/2014, http://www.madamasr.com/bigger-bolder-brighter (accessed 
16/09/2014). 
49 For a summary of the legal amendments to the Egyptian Penal Code: S. 
Abdelaziz, ‘Egypt Criminalizes Sexual Harassment’, in CNN, 10/06/2014,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/06/world/africa/egypt-sexual-harassment-law/ 
(accessed 04/09/2014) – incl. critical comments of Fathi Farid, a founder of Egypt’s 
‘I Saw Harassment’ campaign; ‘Qānūn miṣrī jadīd yardaʿ al-taḥarrush al-jinsī’, in al-
ʿArabiyya net, 06/06/2014: http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/egypt/ 
2014/06/06/ (accessed 04/09/2014). HarassMap/Kharīṭat al-taḥarrush, ‘Qawānin 
tajrīm al-taḥarrush al-jinsī fī Miṣr’, http://harassmap.org/ar/resource-center/laws-
against-sexual-harassment-in-egypt/ (accessed 04/09/2014) - includes a link to the 
full text of the law and remarks on the deficits of the amendments; S. Cordes, 
‘Egypt’s New Anti-Harassment Law to Make a Difference?’, in WoMenDialogue, 
04/08/2014, http://www.womendialogue.org/node/10171 (accessed 04/09/2014). 
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Law can be assessed, at least prima facie, as a success and as the 
result of the continued pressure on the part of civil society actors 
insisting on the need to hold perpetrators of GBV crimes accountable. 
However, in view of the weaknesses of the new articles and also of 
other measures introduced by the new political elite (new protest law, 
violence against oppositional and/or nonconformist forces), it can also 
be seen as an attempt by the state to reclaim the prerogative of 
interpretation (and control).  
Until the amendment, SH was not specifically defined or addressed 
by Egyptian Penal Law. But there were three articles in the Penal Code 
that were sometimes applied to cases of sexual (or sexually motivated) 
attacks on women: insulting (Article 306), indecent behavior (Article 
278), and sexual assault (Article 268). There were a number of 
problems with these articles: among other things, the burden of proof 
was laid on the victim/targeted woman, public awareness regarding 
the law and its enforcement was limited, and a further factor was the 
reluctance of victims to report the attack and the unwillingness of 
witnesses to become involved and support the victims.50  
Although the new laws were welcomed by all women’s rights 
activists, independent NGOs such as Nazra, El-Nadeem and other of 
the aforementioned groups pointed to its weaknesses and called for a 
revision. Following the sexual assaults perpetrated during the 
celebrations for the inauguration of the new president al-Sisi, the 
aforementioned groups asserted in a joint statement51 that the 
incidents demonstrated the ‘insufficiency of the recent legal 
amendment to combat these crimes’. What was required instead, they 
argued, was a ‘holistic national strategy and comprehensive legal 
reform’. Concerning the necessity of a revision of articles 267 and 
268, the signatories demanded the inclusion of a detailed definition of 
rape52 and a clear definition of sexual assault. While a definition of 
                                                            
50 For the Penal Law prior to the amendment, see Tadros, Politically Motivated 
Sexual Assault, pp. 24-26; Ebaid, Sexual Harassment in Egypt, p. 7 (pp. 8-9 for 
former reform proposals; on these see also Ambrosetti - Abu Amara - Condon, 
‘Gender-Based Violence in Egypt’, p. 401).  
51 ‘The Mob-sexual Assaults and Gang Rapes in Tahrir Square during the 
Celebrations of the Inauguration of the New Egyptian President is Sufficient Proof 
for the Inefficiency of the Recent Legal Amendments to Combat these Crimes – 
Joint Statement (09/06/2014)’, http://nazra.org/en/node/323 (accessed 22/08/2014). 
52 I.e., the definition must include oral and anal rape, in addition to rape with 
sharp objects and fingers. 
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taḥarrush was introduced for the first time in the amendment, they were 
critical of the fact that this definition would leave too much room for 
interpretation as it is tied to the intention of the perpetrator to receive 
benefits of a sexual nature.53 In addition the signatories emphasized the 
necessity of undertaking appropriate procedures and mechanisms to 
protect women who file reports of SH and pursue legal cases.  
Following the sentencing of seven defendants involved in the ‘Qasr 
El-Nil Felonies’ Nazra and other groups issued another joint statement 
in which they asserted that the verdict should be considered as a 
starting point for legal reform and as the beginning of an investigation 
into all previous crimes.54 
Further steps taken in 2014 to combat SH included the 
establishment of ‘VAW units’ in all police departments, the formation 
of a committee launched by the prime minister to investigate the 
causes of widespread SH and design a national strategy to combat 
VAW. These steps can be regarded as a ‘milestone’55 but also as an 
attempt to neutralize those groups that call for a comprehensive change. 
As the joint statement of Nazra, El Nadeem, CEWLA and NWF shows, 
the composition of the committee is deemed problematic. Moreover, the 
signatories doubt the approach (‘limited vision’), commitment and 
transparency of the committee that is ‘coordinated by the National 
Council of Women with several ministries and a small number of civil 
society organizations and initiatives’.56  
 
                                                            
53 Cf., in contrast, for an official praise of the amendments, the interview of 
Muṣṭafā ʿĪd from al-Shurūq with a legal advisor in the Ministry of Justice, ʿUmar al-
Sharīf: ‘Raʾīs al-tashrīʿ bi-l-‘adl: ‘uqūbat al-taḥarrush fī Miṣr ashadd min al-
Saʿūdiyya…wa-al-ghamza wa-hātī būsa’ jarīma taṣil lil-sijn 5 sanawāt’, in al-
Shurūq, 30/07/2014, www.shorouknews.com (accessed 04/09/2014).  
54 Nazra for Feminist Studies, ‘First Verdict in Cases of Mob-Sexual Assaults 
and Gang Rape in Tahrir Square is No End to the Story; All Previous Crimes of 
Sexual Violence must be Investigated – Joint Statement’, 19-07-2014, 
http://nazra.org/en/node/342 (accessed 16/09/2014). 
55 N. Abol Komsan (ed.), ‘2014: The year of unfulfilled promises for Egyptian 
women. Women’s Status Report 2014. Summary, performed by ECWR’: 
http://ecwronline.org (accessed 23/03/2015), p. 17. 
56 ‘Feminist Groups and Organizations Collaborate together in order to Present 
their Vision for a National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women and Adopt 
a Holistic and Broad Perspective to Eradicate these Crimes from their Roots – Joint 
Statement’, 10/12/2014, http://nazra.org/en/node/392 (accessed 27/03/2015). 
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Concluding Remarks – Positive Signs and Ongoing Systemic and 
Organizational Obstacles 
First of all, one has to acknowledge the courage, commitment, 
steadfastness and creativity of the various initiatives on behalf of 
women’s empowerment. Despite the relatively small number of their 
respective key activists (some of whom are members of different 
organizations and groups) and ongoing repression, they made a 
difference in several aspects: first, as other observers already stressed, 
the involvement of men in the initiatives on GBV is one of the most 
positive developments. Through their presence and partnership work 
they are challenging traditional social norms and values and also 
encouraging alternative gender roles, perceptions and forms of 
femininity and masculinity.57 In addition, they have provided a live 
example of inclusive citizenship as against traditional authoritarian 
patterns. Moreover, as Skalli has pointed out, through their 
combination of online and offline activism, these groups were able to 
expose ‘the complicity of political and patriarchal forces in 
(re)producing and condoning sexual harassment before and since the 
Arab Spring’.58 Last but not least, their innovative artistic or at any 
rate unusual methods of reclaiming and re-organizing public spaces 
have demonstrated the potential of at least a small segment of young 
activists in Egypt and their drive for a more open society.  
What may be problematic in the long run is the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the activists are relatively privileged – 
compared to the great majority of the population. Reaching a broad 
audience may thus be difficult, not only because of the social and 
intellectual gap, but most importantly due to the lack of funds. Most 
initiatives have been either self-funded or operated through short-term 
funded projects,59 in contrast to the established NGOs. And, in 
particular after the removal of Morsi, old rifts between the diverse 
groups have reappeared causing ‘revolutionary’ coalitions to drift 
apart.60 Further fragmentation and polarization of society is a 
hindrance to efforts to work in a sustained manner towards exerting 
collective pressure on the government to carry out genuine reforms.  
                                                            
57 Tadros, Database, pp. 37-38, 42; Skalli, ‘Young Women and Social Media’, p. 250. 
58 Skalli, ‘Young Women and Social Media’, p. 244 (abstract). 
59 Cf. Ambrosetti - Abu Amara - Condon, ‘Gender-Based Violence in Egypt’, p. 414. 
60 On the recent establishment of a new regional coalition see: ‘Founding Statement 
of the Coalition of Women Human Rights Defenders in the Middle East and North 
Africa – Joint Statement’, 08/03/2015, http://nazra.org/en/node/402 (27/03/2015). 
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Everything considered, the various initiatives have had an impact 
as regards raising awareness of SH, but with the setting of the problem 
on the state agenda and the dominance of the established NGOs it is 
hardly conceivable that a genuine solution is to be expected. What is 
more, despite all the great efforts over the past years, old stereotypes, 
rhetoric and discursive patterns die hard, as the reaction in some media 
to a case of SH in March 2014 at Cairo University demonstrates.61  
Further campaigns are needed as is further research to shed light on 
the historical roots and continuous reinvention of persistent collusion 
between state authorities, including judiciary and security apparatus, 
in instigating and/or condoning politically motivated GBV. The law’s 
recognition of acts of violence as crimes should not be restricted to 
violence against women but should also encompass crimes against 
other vulnerable segments of society that are easily exposed to 
discrimination and oppression as a result of culturally deeply rooted 
and widely accepted prejudices. And further, a specific and limited 
definition of STRH is required. 
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Egypt in Transition: What future for Islamic Feminism? 
 
Margherita PICCHI 
 
 
Abstract 
This article aims to present an overview of the discursive and political movement 
known as Islamic feminism, which has received a lot of attention from Western media 
and academia in recent years, choosing Egypt as a country case study. The purpose of 
this article is threefold: first, to review the heated debate over the definition of Islamic 
feminism, its significance, and its legitimacy. Secondly, to present the goals, the 
methodologies, and the characteristics of this very dynamic and diversified 
phenomenon in the specific context of Egypt; and finally, to reflect on how, and to 
which extent, the dramatic and on-going changes that Egypt has faced since the 
beginning of the 2011 revolution are influencing the projects of scholars, groups and 
organizations that can fall under the label of ‘Islamic feminism’. 
 
Defining a Controversial Term 
Islamic feminism has been the subject of growing attention in the 
West, an interest that can be situated in the larger post 9/11 context of 
looking for ‘moderate Muslim’ voices to contrast the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism and jihadism all over the world. However, the concept 
of ‘Islamic feminism’ itself has deeper historical roots, and it requires 
a terminological reflection since it constitutes a relatively new term, and 
highly controversial at that, which still does not have a clear and 
unambiguous definition.  
The feverish debate over this term has been captured in an extensive 
body of writings that includes the research of Margot Badran, Ziba Mir-
Hosseini, Saadiya Shaikh, Qudsia Mirza, Aysha Hidaytullah, Raja 
Rhouni, Valentine Moghadam and Omaima Abou Bakr, to name only 
a few of the many scholars who have dealt with the subject of Islamic 
feminism.1 Grounding this paper on this extensive scholarship, I will 
                                                          
1 There is a growing body of literature on Islamic feminism, its methodology and 
its goals. See for example O. Abou Bakr, ‘Islamic Feminism? What’s in a Name? 
Preliminary Reflections’, in AMEWS review 15/16 (2001), pp. 1-4; M. Badran, 
‘Engaging Islamic Feminism’, in Anytta Kynsilehto (ed.), Islamic Feminism: Current 
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try to summarize the descriptions provided by the abovementioned 
scholars. 
Broadly speaking, Islamic feminism can be used as an umbrella term 
to define various knowledge building projects which share the goal of 
empowering women from within an Islamic frame of reference. Like 
other modernist-reformist religious discourses, Islamic feminism is 
text-centred, in the sense that ‘it derives its understanding and mandate 
from the Qur’ān’.2 Central to this is the concept of ijtihād, an 
independent and critical approach to the interpretation of the Holy Book 
usually conceived of as an opposite to taqlīd or ‘imitating’, a method that 
consists in reading the Qur’ān following the opinion of an authoritative 
scholar of the past.3 Emphasizing individual agency in the interpretative 
process, Islamic feminism invokes a ‘democratization of the ijtihad’4 and 
a redefinition of religious authority that challenges the monopoly of 
traditional scholars and institutions in interpreting religious sources. It 
affirms that: 
 
                                                          
Perspectives, Tampere Peace Research Institute Occasional 96 (2008), pp. 25-36; the 
collection of articles by Margot Badran entitled Feminism in Islam: Secular and 
Religious Convergences, Oneworld, Oxford 2009; M. Badran, ‘From Islamic 
Feminism to a Muslim Holistic Feminism’, in IDS Bulletin 42/1 (2011), pp. 78-87; 
M. Cooke, Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism Through Literature 
Routledge, New York-London 2001; A. Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qur’an, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2014; Q. Mirza, ‘Islamic Feminism and Gender 
Equality’, in ISIM Review 21 (2008), pp. 30-31; Z. Mir-Hosseini, ‘Muslim Women’s 
Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism’, in Critical Inquiry 32 
(2006), pp. 629-645; Z. Mir-Hosseini, ‘Beyond “Islam” vs. “Feminism”’, in IDS 
Bulletin 42/1 (2011), pp. 67-77; V. Moghadam, ‘Islamic Feminism and its 
Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate’, in Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society 27/4 (2002), pp. 1135-1171; R. Rhouni, Secular and Islamic Feminist 
Critiques in the Work of Fatima Mernissi, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2010; S. Shaikh, 
‘Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice’, in Omid Safi (ed.), 
Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender and Pluralism, Oneworld, Oxford 2003, pp. 
147-162. 
2 Badran, Feminism in Islam, p. 242. 
3 For a reflection on the place of Islamic feminism within the broader field of 
modernist reform movements in Islam, see Q. Mirza, ‘Islamic Feminism: Possibilities 
and Limitations’, in John Strawson (ed.), Law after Ground Zero, Cavendish, London, 
2002, pp. 108-122. 
4 Y. Haddad - B. Stowasser, ‘Introduction’, in Yvonne Haddad - Barbara 
Stowasser (eds.), Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity, Walnut Creek, 
Altamira Press, 2004, p. 7. 
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A believer’s right to interpret religion derives not from social sanctions 
(permission from clergies or interpretive communities), but from the 
depths of our own conviction and from the advice the Qur’ān gives us 
to exercise our intellect and knowledge in reading it.5 
 
Through a re-reading of Islam’s fundamental sources – namely the 
Qur’ān, and to a lesser degree, the Sunna and the Islamic juridical 
tradition (fiqh) – Islamic feminism aims firstly at deconstructing the 
traditional and patriarchal interpretations that highlight superiority of 
men over women, and then at producing new readings that can be used 
as part of an emancipatory agenda for the establishment of gender 
equality. Islamic feminism first arose in Iran in the late 1980s, a decade 
after the creation of the Islamic Republic, and has been labelled as ‘the 
unwanted child of political Islam’;6 indeed one of the main factors 
behind its emergence is the rise of Islamist and neo-traditionalist 
movements, which in most cases promote a conservative (misogynist) 
discourse on women’s rights and gender relations, using the Qur’ān and 
fiqh to legitimize their views.7 The first goal of Islamic feminism is thus 
enabling women to ‘turn the tables’ on Islamists and traditional 
religious authorities, beating them at their own game in their own arena. 
It has to be noted, in this regard, that the idea of using religious 
discourse to promote feminist claims is much older; it dates back at least 
to the late nineteenth century, when feminist movements first emerged 
in the Arab-Islamic world. The new Islamic feminist discourse, 
however, is much more developed and elaborate than the one promoted 
by first-wave feminists, who ‘did not have access to the education and 
training that would enable them to engage directly in systematic re-
readings of religious texts themselves’.8 With few remarkable 
exceptions, these first-wave feminists borrowed their arguments from 
                                                          
5A. Barlas, Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of 
the Qur’ān, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2002, p. 210.  
6 Mir-Hosseini, Muslim Women Quest for Equality.  
7 Gender ideology in Islamist movements is the topic of a wide range of studies; 
for a focus on Egyptian Islamism, see Y. Haddad, ‘The Case of Feminist Movement’, 
in Yvonne Haddad (ed.), Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History, State 
University of New York Press, Albany, 1982, pp. 54-70; A. Karam, Women, Islamism 
and the State, Palgrave, New York-London 1998; G. Talhami, The Mobilization of 
Muslim Women in Egypt, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1996; M. Tadros, 
‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s Gender Agenda: Reformed or Reframed?’, in IDS 
Bulletin 42/1 (2011), pp. 88-98. 
8 Badran, Feminism in Islam, p. 4. 
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the Islamic modernist discourse, as elaborated by male scholars such as 
the Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905).9 Today’s scholars 
benefit from the significant progress made in women’s education 
during the twentieth century, even in the highest levels of religious 
science, and they are thus much better equipped in terms of both 
knowledge and experience. Besides profiting of a much better arsenal 
of arguments to answer patriarchal interpretations of Islam, they also 
show a greater consciousness of the relevance of their work, and they 
actively cooperate on a global level to promote those knowledge 
projects that fall under the label ‘Islamic feminism’. 
As the definition provided earlier clearly indicates, Islamic feminism 
first emerged as a discourse. However, over time a growing number of 
Women’s Rights groups and organizations has increasingly referred to 
Islamic feminist arguments in their everyday struggle to reform 
discriminatory laws and customs in Muslim majority societies, at local, 
national, or transnational levels. The Malaysian organization Sisters in 
Islam and the international networks Musawah and Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) are good examples of groups that 
mobilized Islamic feminist discourse to support and legitimize their 
activities and goals.10 Although these different approaches, the 
theoretical and the practical, have been mutually reinforcing, I believe 
a distinction has to be made between the two, since NGOs and activists 
rarely create knowledge, and because they usually mix the religious 
arguments with arguments concerning human rights and practical 
considerations.11 
Moving on to the heated debate over the definition ‘Islamic 
feminism’, it has to be noted that since the very beginning the term has 
provoked strong reactions from scholars inside and outside the Muslim 
world. Opinions can be divided into two broad groups: one formed by 
those who enthusiastically support the term, the other by those who 
                                                          
9 On Muhammad ‘Abduh and his influence on contemporary Islamic thought, see 
A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1962. For a comprehensive analysis of his view on women’s issues, see 
M. ‘Imara, Al-mar’a wa al-Islām fi rā’y Muḥammad ‘Abdūh (Women and Islam 
according to Muhammad Abduh), Al-Qāhira li-l-thaqāfa al-‘arabiyya, Cairo, 1975. 
10For further information, see the groups’ websites: Musawah, 
http://www.musawah.org; WLUML, http://www.wluml.org (access 31/03/2015). 
11 M. Sharafeldin, ‘Egyptian Women’s NGOs - Personal Status Law Reform 
Between Islamic and International Human Rights Law’, in Ziba Mir-Hosseini - Kari 
Vogt - Lena Larsen - Christian Moe (eds.), Gender and Equality in Muslim Family 
Law, IB Tauris, New York 2013, pp. 57-80.  
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vehemently oppose it, who often come from very different 
backgrounds. In this regard, it is worth noting that many secular 
feminists and patriarchal Islamists raise paradoxically similar 
objections, arguing that the values of religion and feminism are 
incompatible and therefore that the term ‘Islamic feminism’ is an 
oxymoron.12 But what may seem more bizarre, at least at first glance, 
is that sometimes it is those who are generally considered to be ‘Islamic 
feminists’ that refuse the term most passionately.  
Indeed, the rejection can be so strong that it sometimes leads to the 
claim that the very expression ‘Islamic feminism’ has been created by 
western feminists and imposed on Muslim women against their will, in 
order to categorize and control them better. Therefore, it would 
represent another orientalist, hegemonic attempt to name the ‘Other’, 
which should be fought fiercely. This allegation can easily be refuted; 
as I will demonstrate shortly, it is based on a poor knowledge of 
feminist history in Muslim majority countries. Moreover, as Badran 
points out, it was precisely in the writings of Muslim feminists, secular 
and religious, that the term ‘Islamic feminism’ first appeared.13 The 
very first time this expression was heard in an academic context was in 
February 1994, when the Iranian feminist scholar Afsaneh Najmabadi 
gave a lecture at SOAS, University of London, and used the term to 
describe the reform project launched in Iran by the new women’s 
magazines Zanan and Farzaneh. Najmabadi spoke about the project in 
enthusiastic terms, underlining how this new approach could open up a 
dialogue between religious and secular feminists.14 The term gained 
                                                          
12 Among secular feminists, Iranian scholar Haideh Moghissi and Egyptian writer 
Nawal el-Saadawi have both claimed that Islam, as all Abrahamic religions, is 
inherently patriarchal, and that the very idea of ‘Islamic feminism’ is deceptive, since 
it leads to the idea that to be ‘authentic’, feminist movements in the Muslim world 
have necessarily to refer to religion, thus strengthening the legitimacy of Islamist and 
patriarchal actors. On the Islamist front, a prominent female voice to support the idea 
that the term ‘Islamic feminism’ is ‘the oxymoron par excellence’ is that of Nadia 
Yassine, spokesperson for the Moroccan Islamist movement al-‘Adl wa al-Iḥsān. See 
H. Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: the Limits of a Postmodern 
Analysis, Zed Books, London-New York, 1999; N. el-Saadawi, ‘Muslim Women in 
the Market’, in Adele Newton-Horst (ed.), The Essential Nawal el-Saadawi: a 
Reader, Zed Books, London-New York, 2010, pp. 114-124; N. Yassine, quoted in 
Rhouni’s Secular and Islamic Feminist Critiques, p. 27. 
13 Badran, Engaging Islamic Feminism, p. 28. 
14 Najmabadi’s speech at SOAS was later turned into in a Persian-language article 
and a book chapter: ‘Feminism in an Islamic Republic’ in John Esposito - Yvonne 
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rapid circulation and almost immediately sparked a debate so heated that, 
as the Egyptian scholar Amani Saleh noted, it caused ‘a curious paradox 
[…]; [the] discourse around the phenomenon greatly surpasses efforts to 
build Islamic feminism itself’.15 
That being said, one is led to wonder why this term is so passionately 
rejected by the very women whose work appears to fit perfectly within 
its definition. A good explanation is offered by the Pakistani-American 
scholar Asma Barlas, who has written on several occasions about why 
she resists being called an Islamic feminist, even though she is generally 
considered one of the pioneers of this movement:16 
 
My resistance was a displacement of frustration with real, live, 
feminists, all of them white. Although I’m sure they were and remain 
well-meaning, many of them seemed utterly blind to the racial politics 
of speaking for women of colour like myself and that too in our 
presence, as if we didn’t exist. Anyone who has been silenced in the 
name of sisterhood can understand how strange and difficult that is, and 
it wasn’t until I read black feminists like bell hooks [sic] that I could 
give voice to my discomfort at being seen as the Sister Other. (…) [But] 
I’ve always been committed to concept of sexual equality, which is at 
the core of feminist theory.17 
 
Barlas clearly stressed that it is not the idea of gender equality that 
is refused, nor the concept of feminism as a cluster of tools of analysis, 
but what she called the ‘Western master narrative of feminism’, which 
is the result of the enduring legacy of colonialism. This narrative, which 
is reflected in popular culture, media, and even in the politics of 
international development institutions, still stereotypes Islam as a 
violent and misogynist religion, and depicts Muslim women as 
powerless victims who need to be ‘saved’ by the West. This rhetoric, 
                                                          
Haddad (eds.), Islam, Gender and Social Change, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1998, pp. 59-84. 
15A. Saleh, ‘Paradigms of Knowledge in Islamic Feminism’, in Omaima Abou 
Bakr (ed.), Feminist and Islamic Perspectives, Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 
2013, p. 11.  
16 A. Barlas, ‘Qur’anic Hermeneutics and Women’s Liberation’. Paper presented 
at the International Congress on Islamic Feminism, Barcelona, Spain, October 29, 
2005 http://www.asmabarlas.com/TALKS/Barcelona.pdf (last access 31/3/2015); A. 
Barlas, ‘Engaging Islamic Feminism: Provincializing Feminism as a Master 
Narrative’, in Anytta Kynsilehto (ed.), Islamic Feminism: Current Perspectives, 
Tampere Peace Research Institute Occasional 96 (2008), pp. 15-24. 
17 Barlas, Engaging Islamic Feminism, p. 17. 
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cynically summarized by the Indian scholar Gayatri Spivak with the 
sentence ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’,18 is 
familiar to anyone who has studied the history of British and French 
colonialism; both these empires strategically used the ‘woman 
question’ for the moral justification of imperialist attacks on Muslim 
countries and to claim an inherent superiority of the West over the 
Muslim ‘Other’.19 This hypocritical exploitation of feminist arguments 
for colonial purposes did not end, however, with the collapse of the 
British and French Empires. On the contrary, as Lila Abu Lughod 
among others has shown, the rhetoric of ‘imperial feminism’ is still 
manifest in the propaganda campaign that accompanies the so-called 
‘War on Terror’, which justified the military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan on the pretence of liberating women.20 
Sadly, many western feminists not only failed to ‘confront[...] 
imperialism and its negative implications for democracy and feminist 
ideals,’21 but often actively contributed to spreading the stereotype of 
the supposed inherently misogynist nature of Islam. The ‘global 
sisterhood’ invoked by Western feminists is in too many cases 
perceived as nothing more than the imposition of their own needs on 
non-Western women, whose specific demands and dynamics of 
oppression are rarely taken into consideration.22 
As a result of all this, in the Muslim world feminism has often been 
associated with colonialism and imperialism. This association has led 
to the widespread perception, shared by traditionalists, political 
conservatives and even certain leftists, that feminism is an ideology 
                                                          
18 G. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Cary Nelson - Lawrence Grossberg 
(eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 
1988, pp. 271-313.  
19 Beside Spivak, a fundamental text that analyzes the gendered character of 
British colonialism is L. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a 
Modern Debate, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992. For the exploitation of the 
‘woman question’ by the Frenchs in Algeria, see M. Lazreg, The Eloquence of 
Silence: Algerian Women in Question, Routledge, New York, 1994. 
20 L. Abu Lughod, ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?’, in American 
Anthropologist 104/3 (2002), pp. 783-790; D. Kumar, Imperialist Feminism and 
Liberalism, in OpenDemocracy, 6/11/2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/deepa-
kumar/imperialist-feminism-and-liberalism (last access 31/03/2015). 
21 M. Badran, Feminism, Islam and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern 
Egypt, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p. 246.  
22 For a criticism of the hegemonic attitude of western feminist discourse toward 
the ‘third world woman’, see C. T. Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist 
Scholarship and Colonial Discourse’, in Feminist Review 30 (1988), pp. 61-88. 
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elaborated by decadent, bourgeois white women, which has no 
relevance for their non-Western counterparts and represents a threat to 
the cultural and religious authenticity of Muslim societies. 
But are these allegations justified? Is feminism really only a Western 
ideology tainted by its long-dated complicity with imperialism? Before 
I elaborate on this point let me offer a concise definition of feminism, 
borrowed from Margot Badran. She argues that feminism should be 
understood as a mode of analysis that includes: (1) the recognition of 
gender equality and of women’s rights that a particular religion, nation, 
society or culture may affirm in its basic tenets but withhold in practice, 
and (2) the identification of ways to secure the practice of such rights 
by women and men alike.23 
Taking this definition as a starting point, I would like to state again 
that, as a significant number of studies have already demonstrated, 
feminism was actually not imposed on the non-Western world by the 
West; even though the word ‘feminism’ was coined in Europe, in 
France to be precise,24 feminism itself is by no means a Western 
concept. On the contrary, 
 
History attests that feminism is the creation of both easterners and 
westerners, of Muslims and those of other religions, of the colonized 
and colonizers, and of women of different races and ethnicities. Those 
who claim that feminism is ‘western’ and ‘white’ do not know their 
history and perpetuate the circulation of myths.25 
 
The history of the Egyptian Women’s Rights movement also attests 
to the existence of an intimate link between feminist advocacy and anti-
colonialist demands; a ‘double struggle’ against Imperialism and 
patriarchal oppression unknown to Western feminisms that represents 
a common feature of several Women’s Rights movements in colonial 
and postcolonial countries, as Sri Lankan feminist scholar Kumari 
Jayawardena’s has pointed out in her now classic book Feminism and 
Nationalism in the Third World.26 Moreover, the very idea of a 
                                                          
23 M. Badran, Feminism and the Qur’an, in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, Leiden, Brill, 2002, vol. 2, p. 199.  
24 K. Offen, ‘On the French Origin of the Words “Feminism” and “Feminists”’, in 
Feminist Issues 8/2 (1988), pp. 45-51. 
25 Badran, Engaging Feminism, p. 32. 
26 In this regard, see the pioneering work of Kumari Jayawardena Feminism and 
Nationalism in the Third World, Zed Books, London, 1986. For a focus on Egyptian 
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monolithic ‘Western feminism’ is reductive and deceiving. While there 
are definitely some strands of feminism in the West that have shown an 
imperialist and racist attitude, feminism in western countries is a 
complex phenomenon. Not only do Western feminisms include locally 
focused and ‘home-ground’ movements, but in the last decades new 
discourses have started to emerge that are highly critical of the 
exclusive focus on gender that Chandra Mohanty described as the major 
aspect in mainstream, white, upper-class western feminism.27 Building 
on the concept of intersectionality, as elaborated by black feminist 
Kimberlé Crenshaw,28 these new discourses call for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the multiple, interrelated dynamics of 
women’s oppression, one that also includes race, class, ethnicity, 
sexuality, religion and other axes of identity, examining how they 
interact in reproducing and reinforcing inequality.29  
Ignoring this complexity and remaining blind to the ‘indigenous’ 
history of feminism in the Muslim world is problematic and even 
dangerous, because it plays into the hands of those Islamists and 
traditionalists who discredit Muslim women engaged in feminist 
activities by accusing them of being the ‘fifth column’ of western 
imperialism and a threat to Muslim identity and authenticity. 
In short, I believe that the rejection of the term ‘Islamic feminism’ 
is due to the confusion and misconceptions that surround the concept of 
‘feminism,’ and not to its actual meaning. Therefore, and although I 
recognize the problematics of using the expression ‘Islamic feminism’, 
I deliberately choose to use it, whether the scholars I associate with the 
term agree with the definition or not. At the same time, out of respect 
for concerns over identity politics and the problem of differences, I 
would like to underscore that with ‘Islamic feminism’ I do not refer to 
an identity, but rather to a discourse. In other words, I do not define 
people as feminists, but I categorize their work as such. With this 
choice, I do not mean to ignore the conceptual difficulties and 
                                                          
feminism, see Badran, Feminism, Islam and the Nation; B. Baron, The Women’s 
Awakening in Egypt, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 1994. 
27 C. T. Mohanty, ‘Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the 
Politics of Feminism’, in Chandra Talpade Mohanty - Ann Russo - Lourdes Torres 
(eds.), Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1991, pp. 1-50. 
28 K. Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Color’, in Stanford Law Review 43/6 (1991), pp. 1241-99. 
29 Anna Carastathis, ‘The Concept of Intersectionality in Feminist Theory’, in 
Philosophy Compass, 9/5 (2014), pp. 304-314. 
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ideological biases that Muslim women engaged in promoting Women’s 
Rights experience with regard to certain attitudes of western feminism. 
However, I insist on using the label ‘Islamic feminism’ because I 
strongly believe that it may help to bridge the gap between different 
expressions of feminism and can go beyond the polarization between 
‘secular’ and ‘religious’ when describing a commitment to Women’s 
Rights. Indeed, as a number of studies have already demonstrated, 
 
[s]ecular and Islamic feminism have been mutually re-enforcing. Not 
only is there an important secular past behind Islamic feminism but also 
an on-going side-by-side presence of the two feminisms.30 
 
As a growing number of women from all over the world are pointing 
out, there is a strong need to reconfigure the contours of feminism and 
elaborate a new understanding of this concept, more inclusive and 
cross-cultural, one that acknowledges the specificities of different 
groups of women and recognizes the varying forms of feminist praxis. 
I do not refer here to a ‘global sisterhood’ built on the presumption of a 
universal womanhood that in practice reflects the reality of a particular 
group of women, but rather to an intersectional, non-essentialist 
‘feminism’ that recognizes cultural diversity, supports multiple 
feminist epistemologies, and pays attention to the specificities and 
particularities of women’s different contexts. The aim of this new 
understanding of feminism is to build ‘a common context of struggle 
which facilitates the formation of politically oppositional alliances and 
coalitions in the face of specific exploitative structures’, as South 
African scholar Saadiya Shaikh says, thus enabling  
 
varying groups of women to share and learn from each other’s 
experiences, whether this is an exchange of feminist tools of analysis, 
or of varying ways of implementing activist initiatives, or simply an 
exposure to other forms of justice-oriented gender practices.31  
 
I would like to conclude this terminological analysis with a final 
reflection. Although I claim the legitimacy of the concept of ‘Islamic 
feminism’, I would recommend a more cautious use of the label. 
Indeed, two decades after the term first appeared in academic literature 
on women and Islam, it has now become widespread not only in 
                                                          
30 Badran, From Islamic Feminism to Muslim Holistic Feminism, p. 82. 
31 Shaikh, Transforming Feminisms, pp. 154-155. 
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academic literature, but also in media and in non-specialist 
publications. As a result, its meaning has expanded so much that it is 
now used to describe almost all active Muslim women, ‘even though 
their activities might not even fit the broadest definition of feminism’,32 
thus losing all analytical effectiveness. Because of the above, I believe 
that the meaning of ‘Islamic feminism’ should be narrowed, because, 
as premised, not all women’s exegetical works can be considered 
feminist, even if this last concept is understood in its broader sense. As 
a matter of fact, the writings of the famous Islamic scholar ‘Āisha ‘Abd 
al-Raḥmān (1913-1998, better known under her nom de plume of Bint 
al-Shāṭī’), who did not pay special attention to issues such as Women’s 
Rights and gender relations,33 and who employed a neo-traditional 
methodology of exegesis, cannot in my opinion be defined as feminist, 
despite her fundamental contribution to the history of women in 
Egypt.34 Even more so, the work of women interpreters who deal with 
women’s issues but explicitly support a complementary-hierarchical 
view of gender relations, claiming that this hierarchy is divinely 
ordained, cannot be defined as feminist. This distinction is 
fundamental, in my opinion, if we want the label ‘Islamic feminism’ to 
maintain its significance. That being said, it is worth remarking that 
distinguishing between feminist and non-feminist writings is not 
always easy, since the lines between these two are often blurred. In fact, 
even those scholars who affirm to be committed to gender equality and 
justice don’t always agree on the exact meaning of these words, and it 
is important not to fall in the trap of considering the western elaboration 
of these concepts the only legitimate one. Similarly, those scholars who 
                                                          
32 H. Moghissi, ‘Women, Modernity and Political Islam’, in Iran bulletin 19-20 
(1998), p. 42. 
33 During her long academic career, Bint al-Shāṭī’ published more than sixty books 
and hundreds of articles, including Qur’anic exegesis, poems, novels, short stories, an 
autobiography and various literary criticism articles. Only a few of these publications 
take into account issues like Women’s Rights or gender relations, showing a rather 
conservative perspective. See, for instance, ‘Aisha Abd al-Rahman, ‘Islam and the 
New Woman’, in Alif - Journal of comparative poetics, 19 (1999), pp. 194-202; ‘A. 
Abd al-Rahman, ‘The Islamic Concept of Women’s Liberation’, in al-Raida 125 
(2009), pp. 37-43. 
34 Among the numerous studies that took into examination Bint al-Shāṭī’s 
contribution to the science of tafsīr, see I. Boullata, ‘Modern Quranic Exegesis: a 
Study of Bint al-Shati’s Method’, in The Muslim World 64/2 (1974), pp.103-113; for 
her view on women’s rights and gender relations, see R. Marcotte, « Emancipation de 
la femme et exégèse Qur’anique chez Bint al-Shati’ (1913-1998) », in Studies in 
Religion/Sciences Religieuses 30 (2001), pp. 277-292.  
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refuse the idea of gender equality in favour of more nuanced concepts 
such as gender equity or gender complementarity cannot be hastily 
defined as promoting a normative patriarchal discourse, since they often 
criticize the attitude shown by Islamist movements and parties towards 
women. Another example from Egypt, offered by the Islamist scholar 
Heba Raouf Ezzat, is enlightening: Heba Raouf is a political scientist 
who has worked as assistant professor in the Department of Political 
Science of Cairo University, as affiliate professor at the American 
University in Cairo, and is currently a visiting researcher at the London 
School of Economics. She is a public figure renowned in Egypt and 
abroad, especially due to her intense cyber-activism. She is an 
independent intellectual and activist, which means she is not a member 
of any party. However, when asked about her ideological background, 
doctor Raouf once defined herself as an Islamist, though specifying that 
‘This doesn’t mean I accept the dominant discourse about women inside 
the Islamist movement’.35 Her research interests include democracy and 
citizenship, critique of authoritarianism, human rights, civil society, 
and women’s social and political rights.36 
Concerning this last topic Raouf generally agrees with feminist 
scholars and activists in acknowledging that the conditions of women 
in Egypt, and more generally in Muslim societies, have to be improved, 
yet she adamantly refuses the label of feminist. She also stresses that 
the means to improve these conditions can and have to be found within 
Islam, and she advocates the necessity of promoting women’s ijtihād in 
order to reach this goal. However, while the main goal of feminists – 
                                                          
35 K. El-Gawhary - H. Raouf Ezzat, ‘An Interview with Heba Ra’uf Ezzat’, in 
Middle East Report 191 (1994), pp. 26-27. 
36Among her numerous publications on the subject of women, see H. Raouf Ezzat, 
Al-mar’a wa al-‘amal al-siyāsi: ru’ya islāmiyya (Women and Politics: An Islamic 
Perspective), IIIT, Washington DC, 1995; H. Raouf Ezzat, ‘Al-Mar’a wa al-Ijtihād: 
Naḥw Khitāb Islāmiyy Jadīd’ (Women and Ijtihād: toward a New Islamic Discourse), 
in Alif - Journal of Comparative Poetics 19 (1999), pp. 96-120; H. Raouf Ezzat, ‘The 
Silent Aisha: an Egyptian Narrative’, in Bayes - Tohidi (ed.), Globalisation, Gender 
and Religion: the Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts, 
Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp. 231-257; H. Raouf Ezzat, ‘On the Future of Women 
and Politics in the Arab World’, in John Donohue - John Esposito (ed.), Islam in 
Transition: Muslim Perspectives, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 184-
196. On the topic of feminism, it is worth mentioning the book co-written with secular 
feminist Nawal al-Saadawi, though it presents two separate and rather opposite 
positions, while it lacks dialogue or discussion between the two authors. N. Al-
Sadaawi - H. Raouf Ezzat, Al-Mar’a wa al-Dīn wa al-Akhlāq (Women, Religion and 
Morals), Dar Al-Fikr Al-Mu‘āsir, Beirut 2000. 
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by definition – is that of discarding patriarchal institutions, laws and 
customs, Raouf recognises the legitimacy of a gendered hierarchy, 
affirming, for instance, that:  
 
Patriarchal systems are necessary in our societies. They uphold the 
family and take care of women. But what we have today is not 
patriarchy, nor is it anything. It is a mixed salad of ideas we took from 
the West and the East. Women are neither honoured by patriarchal 
norms nor are they protected by secular regimes. They are in the worst 
possible situation. The answer is to uphold the values and obligations 
of Islamic patriarchy [Italics mine, MP]. This is where an old woman 
will find respect and honour.37 
 
Her arguments in favour of Women’s Rights usually focus on political 
rights, but when it comes to laws and rules concerning gender relations 
within the family, she is generally in compliance with the most 
conservative Islamist discourse. This is in contrast to many scholars of 
Islamic feminism whose struggle aims precisely at achieving gender 
equality inside the family: as I will explain shortly, reform of Muslim 
family laws is one of the main purposes of their work.  
To conclude, while I do not consider ‘Islamic feminism’ to be an 
oxymoron, I believe that the idea of ‘Islamist feminists’ is a contradiction 
in terms. 
However, women such as Heba Raouf ‘might be more appropriately 
seen as incipient Islamic feminists, especially if they become disaffected 
by male Islamists’ treatment’38 and when they engage in a productive 
dialogue with more progressive scholars, leading one to hope that in the 
future they may become closer to Islamic feminism and then attempt a 
reform of Islamist movements from within. 
 
Islamic feminism in Egypt: Key Actors and Peculiarities  
Islamic feminism is a pluralistic and global phenomenon; scholars 
who engage in this discourse come from Muslim majority and Muslim 
minority societies in Africa and Asia as well as from diasporic and 
convert communities in the West. Hence, although all these scholars 
have lot in common and are in constant communication with each other, 
                                                          
37 Heba Raouf, quoted in S. Hafez, The Terms of Empowerment: Islamic Women 
Activists in Egypt, American University of Cairo Press, Cairo, 2003, p. 102.  
38 Badran, Engaging Islamic Feminism, p. 32. 
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Islamic feminist discourse is characterized by a great diversity of 
opinions and ideas.  
It is worth noting, in this regard, that a significant number of 
contemporary scholars and groups that refer to Islam in promoting 
gender equality are based outside the Arab world. It was in Iran, for 
instance, that in 1992 the already mentioned women’s journal Zanan, 
the first of its kind in the contemporary Islamic world, began 
publishing.39 Amina Wadud, who wrote a groundbreaking work in 
gender-sensitive Quranic hermeneutics, significantly titled Qur’an and 
Women: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective, is an 
Afro-American convert.40 Moreover, it was at the Claremont Main 
Road Mosque of Cape Town, in South Africa, that in 1994 Wadud 
delivered the khuṭba, the Friday sermon, becoming the first woman in 
the modern era to perform this task. Again, it was in New York that, on 
Friday 18 March 2005, she led the Friday prayer for a mixed-gender 
audience, breaking the taboo in Islamic tradition of women leading men 
in prayer.41 Finally, the previously mentioned group Sisters in Islam, 
the first association that started transforming Islamic feminism from a 
purely theoretical discourse into a praxis-oriented movement, was 
founded in Malaysia in 1987.42 As a consequence, most of the literature 
on Islamic feminism has focused mainly on non-Arab scholars, with the 
remarkable exception of the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi, a 
pioneer of Islamic feminism, whose work is considered to be ‘one of 
the most innovative in [this] field’.43  
Should we deduce, from all this, that Arab scholars and groups play 
a secondary role in the landscape of Islamic feminism? Such a 
conclusion would be particularly astonishing if we take into 
consideration that it was in the Arab world, more specifically in Egypt 
and Lebanon, that in the latter part of the 19th and the beginning of the 
                                                          
39 Najmabadi, Feminism in an Islamic Republic. 
40 A. Wadud, Qur’an and Women: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s 
Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999 (First published in 1992 by 
Penerbit Fajar Bakati Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lampur).  
41 For further information on these episodes, and more generally on Wadud’s 
biography and activism, see A. Wadud, Inside the Gender Jihad - Women’s Reform 
in Islam, Oneworld, Oxford, 2006.  
42 Z. Anwar, ‘Sisters in Islam and the Struggle for Women’s Rights’, in Fareshteh 
Nouraie-Simone (ed.), On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, The 
Feminist Press of the City University of New York, New York, 2005, pp. 233-247.  
43 Rhouni, Secular and Islamic Feminist Critiques, p. 12. At this day, Rhouni’s 
excellent book is the most extensive analysis of Fatima Mernissi’s work. 
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20th century Muslim women started reclaiming their agency in a 
religious discourse dominated by men. Maybe the most famous of these 
early women interpreters is the Lebanese Naẓira Zayn al-Dīn (1908-
1976), author of two pioneering works, published respectively in 1928 
and 1929. She passionately argued against women’s full veiling and 
claimed the right for women to fully participate in society and engage 
in any field of culture, including the interpretation of religious 
sources.44 The outstanding books of Zayn al-Dīn are currently 
considered the first attempt by a woman to engage in Quranic exegesis; 
indeed, a figure of her calibre has no precedents in the contemporary 
Islamic world, but the roots of modern Islamic feminism go even 
deeper. As a matter of fact, almost forty years before the appearance of 
Zayn al-Dīn’s books, another woman, the Egyptian poet and novelist 
‘Āisha Taymūr (1840-1902), dared to question the widespread view 
that gender hierarchy is grounded in the Qur’ān. In a small pamphlet 
named Mir’āt al-ta’mul fī al-umūr (A Contemplative Mirror on some 
Issues), published in 1892,45 Taymūr argued that men are not superior 
to women due to some innate characteristic of masculinity; on the 
contrary, this superiority is conditional upon men’s assumption of their 
responsibility toward their families, as it is ‘required by the Quranic text 
(al-naṣṣ) and by the consensus of scholars (ijmā‘)’46 - in fact, were they 
to neglect their duties, they would lose all their privileges.  
Taymūr’s attempt to engage in ijtihād was in many aspects crude, 
and by encouraging men to take up their marital responsibilities instead 
of squandering their money in following the latest European fashion, 
she voiced a rather conservative and elitist view – a view consistent 
with her position in the Turkish upper class. However, her conditioned 
understanding of men’s authority over women was indeed innovative 
at that early historical stage, and it is still very inspirational to 
contemporary feminist scholars in their criticism against patriarchal 
                                                          
44 Both of Naẓira Zayn al-Dīn books have been recently reprinted: see N. Zayn al-
Dīn, Al-sufūr wa al-ḥijāb (Unveiling and Veiling), Al Mada, Nicosia-Damascus, 
1998; and N. Zayn al-Dīn, Al-fatāt wa al-shuyūkh (The Young Girl and the Shaykhs) 
Al Mada, Nicosia-Damascus, 1998. For further information on her life and work, see 
M. Cooke, Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, Oneworld, Oxford, 
2012. 
45 Taymūr’s pamphlet has been recently reprinted by the Women and Memory 
Forum: see A. Taymūr, Mir’āt al-ta’mul fī al-umūr (A Mirror on Contemplation), 
Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 2002.  
46 Taymūr, Mir’āt al-ta’mul fī al-umūr, p. 30.  
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readings of Quranic verses concerning gender relations.47 As I will 
explain shortly, Egyptian family laws are still built on the assumption 
that men hold authority over their families, an assumption presented by 
conservative religious scholars as divinely ordained. Contesting these 
claims is one of the main challenges for contemporary feminist groups 
and scholars, which has led to a rediscovery of Taymūr’s work and 
especially of her pamphlet Mir’āt al-ta’mul fī al-umūr.48 
We could claim, then, that Egypt was the place of birth of gender-
sensitive approach to religious texts. Nowadays, however, we have to 
acknowledge that Egyptian Islamic feminist literature is not as well 
developed and does not have the same impact, on an international level, 
as literature produced in countries such as Iran, Malaysia, South Africa, 
and the United States. This clearly does not mean that Islamic feminism 
is absent in Egypt, or more generally in the Arab world; on the contrary, 
it is active and alive, though it does not receive much attention in the 
West and it faces particularly difficult challenges, as I will illustrate in 
the following paragraphs. 
Concerning Islamic feminism as a knowledge building project, the 
leading scholar in Egypt can be easily identified as being Omaima Abou 
Bakr, professor of English and comparative literature at Cairo 
University. Abou Bakr was one of the first scholars to analyze the 
concept of Islamic feminism, affirming that despite its faults, it is useful 
for the purpose of de-homogenizing feminism and reclaiming the 
legitimacy of promoting gender equality from within the Islamic 
tradition.49Abou Bakr is well known at an international level, thanks to 
her proficiency in English and her participation in cross-national 
                                                          
47 O. Abou Bakr, ‘The Interpretative Legacy of Qiwwamah as an Exegetical 
Construct’, in Ziba Mir-Hosseini - Mulki al-Sharmani - Jana Rumminger, Men in 
charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition, Oneworld, London, 2015, 
pp. 44-64. 
48 A conference held in Cairo in 2002 to commemorate the centenary of Taymūr’s 
death opened the way to this rediscovery. Conference proceedings were later 
published by the Women and Memory Forum: see H. Elsadda (ed.), ‘Ā’isha Taymūr: 
Taḥdiyyāt al-thābit wa al-mutaghayyir fī al-qarn al-tāsi‘ ‘ashar), Women and 
Memory Forum, Cairo, 2004. A few years later, the Egyptian historian Mervat Hatem 
published a book in English on ‘Āisha Taymūr, allowing also non-Arabic speaking 
scholars to deepen their knowledge of Taymūr. See M. Hatem, Literature, Gender 
and Nation Building in Nineteenth-Century Egypt: The Life and Works of Aisha 
Taymur, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011. 
49 Abou Bakr, Islamic Feminism: What’s in a Name.  
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projects and publications.50 She has not engaged directly in Quranic 
hermeneutics, but rather has focused on the history and the genealogy 
of tafsīr, her goal being twofold: on the one hand to underline the 
contradictions in the mainstream exegetical tradition (not to discredit it, 
but rather to show how the personal worldviews and prejudices of 
different scholars have influenced their interpretation of verses 
concerning gender relations) and on the other to shine light on 
alternative discourses that have been marginalized throughout history. 
Besides her focus on the history and genealogy of tafsīr, her research 
interests include women’s history in the Middle East, mysticism in 
Christianity and Islam, masculinity and (Islamic) feminist theory.51 
Abou Bakr is also one of the founding members of the Women and 
Memory Forum (WMF), a non-governmental organization composed of 
women academics, researchers and activists, whose mission is ‘the 
production and dissemination of alternative knowledge concerning 
women in the Arab Region’.52 The women who established WMF in 
1995 come from various backgrounds and use different methodologies, 
integrating secular as well as religious feminist perspectives.  
In fact, WMF is active in a number of projects focused on both the 
local and international level, and even though its publications are 
written mainly in Arabic, some of its scholars regularly publish in 
English to target an international academic audience. At the local level, 
the WMF’s projects can be divided into two broad categories: one 
focused on the idea of re-reading and re-writing histories, which 
includes the building of an oral history archive, the collection of 
storytelling, the reprinting of important women’s publications from the 
beginning of the twentieth century,53 and the publication of a series of 
                                                          
50 Abou Bakr, The Interpretative Legacy of Qiwwamah; O. Abou Bakr, « Le 
Féminisme Islamique et la Production de la Connaissance: Perspectives dans l’Egypte 
Postrévolutionnaire », in Zahra Ali (ed.), Féminismes Islamiques, La Fabrique, Paris, 
2012, pp. 165-184.  
51 The complete list of her publications can be found at http://www. 
wmf.org.eg/member/omaima-abou-bakr/?lang=en (access 31/3/2015). 
52 For further information on WMF’s mission, see http://www.wmf.org.eg/about-
us/?lang=en (last access 31/03/2015). 
53 Beside the previously mentioned pamphlet written by Aisha Taymūr, WMF has 
also reprinted: the complete collection of al-Fatat, the first women’s magazine in 
Egypt, originally published by Hind Nawfal between 1892 and 1893; the 
autobiography of the pioneer of girls education Nabawiyya Musa Tārikhī bi qalamī 
(My history, by my Pen), originally published serially from 1938 to 1942; the 
collection of essays al-Nisā’iyyāt (Feminist Writings) by Malak Hifni Nasef, 
originally published in 1910; and finally, the biographies of famous women published 
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books on women’s history in modern and medieval Egypt.54 The second 
refers to projects focused on the spread of feminist knowledge and the 
study of gender, which includes the organization of workshops in 
various Egyptian universities and NGOs offering specialized training 
in gender studies, and a series of translations of fundamental texts on 
feminism and gender from English to Arabic.55 
Besides these local projects, the WMF also works to keep Islamic 
feminism scholars at a global level connected with each other: one of 
the most successful initiatives in this regard has been a conference titled 
‘Feminism and Islamic Perspectives: New Horizons of Knowledge and 
Reform’ held in Cairo on March 17-18, 2012 with participants from the 
Arab world and Europe. The papers presented at the conference were 
then collected in a volume edited by Omaima Abou Bakr, which was 
published in English and Arabic.56 Moreover, the WMF collaborates 
closely with the previously mentioned Musawah, a global network 
initiated in 2009 by Sisters in Islam with the twofold aim of building 
knowledge about Women’s Rights in Islam and to coordinate initiatives 
for the reform of Muslim family laws that discriminate against women 
and the resistance to regressive amendments demanded by conservative 
groups within society. 
                                                          
by Qadira Husayn in 1924, with the title Shahirāt al-nisā’ fi-l-‘ālam al-islāmiyy 
(Famous Women in the Muslim World).  
54 The series, realized by Omaima Abou Bakr and Hoda el-Saadi, is called ‘History 
notebooks’ (awrāq al-dhākira) and includes four occasional papers: O. Abou Bakr - 
H. el-Saadi, Al-nisā’ wa mihnat al-ṭibb fī al-mujtami‘āt al-islāmiyya (Women and the 
Medical Profession in Islamic Societies), Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 1999; 
H. el-Saadi - O. Abou Bakr, Al-marā wa al-ḥayyā al-dīniyya fī al-‘uṣūr al-wasṭa 
bayna al-Islām wa al-gharb (Women and Religious Life in the Middle Age between 
Islam and the West), Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 1999; H. el-Saadi - R. al-
Khawali, Al-junūn wa al-marā fī Miṣr nihāyat al-qarn al-tāsi‘ ‘ashar (Madness and 
Women in 19th Century Egypt), Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 2005; O. Abou 
Bakr - Hoda el-Saadi, Al-nashāṭ al-iqtiṣādiyya al-ḥaḍriyy li al-nisā’ fī Miṣr al-
islāmiyya (Urban Economic Activities of Women in Muslim Egypt), Women and 
Memory Forum, Cairo, 2007. 
55 The series includes: M. Hatem (ed.), Naḥw dirāsat al-naw‘ fī al-‘ulūm al-
siyāsiyya (Toward the study of Gender in Political Sciences), Women and Memory 
Forum, Cairo, 2010; O. Abou Bakr (ed.), Al-Niswiyya wa al-dirasāt al-dīniyya 
(Feminism and Religious Studies), Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 2012; H. 
Elsadda (ed.), Al-Niswiyya wa al-dirasāt al-tārīkhiyya (Feminism and Historical 
Studies), Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 2015. 
56 O. Abou Bakr (ed.), Feminist and Islamic Perspectives: New Horizons of 
Knowledge and Reform, The Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, 2013. 
 Egypt in Transition: What future for Islamic Feminism? 303 
 
This intersectional approach goes beyond the precise, original 
definition of ‘Islamic feminism’, and it is better described by what 
Margot Badran has defined a ‘Muslim holistic feminism’, one that 
mixes the languages and the discourses of secular and religious 
feminism and aims at surpassing national borders and coordinating 
efforts at a global level with individuals and organizations coming from 
different backgrounds.57 
Another organization that has been prominent in the production of 
Islamic feminism scholarship in Egypt is the Women and Civilization 
group, established in 2000 by Mona el-Fadl, professor of Literature at 
Cairo University. In the two years following its establishment, the 
group published a journal named after the organization (al-Mar’a wa 
al-Ḥaḍāra) that collected many outstanding articles on Quranic 
exegesis, women’s history in Islam, and feminist theory. However, the 
publication of the journal was interrupted after only three issues, as the 
association drastically reduced its activities after Mona el-Fadl 
suddenly passed away in 2002. Despite its limited span of existence, 
the Women and Civilization Journal is still remembered by many as one 
of the most influential Islamic feminist publications in Arabic.58 
Moreover, some of the members of the group – namely Amani Saleh, 
professor in political science at Misr International University, and Hind 
Mustafa, writer and researcher for the Arab Women Organization – 
have remained active, working closely together with the Women and 
Memory Forum, and are now thinking about publishing a fourth issue 
of the journal, focused on ḥadīth.59 
Scholars of WMF and Women and civilization are not the only ones 
to have reclaimed agency by participating in the religious discourse on 
the issues of Women’s Rights in Islam. However, these are the only 
groups that are currently engaged in the country in producing 
significant knowledge that can be associated with Islamic feminism. 
 
Potentials and Challenges of Islamic Feminism in Egypt  
The question then arises of why Egypt, having been at the forefront 
of the feminist movement in the Arab-Islamic world at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, finds itself today in a relatively secondary 
                                                          
57 Badran, From Islamic Feminism to Muslim Holistic Feminism. 
58 Personal interviews with Omaima Abou Bakr and with the historian Hoda el-
Saadi from WMF, 29/01/2014 and 23/03/2014. 
59 M. al-Sharmani, ‘Islamic Feminism: Transnational and National Reflections’, 
in Approaching religion 4/2 (2014), pp. 83-94.  
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position in the global landscape of Islamic feminism. One of the main 
reasons can be identified as the dominant political and religious climate 
in Egypt; as a matter of fact, unlike their colleagues active in countries 
and communities where they can enjoy a high degree of freedom of 
expression, Egyptian scholars operate in an environment where the 
historical limitations of political liberties are reflected in a dominant 
religious discourse that is highly conservative.  
Indeed, while there have been a handful of Islamic liberal thinkers 
who in the last decades integrated notions of democracy, civil society 
and human rights into their doctrines, their social impact remains 
negligible, while the dominant voice on the religious scene remains that 
of the conservative wing of Al-Azhar.60 In this environment, scholars 
who attempt radical innovation face censorship, threats, and even 
charges of apostasy – the most famous case in this regard being that of 
Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943-2010), a central figure in contemporary 
Islamic reformism.61 His innovative yet rigorous exegetical 
methodology has been inspiring for many liberal scholars, including 
those of Islamic feminism, in Egypt and abroad;62 but it also sparked 
controversy in academic, religious and political circles. A wave of 
protests led not only to his ousting from academia, but also to his 
sentencing for apostasy by an Egyptian court and to the consequent 
forced nullification of his marriage on the grounds that, according to 
the sharī‘a-based Egyptian family laws, a Muslim woman cannot be 
married to a non-Muslim (or apostate) man. Before and after the trial, 
Abu Zayd received several death threats and eventually left to live in 
exile with his wife, settling in Netherlands.63 
                                                          
60 A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist 
Turn, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007.  
61 Among his many outstanding contributions to contemporary Islamic thought, it 
is worth mentioning his English book Rethinking the Qur’an: Toward a Humanistic 
Hermeneutics, Humanistic University Press, Utrecht, 2004. 
62 Among the numerous writings that Abu Zayd dedicated to the issue of gender 
relations in the Quran, see N. Abu Zayd, Dawā’ir al-khawf - Qirā’a fī khitāb al-mar’a 
(Circles of Fear – Reading the Discourse about Woman), Casablanca-Beirut, al-
Markaz al-Thaqāfi al-‘Arabi, 2004; N. Abu Zayd, ‘The Status of Women Between the 
Qur’an and Fiqh’, in Mir Hosseini - Vogt - Larsen - Moe (eds.), Gender and Equality 
in Muslim Family Law, pp. 153-168. 
63 On Abu Zayd trial and conviction, see M. Abaza, ‘Civil Society and Islam in 
Egypt: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd’, in Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Studies 2/2 (1995), pp. 29- 42. 
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Probably as a consequence of the dominance of religious 
conservatism, scholars of Islamic feminism in Egypt are extremely 
cautious in expressing revolutionary views concerning gender relations 
and Women’s Rights in Islam, and avoid pushing forward too 
audacious claims that could shock the public. For instance, to find an 
Egyptian scholar who openly speaks about a woman’s right to act as 
imām and lead a mixed-gender prayer, we must refer to Nevin Reda, 
who was born in Egypt, still collaborates with WMF and other Egyptian 
scholars, but is currently based in Canada and publishes mainly in 
English.64 Another example of the overall caution shown by Egyptian 
scholars in dealing with sensitive issues can be seen in the 
conceptualization of gender, as developed by scholars such as Omaima 
Abou Bakr and Amani Saleh. Both these scholars discussed this topic 
at length in their works and expressed views that can be considered 
conservative in many aspects. Indeed, reading their writings leaves one 
with the impression that they do not really move away from the gender 
construct of ‘different but equal’, which leaves room for essentialist 
interpretations of gender difference not too distant from those 
elaborated by Muslim traditionalists and fundamentalists. Moreover, 
these two scholars conceptualize gender in a strictly binary way. Amani 
Saleh, for instance, in her widely celebrated Qaḍayat an-naw‘ fī-l-
Qur’ān (The Issue of Gender in the Qur’ān), praises the usefulness of 
gender for distinguishing between the innate characteristics of 
biological sex and the social constructs associated with it, but she also 
warns against the risk inherent in the western elaboration of the 
concepts of gender, since ‘the existence of a first and a second sex does 
not protect against the appearance of a third sex, a fourth or even 
more’.65 Abou Bakr, then, brushes off homosexual rights as ‘irrelevant’, 
an issue specific to a ‘Western agenda or discourse on gender and 
feminism’ that ‘we need not to subscribe [to]’.66 These kinds of 
statements reveal clearly that Egyptian Islamic feminism remains 
                                                          
64 N. Reda, ‘What Would the Prophet Do: The Islamic Basis for Female-Led 
Prayer’, 2005, http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_351_400/islamic_basis_for_ 
femaleled.htm (last access 31/03/2015). 
65 A. Saleh, ‘Qaḍayat al-naw‘ fī al-Qur’ān: manẓumāt al-Zawjiyya bayna quṭbay 
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66 O. Abou Bakr, ‘Gender Perspectives in Islamic Tradition’, talk given at the 
Second Annual Minaret of Freedom Institute Dinner, Gaithersburg, Maryland on June 
26, 1999, http://www.minaret.org/gender.htm (last access 31/03/2015). 
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impervious to queer theories or LGBTI rights, subjects that are receiving 
increasing attention from prominent scholars of global Islamic feminism 
such as Amina Wadud and Kecia Ali.67 We might say, then, that Islamic 
feminism in Egypt is characterized by what we can define as 
‘conservative liberalism’ which advocates for liberty and equality 
between the sexes on a normative basis and which refers to Islamic 
sharī‘a to a great extent. However, it is not completely clear whether this 
caution is motivated by strategic reasons – in order not to face the fury 
of traditionalists – or by a sincere conviction on behalf of those putting 
forth this discourse.  
None of this means, however, that Islamic feminism in Egypt lacks 
originality. On the contrary, it has developed some peculiar reflections 
that might be of inspiration to other scholars of Islamic feminism on an 
international level.  
A particularly interesting aspect of the research done by scholars 
affiliated with WMF or Women and Civilization is the special focus on 
historical research to support the interpretative-religious project that, as 
stated before, represents the core of Islamic feminism in its original 
meaning. In the work of Abou Bakr and the Women and Civilization 
group, this meaning is expanded to include a different methodology for 
the production of knowledge, which focuses on re-reading history and 
historical sources.68  
According to Abou Bakr, this historical approach has a double goal: 
on the one hand, it is meant to underline the active role that women 
have played throughout history in Egyptian economic, cultural, 
religious, social and even political life, thus revising the official 
historical records that have marginalized women’s contribution and 
have focused solely on men. It comes without saying that the goal of 
this kind of literature is not purely academic; on the contrary, it is 
mainly political, since by rereading historical sources and producing a 
new, alternative history on women’s public role, these scholars aim to 
fight the marginalization of women in today’s Egypt. Secondly, 
                                                          
67 K. Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur’an, Hadith and 
Jurisprudence, Oneworld, Oxford 2006; A. Wadud, ‘LGBTQI Muslims and 
International Movements for Empowerment’, in Feminism and Religion, 20/09/2014, 
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68 Abou Bakr, Le Féminisme Islamique; T. Sharif, ‘Sīrat al-Mar’a fī al-Tārīkh al-
Islāmiyy’ (Women’s Story in Islamic History), in Al-Marā’ wa al-Ḥaḍāra 2 (2001), 
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historical research is aimed at strengthening the strictly religious study 
with a perspective meant to help understand in which context certain 
interpretative works have been produced. This approach, based on the 
notion of intertextuality as elaborated by Julia Kristeva,69 associates the 
study of religious texts with the analysis of other kinds of texts such as 
historical records, private memoirs, and philosophical essays, thus 
extending the reflection from the issue of ‘women in Islam’ to the study 
of the Islamic tradition and cultural history of Islamic societies.70 
Another element of originality in the Egyptian Islamic feminist 
discourse can be found in its special focus on masculinity, manhood 
and maleness in Islam, a new trend of study that has started to appear 
in the last fifteen years but still needs to be studied in depth.71 It has 
been noted that the vast amount of contemporary literature on the 
family and on gender relations in Islam has focused exclusively on 
women, without undertaking a deep analysis of men’s duties and 
responsibilities toward the family.72 As a result, 
 
The modern preoccupation with continuous redefinitions of women’s 
‘Islamic’ conduct and characterization led to an exaggerated focus on 
her duties, her good qualities, her mistakes, her responsibilities, and 
her special burden of preserving and advancing the family, the 
community, and the whole Umma. In this separatist view, she alone will 
also be blamed for imperfections and failures.73 
 
As a reaction to this trend, some Muslim women scholars started to 
‘turn the tables’ on Muslim men, producing a new discourse that 
redefines men as domestic beings and holds them accountable for the 
wellbeing of the family on equal grounds with women.74 In Egypt, one 
                                                          
69 J. Kristeva, Semeiotike: recherches pour une semanalyse, Seuil, Paris, 1969. 
70 Abou Bakr, Le Féminisme Islamique. 
71 To this day, we can find only three books dealing with this subject in depth: M. 
Ghoussoub - E. Sinclair-Webb (eds.), Imagined Masculinities: Changing Patterns of 
Identity for Middle Eastern Men, Saqi, London, 2000; L. Ouzgane (ed.), Islamic 
Masculinities, Zed Books, London-New York, 2006; A. De Sondy, The Crisis of 
Islamic Masculinities, Bloomsbury, London-New York, 2014. 
72 O. Abou Bakr, ‘Turning the Tables: Perspectives on the Construction of a 
“Muslim Manhood”’, in Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 
11 (2013), pp. 89-107. 
73 Abou Bakr, Turning the Tables, p. 90. 
74 As a good example of this trend, see K. Ali, ‘“Beautiful Example”’: The Prophet 
Muhammad as a Model for Muslim Husbands’, in Islamic Studies 43/2 (2004), pp. 
273-291. 
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of the first to use this approach was the previously mentioned Aisha 
Taymūr, who put men at the source of the general crisis in familial and 
social values witnessed by colonial Egypt, unlike ‘pro-feminists’ such 
as Qasim Amin or Muhammad ‘Abduh, whose invocation for change 
and reform was directed at women only. Nowadays, Omaima Abou 
Bakr is building on the legacy of Taymūr and is conducting research 
focused on the analysis of how male writers have conceived the 
characteristics of Islamic manhood throughout history. Balancing 
between studying men’s and women’s rights and duties in the family 
will help, says Abou Bakr, in affirming the principle of shared 
responsibility of both genders in every structure of society, from the 
familial unit to the public sphere. 
 
From Knowledge Production to Legal Activism: Egyptian 
Trajectories 
Thus far my analysis has focused on Islamic feminism as a 
knowledge building project, or an intellectual movement. However, as 
mentioned before, the arguments and the findings of these kinds of 
projects have been used to give legitimacy to the endeavours of various 
organisations and activists that seek to amend and reform patriarchal 
laws currently enforced in Egypt by the secular State, especially in the 
field of Muslim family law, known as Personal Status Law (PSL). The 
term PSL is equivocal, since it does not refer to a single law, but rather 
to various laws that concern marriage, divorce, maintenance, custody, 
paternity and guardianship.75 The first modern codification of these 
laws took place with the decree law 25/1920; the provisions contained 
therein were gradually amended during the following decades, with a 
slowness that clearly indicates ‘the historical difficulty, due to societal 
resistance, of changing it comprehensively’.76 
Women’s struggle to reform the PSL dates back to the 1920s, when 
organizations such as the Egyptian Feminist Union, founded by Hoda 
Shaarawi in 1923, started lobbying for reforming provisions that were 
particularly detrimental to women. As Badran has pointed out, from its 
very beginning the Egyptian feminist movement has drawn on the 
Islamic modernist discourse, as elaborated by Muhammad ‘Abduh, to 
push for reform; nevertheless, for the most part their demands were not 
                                                          
75 For an overview of the different laws and provisions contained in the so-called 
PSL and their evolution over time, see N. Bernard-Maugiron, Personal Status Laws 
in Egypt: FAQ, German Technical Cooperation Office, Cairo, 2010. 
76 Sharafeldin, Egyptian Women’s Rights NGOs, p. 58. 
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met.77 Hence, reform of the PSL remains one of the main challenges of 
women’s organisations to this day. 
A galaxy of small and medium-sized organizations has developed in 
the last decades, engaging in a multileveled and complex undertaking 
that includes pressuring for reforms, spreading legal awareness, and 
providing legal assistance to women.78 While operating independently 
on different projects, some of these groups strive for greater 
effectiveness through networking on a local level (for instance through 
NWRO, the Network of Women’s Rights Organization), and/or on an 
international level, through international networks such as the 
abovementioned Musawah or the London-based Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws. In the case of Musawah, particularly, the cooperation with 
Egyptian NGOs has been so close and fruitful that for some time there 
was discussion of moving the Musawah Secretariat – currently based in 
Malaysia – to Egypt, to the headquarters of CEWLA, the Center for 
Egyptian Women Legal Assistance, probably the leading NGO in 
practically oriented Islamic feminism in Egypt.79  
Women’s Rights activists contest several aspects of the PSL, starting 
with the underlying philosophy on which laws that regulate marital 
relations are built: that is, the ‘maintenance-obedience’ model, where 
men hold qiwwāma (guardianship) and wilāya (authority) over their 
family. This model is based on the idea that in return for providing for 
their families, men have the right to command obedience from ‘their’ 
women and have authority over them. It finds its roots in an 
androcentric interpretation of the oft-examined Quranic verse 4:34, 
which states that ‘men are responsible (qawwāmūn) for women’, 
combined with the traditional idea that women are weak and emotional 
beings that need to be guided for their own good.80 
                                                          
77 Badran, Feminism, Islam and the Nation, pp. 124-143.  
78 An in-depth analysis of the work of these NGOs goes beyond the scope of this 
study; for further information on this subject, I refer to Marwa Sharafeldin’s work 
Egyptian Women’s Rights NGOs, and her chapter ‘Islamic Law Meets Human Rights: 
Reformulating Qiwamah and Wilayah for Personal Status Law Reform Advocacy in 
Egypt’, in Mir-Hosseini - al-Sharmani - Rumminger (eds.), Men in Charge?, pp. 163-
196. 
79 Personal interview with Marwa Sharafeldin, 12/6/2014. Unfortunately, the plan 
was later abandoned due to the increasing difficulties that NGOs face in Egypt and 
the secretariat will be moved to Rabat instead. 
80 For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of qiwwāma and its effects on 
Muslim family laws, see the recently published collection edited by Mir-Hosseini - 
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This particular conception of male authority over women is reflected 
in many provisions contained in the Egyptian PSL that appear unfair 
from a modern perspective, such as the ease in getting a divorce for men 
and its difficulty for women; the possibility of polygamy for men; the 
wife’s obligation by law to obey her husband; the acceptance of the 
husband’s right to discipline the wife; and the father’s automatic right 
of financial guardianship over the children in exclusion of the mother.  
The primary reasons given by Egyptian activists to advocate for the 
reform of these norms are not theoretical or ideological, but refer to the 
harmful effect these provisions have on women in their everyday life. 
In other words, the advocacy of NGOs is not based on an abstract 
commitment to gender equality, but on the grounds that the PSL 
provisions are no longer suitable in the current Egyptian context, where 
women actively contribute in providing for their families, and also 
because they clash with contemporary understandings of equality and 
justice. 
NGOs exercise pressure to change the laws using several means: 
first of all, demonstrating with statistical evidence that the ‘Islamic 
model’ described above (providing for his family being the task of the 
husband and obedience that of the woman) sharply contrasts with the 
lived reality of Egyptian families; indeed, this model is applied to the 
exclusive advantage of men, who claim the right to qiwwāma even 
when they do not provide for their families. Besides pressuring for 
reform, Islamic feminist arguments are used to raise consciousness 
among lower-class women about their own rights within Islam, with the 
hope of empowering them by providing them with the ability to counter 
the patriarchal attitudes of their fathers and husbands by using 
arguments compliant with Islam. 
In the last few decades, the lobbying activities of these NGOs have 
been essential, according to many observers, in pushing the Mubarak 
government to implement a series of ‘women-friendly’ reforms to the 
PSL, the most important of which probably being the so-called khul‘ 
law (law 1/2000). For the first time in modern Egypt, this law allowed 
women’s unilateral, no-fault, judicial divorce, in exchange for 
renouncing some of their financial rights. In the wake of the khul‘ law, 
other reforms were implemented, including an amendment of the same 
law, in May 2000, leading to the re-inclusion of a previously abolished 
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article on the imprisonment of non-providing husbands; and to the 
implementation in August 2000 of a new marriage contract 
introducing the right to include substantive stipulations in the contract 
itself; the implementation of a clause allowing women to travel 
without the consent of the husband, in November 2000; the 
appointment of the first female judge in January 2003; the recognition 
of the right for Egyptian mothers to pass on their nationality to their 
children, in 2004; the opening of a new family court system in October 
2004; and finally, the appointment of thirty women judges in the lower 
courts in early 2007.81 
The activities of the NGOs did not stop after achieving these 
results; on the contrary, their advocacy work continued with a series 
of demands outlined in a detailed document entitled Guiding Manual 
for a Most Just and Comprehensive Family Law, published in 2010 in 
Arabic and then translated into English in order to reach a wider 
audience.82 Among the many proposals, the document suggests a 
restriction to polygamy, stating it should be allowed by a judge only 
in ‘exceptional’ circumstances; easier access to divorce for women; 
the institution of the principle of shared responsibility between 
spouses in caring for the family; the right for women to retain custody 
of children after remarriage; and a regulation concerning the division 
of wealth accumulated within the marriage. As Sharafeldin has 
pointed out, the approach used by NGOs in their advocacy work is 
cautious, and even contradictory in some aspects: for instance, it does 
not contest the principle of wifely obedience per se, but it simply 
proposes to change its name.83 This hesitancy can again be explained 
as a prudent strategy in order to seek negotiation and compromise with 
conservative forces instead of shocking the public. Despite its 
undeniable advantages, this strategy is problematic, since it does not 
seriously attack the obedience-maintenance model as described above 
and thus risks reinforcing prejudices and weakening the effectiveness 
of the proposed reforms.  
 
                                                          
81 For further information on the Khul‘ law and the public debate that surrounded 
it, see N. Sonneveld, Khul‘ Divorce in Egypt, American University in Cairo Press, 
Cairo, 2012. 
82Guiding Manual for a More Just and Comprehensive Family Law, Anonymized 
Network for PSL reform advocacy, Cairo, 2010. The document is efficaciously 
summarized in Sharafeldin, Islamic Law Meets Human Rights, pp. 170-175. 
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Feminisms, Islam and the State in Post-Revolutionary Egypt 
The impact of January 2011 Revolution on Egyptian women and its 
significance concerning their rights, duties and political role present 
ambiguities and contradictions that have been analyzed, with different 
approaches and conclusions, in several studies. 
Some of the research has highlighted the positive effects of the 
revolution in promoting women’s agency, how it has increased the 
awareness of gender as a political problem, both in the institutional 
sphere, where the gender gap is immense, and in the public space. 
Between 2011 and 2013, women were highly visible in street 
demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins, and rediscovered their ability to 
participate and mobilize in the public sphere as an integral part of the 
political community; a presence that has been noted by local and 
foreign observers and compared to the noteworthy female participation 
in the great Egyptian Revolution of 1919.84 It has also been observed 
that the massive participation of women in the revolution and the media 
coverage of the brutal repression they faced from the police forces were 
also useful in shedding light on the issue of sexual harassment and 
sexual assault as a political tool for intimidating women, a subject that 
was a complete taboo until very recently.85 However, the importance of 
the contribution of women to the Egyptian revolution was not 
recognized by all political forces; on the contrary, as the historian 
Mervat Hatem remarked, women’s demands were ‘betrayed’ in the 
political process, when almost all parties and groups marginalized 
women’s issues, not considering them a priority in their political, social 
and cultural agendas.86 After Mubarak’s resignation, no women were 
appointed to the committee created by the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) to review the Constitution; and the first elections 
held after the Revolution witnessed an incredibly low number of 
                                                          
84 L. Sorbera, ‘Challenges of Thinking Feminism and Revolution in Egypt 
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85 N. Pratt, ‘Gender Paradoxes of Egypt’s Transition’, in OpenDemocracy, 2/2/2015, 
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transition (last access 31/3/2015). For a detailed review of gender violence against 
women protesters, see Sexual Assault and Rape in Tahrir Square and its Vicinity: a 
Compendium of Sources 2011-2013, El- Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims 
of Violence and Torture; Nazra for Feminist Studies; New Woman Foundation, 2013, 
http://nazra.org/sites/nazra/files/ attachments/compilation-_of_sexual-
violence_testimonies_between_20111_2013_en.pdf (last access 31/03/ 2015). 
86 M. Hatem, ‘Gender and Revolution in Egypt’, in Middle East Report 261 
(2011), pp. 36-41. 
 Egypt in Transition: What future for Islamic Feminism? 313 
 
women entering parliament, where they held less than 1% of the seats.87 
In another article, Hoda Elsadda has analyzed how this newly elected 
parliament actually pushed to repeal the legal gains obtained by women 
during the presidency of Mubarak, claiming that they were 
implemented to please the whim of the former First Lady, and were thus 
to be considered authoritarian impositions by a corrupted dictatorship. 
It is remarkable that these claims did not come from the Islamist ranks 
only, but also from allegedly democratic, liberal, and pluralist political 
forces.88 
Yet even the emergence of this neo-patriarchal rhetoric had positive 
side effects. In fact, the short reign of president Morsi promoted a new 
wave of religious consciousness among women, directed at confronting 
the Muslim Brotherhood on religious grounds. During the year when 
the Ikhwān were in power, secular and Islamic feminist NGOs and 
activists fought a particularly hard battle against the abovementioned 
proposals to change back the family law, against a constitution that 
failed to recognize sex or gender as grounds for prohibiting 
discrimination and only referred to women in relation to the home and 
the family,89 and against the attempt to re-legitimize female genital 
mutilation (FGM), a practice outlawed in 2008 and declared un-Islamic 
by respected religious figures such as Muhammad ‘Imara, ‘Ali Gomaa 
and Mohammad Selim el-‘Awa.90 This struggle gained a relatively high 
level of visibility in post-revolutionary Egyptian media and it allowed 
the (Islamic) feminist discourse to be heard by people who would never 
have been able to be aware of it or interested in it otherwise.91 
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However, not everyone saw the Islamists’ rise to power as a threat 
to women’s agency. Indeed, in the years immediately preceding and 
following the 25th of January Revolution, some scholars drew attention 
to the existence of a new generation of women active within the Muslim 
Brotherhood, well-versed in religious as well as in secular knowledge, 
who were pushing for more recognition of their role inside the Islamic 
movement.92 
There were signs in 2011 that these young activists could have paved 
the way for a sort of ‘feminization’ of the Islamic movement, providing 
new avenues for female authority and pushing for further reformist 
thinking on women’s issues from within the Islamist movement itself. 
However, this hope has completely vanished after the dramatic fall of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which within a timeframe of a few months 
lost its power, was declared a terrorist organization, and became the 
main target of ruthless repression by the new government led by former 
Field Marshal ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. Under these circumstances, it 
seems unlikely that women’s issues will be considered a priority in the 
Islamist movement, at least for the foreseeable future. 
This does not mean that women will not play an important role 
within the Brotherhood in the future; history suggests that it might 
rather be the opposite. In fact, it was precisely during the years of 
Nasser’s harshest repression that a woman, Zaynab al-Ghazali, became 
one of the main leaders of the Ikwhān, organizing their underground 
activities, a role that cost her six years in prison.93 It is difficult to claim 
with certainty, considering the fact that current circumstances do not 
facilitate any investigation on this subject, but there is evidence 
suggesting that it is currently the women of the Muslim Brotherhood 
who are keeping the movement alive while men activists are in jail, or 
have fled to other countries.94 However, this participation by no means 
implies an actual empowering of women members of the outlawed 
Ikhwān; more likely, this is simply an ‘emergency strategy’, meaning 
women will step back immediately the day the Brotherhood regains its 
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legal right of existence. As a matter of fact, Egyptian history has already 
taught us that a repressive climate favors the emergence of an extremist 
and radical wing of Islamism, and definitely does not encourage any 
liberalization of its discourse. 
The future does not seem much brighter for Egyptian Islamic 
feminism either. In the aftermath of the fall of the Ikhwān, some 
activists showed cautious optimism, expressing the hope that outlawing 
Islamism would facilitate the emergence of alternative, more liberal 
voices on the religious scene.95 However, after a few months this small 
hint of hope has been crushed by the reality of a blatant re-
authoritarianization of the political scene, where all dissenting voices 
are systematically repressed by the regime, regardless of whether they 
belong to Islamist or other political groups.  
Although it is too soon to declare the failure of the Egyptian 
revolution, at least on a cultural level, the new government has already 
demonstrated its ruthless determination to completely control all civic 
groups and subordinate them to security and administrative bodies. 
Since Al-Sisi rose to power, a growing number of reports have 
expressed serious concerns about the widespread and systematic human 
rights abuses committed in the name of the war on terror. The 
controversial counterterrorism legislation issued in February 2015 
which legitimizes these actions, contains an extremely vague definition 
of the term ‘terrorism’ according to which every party, civil society 
organization or student group runs the risk of being accused of being a 
terrorist entity and face brutal repression.96 
Another example of the government’s intention to silence all 
dissenting voices can be seen in the new NGO draft law, which, 
according to a press release signed by numerous organizations, ‘has not 
been this repressive for almost half a century (Law 34, 1964)’.97 The 
prohibitions in the law are both vague and absolute, which will allow 
the government to interfere in associations’ activities or to deny them a 
license at any time and for any reason. More seriously, the bill sets a 
penalty of at least one year in prison and/or a fine of at least LE100,000 
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for any person who establishes an association or entity performing 
activities in violation of the law. In short, the new law legitimizes 
complete control by the security apparatus of the activities of all kinds 
of NGOs, leaving their fate to the whims of those in power and 
depriving them of any form of autonomy or liberty - and consequently, 
destroying their capacity for action.98 
 
Conclusion 
The significance of the increased political consciousness that 
Egyptian women experienced after January 2011, and more generally 
of the historical experience of the revolution, cannot be fully evaluated 
to this day. If the political revolution set off by the demonstrations in 
Tahrir Square appears to have failed, the cultural revolution in Egypt is 
still on-going and will not be stopped overnight. The Egyptian 
population has become aware of its strength and its capacity for change 
during the last few turbulent years, and this rediscovered awareness has 
an undeniable value. However, the vast repressive campaign which, 
after striking down Morsi’s supporters, was then directed at all 
dissenting voices, secular as well as religious, demonstrates that no 
alternative discourse will be allowed to develop in the future. Therefore, 
it seems clear to me that if any further reform of the PSL will be 
promoted in the coming years, this will happen again exclusively on the 
initiative of the state, as was the case under the rule of Sadat and 
Mubarak. Once again the state will monopolize the right to exercise 
ijtihād, as it has already shown its readiness to openly intervene in 
religious affairs. A first move in this direction was made in February 
2014, when a governmental decree imposed unified guidelines for 
Friday sermons in all of Egypt, in an attempt to strengthen the control 
of the state over the religious discourse in the country, specifically 
aimed at the opposition hidden in non-governmental mosques.99This 
religious interventionism was confirmed even more clearly when 
president Al-Sisi himself, on the 1st of January 2015, spoke at the 
university of Al-Azhar, in front of all the main religious authorities of 
the country. In his speech, Al-Sisi expressed his wish for a ‘religious 
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revolution’ within Islam, one that can rejuvenate religious discourse 
and fight extremism and jihadism with an authoritative voice. In this 
respect, it is worth remembering that women’s issues have been 
historically used by Egyptian political forces to fight their enemies: for 
instance, it was precisely during the harshest days of its battle against 
Islamists that former president Sadat issued a decree-law revising 
Personal Status Laws and another that introduced a quota for women in 
parliament.100 Hence, the coming years might witness a further facade 
feminization of the political and religious system, in what Nicola Pratt 
termed a ‘patriarchal bargain’ where ‘women who are obedient to the 
new regime are deemed worthy of the State’s protection’.101 This 
approach would perhaps legitimize the regime in the eyes of Western 
policy-makers and donors; however, a top-down reform imposed by an 
authoritarian regime would unlikely have an effect on the real life of 
ordinary women, who rarely have full knowledge of their rights 
according to the law, and heavily depend on the work of those same 
NGOs that the regime is trying to shut down or completely control. 
Worse still is the fact that such facade feminization would run the risk 
of reinforcing the claims of those who identify the promotion of 
Women’s Rights with political authoritarianism – an association that, 
as we have seen, has historically constituted a serious obstacle for the 
spreading of feminist theories and the Women’s Rights movement in 
Muslim majority countries. 
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Abstract: 
The present article aims at conducting a comparative study of Ahdaf Soueif’s 
2012 memoir Cairo: My City, Our Revolution, entitled Cairo: Memoir of a City 
Transformed in the 2014 edition, and Radwa Ashour’s 2013 autobiography: Athqal 
min Radwā, (Heavier than Radwa: Excerpts from an Autobiography). The works 
that document the 2010-2013 state of flux from the perspective and experiences of 
both writers, interwoven with various recollected historical periods, are examined in 
the light of an interdisciplinary approach that combines cultural studies, postcolonial 
and autobiography theories. Scrutinized within the scope of the intellectuals’ other 
writings and interviews, I argue that the selected texts that depict the issues of 
identity, the self and nationalism as pivotal points can be regarded as acts of literary 
activism or textual spaces of resistance. First, in delineating the history of the nation, 
intertwined with the cartography of the self, the works unmask the history of 
oppression to which the individual and public self/identity have been subjected. 
Second, they document the intellectuals’ resistance to the ongoing 
counterrevolutionary discourse in the post 2011 period. Third, they interrogate and 
condemn the human rights’ violations, and concomitantly extol their anxiety about 
an authoritarian future. Fourth, in portraying the gradual fragmentation of the 
previously homogeneous nationalist discourse characteristic of the first eighteen 
days of the revolution, the works depict the intellectuals’ gradual detachment from 
the prevalent nationalist discourse they critique as hegemonic. 
 
Introduction 
The 2011 revolution and its aftermath have been a threatening 
temporal space to the Egyptian intellectuals. The state of flux, 
ambivalence, hysteria and menace, fueled by the struggle over 
authority and power and over Egypt’s identity, civic or Islamic,1 
                                                            
1 For an analysis of the development of the conflict over Egypt’s identity as 
represented in the cartoons and graffiti of the 2011 revolution and its aftermath see 
Pervine Elrefaei’s paper ‘Egyptian Women in the Cartoons and Graffiti of the 2011 
Revolution: A Janus-faced Discourse’, in Proceedings of the 11th International 
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intertwined with the presence of ISIS in parts of the Arab world, have 
culminated in manufacturing a nationalist discourse anchored in fear 
of a mysterious future. Egyptian writers and thinkers have manifested 
different stances towards such a transitional period.2 Ahdaf Soueif 
(1950- ) and Radwa Ashour (1946-2014) are two prominent Egyptian 
intellectuals and activists whose contribution to the literature of the 
2011 revolution cannot be ignored.3 
The present paper aims at conducting a comparative study of Ahdaf 
Soueif’s 2012 memoir Cairo: My City, Our Revolution, entitled 
Cairo: Memoir of a City Transformed in the 2014 edition, and Radwa 
Ashour’s autobiography: Athqal min Raḍwā (2013), (Heavier than 
Radwa: Excerpts from an Autobiography).4 The works that document 
                                                                                                                                           
Symposium on Comparative Literature 13-15 November 2012, Department of English 
Language and Literature, Cairo University, Cairo University Press, Cairo, 2014, pp. 
751-783. 
2 See Samia Mehrez’s study of the role and position of intellectuals before the 
2011 revolution in her book Egypt’s Culture Wars: Politics and Practice, 
Routledge, London, 2008. 
3 The choice of both writers is dictated by their oppositional stance that sets them 
in contrast to many intellectuals at that time. Anxiety about national security 
culminated in accusations being hurled at Soueif, Ashour and the like-minded 
intellectuals. In being outspoken, those intellectuals have not only challenged 
authority but also all the masses overpowered by the inflamed state of fear 
aggrandized by the media. The people’s change of perspective is signified by the 
transformation of chants and slogans from ‘Down with the military rule’ in the early 
phase of the revolution, to ‘The army, the people, one hand’ (Soueif 2014, p. 224, 
qtd. in R. Bromley, ‘“Giving Memory a Future”: Women, Writing, Revolution’, in 
Journal of Cultural Research 19/2 (2015), p. 7) in the last days of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s rule. 
4 The academic research has witnessed the publication of three recent papers on 
Ahdaf Soueif’s memoir in relation to Mona Prince’s book Ismī Thawra (My Name is 
Revolution), focusing on the 18 days of the revolution, by Kamal, Mazloum - 
Elmarsafy: H. Kamal, ‘Women’s Memoirs of the Egyptian Revolution: Mona 
Prince’s Ismi Thawra and Ahdaf Soueif’s Cairo: My City, Our Revolution’, in 
Creativity and Revolution: Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on 
Comparative Literature: 577-597, Cairo University, Department of English 
Language and Literature, Cairo, 2014, pp. 577-59; S. F. Mazloum, ‘To Write/to 
Revolt: Egyptian Women Novelists Writing the Revolution’, in Journal for Cultural 
Research 19/2 (2015), pp. 207-220; Z. Elmarsafy, ‘Action, Imagination, Institution, 
Natality, Revolution’, in Journal for Cultural Research 19/2 (2015), pp. 130-138. A 
fourth paper by Bromley compares Soueif’s book to Samar Yazbek’s A Woman in 
the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution. Kamal argues that Soueif’s book is 
‘an autobiographical hybrid text’ (2014, p. 586) ‘occupying an inter-generic 
location, where autobiography intersects with diary, memoir, history and journalism’ 
(2014, p. 591). Bromley studies ‘the links between writing and revolution, whilst 
 Intellectuals and Activists Writing under the Sign of Hope 325 
 
the 2010-2013 state of flux from the perspective and experiences of 
both writers, interwoven with various recollected historical periods, 
are examined in the light of an interdisciplinary approach that 
combines cultural studies, postcolonial and autobiography theories. 
The paper situates both writers first within Edward Said’s and Patricia 
Hill Collins’ definitions of the intellectual in dissent against the status 
quo, and second as writers of autobiographical manifestos. Hence, the 
autobiographical strategies of the manifesto and its ‘emancipatory 
politics’ used by both writers to pull together the scattered threads of 
the threatened individual and collective self are major points of focus.5 
Scrutinized within the scope of the intellectuals’ other writings and 
interviews, I argue that the selected texts that depict the issues of 
identity, the self and nationalism as pivotal points can be regarded as 
acts of literary activism or textual spaces of resistance. First, in 
delineating the history of the nation, intertwined with the cartography 
of the self, the works unmask the history of oppression to which the 
individual and public self/identity have been subjected. Second, they 
document the intellectuals’ resistance to the ongoing 
counterrevolutionary discourse in the post 2011 period. Third, they 
interrogate and condemn the human rights’ violations, and 
concomitantly extol their anxiety about an authoritarian future. Fourth, 
in portraying the gradual fragmentation of the previously 
homogeneous nationalist discourse characteristic of the first eighteen 
days of the revolution, the works depict the intellectuals’ gradual 
detachment from the prevalent nationalist discourse they critique as 
hegemonic. 
In his book Representations of the Intellectual (1994), Edward Said 
highlights the intellectuals’ mobilizing role in both revolutions and 
counterrevolutions. On the one hand, ‘herded’ by authority, the 
‘professional’ intellectual, Said contends, assumes the role of the 
‘pacifier and consensus-builder’,6 and hence can be utilized as a 
counterrevolutionary force.7 On the other hand, the real intellectual is 
                                                                                                                                           
exploring how the acts of writing/witnessing/remembering can metaphorically ‘give 
memory a future’ in Paul Ricœur’s words’ (2014, p.1). Mazloum focuses on the 
homogeneous eighteen days of the revolution from a feminist perspective based on 
Judith Butler and G. Spivak. Elmarsafy, by contrast, examines the memoir from the 
context of Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality. 
5 S. Smith - J. Watson, Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1998, p. 433. 
6 E. Said, Representations of the Intellectual, Vintage, London, 1994, p. 17. 
7 Ib., p. 17.  
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an ‘amateur’ who possesses a free independent mind that can never be 
molded or pressured by authority.8 In the dark transitional moments 
the amateurish intellectual should publically interrogate the 
hegemonic discourse of ‘patriotic nationalism’9 that controls the 
nation in the name of ‘loyalty’.10 Dedicated to the universal principles 
of human rights, the intellectual should transcend borders and side 
with the marginalized, downtrodden and silenced everywhere.11 
Said’s perspective is adopted by many thinkers. Patricia Hill 
Collins defines the title of her book On Intellectual Activism (2012) as 
‘the myriad ways the people place the power of their ideas in service 
to social justice’.12 Similarly, Collins contends that the engaged 
revolutionary intellectual should speak truth to both power and the 
people.13 The intellectual’s role has been the subject of autobiography. 
In Autobiography as Activism (2000), Margo V. Perkins argues that 
autobiographies are acts of political activism that challenge 
‘hegemonic history’ since ‘in writing their lives activists seek to 
document their experiences, to correct misinformation, to educate 
their readers, and to encourage the continuation of struggle’.14 In a 
similar vein, Sidonie Smith writes that ‘Assembling an experiential 
history can function as counter-memory, a means to re-narrativize the 
past and to break the silences of official history’.15 Smith contends 
that such autobiographies can be described as manifestos that act as ‘a 
revolutionary gesture poised against amnesia’.16 In elaborating the 
term, Janet Lyon points out that the ‘liberatory’ manifesto depicts the 
experiences of the silenced and marginalized in ‘a putatively 
democratic political culture’.17 In representing the discrepancy 
between democratic dreams or goals and oppressive reality, the 
manifesto struggles against oppression for the reconstruction of 
                                                            
8 Ib., p. xi. 
9 Ib., p. xii. 
10 Ib., p. 27. 
11 Ib., p. 17. 
12 P. H. Collins, On Intellectual Activism, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
2012, p. ix. 
13 Ib., p. xiii. 
14 M. V. Perkins, Autobiography as Activism: Three Black Women of the Sixties, 
University Press of Mississipi, Jackson, 2000, p. 70. 
15  Qtd. in Golley, Reading Arab Women’s Autobiographies, p. 158. 
16 Smith - Watson, Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader, p. 438. 
17 J. Lyon Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca (NY), 1999, p. 2. 
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self/identity.18 In this respect, ‘autobiographical strategies’ are used 
‘for the staging of resistance’,19 and hence for ‘political 
empowerment’.20  
Seen in this light, the selected works, as well as the intellectuals’ 
activism and political agency, do intersect and share much in 
common. Both Ahdaf Soueif and Radwa Ashour are novelists, short 
story writers, translators, political activists and critics who have lived 
between different cultures. Both represent a counter hegemonic 
discourse that struggles against colonial and imperial powers, on the 
one hand, and Arab rulers’ authoritarianism on the other. Both belong 
to families whose members are mostly activists.21 The struggle for the 
democratic rights of the Egyptian people they belong to, universal 
human rights, and the rights of the Third World, specifically Occupied 
Palestine, constitutes the crux of their writings.22 Their aim to create 
consciousness of the need for political transformation, and hence 
alternative history, can be clearly detected in their manifestos.  
                                                            
18 Ib., pp. 3-4. 
19 Smith - Watson, Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader, p. 434. 
20 Ib., p. 433. 
21 As the selected works portray, Soueif is sister of Laila Soueif, a Cairo 
University Professor and activist married to the late activist and human rights’ 
advocate and lawyer Ahmed Seif, and a founding member of ‘March 9’ Group, and 
hence is Ashour’s colleague. Laila Soueif is also mother of Mona Seif, the founder 
of the ‘No To Military Trials for Civilians’ Group in the post revolution period, and 
Alaa Abdel Fatah and Sanaa Seif, imprisoned in the Muslim Brotherhood period and 
later in the post Muslim Brotherhood period for violating the ‘protest law’, issued 
24th November 2013, prohibiting peaceful protests. 
22 Ashour and Soueif’s constant references to the Palestinian cause set them in 
contrast to the other thinkers and writers in such a transitional period. The cause that 
has galvanized the majority of the Egyptian intellectuals for decades, constituting an 
integral part of their nationalist discourse, has witnessed a gradual transformation 
that is documented in the selected works. The attacks on Gaza by the Israeli forces 
in the post revolution period were met by silence on the part of many Egyptian 
intellectuals who were repelled by the threatening and increasing power of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and concomitantly harbored fears about the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Gaza and their impact on Egypt’s national security. In a 2012 
interview, Soueif, by contrast, represents her reading of the Egyptian-Palestinian 
relation and how things should be like in the post revolution period. She declares, 
‘In Gaza, you should see clearly what Egypt should do. It should stop acting as a 
jailor and it should stop being Israel’s thug. […] The whole Egypt-Israel relationship 
has to be recalibrated’ (Shackle, 30/5/2012). Soueif’s perspective remains 
unchanged, consolidated by her constant visits to Gaza in support of the Palestinian 
Festival of Literature. 
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On the one hand, Soueif was an ex scholar of English Literature at 
Cairo University. She moved to Britain years ago and married a 
British. A journalist for The Guardian newspaper, Soueif is also an 
advocate for Palestinian rights and the Founding Chair of Palestine 
Festival of Literature (PalFest) initiated in 2008. Adopting Edward 
Said’s perspective, Soueif aims, as she puts it, at asserting ‘the power 
of culture over the culture of power’.23 She is also the translator into 
English of Mourid Bargouti’s Arabic memoir I Saw Ramallah, 
forwarded by Edward Said.  
Radwa Ashour, on the other hand, was a graduate of Cairo 
University and Professor of English and Comparative Literature at 
Ain Shams University in Cairo. Married to the renowned Palestinian 
writer and poet Mourid Barghouti (Murīd al-Barghūtī), and mother of 
poet Tamim Bargouti (Tamīm al-Barghūtī), Ashour was a member of 
the Committee for the Defense of National Culture, formed in the 
wake of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, and a founding 
member of the 9 March Group for the Independence of the 
Universities. Ashour’s humanism that transcends borders and gender 
is epitomized by her words ‘All the oppressed of the earth have 
wings’; a statement written on the cover of her novel Faraj (2008),24 
translated as Blue Lorries (2014). On her death on 30th November 
2014, Marina Warner describes her as ‘a powerful voice among 
Egyptian writers of the post war generation and a writer of exceptional 
integrity and courage’. 
 
The Intellectuals’ Identity Issue 
The similarities and differences between the selected writers who 
represent the nation as far as the identity issue is concerned are worthy 
of note. On the one hand, in contrast to Soueif who lives on the cusp 
of both cultures, East and West, Ashour has always been adamant to 
                                                            
23 Qtd. in K. Sharma, ‘I’ve Written no Fiction since my First Visit to Palestine in 
2000: Ahdaf Soueif’, in The Hindu, 4/1/2015, http://www.thehindu.com/features/lit-
for-life/ive-written-no-fiction-since-my-first-visit-to-palestine-in-2000-ahdaf-
soueif/article6751332.ece (access 9/1/2015). 
24 For an analysis of Ashour’s novel Faraj see Elrefaei’s paper ‘Egypt and the 
Prison as Dual Space of Repression and Resistance: The Dialectics of Power 
Relations in Literature and Film’, in Mohamed Osman Elkhosht - Amani Badawi 
(eds.), Essays in Language and Literature: in Honour of M. M. Enani, Cairo 
University Center for Languages and Professional Translation, Cairo, 2012, pp. 277-
297.  
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consolidate her Arab identity and defend her cultural heritage. As she 
declares,  
 
I’m an Arab woman and a citizen of the Third World and my heritage 
in both cases is stifled. ... I write in self-defence, and in defence of 
countless others with whom I identify or who are like me.25  
 
Addressed to Arab readers, Ashour’s works and resistant voice 
have achieved international recognition through translation. Writing in 
Arabic is an intrinsic constituent of her identity that provides her, as 
she puts it, with ‘the security of a stable anchorage and the fluidity of 
open potential’; it makes her feel ‘less alienated, less confused, and 
less orphaned’.26 In the opening pages of Athqal min Raḍwā, she 
delineates the cartography of identity through tracing her family tree 
and the genealogy of her name. Her name is that of a mountain near 
Al-Madīna Al-Munawwara in Saudi Arabia. The mountain is rumored 
to be the space eternally inhabited by Muḥammad al-Ḥanafiyya, the 
Muslim Imam, who would reemerge on doomsday to spread justice on 
earth.27 Her eldest brother Tarek, she adds, is named after another 
mountain that recalls Islamic power and civilization associated with 
the Arab leader Ṭāriq b. Ziyād. The love of Arabic language and 
culture was instilled into her by her parents and grandparent, the 
academic translator of Persian literature and the founder of the first 
university in Saudi Arabia. Deeply rooted in history, geography and 
Arabic culture, both names, Radwa and Tarek, constitute the borders 
of the Arab world from East to West.  
As Ashour herself puts it, ‘the personal and the general were 
interlocked to a degree that made it difficult to distinguish one from 
the other’.28 Her 2013 individual/nationalist narrative documents her 
activism and agency before the 2011 revolution. As the narrative 
proceeds, on her arrival to Egypt following the revolution, Ashour 
reassumes her role as an eyewitness, a scribe and a citizen-activist on 
the ground. However, she is also adamant to delineate herself as a 
                                                            
25 Qtd. in M. Warner, ‘Radwa Ashour Obituary’, in The Guardian Online, 
8/12/2014, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/dec/08/radwa-ashour (access 
2/12/2016). 
26 Ashour, ‘Eyewitness’, p. 89. 
27 Ashour, Athqal min Raḍwā, p. 6. 
28 R. Ashour, ‘My Experience with Writing’, Human Rights and People’s Rights 
in Literature and the Humanities’, in Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics 13 
(1993), p. 173. 
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liberal multi-culturalist. In contrast to Soueif, in her autobiography, 
she takes her readers on a journey into world museums, culture and 
history. Integrating famous artistic works and paintings, Ashour 
utilizes them symbolically to create a universal self that struggles for 
justice and human rights. Knowledge in general is depicted as an 
empowering strategy for the self. However, the book’s cyclical 
structure is intricately anchored in the issue of identity as it starts and 
ends with home, family, Egypt and roots.  
On the other hand, Soueif’s Egyptian identity has always been 
controversial. Her ‘interstitial’ position is highlighted by many critics 
who see her as an ambivalent writer possessed by divided loyalties.29 
The critics’ contention is emphasized by Soueif herself who admits: 
‘The fact (is) that I’m more writing from within a European 
tradition’.30 In her 2012 memoir, she reflects on her previous 
conflicting feelings, her love for, yet disappointment with her city: 
‘Cairo/London, London/Cairo, and Cairo was being constantly 
downgraded’.31 ‘All I could do was look and listen and stay and march 
and insist that I loved her’.32 To her, the city was attractive and 
protective as a mother, yet repulsive and oppressive for being passive 
in front of dictators and corrupt politicians: 
 
…the city was there, close to me, looking over my shoulders, holding 
up the prism through which I understood the world, inserting herself 
into everything I wrote.33  
 
In reflecting on the rebellious city on the 28th January, she writes: 
 
This is the reality that we’ve been living for decades, finally risen to 
the surface. At last our capital reflects the true condition of the 
country and of our lives: burned and broken and almost ruined.34 
 
                                                            
29 Mazloum, ‘To Write/to Revolt: Egyptian Women Novelists Writing the 
Revolution’, pp. 212-213. 
30 Qtd. P. Philipose, ‘Cairo’s Literary Daughters, Ahdaf and Radwa’, 11/4/2010, 
Boloji, http://www.boloji.com/index.cfm?md=Content&sd=Articles&ArticleID=6855 
(access 1/8/2014). 
31 Soueif, Cairo: My City, Our Revolution, p. 43. 
32 Ib., p. 45. 
33 Ib., p. 9. 
34 Ib., p. 24. 
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In contrast to Ashour, it is only when the city rebels against a long 
history of dictatorship and corruption that Soueif’s sense of belonging 
is retrieved.  
Though this paper agrees with the reality of Soueif’s state of 
inbetweenness, the critics’ views can be regarded as accusations that 
may delegitimize her voice. In declaring her oppositional stance in 
Arabic in Al-Shorouk newspaper, Soueif is classified as a British, a 
foreigner and a ‘fifth columnist’ who fabricates lies and conspires 
against Egypt.35 Hence, I argue that Abdul JanMohamed’s notion of 
the ‘specular border intellectual’ is illuminating in comprehending 
Soueif’s cultural positionality, granting her voice both power and 
legitimacy. Like her mentor Edward Said, Soueif has maneuvered to 
change her cultural space into a space for ‘agency’; ‘a vantage point’ 
to struggle for ‘other utopian possibilities’.36 Her ‘border-crossing’ 
empowers her to embark on ‘positive missions’ and achieve 
‘significant cultural acts’ (p. 220). Working for the Guardian as a 
‘specular site’ (p. 219) enabled her to travel for the first time to 
Palestine as a reporter on the Intifāḍa (Uprising). In an interview, she 
points out the journey as an ‘eye opener’ and ‘a turning point’ in her 
life as it has driven her into ‘cultural activism’.37 Jacques Testard’s 
observation is worth noting as he states that she ‘has grown into 
Egypt’s – and perhaps the Arab World’s – foremost political voice in 
Britain’. In her 2012 edition of her memoir, Soueif highlights the 
objectives beyond her narrative. First, she aims at proudly 
representing the right and positive image of the culture of resistance 
manifested by the Egyptian people in the first eighteen days of the 
revolution to the West. Second, she aims at correcting the 
misconceptions of internal and external hegemonic media, and hence 
destabilizing both Western and Egyptian official narratives. As she 
states: 
 
On my Jaipur hotel TV, I could only get CNN, but there the 
Americans were, transmitting from Tahrir, and the whole world was 
                                                            
35 See A. Gamal ‘A Miracle Documented by the British’, Elbashayer, 
15/11/2014, Elbasheronline.com. 
36 A. R. JanMohamed, ‘Worldliness-Without-World, Homelessness-as-Home: 
Toward a Definition of the Specular Border Intellectual’, in Michael Sprinker (ed.), 
Edward Said: A Critical Reader, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, p. 219. 
37 Qtd in G. Hariharan, ‘Githa Hariharan in Conversation with Radwa Ashour 
and Ahdaf Soueif pt 1’, Online video clip, Youtube, 5/4/2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfZQvc0Fgq8 (access 2/12/2016).  
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wondering what was going on, and the spokesperson for the Egyptian 
government, Hossam Zaki, was cheerily dismissing the crowds.38  
 
Coming to Egypt as a reporter on the revolution was another 
turning point in her life. In a May 2012 interview, Soueif, in contrast 
to Ashour, comments on the experience of writing for the first time in 
Arabic in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Shorouk: ‘That’s been a 
discovery, and I don’t think it would have happened without the 
revolution’.39 On her role in the revolution she writes in the Guardian,  
 
You, the citizen, need to be present, there, on the ground, marching, 
supporting, talking, instigating, articulating. Your talent – at the time 
of crisis – is to tell the stories as they are, to help them to achieve 
power as reality not as fiction.40  
 
Soueif’s words shed light on the revolution’s role in driving her to 
reclaim her Egyptian citizenship. On 11th February, she consolidates 
her hybridity yet Egyptianness through the detailed description of the 
practical, yet symbolic, clothes she wears. Getting ready for the battle, 
underneath her modern European clothes, she dons ‘cotton trousers’, 
‘the pants Egyptian farmers and laborers wear under their galabeyyas’ 
to protect her from ‘baltagis (thugs) and Central Security’.41 Like 
Ashour, she perceives her struggle as an intrinsic part of the struggle 
for universal human rights. As she puts it at the end of her 2014 
edition: ‘When you read these words, many months from now, maybe 
we’ll be farther down the road toward its great, human aims’.42  
Ashour’s mapping of her individual and collective identity, by 
contrast, aims at creating consciousness and educating her readers in 
the necessity of knowing one’s roots, history, geography and culture 
as indispensable empowering strategies to combat amnesia and 
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political oppression during threatening transitional periods. As she 
puts it, 
 
History … was a living experience of everyday life: consecutive wars, 
1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978, 1982, 1991; massacres too many to be 
cited here, heavy losses, traumatic changes, fractures and disjunctures, 
and the constant insecurity of a human will negated, and of subjects 
acted upon rather than acting. Our present was lived history, an 
oppressive and haunting historical reality with which we wrestled and 
which we labored to grasp.43  
 
For Ashour writing is part of her identity and role ‘as a national 
recorder’.44 Elaborating her perspective which situates her in the 
context of the intellectual and writer of the autobiographical 
manifesto, Ashour declares: 
 
…The need to record, for the writers of my generation, was also a 
response to a growing awareness of the constant threat of word 
manipulation, what I would call ultra-modern germ warfare tactics. 
What we lived through was denied and disfigured. Our collective 
memory was subjected to a double pressure, it was attacked from 
within and without, with the kind of political language which Orwell 
once described as ‘designed to make lies sound truthful and 
respectable’… This endeavor has been a kind of cultural resistance, 
which partly implies the protection of collective memory, a kind of 
cultural conservation in the face of the double threat of cultural 
imposition and cultural disintegration; to challenge the dominant 
discourse, (a challenge in my case, mounted by the triple periphery of 
nation, class and gender): to attempt to give history visibility and 
coherence, to conjure up unaccounted for marginalized and silenced 
areas of the past and the present, this has been my endeavor.45 
 
Ashour’s words sum up her cultural/political activism. In her 2013 
autobiography, she documents a period of political upheaval, 
collective mobility and personal difficulty in which both herself and 
the nation are in critical conditions. Oppressed by medical instruments 
and successive operations, her mental space that suffers from brain 
cancer runs parallel to a country threatened by a tumor that has grown 
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wild and uncontrollable. Thus, her meticulously selected ‘excerpts’ 
represent her struggle to piece together and re-appropriate ‘a 
threatening history’, ‘a threatened geography’,46 and, hence, a 
threatened identity, besides a determination to embrace life and resist 
power, oppression, defeat and personal predicament. 
Similarly, Soueif’s narrative is anchored in recollecting the 
fragmented temporal and spatial map of self and nation. However, her 
deliberate depiction of her individual identity formation, construction 
and reconstruction is geared towards creating consciousness of how 
the individual self-identity and the sense of dislocation are the product 
of a long history of oppressive power structures. Though different, 
Soueif’s and Ashour’s works thus converge on depicting individual 
and collective identity struggling with oppressive authority for 
subjectivity and wholeness. As Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith put it: 
 
In the midst of dislocations and relocations, personal and collective 
storytelling can become one way in which people claim new identities 
… It can be enlisted in witnessing to the failures of democratic nations 
to realize and live up to their democratic principle of inclusive 
citizenship … In all cases storytelling functions as a crucial element in 
establishing new identities of longing (directed toward the past) and 
belonging (directed toward the future).47  
 
Having put that, an examination of the intellectuals’ 
autobiographical strategies of the manifesto in relation to the issue of 
identity and nationalism is in order.  
 
Historicizing Identity: The Autobiographical Strategies of the 
Manifesto 
In their narratives, both intellectuals assume a number of 
autobiographical strategies. First, ‘mimesis’, a strategy that is shared 
in common, is described by Smith as follows: 
  
… the autobiographer positions herself as the subject of traditional 
autobiography: that is, she mimes the subjectivity of universal man. 
Speaking from this location proffers authority, legitimacy, and 
readability. It also proffers membership in the community of the fully 
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human. For oppressed peoples, such membership can be 
psychologically and politically expedient and potent.48 
 
Thus, conscious of addressing the Western audience, Soueif begins 
her memoir with reference to Jean Genet. The feelings of anxiety and 
fear she harbors, detaining her from writing a book about Cairo, ‘my 
Cairo’, as she puts it, recalls to her mind Genet’s experience:   
 
Jean Genet in his book that I most admire, Un captif amoureux writes: 
‘I’m not an archivist or a historian or anything like it ... This is my 
Palestinian revolution told in my own chosen order’ I cannot say the 
same. This story is told in my own chosen order, but it is very much 
the story of our revolution.49  
 
The opening sets the tone for the whole memoir, granting it a 
historical and universal dimension as Soueif situates her narrative 
within the universal struggle against power and authority for the 
consolidation of the principles of human rights. Genet’s appearance in 
the preface recalls the literature and figures of resistance like Sartre, 
Foucault and the Palestinian leaders he associated himself with.  
Ashour’s opening of her autobiography, by contrast, is more 
personal. Chapter one opens with the birth of her brother Tarek and 
ends with the death of both mother and brother. However, similarly, 
Ashour draws an analogy between herself/name and the mythical 
story of the previously mentioned Muslim Imam, Muḥammad Ibn al-
Ḥanafiyya, the icon of justice who will reemerge to spread justice on 
earth.50 The analogy implicitly underscores her consciousness of her 
empowering interrogative voice that will be transmitted to posterity. 
The opening of both works, thus, consolidates ‘the politicization of the 
private and the personalization of the public’.51  
Second, as Smith rightly argues, in ‘historicizing identity’ the 
manifesto ‘insists on the temporalities and spatialities of identity and, 
in doing so, brings the everyday practices of identity directly into the 
floodlights of conscious display’.52 Highlighting the manifesto’s use 
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of the fluidity of time, Mary Ann Caws states, ‘making known past 
actions and explaining the motives for actions announced as 
forthcoming’ represent part of ‘the poetics of the manifesto’.53 As 
Ashour points out, ‘To tell my story, was to include that composite 
experience which constantly incorporated the old in the new’.54 She 
later states, ‘There is the geography of a place. There are no places 
without history. Both of us are Egyptians, we are Cairenes, and Cairo 
is a place full of a multi-layered history. Every corner, every street has 
a story’.55 Thus, both writers embark on a mental and physical journey 
backward and forward in time and space, intertwined with a journey 
inward, to piece together the individual and collective self that has 
been drifting with the state of flux characteristic of that transitional 
period. Such fluidity is delineated by the water, the Nile, the bridge, 
and the hospital as shared settings. The selected works represent the 
endeavor to transform oppressive geographical and temporal spaces 
into spaces for agency, transformation and resistance.  
With the coming of the 2011 revolution, Ashour finds herself as 
both insider and outsider. Compelled by her critical condition to seek 
diagnosis and medication, she has to leave Egypt a couple of months 
before the revolution. Thus, unlike Soueif’s narrative, the first four 
months of the revolution are filtered through the eyes of friends as 
well as the news she, her son Tamim and husband Mourid, follow on 
the satellite and internet. Soueif rightly pinpoints the variation in 
Ashour’s technique. In narrating her personal experience of suffering, 
Ashour maintains distance between herself and the readers so as not to 
get them emotionally involved. However, in documenting the 
suffering of the nation, the deaths and the calamities, the narrator 
emotionally attracts the readers in an attempt to create consciousness 
of the ongoing status quo (‘Athqal min jabal’).  
Like Ashour, Soueif was abroad at the time of the revolution, only 
to join it later on the 28th January as a reporter for the Guardian and 
an activist in Tahrir Square. Her 2012 edition represents an act of 
cultural resistance that struggles to reclaim space from both the 
Egyptian regime and the United States as the superior imperial power. 
As she puts it in her interview with Shackle on 30th May 2012, 
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‘Western governments should stay out of things. They have done so 
much damage; it surprises us how they have the gall to comment. 
They have failed to deliver the societies people want’.56 In mapping 
Tahrir Square for the Western reader in her 2012 memoir, she depicts 
the historical dimension of a space rampant with what she describes as 
‘the symbols of military and political power’.57 Tahrir Square 
becomes a microcosm of the whole country; a space of oppression that 
has turned with the 2011 revolution into a space for agency: 
Since Egypt’s ruler Khedive Ismail established it in 1860 … control of 
Tahrir has seemed central to controlling the country. Ismail himself 
stationed the Egyptian army and the Ministry of Defense here, and 
when the British occupied Egypt in 1882 their army took over the 
barracks and the Ministry on one side of Qasr el-Nil Bridge and they 
put their embassy on the other. The Americans were to follow suit and 
put their increasingly fortress-like embassy next to the British...58  
 
The reader is again reminded of the Western colonial and imperial 
powers through Soueif’s recollection of an interview in India on the 
24th January, a day before the revolution. Triggered by a question on 
the Tunisian revolution, she reflects on Egypt’s internal and external 
affairs, pinpointing the political and social mobility that were taking 
place before the revolution. Soueif highlights the discourse of power 
and authority that governs relations between the Egyptian people, on 
the one hand, and the Egyptian regime, the United States and Israel on 
the other. She declares: 
... for a very long time now, our perception is that (Egypt) is not being 
run in the interests of the Egyptian people. And the primary 
motivation of the people who are governing us is that they should 
remain in power in order to continue ransacking and looting the 
country. Now, the main support that they have to remain in power is 
of course the Western powers – particularly the United States. And the 
price that they have to pay in order to be supported is to run policies 
that favor Israel...59 
 
Soueif’s 2012 memoir opens with a Western Orientalist discourse 
that is soon subverted. The traditional oriental image of a stagnant 
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river/space symbolizes a long history of oppression and 
authoritarianism. The opening scene is an answer to the western 
question she recalls ‘Will Egypt move? … Egypt is too big … too 
heavy’.60 The representation of the 28th January, or the ‘Day of 
Wrath’, is a refutation of the Western image of a country cemented in 
time and space. Beginning in medias res, with herself and her two 
nieces riding a ‘small motor boat’ in ‘the river’ that is depicted as 
‘steely grey, a dull pewter’,61 Soueif almost recalls Dante’s journey in 
the Inferno, Conrad’s river in the Heart of Darkness, or Lawrence 
Durrell’s Mountolive in his boat journey in the third part of the 
Alexandria Quartet. The image is soon replaced by the following state 
of mobility, dynamism and agency, epitomized by the resistance of 
Soueif, her nieces and the masses to power and authority. The scene 
that delineates all three women ‘coughing and choking’62 in the midst 
of an ambivalent limbo space ‘heavy with tear gas’, and struggling to 
push ‘into mid-stream’ sets the tone for the journey in quest of self 
and national rights. 
Soueif, together with her nieces, endeavor to maneuver their way 
through the battle ground. Her ‘embrace’63 of the right of return to the 
city/homeland that has repelled her is signified by the religious 
metaphor of the exodus at the hands of the Pharaonic dictator. Soueif 
writes:  
 
Down in the embankment, with the soldiers facing us and behind them 
the cornice road littered with stones and charred cars and the Hilton 
dark and shuttered… We run down the embankment steps and jump 
into a boat: to Giza, please. Drop us next to Galaa Bridge. We’ll go 
home.64 
 
Galvanised by Tahrir Square, all three women drift back to the 
epicenter. Water imagery is utilized to signify the state of in-
betweenness and the oscillation between fixity and fluidity: ‘Qasr el-
Nil Bridge’ is depicted as ‘a mass of people, all in motion, but all in 
place’.65 ‘There’s something of Dante about the spectacle. Isolated 
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figures drift. Smoke drifts. … We drift together, embrace …’.66 The 
battle for subjectivity is consolidated by the geographical map of 
space she meticulously draws before her journey, and the mental map 
she depicts in words. She adds, ‘Our friends had won us another 
couple of meters and we followed them and held our ground’.67 As the 
narrative unfolds and the state of flux prevails, the boat and the bridge 
reappear as constant settings that signal the transitional period and the 
historical dimension. The opening that takes the reader from the 
present into the past and anticipates the future shifts from land to 
water and back again with the bridge as a real and symbolic 
connecting space. 
The battle over space is carried over in ‘Lazoghli’, the whereabouts 
of the State Security Intelligence Bureau. The interconnectedness of 
the public and private is conspicuous. The ongoing brutal death of the 
revolutionaries at the hands of the police on that day is juxtaposed to 
the peaceful past history of the individual self in space. The reader is 
taken into Soueif’s psyche to reflect on the source of her feeling of 
estrangement and exile from a city she has severed her ties with. 
Soueif highlights the impact of the encroachment of such oppressive 
spaces of authority over the rights of the citizen. ‘Lazoghli’ was the 
‘childhood landscape’ where she, as an eight year old girl, used to 
visit her aunt Awatef where she lived. Unlike her parents’ home that 
stood for regulations, the old Lazoghli represented freedom, art, 
creativity, love and a whole dream world epitomized by the old 
movies she used to watch from her aunt’s balcony that overlooked the 
neighborhood’s cinema: ‘exclusively Lazoghli for me was the bridal 
setting up of a new home; a home that was an alternative to how my 
parents did things’ (p. 29). The transformation of home into an 
oppressive, repulsive space is intertwined in her memory with the 
oppression of the Palestinians. She adds,  
 
… in 2000, when Egyptians started mobilizing in support of the 
Palestinian Intifāḍa, it came back: “Lazoghli” was disappearances, 
“Lazoghli” was torture, “Lazoghli” was the Dakhleyya and the State 
Security Intelligence Bureau …68  
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The nightmarish present is again overshadowed by the imperial 
presence of the US as the supreme power at the back of a corrupt 
oppressive regime. Surrounded by the wounded in the makeshift 
hospital in Tahrir Square, Soueif voices their agonies and demands; 
her gaze of power unmasks the reality to the world and transforms the 
space of death into a space of empowerment:  
 
I look. Wounded young men everywhere … I write fast; their message 
is urgent: They are using live ammunition... Look: empty cartridges, 
Made in the USA. Look. Look: …. This is what we get from the US 
Aid. This is the ‘aid’ they hold over us.69  
 
The multi-layered past takes her back to the present as she manages 
to maneuver her way guided by her experience in Palestine. Hence, 
the Western reader is time and again reminded of the Palestinian 
condition. Warned by the men around her to turn back, she is 
determined to move on: ‘I can hear the shots and smell the acrid 
smoke, but a lesson from time spent in Palestine is that unless there’s 
an insurmountable physical obstacle … keep going’.70 Soueif 
implements the Palestinian tactic of ‘ṣumūd’ or ‘steadfastness’ as a 
tactic of resistance.71 The physical journey in space is a psychological 
journey into the deep recesses of the self; the old city with its 
‘pedestrian passages that run between or through buildings’ provides 
her with the right exit from the threatening reality of the new urban 
space. Reclaiming space, in this sense, is an endeavor to reclaim the 
lost self/identity from the historical maze of political oppression.  
Like Ashour, Soueif is conscious of the role of memory and history 
as resistant tactics. The historical/political events and the economic 
conditions leading to the geographical changes of the city due to 
tremendous urbanization and capitalism have destabilized the self. As 
she puts it: ‘Tahrir is about dignity and image as much as it is about 
the economy and corruption’.72 Losing its authenticity during the 
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak eras, the city has become increasingly 
oppressive to the individual and collective self. With the loss of 
Abulela Bridge, the space that used to connect her home in Zamalek 
to downtown Cairo, Soueif is uprooted and the self splits. Gazing at 
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her city from her new home, London, she feels more and more 
detached. ‘In Cairo, every time I come home, home goes a bit more 
bitty on me’.73 The relation between the corrupt, dictatorial political 
leaders and the city is cast in the light of a male-female patriarchal 
relationship in which the city is depicted as an enslaved female body 
that is abused, harassed and brutalized: ‘Degraded and bruised and 
robbed and exploited and mocked and slapped about: my city’.74 
However, the bridge has always been there as a temporal and spatial 
reality; a place of hope, energy and connectivity sought by citizens, 
authenticating their right to the city. An eyewitness to their past, the 
bridge has generated a voice and has galvanized the masses in 
anticipation of a changed future. As she optimistically reflects: 
 
Green spaces vanished but every night the bridges would be crammed 
with Cairenes taking the air. We suffered a massive shortage of 
affordable housing but every night you’d see a bride starring in her 
wedding procession in the street. Unemployment ran at 20 per cent 
and every evening there was singing and drumming from the cheap, 
bright, noisy little pleasure boats criss-crossing the river.75  
 
The people are an extension of their land and its trees; a force of 
nature that can never be overpowered. As Soueif puts it, ‘if they 
(corrupt politicians) cut a tree down, it grew shoots’.76 Reconstructing 
the borders of the ‘Midan’, Soueif relegates all spaces of power and 
authority to the periphery and locates the masses at the center. The 
Midan becomes both liberated and liberating, watched over and 
energized by symbols of agency and resistance, ‘Omar Makram, 
Simon Bolivar and Abd el-Menem Riyad’, besides ‘the Nile’ as the 
most energizing force.77  
In contrast to Soueif and her fluidity of identity signified by the 
water imagery, Ashour’s rootedness is signified by the land that is 
mapped and embraced from beginning to end. Like Soueif’s home that 
was close to Abulela Bridge, Ashour’s childhood home is strategically 
located close to Abbas Bridge. However, water and the bridge figure 
differently in Ashour’s writings. Her words in 2000 are worth 
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mentioning in this respect. As she puts it, 1946, the year she was born 
witnessed the death of the students who demonstrated against British 
occupation on Abbas Bridge. The bridge was, therefore, a space of 
oppression and resistance: ‘The bridge was a familiar view: I could 
see it from the bedroom window. I could also see the Nile and observe 
the late summer flood waters, rising heavy with brownish red silt’.78  
Ashour draws an affinity between the Pharoanic practice of wafā’ 
al-Nīl, ‘human sacrifice’ for the Nile, and the sacrifice of the 
revolutionaries at the hands of authoritarian dictators: ‘The original 
was a girl like me who drowned like the boys of the demonstration’.79 
Thus, in contrast to Soueif’s stagnant river that has finally erupted 
with the revolution, Ashour’s river has never been stagnant. It has 
always been an energizing space of resistance and an eyewitness to 
martyrs despite historical oppression. At the end of her autobiography, 
Ashour reiterates the same view and draws upon the Nile as a personal 
and political resistant space:  
 
Life frames death, precedes it, comes after it and dictates its borders. 
It embraces it from its top, bottom and margins. This is my conviction. 
I do not know if this conviction is related to spending my early 
childhood till the age of nine in a house overlooking the Nile. The 
Nile was strongly present … Later on, we will slowly realize that the 
Nile has infinitely been there in the past and will infinitely and 
mysteriously be there in the future ...80 
 
Like Soueif’s memories of home, Ashour’s childhood home 
instilled into her the first seeds of political awareness. Similarly, 
Palestine emerges in association with home; Ashour’s private balcony 
opened up at the 1948 War and the occupation of Palestine: ‘From that 
same window, I saw the war planes’. She adds, ‘It was then that I 
heard the word Palestine for the first time’.81  
In a similar vein to Soueif, Palestine and Jerusalem constitute part 
of Ashour’s identity and one of her major life battles. In meticulously 
depicting her university’s office and desk in her autobiography, 
Ashour transforms her academic space into a space for agency, 
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resistance and identity. Underneath the glass on her desk lies a copy of 
one of the famous paintings of the Syrian Artist Borhan Eddeen 
Karkotly, stenciled in black ink, representing Jerusalem with its 
minarets, domes and churches; the words ‘Jerusalem is ours and the 
victory is ours’ emanate from the sun, occupying center space in the 
painting.82 Moreover, the Egyptian support of the Palestinians in the 
early phases of the revolution in response to the attacks on Gaza is 
meticulously depicted. In August 2011, the Israeli embassy in Giza 
was besieged by the demonstrators. Ashour dedicates almost ten pages 
of her narrative to document the successful attempt of the young 
Egyptian Ahmed Elshahat, or the Spiderman, to climb the thirteen 
floors of the building where the embassy was located without a rope to 
substitute the Israeli flag with its Egyptian counterpart. Delineated 
heroically by Ashour as ‘an icon in our nationalist history’, the young 
man, the people, and the whole scene are cast in the light of the 
historical struggle between Egypt and Israel over decolonization.83 
Ashour in those pages is adamant to verify the identity of ‘the 
Spiderman’ that, as she writes, the state has endeavored to stigmatize 
and erase from collective memory. Moreover, Ashour’s politics of 
inclusion extends to encompass the Palestinians themselves, granting 
them voice through the recurrent presence of figures like Mahmoud 
Darwish (Maḥmūd Darwīsh) and Najy Al-‘Ali (Nājī al-‘Alī) and the 
Palestinian art of resistance.  
Like Soueif who loses her mother and mentor Edward Said before 
writing her memoir, Ashour writes her narrative following the 
personal loss of roots, embodied by the recent deaths of her mother 
and brother. However, as an insider, Ashour, by contrast, begins her 
autobiography with a November 2010 scene that documents the 
academic activism of the March 9 Group in the two months prior to 
the January revolution. Depicting the university as a space for agency, 
political mobility and activism, Ashour represents her self-
determination and struggle against institutional repression, 
bureaucracy and state authority. The recollected episode culminates in 
the sixty four year old Ashour being beaten, amongst other academics, 
by the thugs inside the university campus. The scene that caused 
tremendous rage amongst many university scholars then became the 
subject of social media and television networks. The struggle on her 
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part, as well as on the part of those academics to reclaim academic 
space, paved the ground for the coming of the revolution. Ashour’s 
counter narrative subverts the official narrative propagated by the state 
media; the circulated discourse was that the academic professors were 
strangers and trespassers, accused of committing acts of ‘thuggery’ 
and vandalism.84 Documenting her resistance, she quotes the letter she 
wrote in response to the oppression of authority: 
 
The declaration of the President of the University is motivated by 
security vision which dictates that every individual, be it a student or a 
professor, should be confined to an assigned space. It, nonetheless, 
regards those who dare to step out of it as transgressors, strangers and 
sneaking minorities. Such a perception, does not only signify a 
captivating perspective that divides the society and its institutions into 
small prisons, but, more importantly, deconstructs the idea of a 
university altogether.85  
 
Ashour’s personal/political academic experience is followed by the 
attempts of the president of the university and the Minister of 
Education to break her will by depriving her of the right to medical 
leave; a thing she rejects. The oppression Soueif used to experience in 
her country leading to her detachment and alienation has, by contrast, 
a different impact on Ashour. The nation’s sick body has its impact on 
Ashour’s body, pinpointed by Ashour herself. In one of her 
interviews, Ashour admits: 
 
Sometimes I have the illusion that I fall ill for psychological reasons. 
In 1991, after the bombardment of Iraq, I got a liver infection and I 
was, and still am convinced, that this was bound to happen. In October 
when they conferred in Madrid, I was very ill; I couldn’t get out of 
bed. That’s roughly the time when the book Granada was written.86  
 
Ashour highlights how her medical investigations preceding the 
diagnosis of her malignant brain tumor synchronized with her 
brother’s malady and death. Dying on his sixty seventh birthday, the 
eldest brother brings to her mind the traumatic memory of the 1967 
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war; a historical date that is engraved in the collective consciousness 
of the Arabs. In chapter three, Ashour writes: 
 
Six days later, Tarek passed away; he died on his 67th birthday… I 
stopped at that date and almost told myself…something about our 
relation with that murderous date. In June 1967, Tarek was not yet 
twenty-four years old when he suffered from pleural effusion and was 
bedridden for weeks. Regardless of any medical opinion, I associated 
his illness with his grief over the loss of thousands of his own 
generation; some of whom were friends and acquaintances who were 
deported to Sinai and never got back. Later, in September 1981, I was 
deeply convinced of that when I fell sick with the same disease 
following Sadat’s famous campaign in which he incarcerated 1536 
oppositional figures, including many of my friends. At that time, I was 
abroad with my husband, compelled by health problems to have two 
consecutive surgeries.87 
 
Ashour’s oppositional stance towards Sadat’s policy is similarly 
adopted by Soueif. In her 2014 edition, Soueif adds a part entitled ‘A 
Brief and Necessary History’ to her memoir.88 Critiquing Sadat’s era 
and tactics that culminated in the increase of oppression, the rise of 
Islamists, and the stronger grip both USA and Israel have over Egypt 
in the name of the peace process, she writes: 
 
Sadat’s overall project was to remove Egypt from the nonaligned 
camp, to adopt the free market capitalism, and to make peace with 
Israel. To do all this, he needed to discredit the Nasser era and dis-
empower the Left, the Nasserites, and the Progressives. The 
instrument he chose was the Muslim Brotherhood.89 
 
The use of political Islam as an oppressive tactic utilized by both 
the Egyptian regime and the external imperial powers against the 
masses in times of political instability is a major point highlighted. 
The US similarly figures in Ashour’s autobiography as an imperial 
power. However, the space she travels to seeking medical help is 
transformed by the whole resistant family into a space for agency. 
Joining her son Tamim, a lecturer of political science at Georgetown 
University, she depicts the image of a family desperate to go to Egypt 
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at such a crucial moment of time. Tamim’s famous mobilizing poem 
‘The People of Egypt’, broadcast to the whole world on 27th January 
2011, takes its moment of utterance in the US. Ashour realizes the 
sharp gap between generations through comparing her revolutionary 
feelings to those of her son. Filled with anxiety about three lines in his 
poem where he condemns those who do not participate in the Tahrir 
demonstrations as traitors, she advises him to delete them. Later she 
realizes the power of those same lines in mobilizing passive Egyptians 
to take to the streets. It is here that she confesses: ‘I’m a woman in her 
sixties who does not necessarily possess the wisdom of the youth who 
participate in the revolution; some are as old as her children and others 
may be as her grandchildren’.90  
Ashour, thus, testifies to the power of the youth as the leaders of 
the revolution who have accomplished what their predecessors failed 
to do. Though Ashour constantly associates herself with old age, her 
actions betray her words as her resistance and vitality despite 
hardships never betray her. Soueif, by contrast, never ruminates on old 
age; on the contrary, we see her endeavors to merge with the youth 
and act the role Ashour has always assumed and from which she has 
for so long been deprived. 
On the 9th February 2011, Ashour is under anesthesia following her 
surgery. Her very first words when she is struggling to get back to 
consciousness, as her husband Mourid later tells her, delineate her 
deep down worries about the youth of the revolution. ‘Did they beat 
the kids?’,91 is the question she asks Mourid, casting light on her 
image as a mother of all the youth and martyrs of the revolution. In 
the intensive care unit, she recites lines from an Afro-American song 
to the Afro-American nurse that sum up the US imperial history of 
slavery. Exchanging roles, Ashour the mother becomes an exiled lost 
orphan; a child slave yearning for home and roots: 
 
Sometimes I feel like a motherless child 
A long way from home 
Sometimes I feel like I’m almost gone 
A long way from home.92 
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The bedridden Ashour transforms her desperate ailing voice, her 
sense of alienation and anguish, and the hospital she is in through her 
cultural memory into a voice and a space of resistance to oppression 
and authority. The two failed brain surgeries followed by a third she 
undergoes to eliminate the tumor run parallel to the nation’s surgery to 
deracinate Mubarak. The sense of sorrow she experiences for not 
being physically part of the revolution and her nostalgia for the Square 
and the people are documented in another chapter of her 
autobiography. In contrast to Soueif who struggles to reclaim 
space/self, Ashour psychologically embraces home wherever she 
goes. Assuming a bird’s eye view, the nostalgic activist plays the role 
she misses of the mobilizing mother of the revolutionaries. In her 
mental map, her home becomes the nation’s home; the nest where the 
protesters as flocking birds seek refuge. 
The narrative thus is filled with stories within stories in which 
Ashour assumes multiple roles. As a second Shehrezad, she struggles 
with death, power and authority and casts a ‘mythical’ framework on 
the revolution and its aftermath.93 Ashour, the human being, the 
activist and the narrator, stops in the middle of both experiences, the 
personal and the political, and assumes the role of the scholar of 
literature to educate the Arab reader in Western and American culture 
by referring to world museums, paintings and literature amongst other 
things. Ashour, the member of the Committee for Protecting National 
Culture, to whom history, geography, Arabic culture and language are 
tools of resistance that constitute the borders of the self, educates her 
reader in the history of space. Meticulously selecting space that 
conjures up memories, Ashour becomes the reservoir of Egypt’s 
culture and identity. 
Ashour finally arrives at Cairo on the 24th May, 2011. Her first visit 
to Tahrir Square takes place on the 26th May, the day of her birthday, 
when she documents the euphoric spirit that envelops her as part of a 
collectivity. Mapping the revolutionary surroundings, she takes the 
reader on a guided tour from her home to the Square. Her excitement 
and longing for the energizing space, as well as her perception of the 
national ground fertilized by the people’s dreams of freedom, equality 
and dignity, are documented as follows:  
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The street is the same, with its permanent things and its people. What 
is new? I count on my fingers: The new thing is that there are 
passersby like me who head to the Square …because it is the Square. 
They will go to it on Friday to raise the flag and their voices and 
demand. I count again. The new things are the vendors at its entrance 
who do not sell socks or ordinary underclothes but big and small 
banners and flags of Egypt, Palestine and Tunisia… The new thing in 
the Square is the martyrs’ blood absorbed by its ground, or maybe not 
yet absorbed but stuck between its exterior and interior ground, 
waiting to permeate it and shape its soil.94  
 
Driven by euphoria, Ashour weaves more stories within stories as 
she documents the testimonies of revolutionaries from all walks of 
life. Unlike Soueif, the threat she is exposed to in the Square stems 
from her ailing body. As she puts it, her visits to the Square have to be 
taken with precaution as she has to spread ointment on the place of her 
surgery to avoid the sun. Nonetheless, she is adamant to assume her 
role in the collectivity and participate in the demonstrations. Holding a 
much longer flag than herself and dressed in a big, funny hat, she 
embarks on her consecutive resistant visits to the Square for months 
when things start to get dismal and bleak. 
 
A Fragmenting Strategy 
The tactics utilized by the regime to overpower the masses and 
regain power are examined by both writers. First, the books document 
the gradual remapping of space in the post revolution era. The 
construction of walls for security reasons is delineated by both as a 
constant attempt on behalf of authority to fragment the demonstrators 
and the Ultras, and abort the revolution. Ashour represents a more 
detailed description of the changed map. Walls are represented by her 
as a kind of occupation, casting the whole relation between the 
demonstrators and authority in the light of the Palestinian-Israeli 
condition. Like the walls constructed by Israelis to imprison 
Palestinians in their limited space, the demonstrators down town are 
not allowed free movement in space (pp. 198, 204). However, walls 
are resisted and deconstructed through the demonstrators’ creativity 
and the liberating graffiti that bring life and freedom to death and 
imprisonment. Ashour’s individual-collective self struggles over space 
and rights. Her narrative rewrites ‘the official narrative’ that, she 
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believes, fabricates lies and stereotypes the demonstrators as thugs 
who destroy and burn their country (p. 202). Voicing her view of the 
whole thing, Ashour interprets the tactics and policy implemented in 
the post revolution era in the light of a ‘conspiracy theory’ (p. 211). 
Women’s role in the nationalist narrative is not the major focus of 
both writers but is intricately interwoven as part of the struggle of the 
whole nation. In an interview on April 2010 the two writers highlight 
their perspective. Ashour declares,  
 
Feminism for us is much more than ideas, it is a lived experience…So 
we wouldn’t like to confine ourselves to writing about women or 
writing about women’s issues. I always think one of the great things 
about literature is that it can transcend gender.95  
 
Similarly, Soueif points out,  
 
I suppose neither Radwa nor I have had problems about being 
women… issues that impact women have to do with issues that impact 
wider society. When society has problems, then they tend to be played 
out on women. When there is a recession, it is women who suffer the 
most. So the answer is to look at society as a whole.96  
 
Seen in the previous light, utilizing women’s bodies as a medium 
to repress the masses is the second tactic exposed and documented in 
the selected works; the story of the girl who was subjected to the 
virginity test, for example, is shared in common.97 However, Ashour, 
in contrast to Soueif, dedicates a whole chapter to document her 
journey to the girl’s village to represent a detailed counter narrative (p. 
224). As Ashour puts it, 
 
It is reiterated that the number of civilians hired by the State Security 
Police, (I mean thugs), amounts to 300, 000. Even if this number is 
exaggerated, there is, definitely, an army of thugs whose wide and 
extended task involves stereotypical harassment in a manner that 
stigmatizes the icons and spaces of the revolution so that the Tahrir 
Square becomes desolate and bleak and the university the abode of 
violence.98 
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Soueif, similarly voices the same conviction. In an interview she 
states,  
 
Women were very careful to say that they were taking part in the 
revolution as citizens. Social problems such as harassment on the 
streets vanished during the eighteen days. They’re back now. What is 
new is the way women respond. There’s graffiti, stickers, women 
taking self-defense classes, so the fight back is on (The NS 
Interview).99 
 
In their narratives, both writers document their rejection and 
critique of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the military in power. In 
chapter 25 (pp. 291-308), Ashour utilizes her knowledge of visual 
culture to cast the nationalist narrative in a global historical light (p. 
295) through writing a detailed description of Picasso’s black and 
white painting ‘Guernica’. The painting that was produced in response 
to the Spanish Civil War has become a symbol of the suffering of the 
masses at the hands of oppressive powers as well as a condemnation 
of and a struggle against oppression. Picasso’s lines and ‘symbolism’, 
Ashour writes, ‘go back to the Pharaonic times’ (p. 295). The depicted 
painting takes the reader to the down town map and the battle field. 
Ashour spots Mohamed Mahmoud Street, known then as ‘The Eyes of 
Liberty Street’ where many young people lost their eyesight, and Qasr 
Edoubara Church, located near to Omar Makram Mosque, where the 
makeshift hospital moved to (p. 299). The suffering, deaths of martyrs 
like Mina Daniel and struggle of Egyptians are, therefore, associated 
with the historical suffering and struggle of the Spanish people. 
Testimonies of revolutionaries like Nawara Negm, Malek Adly and 
Mohamed Abulgheit are meticulously documented (pp. 304-307). 
Picasso’s painting is followed by the Mexican artist David Alfaro 
Siqueiros’ famous mural ‘Tropical America’ in relation to the graffiti 
of the revolution in chapter 26. Time and again global culture is 
utilized by Ashour to symbolize the suffering of the Egyptians and the 
power of the art of resistance to empower the people and document 
history (pp. 311-322).  
As an academic and activist, Ashour pinpoints the university as a 
major space subjected to a long history of repression. In chapter 13 of 
her autobiography, for instance, she takes the reader on a historical 
journey into the Zaafarana Palace, the whereabouts of the Ain Shams 
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University administration, highlighting the distant colonial past 
overshadowing the postcolonial present. The historical oppression of 
the university students culminates at the end of the chapter in 
memorizing the martyrs throughout the ages, starting from the martyrs 
of the 1935 Students’ Uprising to the 2011 martyrs like Alaa 
Abdelhady and Abulhasan Ibrahim (p. 158). The title of the chapter 
‘al-Safran (al-Zaʿfarān)’ (p. 145), ‘Saffron’, is meticulously selected 
to undermine and disempower the oppressive authoritarian space. The 
space is transformed into a space for agency that will immortalize the 
martyrs who are the saffron of all ages: ‘I tell myself, as long as the 
land has memory, then the saffron must have memory; … it (the 
Zaafrana Palace) no longer belongs to an old lady living in a palace, 
but to the amazing youth, emerging despite departure’ (p. 159). 
The similarities and differences between the symbolic conclusions 
of both narratives are worth mentioning. In their analysis of Soueif’s 
2012 memoir, critics rightly highlight the structure of the first edition 
as it begins and ends with the revolution while the dark period of the 
violation of human rights is compressed in the middle.100 Clarifying 
her perspective, Soueif states, ‘I believe optimism is a duty’.101 Kamal 
rightly points out that the first edition ends with Mubarak’s ousting on 
11th February 2011, followed by an epilogue that comprises the voices 
of her nieces, nephew and son, to whom she dedicates the 2012 
edition, seeing them as the real revolutionaries.102 Thus, despite her 
recognition of the violations of human rights and the changed nature 
of Tahrir Square occupied by Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Soueif chooses to end her 2012 edition with Tahrir Square and her 
son’s optimistic vision of the revolution, anticipating a promising 
democratic future: ‘Inclusive, inventive, open-source, modern, 
peaceful, just, communal, unified and focused. A set of ideals on 
which to build a national politics’.103 
As a temporal map for public consciousness, her 2014 
edition/manifesto, by contrast, ends with what she entitles ‘A Brief 
and Necessary History’.104 Documenting the history of oppression, 
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Soueif begins with the 16th century defeat of Mameluk kings at the 
hands of the Ottoman Turks, passing through French and British 
occupation, Nasser and Sadat’s Egypt, and ending with the Mubarak 
era. Her second edition comprises two more chapters. ‘Revolution II, 
Eighteen Days Were Never Enough, October 2012’105 starts from 
where she has stopped at in the first edition, her nephew’s trial at the 
military court in October 2011. The second part she adds is 
‘Revolution III: Postscript, 31th July 2013’106 in which Soueif, the 
political commentator, analyses the gloomy and tragic period of 
Morsi’s rule and failure: ‘The economic situation worsened and Morsi 
outdid Mubarak in opacity and cronyism’.107 
It is worth noting that the epilogue and voices of the young 
revolutionaries previously published in the 2012 edition are no longer 
included in the 2014 edition, signaling a changed period that has 
witnessed the silencing of those voices by the collective. Hence, the 
juxtaposed tone between both editions is detectable. Soueif’s deep 
anxiety about a dictatorial future that threatens Revolution III, and her 
anxiety about the overpowering fingerprints of the 
counterrevolutionary forces are conspicuously fleshed out as she 
begins the last part, 31th July 2013, with her words, ‘waiting for 
Armageddon. Hope it won’t come’.108 The detachment from the 
collective self, repulsion from and condemnation of a nationalist 
discourse she and her family believe to be oppressive, are signaled by 
her choice of the sea as a setting she chooses to end her narrative with. 
Therefore, while in the first edition the nationalist narrative takes its 
point of departure from the river in Cairo and culminates in the ground 
of Tahrir Square, consolidating the continuity of the struggle and the 
deeply entrenched aims of the revolution, the journey of the self in the 
2014 edition begins with the river in Cairo and ends at the ‘sea’, 
located ‘seventy kilometers west of Alexandria’.109 Soueif delineates 
herself and her family members as a collectivity deracinated from the 
Tahrir nationalist narrative and setting themselves against both the 
masses and the regime: ‘We have persuaded ourselves to take three 
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days out of Cairo; away from the jingoism and army-worship of a 
Tahrir where we don’t, for the moment, feel we belong’.110  
The second edition’s changed spatial politics of water-land-water 
is, thus, rendered in cyclical terms as the state of fluidity prevails. To 
Soueif, Cairo becomes again oppressive and repulsive. The 
transformation of the definite article in ‘the Tahrir Square’ into the 
indefinite ‘a’ in ‘a Tahrir’ in the previous sentence signals her vision 
of the fragmented nationalist discourse, the splitting of the 
collectivity, and hence the end of the myth of the 2011 ‘Tahrir Square’ 
as the ‘Holy Grail’,111 the epicenter of the revolution.  
Nonetheless, the optimism and perseverance of the intellectual-
activist still prevails. As she puts it in her 2012 edition, ‘A revolution 
is a process, not an event… Our Egyptian revolution is ongoing. And 
its path has not been smooth. How could it have been when the 
interests we are seeking to break free of are so powerful and so 
pervasive?’ (p. xiv). The detached space the family occupies at the 
end is depicted as a therapeutic haven and an energizing space 
intrinsic for honing their revolutionary spirit. ‘We’ll be back on the 
streets, helping our revolution in its difficult path’ (p. 226), she writes. 
As an intellectual, Soueif believes that the people’s digression from 
the goals of the revolution is but a temporary phase. Her concluding 
words thus consolidate her rejection of both, ‘military rule’ and ‘the 
rule of the Brotherhood’. The 2014 edition, in contrast to 2012, opens 
and ends with the martyrs; dedicated to them at the beginning and 
glorifying them in the concluding sentences: ‘And glory to our 
martyrs forever’. Soueif’s narrative is in this light a manifesto, a 
declaration of the rights of the citizens and the martyrs inscribed by 
their ‘blood’ (p. 226). The martyrs as ‘the still centre’ in the 2012 
edition (p. 181) are given voice in the beginning and end of her second 
edition in which Soueif speaks the truth, as she sees it, to both power 
and the people. 
Ashour opens and ends her book with home, family and children. 
Her indoor setting that stands for roots and solidity is set in contrast to 
Soueif’s space that signifies fluidity. On the 9th May 2013, things get 
more tragic. Wrestling with a fragmented world and an active brain 
tumor, she, nonetheless, retains her militant, rebellious and obstinate 
spirit. Hope and optimism are similarly her resistant weapons that 
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energize and empower her and the readers in the darkest moments. 
She writes: 
Despite everything, life regenerates itself … This is my belief, and 
this was how in the darkest moments before the revolution I believed 
that things would never be the same. It was consolidated when the 
youth took to the streets on the 25th January … and the demonstrations 
culminated in the revolution. Though the direction has been 
destabilized, my belief has not been shaken…because at the end life 
wins, though it shows the opposite; and because human beings are 
mature, no matter how confused and disturbed they get, or how their 
steps falter;…and because endings are not endings; they intermingle 
with new beginnings. Now, I do not think of my father, mother and 
their offspring…I expand in my talk to encompass all the martyrs… 
and I know that their tombs… will keep on sending underground 
messages that permeate the earth and water the preserved orchard, 
surprising us with its product.112 
 
In the light of my argument, water, hospitals and bridges are 
represented by both intellectuals as major spaces that embody and 
symbolize the state of inbetweenness felt by both self and nation, its 
oppression and resistance. The construction and reconstruction of the 
self/identity run against the recurrent reference to different hospitals in 
relation to different generations. The hospitals where Ashour, the 
representative of the older generation, struggles to receive treatment 
abroad and in Egypt run parallel to the makeshift hospital in Tahrir 
Square. The makeshift hospital is depicted by both writers as a space 
for agency that witnesses the struggle of the second generation 
represented by the youth of the revolution, the martyrs, as well as the 
Egyptian doctors/activists, led by Mona Mina, the founder of the 
group Physicians without Rights. The hospital where Soueif was born 
is recurrently referred to all through and is spotted as a major space on 
the map she attaches to her memoir.  
Moreover, hospitals in the selected works witness the birthplace of 
the new generation, symbolizing hope in the future. The hospital 
features in the second part, Revolution II, Soueif adds to the 2014 
edition. The celebration of Alaa’s new born son takes place in Tora 
prison while Alaa is still detained under Morsi’s rule. The prison is 
transformed through the celebration of birth into a space for agency. 
Soueif is depicted documenting history on her computer and 
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communicating with the outside world; her son Omar is likewise 
filming the whole scene. Though Ashour, by contrast, experiences 
pain in hospitals and associates the space with memories of Mahmoud 
Darwish, Mohamed Anis (Muḥammad Anīs) and Frantz Fanon, 
figures of resistance who all died in hospitals following major 
operations,113 she, nonetheless, similarly, ends her autobiography with 
a meeting of the different generations of her family at her parents’ 
home. Like Soueif’s description of her sister’s grandchild flying his 
kite with the help of his grandfather as his tutor and guide at the end 
of her 2014 edition,114 Ashour ends with a detailed description of the 
scene of her brother’s grandchild taught how to play the drum by her 
son Tamim.115 Ashour meticulously selects the energized space that 
speaks of life and continuity to voice her final words that subvert 
death and defeat.  
 
Conclusion 
In the light of what has been put forward, the selected works can be 
read as autobiographical manifestos that interweave the intellectuals’ 
individual identities with a collective national identity subjugated to a 
long history of political repression, violation of human and citizenship 
rights. The narratives represent the intellectuals’ perspective of truth 
and document the resistance and repression of the activists in the post 
revolution period. In a nutshell, the texts disseminate an oppositional 
discourse to mobilize the readers. In contrast to Soueif’s voice, 
Ashour’s narrative represents not only her voice but the global voices 
of the marginalized and silenced. Soueif’s comments on Ashour’s 
autobiography, her role as a revolutionary, a storyteller, and her 
individual-collective and larger than life self are worth mentioning in 
this respect. In a May 2014 article in Al-Shorouk newspaper, Soueif 
writes:  
 
Radwa’s self expands to envelop not only her family, her loved ones, 
her students and work, but also the poems of poets, the drawings of 
artists, the earth’s stones, the people’s buildings, and human history at 
large. 
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Highlighting the resistant discourse disseminated by Ashour in her 
2013 autobiography, intertwined with her humanism, Soueif adds, ‘I 
feel happy and proud that Radwa represents me’. From her 
perspective, Ashour is the guide, mentor, and mother of Egyptians. 
Her narrative, she adds, is thus a ‘maternal, educational, revolutionary 
and artistic act’ (Athqal min jabal). 
Despite the tragic air that has enveloped the whole transitional 
period, the selected manifestos foreground hope as a strategy that 
perpetuates the belief in the historical regeneration of more activists. 
Hence, the martyrs occupy the center of both nationalist narratives as 
the seeds that will shoot more trees of resistance. Smith’s words are 
illuminating in this respect:  
 
The “I” writes under the sign of hope and what Helene Cixous calls 
“the very possibility of change”,… the manifesto attempts to actively 
position the subject in a potentially liberated future distanced from the 
constraining and oppressive identifications inherent in the everyday 
practices of the Ancien régime.  
 
The fluidity of time and space characteristic of the manifesto, thus, 
attests to the look ‘forward’ in the affirmative positivity of its politics 
to new spaces of subjectivity’.116 
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Abstract 
In the wake of the 25th January 2011 revolution and the ensuing uprisings, 
Egyptian cities became platforms for political activism. Henri Lefebvre, David 
Harvey and others argue the importance of urban space for political activism. For 
Lefebvre, the centrality of urban space allows for political action, as Harvey argues, 
of a larger predominant population (2013). It is the congregation of this predominant 
population that the government constantly fears and tries to fight by denying it 
access to that space which rightfully belongs to it. In this paper, I argue that the 
youth movement of the 25th January revolution set out to reclaim urban public space 
through a cultural movement that depended on the utilization of different forms of 
popular culture, from graffiti to beautifying the city and coloring through corruption 
initiatives, from street fairs to public concerts and popular performances. Through 
these and other forms of popular culture, the younger generation attempts to give 
birth to a new city and sustain a platform for political engagement. In the process 
they ultimately clash with an older generation that tries to forestall development, and 
maintain a corrupt status quo. 
 
Introduction 
In Chloe, a great city, the people who move through the streets are all 
strangers. At each encounter, they imagine a thousand things about 
one another; meetings which could take place between them, 
conversations, surprises, caresses, bites. But no one greets anyone; 
eyes lock for a second, then dart away, seeking other eyes, never 
stopping.1 
 
I close my eyes and Italo Calvino’s description of his invisible 
cities brings to mind Cairo, and just as Venice remains Marco Polo’s 
port of reference, Cairo, the city victorious, is mine. For the longest 
                                                 
1 Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, Harcourt Brace & Company, New York-London, 
1972, p. 51. 
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time, Egyptians have had to maneuver their way around their cities, 
constantly facing blocked roads, barricaded streets, fenced gates, and 
closed off parks, and continually negotiating access to both officially 
restricted areas as well as to subtle exclusion from upscale urban places 
as in gated communities, private clubs, upmarket shopping centers, etc. 
Consequently, the space they manage to craft for themselves in the 
face of this blocked landscape is tinted with feelings of estrangement, 
neglect, and a sense of uncaring towards both the place they occupy 
and the fellow citizens who share the same space with them. This is 
manifested in the increased level of uncleanliness, waste trash visible 
everywhere on the streets, obvious signs of ugliness in the loss of 
architectural harmony, scarce public recreational facilities, and above 
all a feeling of disrespect for the rights of citizens for a clean, 
aesthetically beautiful and congenial life.  
In ‘City Watching: Closed Circuit Television Surveillance in Public 
Spaces’, Nicholas R. Fyfe and Jon Bannister argue that the idea of 
urban public space implies citizens’ unrestricted access and right of 
way to places,2 a notion that is arguably problematic for two reasons. 
First, places accommodate different groups of people at different 
historical times; and second, unrestricted access or what is generally 
perceived as the democratization of public space is constantly met by 
attempts from the state to protect public places from citizens for 
reasons pertaining to physical security.3 Both reasons result in the loss 
of public access and the marginalization of unwanted groups of 
people. While successful access to public space, it has been argued, 
nurtures the growth of public life and creates a healthy communal 
environment that allows for social, cultural, and political expression, 
the restriction of access to public space, on the other hand, invariably 
creates an atmosphere of repression whereby citizens’ rights are 
usurped under the pretext of the welfare and security of the nation. 
Eventually, the protection and preservation of space itself becomes 
more important than the citizen who, as a result of such measures, 
finds himself/herself partaking in the pseudo protection of the space at 
the expense of his/her own rights and needs.  
                                                 
2 N.R. Fyfe - J. Bannister, ‘City Watching: Closed Circuit Television 
Surveillance in Public Spaces’, in Area 28 (1996), pp. 37-46. 
3 For more information on this topic see M. Davis, The City of Quartz: 
Excavating the Future of Los Angeles, Vintage, New York, 1990 and S. Zukin, The 
Cultures of Cities, Blackwell, Cambridge-Oxford,1995. 
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For the past thirty years or more, Egypt has witnessed both subtle 
and blatant attempts to confiscate public space, and limit people’s 
access to shared platforms that would foster a sense of communal 
life while retaining individual personal space. Such attempts were 
meant to restrict the coming together of citizens for fear that such 
congregations may initiate expressions of dissent against an 
authoritarian regime that has worked hard on separating people to 
disempower them, and, consequently, maintain control over them. 
The loss of civic sites for cultural and political expression, I would 
argue, not only created a sense of isolation where people ceased to 
be aware of the existence of fellow citizens who are just as entitled 
as they are to the same rights but perhaps, more importantly, it has 
led to the loss of the communal sense that unites people who live 
together and occupy the same space, and consequently to a loss of 
identity. In this essay, I discuss some of the initiatives undertaken to 
reclaim urban space in Egypt after the 25th January revolution 
through creative art projects that bring people together, and 
challenge the attempts of the state to confiscate voices of dissent by 
limiting their access to public spaces. I examine several of these 
projects, and focus on the example of El Fan Midan (Art is a 
Square), arguing that the ensuing struggle over reclaimed space is 
indicative of a deeper struggle between the old guards of the deposed 
regime and the new forces of change that strive to overcome the 
counter revolution. 
In the few years leading up to the 25th January 2011 revolution, a 
number of cultural initiatives taking place in, and making use of, 
public space mainly in Cairo and other major cities became quite 
noticeable as a new phenomenon quite uncommon to the Egyptian 
landscape, and unfamiliar to its citizens. For the first time musical 
bands would be seen performing on the streets of Cairo. The soft rock 
band Wust el Balad (Downtown Cairo), for example, which was 
formed in 1999 by a group of young musicians started performing the 
popular songs of Sayed Darwish, the famous Alexandrian musician, 
on the streets of downtown Cairo. This was a very uncommon sight 
then. The band, which takes its name from the Cairo downtown area 
itself, was able to do so because of the recent renovation projects in 
Downtown Cairo, turning streets into pedestrian areas, and 
refurbishing buildings, shops, and restaurants that have long suffered 
from neglect and decline, and thereby creating an open-air museum 
accessible to ordinary people who visit downtown for business and 
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pleasure.4 Other cultural initiatives which utilized public space back in 
2007 was the inauguration of El Korba annual street festival in the 
old, prestigious district of Heliopolis. The modern day festival of 
street art and performances created a space for self-expression where, 
according to its organizers, the ‘common factor was the energy that 
filled the air, the smile on every face adult or a child’.5 
In 2008, graffiti artist, Aya Tarek, would initiate the ‘Alex Street 
Art’ project with a group of young artists based in Alexandria ‘to 
build an organised Egyptian street-art movement’,6 since in her own 
words the ‘majority of Egyptians have never been to an art gallery in 
their lives’.7 She explains that ‘[a]rt should not be limited, it should be 
open to everyone, and so if Egyptians still fail to reach art, we will 
bring art to them, to a wall just around the corner’.8  
Ahmed Abdallah would feature the initiative in his 2010 film 
Microphone, documenting the underground artistic and musical youth 
movement in Alexandria. Abdallah explains that Microphone was 
inspired by the graffiti on the walls facing the Alexandria ‘cornice’ 
which 
 
Seemed to conjure up the image of a mental battle-expressed in 
writing and in drawing-between the street artists and their 
intended audiences. Some messages encouraged you to restrain 
yourself and use your head while others asked you to rebel.9 
 
In spite of their different agendas and political orientation, these 
examples of cultural intervention attempted to infiltrate the blocked 
landscape of Egypt. While some were able to reach out to fellow 
citizens like Wust el Balad band who sang of ordinary people crossing 
paths daily in downtown Cairo, and so were able to connect with 
them, other examples were not so successful. El Korba festival, for 
                                                 
4 For further discussion on this point see ‘Alismaelia’, www.al-ismaelia.com. 
5 ‘El Korba Festival 2007: Talk about Positive Energy’, in Nermeena, 17/3/2007, 
https://nerro.wordpress.com/2007/03/17/el-korba-festival-2007-talk-about-positive-
energy/ (access 2/12/2016). 
6 Heba Habib, ‘Vigilante Art - Graffiti in Egypt’, in Ahramonline, 1/11/2010, in 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/5/25/117/Arts--Culture/Visual-Art/Vigilan 
te-art--Graffiti-in-Egypt.aspx (access 2/12/2016). 
7 Habib, Ahramonline. 
8 Ib. 
9 An online interview with Ahmed Abdallah, the director of the film 
Michrophone in http://youtu.be/JL5Qg8JyEKg (access 2/12/2016). 
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example, was perceived as creating an exclusive space that 
accommodates the gentrified and fails to connect with ordinary 
people, causing a wider rift in the Egyptian social fabric. Despite these 
differences in perspective though, it is interesting that most of these 
early initiatives to reclaim public space were undertaken by Egyptian 
youth.   
In the wake of the Arab spring, public space emerged as a key 
player in the revolutions and uprisings that overtook the region. From 
Tahrir Square all the way to Pearl monument, Habib Bourgiba 
Avenue, Green Square, and Gezi Park, young people came together 
from all walks of life overcoming the fear that has kept them apart and 
reclaiming, in their own way, the very space from which they have 
been constantly pushed away, opening it up for fellow citizens who 
responded in turn by joining in, and lending their support. Art was 
certainly one of the tools they used to reclaim space. I argue that what 
has been dubbed as the cultural revolution which accompanied the 25th 
January 2011 revolution and manifested itself in overtaking, 
‘occupying’, and manipulating urban space to enforce change, has in 
fact heralded the revolution rather than being its by-product. I’ve 
based this reading on Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist stance regarding urban 
revolution and the social production of space, where he maintains that 
any revolution is dependent upon an urban revolution and they both 
depend upon a revolution of everyday life. Lefebvre argues that ‘a 
revolution takes place when and only when, in such a society, people 
can no longer lead their everyday lives’.10  
Aya Tarek’s graffiti initiative in Alexandria draws upon this notion 
when she explains her strategy in subverting state hegemony and 
making art available to everybody. She also makes the connection 
between physical and virtual public space as alternative and 
‘alternating’ sites of resistance that lead to the reconfiguration of the 
meaning of public space and of activism.11 Tarek explains that 
possibilities of transferring graffiti work to the virtual public space of 
various social media platforms allows for a different kind of exposure 
and interaction to take place. 
In the following section, I will attempt to envision a working 
definition that takes into consideration Lefebvre’s idea of the urban 
                                                 
10 H. Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, Athlone Press, London, 
2000, p. 32. 
11 A. Tarek, Words of Women from the Egyptian Revolution Episode 11, 
http://youtu.be/gI1sBiWaPhM (access 30/11/2016). 
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revolution and Charles Landry’s concept of the Creative City and 
offer a reading of the intersection of art and urban space in the context 
of the pre and post Egyptian revolution. In The Production of Space, 
Lefebvre explains that every city produces its own space, that space is 
a social product which affects spatial practices and perceptions, and 
‘serves as a tool of thought and of action’.12 He argues that change 
cannot happen without changing the very space where it occurs, and 
that new social relations require in turn new space. The production of 
space he maintains is ‘a means of control, and hence of domination, of 
power’.13 We see this very clearly, as I explained above, in the way 
the state controls access to public space, whereby if people want to 
subvert this control, as in the case of Aya Tarek for example, they 
need to engage in the production of their own space.  
Lefebvre argues further that urban reality cannot exist without a 
center, a gathering, or an encounter of the subjects and objects that 
exist within that space. Centrality therefore becomes crucial to 
political activism, since free dialogue ensues only when groups and 
classes ‘succeed in meeting face to face’,14 achieving what the state 
tries to control at all costs.  
Charles Landry in The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban 
Innovators also emphasizes the importance of public space as a 
platform for citizens to meet, interact, and exchange ideas. He 
propagates the notion of increasing urban quality through what he 
calls ‘soft creative infrastructure’ which he defines as an ‘overall 
mental infrastructure and mindset of the city. This is the way in which 
a city approaches opportunities and problems’.15 This is different from 
hard infrastructure which is concerned with the construction of roads, 
houses, buildings, etc. The soft creative infrastructure instead 
highlights the innovative role of the city planner in creating such a 
space, and the collaborative nature of this process. This city, 
according to Landry, ‘wants dynamic thinkers – creators as well as 
implementers as creativity is not only about having ideas, it is about 
making them happen too’.16 Towards this end, Landry highlights five 
                                                 
12 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Blackwell, Oxford-Cambridge, 1991, 
p. 26. 
13 Ib., p. 26. 
14 Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, p. 185. 
15 C. Landry, The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators, Comedia, 
London, 2000, p. xxiv. 
16 Ib., p. xxiiii. 
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key attributes which fashion the creative city of imagination: curiosity, 
imagination, creativity, innovation and invention. Based on Lefebvre 
and Landry’s reading of urban space as a center for political, social 
and cultural interaction, art becomes a means of creating a rupture in 
the fabric of an otherwise confiscated public space with the aim of 
producing alternative sites, thus gaining power over the state. The 
creative city becomes a place where innovative citizens engage in the 
counter production of alternative public space relying on such 
attributes as outlined by Landry: curiosity, imagination, creativity, 
innovation, and invention. If we look back at the first eighteen days of 
the 25th January 2011 revolution, we see this manifested in the 
occupation of Tahrir square and its transformation into a makeshift 
creative city through graffiti work, street art, performances, concerts, 
etc. The newly forged space allowed citizens from different walks of 
life to come together face to face, and engage in creative and 
innovative expressions of dissent against the ruling regime. These 
peaceful expressions which called out for the downfall of the regime 
were more powerful and threatening than any violent encounter 
between the protestors and the security forces because they succeeded 
in subverting the power of the state.  
The revitalized urban space which emerged after the first wave of 
the 25th January revolution, and the continued ability of the people to 
reclaim public places through independent creative initiatives was 
understood by the state as a strong political statement that had more 
power than violent demonstrations. In turn this ensued a struggle over 
the control of urban space. This was clear in the attempts to 
whitewash the graffiti work produced during the revolution, 
sometimes even layering it with state-directed messages to subvert the 
power of the original meaning of the work. Perhaps the most obvious 
example is the attempt to demolish the Mohamed Mahmoud graffiti 
work, which was not only a documentation of the atrocities of the 
regime but also a platform for political expression by those who did 
not necessarily engage in the artistic production of the graffiti, yet 
nevertheless found in the space a means for interacting and 
exchanging political views with fellow citizens. 
Similarly, the ‘No Wall’ project was a creative attempt to subvert 
the erection of walls in downtown Cairo to block the streets leading to 
Tahrir Square. The walls were built by the army in 2012 to circumvent 
demonstrations, and prevent protesters from having access to the 
square. The ‘No Wall’ project was initiated by a group of artists who 
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engaged in the metaphorical removal of these state-erected walls by 
painting a series of landscapes on the slab blocks to open up the 
blocked streets and create an optic illusion whereby you can see a 
continuation of the street (see Morayef for a description of the 
project). As Mohamed El Moshir, one of the artists involved in the 
project, explains ‘[w]e’re simply stating that the streets are open. And 
at the same time, we’re telling a story’.17 In doing this, the artists 
reclaim space in an innovative manner. They are documenting the 
different forms of aggression exercised against protesting voices, and 
also reaching out, at least symbolically, to the people who are trapped 
behind these walls, and who in many cases have limited access to their 
homes, their work, and daily activities. Most of these walls still stand 
but the encouraging images which created a sense of hope trying to 
keep alive the spirit of resistance have been removed by the state, 
leaving instead a blocked landscape. 
‘Coloring through Corruption’, a social awareness campaign 
against corruption, is another example of the power of creativity to 
create a rupture in the fabric of an otherwise confiscated space that 
prevents people from coming together to discuss the issues and 
problems that concern them as fellow citizens sharing the same place. 
The campaign started with a group of artists who decided to paint 
walls, water pipes, plastic fences in different areas of Cairo and other 
cities in Egypt, to draw attention to the different forms of government 
corruption either by stealing people’s money or by forfeiting its role in 
providing state services. Amr Nazeer, the leader of the group explains 
that:  
 
We’re not painting to make life pretty – on the contrary, this is our 
way of drawing your attention to the reality of the situation. The 
government is stealing your money... We’re painting corruption to 
draw people's attention and then tell them our message.18  
 
Indeed, seeing young people on the streets splashing bright color 
on decrepit, old, and crumbling walls, bridges, and public utilities 
draws attention to the idea of corruption which can be seen 
                                                 
17 M. El Dahshan, ‘Art Conquers Walls in Cairo’, in Foreign Policy, 19/3/2012, 
foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/19/art-conquers-walls-in-cairo/ (access 30/11/2016). 
18 ‘Graffiti for a Social Cause: Zeft, Nazeer, Nemo and Mona Lisa Brigades’, in 
Suzeeinthecity, 11/3/2013, https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/graffiti-
for-a-social-cause-zeft-nazeer-nemo-and-mona-lisa-brigades/ (access 30/11/2016). 
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everywhere in Egypt, ‘[c]orruption is black, brown, grey, devoid of 
color’.19 To circumvent the success of the campaign though, the state 
has started its own efforts of, what it perceives as, beautifying Egypt. 
Interestingly, whitewashing graffiti, and sometimes substituting it 
with state-sponsored murals is part of its beautification plans for 
Egypt, and so is the arrest of artists who dare to voice their dissent in 
creative ways that appeal to the masses and therefore bring them 
together.   
The struggle over who controls public urban space is particularly 
clear when it comes to the project of El Fan Midan (Art is a Square). 
The project was initiated in April 2011, two months after the ousting 
of Hosni Mubarak, a time when hopes were still high and the demands 
of the revolution, uppermost of which remains, freedom, human 
dignity, and social justice seemed to be an attainable dream. The 
Independent Culture Coalition, a group of artists from various 
mediums who work together to reshape the Egyptian cultural and 
artistic scene, and create more independent, free of state-control 
platforms, announced, and publicized, the first event of El Fan Midan 
as ‘a cultural celebration in the squares and streets of Egypt’.20 It was 
held on the first Saturday of every month in Midan Abdeen (Abdeen 
Square), and other squares in different cities in Egypt, seeking to 
establish a public cultural dialogue amongst people through sharing 
various forms of art, music, and theater. It was inaugurated in Midan 
Abdeen (Abdeen Square) which is located approximately one and a 
half mile south of Tahrir Square. The square takes its name from 
Abdeen palace which resides in the heart of the square with a public 
garden in front of it. The palace was constructed in 1863 by Khedive 
Ismail as part of his project to modernize Cairo. In 1874, the royal 
family moved to the palace, and the government headquarters, which 
had always been housed in the Citadel of Cairo where the Khedive 
resided, were also transferred to the palace. Eventually the area came 
to be recognized as downtown Cairo. The palace remained the seat of 
the government until 1952 when the military coup of the Free Officers 
brought an end to the monarchy, and Egypt became a republic.  
                                                 
19 ‘Graffiti Artists Color Egypt’s Soul-Crushing Corruption’, Green Prophet, 
16/4/2013, www.greenprophet.com/2013/04/graffiti-artists-color-egypt-corruption/ 
(access 30/11/2016). 
20 D. Hamza - M. Heikal, ‘Egyptians celebrate the revolution with street art’, 
Ahramonline, 3/4/2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/9211.aspx (access 
30/11/2016). 
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Since then, the palace has been recognized as one of the official 
presidential residences, and office of the president of Egypt. Since 
1952, however, the palace has never been used as a presidential 
residence but as an official office particularly during Anwar Sadat’s 
presidency, and also to accommodate visiting foreign dignitaries on 
official visits to Egypt. Ultimately this meant an increased limited 
access to the square as the security forces set up fences and barbed 
wire to control access to the place and prohibit citizens from venturing 
closer to the palace and the public garden. Historically, Abdeen 
Square, being the seat of the government, has been a site of protest since 
the end of the nineteenth century. From Aḥmad ‘Urabi in 1881 to Sa‘d 
Zaghlūl in 1919 to the 1952 events, were all protest movements that 
ended up at the gates of Abdeen palace demanding freedom and 
liberation from the Ottoman and British hegemony. Aḥmad ‘Urabi, an 
Egyptian army officer, would give his infamous speech in front of the 
ruler of Egypt, Khedive Tawfīq (1879-1892), delivering his famous 
words ‘[o]ur mothers bore us free; we were not created as slaves to 
anybody’.  
The choice of Abdeen Square, therefore, as a site for the 
inauguration of El Fan Midan is very significant because of its socio-
historical and political context. Karima Mansour, one of the 
organizers of El Fan Midan, explains that the notion of space is 
integral to the initiative, 
 
The choice of the street as space for performance is very important as 
there is a socio-political statement; we are reclaiming the street, and 
its meaning, freeing the art scene and voicing an opinion.21  
 
El Fan Midan worked on developing the creative spirit which 
emerged out of Tahrir Square during the first eighteen days of the 25th 
January revolution, and promoting an artistic scene that is accessible 
to everybody. The initiative was perceived as a modern day festival, a 
much more inclusive version of El Korba festival referred to above. 
By reaching out to people living in the downtown area, El Fan Midan 
worked on decentralizing the cultural scene in Egypt as Mansour, 
explains:  
 
                                                 
21 ‘El Fan Medan: Egypt Takes to the Streets for Culture & Fun’, 5/5/2011, 
http://www.cairo360.com/article/artsandculture/1899/el-fan-medan-egypt-
takes-to-the-streets-for-culture-and-fun (access 30/11/2016). 
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The festival aims to open up spaces for independent and underground 
artists to present their work, to recreate the relationship that once was 
between people and art... It’s about re-appropriating the artistic space 
– art doesn’t happen behind closed doors or in black boxes only.22 
 
It is significant to observe that the organizers of El Fan Midan 
described the project as a festival that calls for a celebration, and 
designates families and young people as its audience. The idea of a 
festival recalls the rural experience of religious celebrations that take 
place in small villages and towns, and bring together communities of 
people living in nearby areas. In a religious festival, people experience 
various forms of artistic production that cater to the young and the old. 
The festivals are also participatory in nature, allowing for those who 
are interested in watching performances to do so, at the same time 
creating a space for those who wish to partake in the process of artistic 
production. These features were reproduced by El Fan Midan which 
was held on the first Saturday of every month in six different Egyptian 
cities: Cairo, Alexandria, Assuit, Port Said, Suez and Luxor. It 
included music performances, poetry recitals, art exhibitions, craft 
workshops, book fairs, and a market, and brought together people 
from different parts of the city.  
In Cairo, for example, people living in Abdeen, a middle class area, 
would find themselves occupying the same space as people belonging 
to higher and lower social classes coming especially for the event. 
This is not easily realized at other times since the state works against 
the congregation of citizens. The emphasis, therefore, on Abdeen 
Square and other squares that host the event as places that 
accommodate both families and young people implies both a gender 
and a generational interaction amongst people in a tension-free space 
that fosters respect for the individual, and tolerance of different 
political, religious, and gender orientations.  
The celebratory nature which characterized the early days of the 
project developed into an attempt to record and commemorate events 
arising from the unfolding political tension in Egypt. Many of the 
artists, poets, musicians, and singers whose first appearance was in 
Tahrir Square also continued to use El Fan Midan as a political 
platform to pursue an activist agenda, which in turn instigated a crack 
down from security forces. In April 2014, security forces in 
Alexandria dispersed a Saturday night concert that was hosted by El 
                                                 
22 Ib. 
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Fan Midan and arrested some of the attending political activists, 
organizers, and attendees. The order came from the Alexandria 
Security Directorate, claiming that the concert was organized without 
security permission. The arrestees were released after a report was 
filed against them. Significantly, the police officer at the station said 
that the name of the festival ‘aroused suspicions because of the word 
midan’.23 
 
Conclusion 
The ongoing struggle of power between the state and the citizens 
over urban space can be read in light of Henri Lefebvre’s hypothesis 
as stated above of how every city produces its own space which 
ultimately affects spatial practices and perceptions, and, accordingly, 
serves as a tool of thought and of action.24 The struggle indicates that 
the state is aware of the attempts of the citizens to reclaim public 
space, an act which Lefebvre considers a means of gaining control and 
power. At the same time the state is not ready to relinquish its control 
over what it continues to perceive as private property. Any 
congregation of citizens, therefore, is perceived by the state as a 
threat, an act of trespassing which it thinks it has the right and power 
to dissipate. Whether or not cultural initiatives like El Fan Midan, No 
Wall, Coloring Through Corruption and other creative projects are 
able to bring about change remains debatable since change, according 
to Lefebvre, cannot happen without changing the very space where it 
occurs. If such projects are unable to maintain their control over the 
reclaimed space, then change becomes problematic.In one of the last 
events of El Fan Midan in 2014 before it was stopped, one of the 
audience related the following scene at Abdeen Square: ‘Behind the 
stage were layers and layers of barbed wire, some sandbags and a 
large contingent of military force. They stood there, taking turns 
watching the crowd for signs of trouble. Soldiers farther back, 
standing near a row of tanks behind the palace gates, poked their 
heads between the bars to get a better view. One soldier started 
                                                 
23 S. O. Shoureap, ‘Al-Fan Midan street art festival shut down by security 
forces’, The Cairo Post, 8/4/2014, in http://thecairopost.youm7.com/news/ 
105596/news/al-fan-midan-street-art-festival-shut-down-by-security-forces (access 
30/11/2016). 
24 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p. 26. 
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dancing in place but snapped to attention when noticed’.25 The winds 
of change are certainly in the air, a fact which the state is aware of, 
and tries its utmost to suppress.  
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Abstract 
Is there change in modern Arabic/Egyptian writings pre and post the January 
2011 revolution? Yes, there has been a good deal of it: the Arabic presses have been 
churning out heaps of material, and to sift through them for such trends may require 
research of a specialized and sustained nature. The alternative is to highlight one or 
two major trends, whether fully indicative of such change by themselves or not. This 
paper will therefore focus first on what I may call the language polemic, that is the 
clash between writing (and speaking, though only up to a point) in archaic Arabic 
(symptomatic of the religious discourse resurrected in the 1970s), and the local 
varieties of vernacular Arabic popularized, simultaneously, by the theatre and the 
soap operas, and the plethora of ‘poetic’ pieces published in the press and in 
individual volumes. The latter is hailed as the real language of the people. The 
second point this paper will deal with will shed light on the problem of feminist 
writing. 
 
Introduction 
In January 2011 Egypt caught the attention of the world and the 
Egyptian revolution was televised far and wide. This paper will not 
take part in the debate about whether it was a revolution or not 
because the term revolution has come to be quite controversial. It is 
currently defined according to which major intellectuals are involved. 
In Egypt today there are two groups, one claiming that 25th January 
2011 is a revolution in the sense that the wheel of fortune has turned 
forward (the literal sense of revolve); and the other insists that it is an 
uprising, almost impromptu. This paper adopts the position of the first 
group that highlights the change that occurred; and as long as there 
has been change, then it is a revolution. The two questions that will be 
raised are first, have Egyptian writers (essayists, dramatists, novelists, 
poets) inspired and predicted the January 2011 revolution? That is, 
was this revolution expected? Secondly, is there change in modern 
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Egyptian/Arabic writings pre and post the January 2011 revolution? 
The contention of this paper is to argue that yes, indeed, the revolution 
was in the air, and the writings before the revolution have been 
inspirational; and there is change that can be traced in both form and 
content in pre and post revolution writings.  
During the two decades that preceded the revolution there was a 
great deal of discussion about the endless chronic problems in Egypt. 
After the revolution the Egyptian/Arabic presses have been churning 
out heaps of material. To sift through them to determine all the 
different trends may require research that is beyond the scope of a 
short paper. The alternative is to highlight two major trends that are 
indicative of predictions and change. This paper will, therefore, focus 
first on what I may call the language polemic, that is, the clash 
between writing (and speaking, though only up to a point) in archaic, 
outdated, old-fashioned Arabic (symptomatic of the religious 
discourse resurrected in the 1970s), and the local varieties of 
vernacular (dialect) Arabic popularized, simultaneously, by the theatre 
and the soap operas, and the plethora of ‘poetic’ pieces published in 
the press and in individual volumes. The latter is hailed as the real 
language of the people. The second point my paper will deal with is 
the problem of feminist writing. This is still a problem insofar as the 
majority of the Arabic reading public cannot fully accept that a 
woman’s voice is worth listening to, especially if that voice is 
campaigning in an idiom drawn with ‘specialized’ terminology, less 
than transparently translated.  
 
The first trend: verse vs prose 
Verse 
In so far as the Arabic language is concerned, the gulf separating 
classical Arabic (in both its archaic and modern standard varieties) 
from the vernacular keeps widening. The ‘consumerist’ (generally 
commercial) culture of the fledging capitalism in Egypt, has established 
the vernacular as the language of advertising (which has witnessed a 
revolution as the billboards and the media clearly show, but this is not 
within the scope of this paper), and this variety is gaining ground 
everyday, so much as that verse written in it now rivals that written in 
modern classical Arabic. Here I will limit myself to two different 
Egyptian voices, one before and another after January 2011. 
The first trend in writing verse emerged before 2011 and is 
identified by Mohamed Enani (Muḥammad ʻInānī/ʻAnānī, b. 1939), 
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the eminent scholar, dramatist and translator, through ‘Angry Voices’. 
In the third volume of the Contemporary Arabic Literature Series 
entitled An Anthology of the New Arabic Poetry in Egypt, Enani has 
translated a selection of poems from Arabic into English by the 
‘second generation’ of Egyptian poets who followed the first 
generation, the ‘pioneers’, the ‘innovators’ who introduced the ‘New 
Poetry’ in the 1960s (Enani. New Arabic Poetry in Egypt, p. 11), 
namely Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Bārūdī (1838-1904), Aḥmad Shawqī (1868-
1932), Ḥafiẓ Ibrāhīm (1872-1932), and others. Of this second 
generation, Enani starts with Salah Abdul-Saboor (Ṣalāḥ ʻAbd al-
Ṣabūr, 1931-1981) who ‘wanted poetry to break free totally of order 
“imposed” on our vision by the tradition, to allow the poetic impulse 
to reign supreme and unbridled, so as to dictate “to the mind fresh 
modes of thought”’. (Enani. New Arabic Poetry in Egypt, p. 8) Enani 
argues convincingly that for Abdul-Saboor and others 
 
The classical Arabic poem has ceased to provide a frame of reference, 
positive or negative: they neither accept it as a model nor consciously 
reject it for its classical poetics. From the collections published in 
1984-1985 one is compelled to conclude that their frame of reference 
is the European poem, though not necessarily the “modernist” poem, 
initially made available through translation, but now primarily through 
the first generation of Arabic modernists. So, while it was possible in 
the case of Salah Abdul-Saboor to trace Eliotic influences in his verse 
drama or Yeatsian personae in his longer lyrics, it is now mainly the 
Abdul-Saboor poem itself that must be ultimately examined for 
influences on the younger generation.1  
  
Examining the poems by the late Salah Abdul-Saboor to trace his 
influence on the third ‘younger generation’, as Enani suggests, 
provides evidence that Egyptian poetry written at the end of the 
twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty first changed in 
form and content. This is not only evident in poems of the second 
generation by Salah Jaheen (Ṣalāḥ Jāhīn, 1930-1986), Amal Donqol 
(Amal Dunqul, 1940-1983), Mohammad Abu-Sinnah (Muḥammad 
Abū Sinna, b. 1937), Wafaa Wagdy (Wafā’ Wajdī d. 2011) and others 
in this volume, but in the ‘Angry Voices’ that followed and in the 
‘voices’ that ‘celebrate the Arab Spring’. More often than not, they 
                                                          
1 M. Enani, An Anthology of the New Arabic Poetry in Egypt, General Egyptian 
Book Organization, Cairo, 2001, p. 12. 
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use the vernacular/Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and address 
modern lyrical themes that deal with alienation, imagination, 
emotions, ‘the heartless city’, spiritual aridity, freedom, nationalism, 
political issues and more. 
Many poets writing in Egypt nowadays, who use the 
vernacular/MSA, believe that this language is more in tune with their 
feelings and ideas; and poetry written in this form of language is 
better received by the Egyptian/Arab audience. This group of poets 
started writing before January 2011 and they were quite revolutionary. 
In 2001, Enani selects poems by eighteen young Egyptian poets, 
translates them into English and publishes them in volume sixty-five 
of the Contemporary Arabic Literature Series entitled Angry Voices: 
An Anthology of the Off-Beat Arabic Poetry of the 1990s in Egypt. 
With the captivating and provoking title Angry Voices, Enani is 
ringing a warning bell and publicizing that a volcano is about to erupt.  
This first trend also includes poets who wrote after the January 
2011 revolution. Most of the poetry celebrating what is known as the 
Arab Spring by poets of different generations like Ahmed Fouad 
Negm (Aḥmad Fu’ād Najm 1929-2013), Abdel-Rahman Elabnoudy 
(‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-‘Abnūdī, 1938-2015), Sayed Hegab (Sayyid 
Ḥijāb, b. 1940) and Amin Haddad (Amīn Ḥaddād, b. 1956) 
(Eskenderella) is written in the vernacular, and a new critical trend is 
emerging to regard that poetry, and the rhyming slogans chanted in 
popular rallies, demonstrations and in graffiti, as ‘received’ literature 
or even canonical. The Egyptian ‘ammiya poet Sayed Hegab is 
prolific and profuse in writing in the Egyptian dialect – to the point of 
contributing Yawmeyat (Diary) in prose, a major column in one of the 
most popular daily newspapers, Al-Akhbār (The News). Not only does 
he write verse in the Egyptian dialect, but early in August 2014 he 
declared that he is using the Egyptian language which he regards as fit 
for poetry. He went on defending the colloquial Egyptian Arabic as 
the ‘genuine’ language of the Egyptians. 
Amin Haddad, who wrote an anthology of poems with paintings of 
scenes from the revolution by Samir Fouad (Samīr Fu’ād) entitled 
From the Homeland to Heaven, created a very popular group, 
Eskenderella, that sang/performed his poetry wherever they were 
invited: in the Medan (Tahrir Square), in the Cairo Opera House, at 
Cairo University, etc. This volume of poetry by Amin Haddad is 
dedicated to ‘The People of Egypt: They always prove that myths are 
real’. Of Amin Haddad’s generation, Bahā’ Jāhīn has made history by 
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publishing a poem in Egyptian Arabic on the front page of Al-Ahrām 
no less. The significance of this move can be better appreciated when 
we remember that only Aḥmad Shawqī, the master craftsman of 
Arabic poetry, had the right to such pride of place in Al-Ahrām. It is 
paradoxical that at a time when there is so much talk about the Arab 
nation, the historical weight of the Arabic language in its classical 
form/tradition that a relatively young poet should occupy the position 
of the major symbol of Arabic tradition. This tendency culminated in 
Abdel-Rahman El-Abnoudy’s magnificent murabba‘āt 
(quartets/quatrains) in order to distinguish it from Salah Jahin’s 
rubʿayyāt although both terms refer to a four-line stanza with varied 
rhyme schemes. Elabnoudy’s murabba‘āt show that there has been a 
change in the traditional form of popular verse. In the traditional 
poem, there are two hemistichs, each having two units, namely 
distichs which in turn have two monostichs. Instead of a having a long 
slow rhythm,  ٌلعاف ٌلعفتسم (a hemistich with two units, each having two 
feet that are different, one long and the other short) repeated four 
times in the line, two times in each distich, creating a long rhythm like 
Salah Jahin’s, Elabnoudy has a single major foot followed by two 
minor feet:  ٌلعاف ٌلعاف ٌلعفتسم.  
This is a point that I am highlighting because it provides evidence 
that the nature of Arabic is about to change; instead of the loud, slow, 
balanced movement of the typical Arabic line of verse, we now have 
vivacity, quickness in tempo and the hitherto unknown quality of 
reaching the audience instantly. Here are two samples, one by Salah 
Jahin and the other by Alabnoudy. The first one by Jahin is translated 
by Nehad Salem (Nihād Sālim) (43) and the second by Al-Abnoudy is 
translated by Mohamed Enani. 
 
فلت ضفراو روتای كامغ علقا 
فتو متشاو ةیقاسلا سورت رسكا 
..نامك ةوطخو ..نامك ةوطخ سب لاق 
!فجی ریبلا ای ةكسلا ةیاھن لصوا ای 
 
Throw off your blindfold, Bull! Refuse to go! 
Break the cogs of the waterwheel, spit in our eye! 
The bull said with a sigh: ‘One more step, or so, 
Either I reach the end, or the well will dry. 
 
As far back as the 1980s, the late Salah Jahin, Egypt’s best known 
cartoonist and poet of the vernacular, was addressing the Egyptians 
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who are blindfolded, urging them to ‘Refuse to go!’ The scene of a 
blindfolded bull is familiar in both rural and urban Egypt, but what is 
not familiar is the ‘refusing to go, breaking the cogs of the 
waterwheel, the spitting in the eyes of those who deserve this’. The 
bull has a voice and warns that ‘the well will dry’, a nightmare for any 
Egyptian farmer. In his comment on the translation of this quatrain in his 
‘Introduction’ to his translation of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, 
Mohamed Enani applauds the translator for adding ‘with a sigh’ in the 
English translation because this addition makes up for the difference 
between what the bull alludes to in Arabic and how this English does not 
convey the same allusion (19).  
As for Alabnoudy’s, he said: 
 
 يِرْغِت ةطْلُسلا …يِرْغِتو  
انیِذللا تنب ةذیذل 
يرغود يشمت نیموی لوأ 
!!ةنیدملا عیبت موی تلات 
 
‘  :اولوقی يللا‘فلت فلسلا  
ةناكتسلإا َع ةدْخاو ةدقاح سان 
-- انداصتقا انحإ-فرشلا انیلو  
!! ةنادتسا ھُُصن-ةناعإ ھ ُُّصنو  
 
Look how tempting is that power, 
How delicious at every hour, 
For a day or two go straight, go gritty, 
But on the third, sell the city. 
 
Those who advise you ‘gainst credit’, 
Are just submissive and sour; 
For our economy, is such an honour, 
Lives partly on aid, partly on credit. 
 
In these two short quatrains, Alabnoudy is not only alluding to those 
who desire, gain and abuse political power, but is critical and cynical 
about the people who accept those in power and the dysfunction and 
lack of productivity of the nation. In both Jahin and Alabnoudy, the 
humour, the reference to problems that ought to be addressed, and the 
insinuations that power is corrupt convey an indirect message that a 
revolution is inevitable. The two dominant images in Jahin are first, 
the blindfolded bull that should make use of its eyesight or vision in 
’
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order to break loose and free itself; and second, the well that will dry 
if the bull remains blindfolded. In the translation, the word ‘Bull’ is 
capitalized to hint that this is a proper noun, and therefore a reference 
to every one of us. In Alabnoudy, the central image is of power, but 
power that will ‘sell the city’.  
The voices that celebrate the Egyptian 2011 revolution started off 
by having an altogether different tone. When Mubarak stepped down, 
there was hope that a new era will prevail. Individual poets and groups 
of young writers and singers conveyed the hope that the Egyptians 
have regained their country and that Egypt will be leading the Arabs 
to democracy, development and enlightenment. The poems ‘Al-
Medan’ by Alabnoudy and ‘A Bird’s-Eye View of Medan El-Tahrir’ 
by Hesham Elgokh (Hishām al-Jakh) were recited in Medan El-Tahrir 
(Maydān al-Taḥrīr) and heard on the Egyptian TV and Radio as well 
as in different Arab cities to create a positive image of the Egypt that 
they are witnessing and the glorious future they expect. Aziz El-
Shaf‘ie (‘Azīz al-Shāfi‘ī) who wrote the lyrics of the song ‘Oh, My 
Country’ gave the martyr a voice. This song that became regarded by 
Egyptians as the ‘song of the revolution’ brings tears to the eyes of 
listeners whenever it is sung or heard years after it was first sung. 
Amin Haddad and his popular group, Eskenderella, and The Choir 
Project (لاروك عورشم) lead by Salam Yousry sing/perform poetry that 
attracts enthusiastic audiences.  
 
Prose 
I have so far focused on poetry, but the vernacular has been 
struggling to prove itself as a literary language outside poetry as well. 
The so-called popular tradition in Arabic is mainly in poetry, with the 
exception of course of A Thousand and One Nights which fuses 
classical Arabic with especially Egyptian vernacular, as the Nights 
was written or compiled in Egypt sometime in the 16th century. The 
poetry in the Nights is interesting as it represents the first ever attempt 
to weld classical and local varieties of Arabic together.   
As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian/Arabic presses have produced 
heaps of material after the revolution. For the purpose of this short 
paper, I will shed light on three observations that will unfortunately 
sound like sweeping generalizations. The first has to do with a group 
who writes reflections: some of these are admirable because they 
write short articles that are focused and use punctuation, an unfamiliar 
practice for writers in Arabic (like Rola Gharsa, the Egyptian Newton 
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and others). The members of the second group write with the purpose 
of sending direct messages to those in power, and a third group of 
journalists who are posing as discriminating critics (like Magda El-
Gendi, Sanaa Al-Baisy, Safeya Amin, Dina Eryan, and others) worse 
still, are writing prose in a language best described as ‘motley’ – with 
patches of classical, archaic, modern standard and colloquial – and 
calling it poetry. A. El-Deeb writes Arabic in the same style that al-
Manfalūṭī (1876-1924) adopted. As if to redress the balance some 
Arab countries have totally banned all writing (poetry in particular) in 
the vernacular. The United Arab Emirates now hold an annual 
competition for the best poet who writes in classical Arabic, in Dubai, 
and the winner is crowned as ‘Prince of the Poets’ (presumably with a 
financial reward to go with the title). In Syria and Iraq, that is, until 
before the recent upheavals (2003-2017) have had no regard at all for 
anything not written in classical Arabic. The Arabian Peninsula is a 
little more liberal in this regard, following the strange case of Egypt. 
So far as one can tell, the varieties one reads (or are imposed on 
one’s consciousness by the media and the sign boards) amount to 
nothing more than chaotic ‘overflowing’ of feelings and ideas, lacking 
the ‘order’ one normally associates with art, unless one accepts Morse 
Peckham’s view that all art represents ‘a rage for chaos’, not 
otherwise. He said, ‘Art is the exposure to the tensions and problems 
of the false world such that man may endure exposing himself to the 
tensions and problems of the real world’.2 As for the slogans of the 
protestors that show humour and ingenuity:  
 
ينعی لحر إ – Go! 
؟ لااو مھاف – No?  
ماظنلا طاقسا دیری بعشلا  – The people want the fall of the regime 
 
and the graffiti that uses the walls of cities and towns to give a voice 
to the voiceless, these are now recorded in many volumes that deserve 
in depth studies. Although by its very nature, graffiti is an artistic 
expression that does not last because it can be easily erased, the 
graffiti of the waves of the Egyptian revolution have been saved 
through the use of the camera. The graffiti played the role of an 
alternate media, launching campaigns concerning martyrdom, random 
imprisonment, Maspero and Muslim/Christian conflict, civil 
                                                          
2 Enani, An Anthology of the New Arabic Poetry in Egypt, p. 12. 
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disobedience, the role of the Ministry of Interior and SCAF, etc. It 
turned the city into an open museum that exhibits art that cannot be 
sold or bought. 
Decades before the January 2011 revolution, the Egyptian identity 
and consciousness were shaped by the works of Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm 
(1898-1987), Naguib (Najīb) Maḥfūẓ (1911-2006), Abdel-Rahman El-
Sharkawy (ʻAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sharqāwī, 1920-1987), Youssef Idris 
(Yūsuf Idrīs, 1927-1991) and others. Those who do not read (and this 
is the majority of the Egyptian population) were exposed to the ideas 
of these writers through the adaptation of their works into films. 
Those who read were affected by these writers and produced works of 
their own, like Bahaa Taher (Bahāʼ Ṭāhir, b. 1935), Sonallah Ibrahim 
(Ṣunʻ Allāh Ibrāhīm, b. 1937), Khairy Shalaby (Khayrī Shalabī, 1938-
2011), Ibrahim Aslan (Ibrāhīm Aṣlān b. 1935), Alaa Alaswany (ʿAlāʾ 
al-Aswānī, b. 1957) and others. Intellectuals rather than young 
common readers, however, read these writers. It is during the two 
decades that preceded the revolution that the Egyptian market was 
flooded with both fiction and nonfiction books in the vernacular that 
have had a very wide reading public. These works that cover different 
genres are groundbreaking in both form and content and provide 
evidence that a revolution is in the air. Writers in their forties have 
become quite famous, attracting a young audience that was never 
interested in reading. Essam Youssef and Ashraf Al‘ashmawy, among 
others, have captured the hearts and mind of readers because they 
wrote in a language these young people can identify with and they 
both focused on taboos that were not touched upon before. They also 
gave voice to the voiceless.  
In Essam Youssef’s Arabic novel Rob’ Gram (2008) (translated 
into English as A ¼ Gram in 2009) the drug addict has a voice for the 
first time in Arabic literature. ‘The novel sheds light on education, 
love-life, ‘urfī marriage, drafting, family life, friendship, leisure, 
growing up, faith, infidelity and relations between Muslims and 
Christians (Salah and Ameer, his roommate in the rehabilitation 
center)’.3 In Essam Youssef’s The Good Cup and the Bad Cup (2013) 
the corruption in the Egyptian society is exposed. The Good Cup and 
the Bad Cup is a narrative that portrays a real-to-life good cup, but 
                                                          
3 O. Khalifa - L. A. Youssef, ‘Junkies on the Nile: Can the Translator of A ¼ 
Gram be Invisible?’, in L. Youssef (ed.), Eminent Scholars IV: Essays in Language 
and Literature in Honour of Mohamed Enani, Cairo University Center for 
Languages and Professional Translation, Cairo, 2012, p. 302. 
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provides evidence that when the life of a police officer who has 
integrity gets entangled with another who is evil and corrupt, the good 
cup finds himself determined to use all his resources (official and 
unofficial) to take revenge. And the question is does this make the 
good cup evil? Such an interesting question and many others can also 
be asked about The Barman by Ashraf Al‘ashmawy and Taxi (2006) 
by Khaled Al-Khamissy (Khālid al-Khamissī, b. 1962). Although 
these works have been read by millions, they are not eligible for 
national prizes because the writers use the vernacular. Despite the fact 
that these works discuss extremely serious problems in society 
(namely drug addiction, political, social or economic problems) the 
element of humour is prevalent and dominant, rendering them 
informative and entertaining. The sales of these books show that the 
Egyptian readership is growing and the reading public welcome works 
that are true to life and portray the marginalized.  
Why am I shedding light on these works and this new group of 
young readers? My claim is these are the young readers who led the 
January revolution. For a long time the young people of Egypt had no 
hope that change will come about. They had no voice and were not 
aware of the power they had over their parents and the adult population 
of our country. It is books like A ¼ Gram and Taxi that created an 
awareness that the young have courage and energy and can make a 
difference. In a paper on ‘Balāgha or Rhetoric: The Language of the 
Tahrir Square Revolution’, I argue that although all the main characters 
of A ¼ Gram are addicts, the writer portrays them as ‘well bred and 
worthy of respect’ (23). In this paper, with reference to Hatem, one of 
the recovering addicts who goes through the Narcotics Anonymous 
Program in Egypt, I quote an extract by Hatem and argue that  
 
With no illusions about himself, Hatem reflects on his condition as an 
addict, and makes a general statement about Egyptians that is funny 
and wise. In addition to being witty, this extract is critical of the 
streets of Cairo, the tension people are suffering from, and the need 
for a solution, namely to subject the Egyptians to a rehabilitation 
Program. The imagery of madness, of a circus and a war are apt in 
alluding to the many layers of problems that prevail. The protestors in 
Tahrir exhibit a similar kind of humor and wisdom. (24) 
 
During the January revolution, the young people of Egypt discover 
that they can in fact do what their parents have been unable to do. 
There are endless stories about parents trying to forbid their children 
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from going to Tahrir (and similar squares everywhere in Egypt), but 
when the parents could not stop their children, they joined them. 
Although the characters in A ¼ Gram are drug addicts and those in 
Taxi are taxi drivers and users, the language and humor in both echoes 
the language and humor of the revolution.   
Another relevant and interesting work, a play directed by Khaled 
Galal and entitled ‘Black Coffee’ in 2009 (available on Youtube), also 
attracted a large audience. The students of The Center for Creativity at 
the Higher Council for Culture located in the Cairo Opera House 
produced this humorous, satirical, witty play to criticize the ills of the 
Egyptian society. The title, which is a reference to the tradition of 
drinking black coffee in funerals when Egyptians go to pay their 
condolences, and the characters who are dressed in black indicate that 
Egypt is in mourning and there is a sense of loss that pervades the 
country. The characters hold cups to drink black coffee after every 
one of the problems is alluded to imply the death of morality. The first 
problem they address echoes George Orwell’s claim that ‘Our 
civilization is decadent and our language – so the argument runs – 
must inevitably share in the general collapse’.4 The characters proceed 
to refer to problems related to businessmen, spinsterhood, a war 
without end, ugliness, inflation, ignorance, illegal immigration and 
more.  
Be that as it may, the real source of polemic is to be found in the 
competing religious discourse, which hardly ever departs from archaic 
Arabic. It is to be heard at its loudest on Fridays during the khuṭba for 
the noon prayers, when the Imams use it with its strident tones, 
absolutist doctrines, in their homilies; more often than not loud 
speakers are used, so that passers-by feel they are listening to a 
shouting contest. The result is, obviously, that ordinary mosque-goers 
cannot concentrate on the sense of the words, only recognizing 
Qur’anic verses and, occasionally, prophetic traditions. The rest 
consists in most cases of independent interpretations of some of the 
tenets of Islam to which the mosque-goers listen without 
concentration, realizing that they have to go through this experience as 
part of the Friday prayer ritual. When at the end of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty first charismatic preachers – 
like Amr Khaled (‘Amr Khālid) and Khaled Elgindy (Khālid al-Jindī) 
                                                          
4 G. Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’, in W. Lutz - H. Brent (eds.), 
The Critical Reader, Harper and Row, New York, 1990, p. 374. 
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and a group belonging to a younger generation like Mustafa Hosny 
(Muṣṭafā al-Ḥusnī), Mo’ez Mas’oud (Mu‘izz Mas‘ūd) – who have 
different credentials appeared as public speakers in mosques and on 
TV, these posed a threat to the Mubarak regime and were not allowed 
(as far as I know) to deliver the homilies on Friday. They raised 
debate in Egypt about the role and impact of the ‘new’ religious 
discourse especially on the youth. 
Although these religious preachers speak in Modern Standard 
Arabic (MSA), and appear on TV and in talk shows, they are 
perpetually tied up to the idiom of archaic language. Their religious 
discourse is tied up to classical Arabic. They quote the Qur’an and 
consult the explanations of Ibn Kathīr, Al-Qurṭubī and al-
Zamakhsharī. The late Sheikh Metwally Al-Sha‘rawy (al-Sha‘rāwī) is 
different from the three mentioned above, Amr Khaled, Khaled 
Elgindy and Mo’ez Mas’oud, because he built his charisma gradually 
through the common trick/device of having a captive audience, mainly 
the congregation in the mosque where he preached. Anyone preaching 
to the converts is guaranteed a positive response. His method and 
specific attraction involved tapping his linguistic and literary 
resources in adding glamor to verses hitherto taken for granted. Here 
is an example: 
 
 .بطرلا حلبلا نم ةرشقلا جورخ اھلصا :قسف 
  حلبلا لثم نامیلاا عرد نم جورخلا ھنا يلع قوسفلا مادختسا رربی اذھ 
 
The date is pressed by the eater to take it out of its skin. Sheikh Al-
Sha‘rawy applies this concrete image to all uses of the verb قسف that is 
getting out of the protective armor of faith. 
What has this to do with writing, one may very well ask. Well, 
when one listens to a language one hardly knows, or with thoughts 
‘voyaging’ elsewhere, can that language be used as a medium for a 
truly aesthetic experience of poetry and/or fiction? I believe this is 
rather unlikely, and most of the verse written in the manner of the 
‘ancients’, that is, basically using that language, has come to represent 
an almost ‘specialized’ (subjective) experience. The ideas of the 
‘ancients’ are enjoyable because they were once fresh and vigorous, 
but today they are simply ‘reliques’ of ancient poetry, such as those 
compiled by Bishop Percy in the 18th century in England. In Egypt 
nowadays we have two groups of contemporary writers of the 
‘ancient’ verse; one is composed of graduates of Dār al-‘ulūm (House 
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of Knowledge) like Abdel-Latif Abdel-Halim (‘Abd al-Laṭīf ‘Abd-al-
Ḥalīm), Ahmed Ghorab (Aḥmad Ghurāb), Mohamed Tohamy and 
others, and the other is composed of journalists publishing their verse 
in the Egyptian daily newspaper Al-Ahrām, like Farouq Shoosha, 
Farouq Guwaida, Mohamed Bahgat, Bahā’ Jāhīn, Atef Alnimr, 
Mostafa Abdel-Ghani and others. Though few, they are powerful and 
influential because they publish their verse in daily nationals and in 
collections, expatiate on their merits in the media but there are no 
appreciative ‘receivers’ outside the circles of the poets themselves.  
 
Feminist Writing 
The second trend that ought to be mentioned is feminist writing 
especially that 2014 (http://arablit.wordpress.com/2014/01/23/the-
year-of-reading-arab-women/) has been declared as The Year of 
Reading Arab Women. This genre will be found to suffer from a 
similar rift to the one addressing the language used in writing and in 
religious discourse. Writers on feminism are mostly academicians 
who are deeply influenced by the major figures of feminist thought 
worldwide. Women writers like Fathia Al-‘Assal (Fatīḥa al-‘Asāl, 
1933-2014), Radwa ‘Ashour (Raḍwā ‘Āshūr, 1946-2014), Lamis 
Gaber (Lamīs Jābir), Nawal Al-Sa‘dawy (Nawāl al-Saʻdāwī b. 
1931), Salwa Bakr (b. 1949), Azza Badr (and journalists like Hala 
Al-‘Essawy and Maha Abdel-Fattah to give but two examples) and 
others, appear to provide the required material to substantiate the 
feminist claim that women are no less talented writers than men, and 
that they can make their own voice heard. At present, a writer like 
Nawal Al-Sa‘dawy publishes in Al-Ahrām. She would attempt an 
ideological narrative replete with idioms drawn from ultra modern 
theories such as the subalternity of the female voice within the 
patriarchal cacophony of society. Such a style is designed to impress 
dealers in theory, from critical theory, through feminism, through 
modernism. As published in Al-Ahrām, such an impressive style, 
however abstruse (obscure, perplexing, highbrow, profound), could 
not be expected to be welcome by the common male reader. The 
typical Arab male reader is brought up to expect a mellower style 
and a sweeter feeling from his female counterpart: he would be 
puzzled, to say the least, to read such a narrative from a woman, 
however learned. 
But the thrust of the feminist onslaught on the patriarchal society 
and the discourse of male power seems to be to transplant in a Muslim 
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country ideas developed in a largely ‘free-thinking’ society, a 
permissive society, or a society that has long separated the state from 
religion. In certain cases, women influenced by feminist ideas have 
found it difficult to espouse their acquired feminist principles to the 
deep-rooted religious feelings, which (in Islam as well as in 
Christianity) seem to make the husband lord and master. Feminist 
writings are often seen as an amusing novelty, condescendingly 
accepted by some men, but passed over by most. 
While in poetry the rift is primarily linguistic, the rift here is 
primarily cultural. But I believe the two phenomena can be 
approached together as indicating a ‘crisis’ in Arabic culture. I use the 
word ‘crisis’ guardedly as I have noticed that whenever you try to 
combine the two sides (poetry and feminist writing) of each dilemma, 
you end up with more questions than answers. For instance, if you try 
to envisage a ‘third language’, as Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm has done, that is a 
language in-between Modern Standard Arabic and the Egyptian 
vernacular, you will end up facing the ancient variety, the archaic 
language of the religious sermons with which the people are 
bombarded continually. It is true there are many voices calling for the 
need for a different/new Islamic discourse, and there are a few who 
have already adopted a sensible attitude reflected in both tone and 
content namely the late Sheikh Al-Sha‘rawy and Ghazali (al-Ghazālī) 
and Amr Khaled, Khaled Elindi, Mo’ez Masoud, but they are still a 
minority. As for the contemporary novelist, s/he is still judged by his 
level of language and may be discarded if he departs too much from 
Modern Standard Arabic. 
The same applies to feminism as an advocated principle and as 
discourse, to be found in the writings of women themselves: whenever 
you try to strike a balance between the so-called liberation of women 
and their subalternity to men, you will meet with resistance both from 
men (naturally) and from women who believe that they can have in 
being only ‘second in command’ pleasure enough. As the famous play 
says ‘what every woman knows’ is the art of actually controlling men 
by pretending to be controlled by them. 
In conclusion, attempts to produce worthwhile studies of the 
current linguistic rift in the new writings in Arabic have been made on 
the basis of the linguistic studies made in the west; but the difference 
is vast between our rift and any comparable rift in western languages. 
What is needed is not a linguistic effort but a critical approach capable 
of gauging the effect of each language variety on the reading public, 
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especially now the internet is proving to be a major player, exhibiting 
many facets of the current rift. 
Every Egyptian revolution over the last century or so was 
characterized by its quintessential Arabic tone, that is, Arabic as the 
language of our history, tradition, and even identity. The resurrection 
of the Arabic nation was inevitably associated with the reader of the 
classical Arabic tradition: the major poets tried to revise the ancient 
Arabic poetry: Shawqī, Ḥāfiẓ, al-Bārūdī, ʻAlī al-Jārim, etc. They saw 
themselves as the heirs of the great Arabic tradition reinforced by the 
establishment in the 1930s of the Arabic Language Academy. The 
progress towards modernity never felt to clash with the classical 
Arabic tradition: The Apollo School of the 1930s, the Revival of the 
1940s and 50s still relied on Pan Arabism with its bulwark 
(fortification, defense) of the classical language. During the 
revolutions (from ‘Urabī 1882, 1919, to 1952 until 25th January 2011), 
Egyptian Arabic was reborn, thanks to the new media where people 
can use any language they want, with official organs (official 
government documents or documents speaking for the government) of 
the state being relegated to a secondary position.  
In preparing for the talk that developed into this paper, I felt I have 
been trying to recreate the spirit in Medan El-Tahrir in words. This is 
beyond me because what happened then was unprecedented. There 
was what Radwa Ashour calls ‘Collective Energy’ that was magical. 
Even Bakhtin’s image of a carnival does not help. There was laughter 
and tears; there was a bond between rich and poor, educated and 
illiterate, Muslim and Christian, young and old. The flag of Egypt 
brought everyone together, but we are now aware that the path ahead 
is long and unclear, but there is a spirit of hope. ‘Hope cannot be 
destroyed’ as Bill Ashcroft said in the Comparative Literature 
conference at Cairo University in 2012. As has become clear, much 
has been written about the revolution in verse and prose. But being a 
believer that the best writing is a ‘spontaneous overflow of powerful 
emotions recollected in tranquility’, a great deal will be written when 
Egyptians enjoy a state of ‘tranquility’.  
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Appendix I 
 
A Bird’s-Eye View of Medan El-Tahrir 
Hesham Elgokh 
 
ریرحتلا نادیم نم يسأر دھشم 
 
اھلك ةمیدقلا كدئاصق ئبخ 
اھلك ةمیدقلا كرتافد قزم 
اھلثم ارعش مویلا رصمل بتكاو 
اھلك ةمیدقلا كرتافد ئبخ 
اھلثم ارعش مویلا رصمل بتكاو 
اھلھأو رصم لین املاس بتكاف ھفوخ ضرفی مویلا دعب تمص لا 
نیعيھتناو ضام فوخلا اذھ نأب ناررقت نیتلفط لمجأ كا 
اھتقو رسفن ملو عیقسلاو ةدوربلاب عراوشلا انبعادت تناك 
اھدرب يسنن نیمستبت كارنو انضعبب يف انضعب ئفدن انك 
اھھجو سندی يبأی انؤایحو اھھجو نع تفشك تبضغ اذاو 
اھسوأ ةناملأا ناخ درمتم يننأب كوربخی مھیكرتتلا 
ی مھیكرتتلااھجومو اھفات ائیش تحبصأ يننأب كوربخ 
يھن نمو رقأ نمو لاقأ نمو دارأ نم كنطب نباو كنطب نبا انأف 
   اھلوق تلاق كوقشع نم عومجو مھنبجب نیفئاخلا لولف تتمص 
 
Hide all your old poems, 
Tear up all your old copybooks, 
Today, write for Egypt the poetry that Egypt deserves. 
Hide all your old copybooks, 
Today, write for Egypt the poetry that Egypt deserves. 
As of today, no silence will oppress us because of fear; 
Write a peaceful prayer for Egypt's Nile and people. 
The beauty of your two eyes, like two beautiful girls, affirms the end of fear, 
forever. 
In the bitter cold the streets playfully flirted with us, but, then, we could not 
understand, 
We warmed up one another and forgot the cold when we saw your smile, 
And when you were angry, we saw it in your face, and would not dare tarnish your 
image. 
Let them not tell you that I’m a rebel who betrayed you or forgot my oath, 
Let them not tell you that I’ve become petty and misguided, 
I’m the son you bore, the son you bore who wants, dismisses, decides, and prohibits. 
Silent, the cowards are terrified, and the masses that cherish you have made their 
statement. (My translation)5 
                                                          
5 The poem ‘Al Medan’ by Alabnoudy is recited by the poet himself and can be 
heard on youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fk_HJmPReLQ&feature 
=share (access 2/12/2016). 
 983 … erp sgnitirW naitpygE ni ralucanreV naitpygE eht fo yrotciV ehT 
 
 
 II xidneppA
 
 yrtnuoC yM ,hO
 ei‘fahS-lE zizA
 ei‘fahS-lE zizA dna lamaG ymaR yb gnuS
 
 یا بلادي یا بلادي
 یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 لادي، أنا باحبك یابلاديیا بلادي یا ب
 قولوا لأمي ماتزعلیش، وحیاتي عندك ماتعیطیش
 قولولھا معلش یأمي، أموت أموت وبلدنا تعیش
 أمانھ تبسولي ایدیھا وتسلمولي علي بلادي
  
 یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 
 في جسمي نار ورصاص وحدید
 یدي واسمي شھیدعلمك في ا
 بودع الدنیا وشایفك
 یا مصر حلوه ولابسھ جدید
 لأحر نفس في بانادي
 باموت وانا باحب بلادي
 
 یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 
 طایرین ملایكھ حولیا طیر
 لحظة فراقك یاحبیبتي غیر
 ھامش معاھم وھسیبك
 بخیر واشوف یامصر وشك
 قالولي یال ع الجنھ
 قلتلھم الجنھ بلادي
 
 یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 6یا بلادي یا بلادي، أنا باحبك یابلادي
 
 
                                                          
 ?hctaw/moc.ebutuoy.www//:sptth :ebutuoy no draeh eb nac meop ehT 6
 .)6102/21/2 ssecca( ADHt5hMZXtb=v
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Oh, my country, oh, my country, I love you my country 
Oh, my country, oh, my country, I love you my country. 
 
Tell my mom not to be sad; by my life, do not cry; 
Tell her ‘I am sorry, mom, I will die again and again, 
And may our country live on.’ 
Promise to kiss her hands for me, and give my country my greetings. 
Chorus 
 
There is fire, shots, and bullets in my body; 
Your flag is in my hand and I am now a martyr, 
I have bid the world farewell and can see you 
Beautiful, in your new dress; 
With my last breath I proclaim as I die, I love my country.  
Chorus 
 
Angels are flying all around me,  
The moment to say good bye my love has come, like no other, 
I’m going with them and will have to leave you,  
And let me wish you well, Egypt. 
They said, ‘Let’s go to heaven’. I said ‘My country is heaven.’  
Chorus 
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Égalité de genre au Maroc après 2011 ? Les droits 
sexuels et reproductifs au centre des récentes luttes de 
reconnaissance 
 
Sara BORRILLO 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores some discourses and actions oriented to a new conception of 
the women’s body and the individual liberties that some social Moroccan actors put 
in place after 2011. On the one hand, it analyzes the impact of social and political 
activism in urban contexts on the recognition of the formal equality between women 
and men. On the other hand, it points out the importance of sexual rights in the 
debates about the gender equality and the ‘right to have rights’. In particular, 
through the analysis of some political and artistic experiences in Moroccan civil 
society, it demonstrates the emergence and the importance of gender issues and 
sexual rights in the struggles for the ‘rights to recognition’. On what basis, against 
what resistances and within what perspective is it possible to imagine a renewed 
conception of the female body as an essential axis of the construction of gender 
equality after 2011 in Morocco? 
 
Introduction 
Au Maroc, une danseuse est une prostituée.1 Une femme en minijupe 
est une prostituée. Une femme qui habite seule et qui n’est pas mariée 
est une prostituée. Au Maroc, on ressent cela. On vit cela. Et moi, je 
ne peux pas vivre de façon indépendante comme j’aimerais, car ma 
famille – qui fait partie de cette société – ne me le permet pas. Car 
cette société considère la femme et son corps comme une honte, 
comme quelque chose à cacher, comme une ‘awra. Par exemple, ma 
mère me dit : « Meriem, ma fille, ne sors pas en minijupe : tu es 
encore trop jeune ». Et je lui réponds : « Ok, maman ». Et quand je 
serai mariée, mon mari me dira très probablement : « Meriem, ma 
femme, ne sors pas en minijupe, sinon tous les autres hommes vont te 
regarder et ça c’est un manque de respect envers moi ». Et moi je lui 
                                                            
1 Je remercie vivement Catherine Errafi et Gaëlle Gillot pour leurs précieux 
commentaires à cette étude. 
394 Sara BORRILLO 
 
dirai : « Ok, mon mari ». Si mon mari meurt et que je me retrouve 
veuve, j’aurai envie de sortir en minijupe et ma voisine me dira : 
« Meriem, ne sors pas en minijupe, ton mari vient de mourir ». Et moi 
je lui dirai : « Ok, ma voisine ». Mais alors : Quand est-ce que je 
pourrai mettre cette minijupe ?! Quand on est jeune et belle on a 
l’énergie et l’envie de s’exposer et montrer son corps, mais cette 
énergie reste en toi, en toi, et un jour tout d’un coup, elle fait boom ! 
C’est cela être femme au Maroc…2 
 
Meriem Bouslama a 26 ans et elle est originaire de Salé, où elle 
habite avec ses parents, deux professeurs du secondaire de la classe 
moyenne. Sa sœur Zaïnab, ingénieure d’État, a été activiste dans 
l’Association marocaine des droits de l’homme (AMDH). Avec elle et 
grâce à elle, Meriem a milité dans le cadre du Mouvement du 20- 
Février, le mouvement social qui a bouleversé la politique marocaine 
en 2011, en participant surtout à l’organisation de débats, ateliers de 
réflexion et lecture, flash mob et autres activités culturelles et de 
sensibilisation. Malgré la désagrégation du mouvement, après 
l’adoption de la Constitution en juillet 2011 et la victoire du Parti de la 
justice et du développement (PJD) aux élections du 25 novembre 
2011, elle continue à militer dans son quotidien et dans le cadre d’une 
association informelle qui s’occupe d’éducation à l’enfant. Elle rêve 
de devenir danseuse, mais continue ses études pour devenir éducatrice 
d’enfants, car elle est convaincue qu’il faut éduquer les nouvelles 
générations à un changement radical des mentalités. Sa voix est 
représentative, d’une part, de la désillusion de beaucoup de jeunes 
militantes qui ont participé aux manifestations populaires de 2011 en 
luttant aussi pour subvertir la hiérarchie des relations de genre. 
D’autre part, elle représente la détermination de certaines d’entre elles 
qui continuent à agir pour l’égalité de genre, en mettant le corps au 
centre de leurs propres revendications, car elles considèrent la 
répression des libertés liées au corps des femmes comme un signal 
grave de la plus large répression des libertés individuelles en cours 
dans le pays. 
Sur la base d’une enquête de terrain, basée sur des interviews 
narratives et semi-structurées, dirigées en septembre 2014 auprès des 
militantes indépendantes du Mouvement du 20-Février et des 
représentantes des associations du féminisme historique marocain de 
                                                            
2 Interview avec Meriem Bouslama, militante du Mouvement du 20 Février, 
Rabat, 4/9/2014.  
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Rabat et Casablanca, cet article se focalise sur la centralité des 
questions liées à l’autodétermination du corps féminin dans le cadre 
des débats et des revendications pour l’égalité de genre et pour les 
libertés individuelles qui se sont déroulés au Maroc depuis 2011.  
 
Égalité de genre, agency, citoyenneté 
Les normes liées à la sexualité et à la construction des rôles sociaux 
de genre contribuent à structurer – et en sont même l’expression – des 
formes de domination sociale, politique, économique d’une société à 
un moment historique donné.3 Les significations de la sexualité et du 
genre sont strictement corrélées à travers : les systèmes de parenté et 
familiaux qui produisent des instruments de socialisation et articulent 
des systèmes de propriété et héritage ; les communautés élargies qui 
construisent la normativité dans le domaine de la sexualité, 
notamment dans la définition de l’honneur et de la pudeur, de la vertu, 
des limites entre pratiques licites et illicites ; un système national de 
dispositifs de pouvoir, de lois, discours religieux et mécanismes de 
production dans lesquels la famille et la société sont intégrées.4 
Analyser les significations de la sexualité et du genre peut donc se 
révéler utile pour comprendre les structures de pouvoir d’une société.  
Au Maroc, la hiérarchisation des relations de genre est légitimée 
par l’usage patriarcal de l’Islam qui s’explique à travers les normes 
sociales et celles du Code de la Famille (Mudawwana). Celui-ci 
consacre la discrimination des femmes dans un continuum public-
privé et rend la citoyenneté des femmes imparfaite,5 voire dérivée de 
celle d’un homme, dans le sens où elle est considérée en fonction de 
son rôle social de mère, épouse, fille et sœur.6  
Depuis 2011, la question des libertés individuelles liées à la 
sexualité et à l’autodétermination du corps a été centrale dans le cadre 
de la lutte de plusieurs associations et groupes de militant(e)s dans la 
                                                            
3 J. Scott, ‘Gender a Useful Category of Analysis’, in The American Historical 
Review, 1986, pp. 1053-1075. 
4 M. Foucault, La volonté de savoir. Histoire de la sexualité I, Gallimard, Paris, 
1976; B. Dunne, Sexuality and the Civilization Process in the Modern Egypt, PhD 
Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1996, p. 7.  
5 Pour la notion de « citoyenneté imparfaite », voir D. Kandiyoti, ‘Beyond 
Beijing. Obstacles and Prospects for the Middle East’, in Mahnaz Afkhami - Erika 
Friedl (eds.), Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation. Implementing Beijing 
Platform, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 3-10, p. 5.  
6 M. Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001, p. 233. 
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phase de transformation sociale et politique qui a suivi les 
protestations animées par le Mouvement du 20 Février (M-20F). Le 
persistant harcèlement sexuel, le phénomène des violences basées sur 
le genre, le droit d’expression à travers le corps et les droits liés à la 
sexualité (comme le droit à avoir des relations sexuelles avant le 
mariage ou à choisir l’avortement) ont fait l’objet de plusieurs 
campagnes, débats et manifestations qui sont allées bien au-delà de la 
mobilisation du M-20F pour la dignité, la liberté et la justice sociale. 
En fait, jusqu’à aujourd’hui, surtout dans les contextes urbains de 
Rabat et Casablanca, plusieurs activistes et groupes des militant(e)s 
invoquent l’urgence de la reconnaissance des droits et libertés en lien 
avec les choix autodéterminés liés au corps. Même si l’égalité de 
genre est aujourd’hui reconnue dans la nouvelle Constitution 
marocaine (1er juillet 2011), plusieurs obstacles caractérisent la 
reconnaissance de la citoyenneté des femmes.  
Ici, la citoyenneté est conçue non seulement comme un statut social 
ou politique formel qui définit l’appartenance à une communauté 
donnée, à un statut attribué à des individus par un État, ou à un 
ensemble d’obligations et droits individuels qui définissent la relation 
entre citoyens et État ou entre individus d’une même communauté.7 
Ici la citoyenneté est conçue aussi comme idéal d’agency politique, 
c’est-à-dire comme pratique performative d’expression du soi et 
exercice actif de responsabilité individuelle en relation avec la 
collectivité.8  
C’est pour cette raison que cet article explore en premier lieu 
l’impact de la reconnaissance du principe d’égalité de genre sur la 
citoyenneté, à travers les voix des activistes qui ont été parmi les 
protagonistes de la mobilisation du M-20F. Puis il se focalise sur 
l’analyse des luttes pour les libertés individuelles et en particulier des 
droits sexuels et reproductifs, qui sont conçus ici comme 
fondamentaux dans une société égalitaire reconnaissant les femmes 
comme des sujets de droits.9 Il examine donc les discours, les 
résistances et les perspectives d’autodétermination du corps, à travers 
                                                            
7 B. S. Turner, ‘Contemporary Problems in Theory of Citizenship’, in Bryan S. 
Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory, Sage, London-Newbury Park, 1993, p. 
1-19; E. Vezzosi, ‘La cittadinanza femminile: una nozione “porosa”’, in Genesis- 
Rivista della Società Italiana delle Storiche V/2 (2006), pp. 219-234. 
8 J. Butler, Undoing Gender, Routledge, New York, 2004. 
9 M. Mouaqit, L’idéal égalitaire féminin à l’œuvre au Maroc. Féminisme, 
islam(isme), sécularisme, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2008. 
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lesquels les droits sexuels et reproductifs représentent un axe 
incontournable du changement des lois et des mentalités en direction 
de la construction d’une société plus égalitaire au Maroc.  
 
Le débat égalité/complémentarité et la Constitution de 2011 : deux 
fractures internes dans le Mouvement du 20 Février 
La participation des femmes aux mouvements protestataires de 
2011 au Maroc, comme dans la région MENA, a souvent été analysée 
selon deux dimensions qui se sont révélées mystificatrices : elle a été 
considérée comme un phénomène exceptionnel et comme une 
expression des revendications exclusivement des nouvelles 
générations.  
En premier lieu, les visions orientalistes et néocoloniales, qui 
considèrent les femmes des pays majoritairement musulmans comme 
victimes éternelles du patriarcat et incapables de se libérer, se révèlent 
erronées lorsque l’on observe comment est articulé le mouvement des 
femmes au Maroc. Afin de mieux comprendre la remarquable 
présence féminine dans le cadre du M-20F, celle-ci doit être 
contextualisée historiquement. Le mouvement des femmes du Maroc 
voit ses premières voix s’exprimer dans la période des luttes pour 
l’autodétermination nationale et pour l’indépendance ; puis, dans les 
années 40, il commence à se structurer dans les premières associations 
féministes, et après l’indépendance, en 1956, dans les partis politiques 
surtout de gauche et dans le cadre des luttes syndicales, estudiantines 
et pour les droits humains des années 60 et 70. En particulier à partir 
des années 80, avec la formalisation des principales associations des 
femmes, le mouvement féministe se structure en ce que Zakya Daoud 
a appelé le féminisme combatif des principales associations qui 
militent encore aujourd’hui pour les droits politiques, économiques et 
sociaux des femmes et pour l’égalité de genre : l’Association 
démocratique des femmes du Maroc (ADFM), l’Union de l’action 
féminine (UAF), et plus tard la Ligue démocratique des droits des 
femmes (LDDF).10 Parallèlement, dans le domaine académique, une 
quantité significative d’études et d’analyses sensibles à l’approche 
genre, baptisées comme féminisme intellectuel, a agi en support aux 
réalités opérationnelles sur le terrain.11 
                                                            
10 Z. Daoud, Féminisme et politique au Maghreb. Soixante ans de lutte (1930-
1992), Eddif, Casablanca, 1993. 
11 R. Bourquia, Femmes et fécondité, Afrique Orient, Casablanca, 1996, pp. 9-14. 
398 Sara BORRILLO 
 
Deuxièmement, contrairement aux analyses qui considèrent la 
participation féminine et plus généralement la participation aux 
protestations de 2011 dans la région MENA comme typiquement 
émanant des jeunes, il faut remarquer que dans les marches, dans les 
débats et assemblées, comme dans les comités de décision du M-20F 
au Maroc, des femmes jeunes et moins jeunes ont agi ensemble et de 
façon intergénérationnelle. 
De plus, la mobilisation des femmes a été hétérogène et 
transversale à différentes formes d’appartenance politique, religieuse, 
sociale. Elle a été caractérisée par la coprésence de femmes de : 
- formations de gauche, comme celles proches des partis tels que 
l’Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP), le Parti de l’avant-
garde démocratique et socialiste (PADS), le Parti socialiste unifié 
(PSU), le Parti du progrès et du socialisme (PPS) ; 
- des associations du féminisme historique comme l’Association 
démocratique des femmes du Maroc (ADFM), la Ligue démocratique 
des droits des femmes (LDDF), l’Union de l’action féminine (UAF), 
l’Association des femmes marocaines démocrates (AFMD) ; 
- des associations pour les droits humains comme l’Association 
marocaine pour les droits de l’homme (AMDH) ; 
- des associations comme Attac ;  
- des groupes de diplômés chômeurs, qui militent pour le droit au 
travail dans le secteur publique ;  
- des femmes des forces islamistes, du Parti de la justice et du 
développement (PJD, Ḥizb al-ʻadāla wa-l-tanmiyya) ou de l’association 
Justice et Bienfaisance (Al-ʻadl wa-l-iḥsān) ;  
- des femmes proches de groupes salafistes qui demandaient la 
libération des membres de leur famille emprisonnés (en raison de la loi 
antiterrorisme adoptée après les attentats de Casablanca de 2003) ;  
- des femmes indépendantes. 
Cette variété témoigne de la participation des courants multiples, 
qui vont de la sphère laïque à celle islamiste, unis dans la lutte contre 
l’humiliation (lett. ḥogra, mot dérivé du verbe ḥaqara, qui signifie 
humilier, mépriser). La ḥogra peut être, en effet, comprise de manière 
intersectionnelle, puisque ce concept s’articule autour des dimensions 
de classe, d’origine, et aussi de genre.12 Pour la jeune militante de 
Salé, Zeinab Bouslama,  
                                                            
12 N. Lykke, Feminist Studies. A Guide to Intersectionality Theory, Methodology 
and Writing, Routledge, London-New York, 2010; K. W. Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the 
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la ḥogra est vécue par tous les marocains, sauf ceux qui ont un nom de 
famille bien connu ou qui sont très riches. La ḥogra est quotidienne : 
pour moi, par exemple, cela signifie ne pas pouvoir obtenir un 
document simple, sans donner de l’argent aux employés publics ; ne 
pas avoir accès à une école en sachant qu’il y a des places déjà 
prévues pour les recommandés ; et en plus, en tant que femme, je sens 
doublement la ḥogra, sur le plan social et patriarcal.13  
 
L’égalité de genre est devenue une question de plus en plus 
centrale dans les revendications du M-20F, aussi bien pour ce qui 
concerne la relation entre les différents courants du Mouvement que 
pour ce qui concerne la relation entre le Mouvement et le pouvoir 
central.14 Les différents courants du M-20F, dans lesquels la 
participation féminine a été remarquable, ont présenté des conceptions 
différentes des droits des femmes et des rôles sociaux : en général, les 
formations progressiste-démocrates ont été favorables à l’égalité, tandis 
que les groupes d’affiliation islamiste ont soutenu la complémentarité 
entre hommes et femmes. Même si les femmes des forces sociales 
laïques et des islamistes ont interagi pendant les derniers décennies, 
échangeant des pratiques de lutte et des discours selon leurs objectifs 
politiques respectifs,15 le débat qui les opposait en 2011 a été bien 
visible : les différents groupes ont montré publiquement leur position, 
en scandant des slogans opposés et, pendant que les groupes 
progressistes marchaient de façon mixte, les islamistes respectaient une 
séparation sexuelle de l’espace selon laquelle les hommes marchaient 
devant les femmes.  
                                                                                                                                           
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color’, 
in Stanford Law Review 43/6 (1991), pp. 1241-1299; C. Andrew, ‘Ethnicities, 
Citizenship and Feminisms. Theorizing the Political Practices of Intersectionality’, 
in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1/3 (1995), pp. 64-81; J. W. Scott, Gender and 
the Politics of History, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988.  
13 Interview avec Zainab Bouslama, militante du M-20F, Rabat, 4/9/2014. 
14 S. Borrillo, ‘Il Movimento del 20 Febbraio e l’uguaglianza di genere in 
Marocco: tra dibattito interno e riforma costituzionale’, in Anna Maria Di Tolla - 
Ersilia Francesca (eds.), La rivoluzione ai tempi di internet. Il futuro della 
democrazia nel Maghreb e nel mondo arabo, Università “L’Orientale”, Napoli, 
2012, pp. 27-46. 
15 Z. Salime, Between Feminism and Islam. Human Rights and Sharia Law in 
Morocco, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London, 2011; F. Sadiqi, 
‘Facing Challenges and Pioneering Feminist and Gender Studies: Women in post-
Colonial and Today’s Maghrib’, in African and Asian Studies 7 (2008), pp. 447-470. 
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De façon générale, plusieurs jeunes militantes interviewées ont 
déclaré avoir subi des pressions contre la présence active de femmes 
dans l’espace public. La jeune Salma Maarouf, présente dans les 
marches du M-20F de Rabat depuis le début de la mobilisation 
nationale et parmi les animateurs de l’appel vidéo à la mobilisation 
diffusé sur Youtube au début du 2011,16 a dénoncé le fait que  
 
la femme libre n’était pas la bienvenue et beaucoup d’islamistes ont 
été contre le fait que les femmes soient sur les charriots, animent les 
foules avec le mégaphone, ou participent aux comités décisionnels.17  
 
De plus, si le débat autour de l’égalité a marqué une différence entre 
les deux blocs, le débat sur l’intégration de l’égalité dans la nouvelle 
Constitution a représenté au même moment un tournant significatif 
pour la cohésion du bloc séculier des progressistes/gauchistes, en 
traçant une distance entre les représentantes des associations du 
féminisme historique et les militant(e)s indépendants. 
Un des résultats les plus évidents de la lutte pour l’égalité de genre 
vis-à-vis du pouvoir a été la formalisation de ce principe dans l’article 
19 de la nouvelle Constitution, rédigé par une commission nommée 
par le Roi, après son discours du 9 mars 2011 qui avait pour but de 
calmer les esprits révolutionnaires. Mais cet acquis, qui a été salué 
avec ferveur par certaines associations du féminisme historique, a été 
considéré insuffisant par les composantes indépendantes du M-20F 
qui ont estimé le nouveau texte cosmétique. Pour les associations du 
féminisme historique, l’égalité devait finalement être reconnue comme 
concept nécessaire au plaidoyer sur le terrain, utile pour les activités 
de formation, de sensibilisation et ensuite comme un outil de pression 
sur les institutions pour négocier sur une base plus concrète 
l’application réelle de l’égalité. Les composantes indépendantes du M-
20F ont opté pour le boycott de la Constitution,18 convaincues que la 
nouvelle Constitution ne contribuait pas au changement des relations 
hiérarchiques entre couronne et Parlement (le Roi garde des pouvoirs 
                                                            
16 Morocco campaign#feb20#morocco, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0f6F 
SB7gxQ (accès 27/10/2015). 
17 Interview avec Salma Maarouf, militante du M-20F, Rabat, 11/9/2014. 
18 La Constitution a été adoptée grâce au résultat positif au referendum du 1er 
juillet, anticipé par une grande campagne médiatique pour le Oui : ont voté à 72% et 
plus de 95% des voix ont été pour le oui. AFP, « Maroc : 98% pour le oui à la 
nouvelle Constitution », 2/7/2011, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP 
20110702104433/ (accès 27/10/2015). 
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sur le Parlement), ni des relations entre pouvoir et peuple (la 
Commission pour la rédaction du texte a été nommée par le Roi et n’a 
pas été élue par les Marocains), ni des relations de genre (l’article 19 
reste seulement une déclaration théorique). En effet, même si dans 
l’article 19 l’égalité entre hommes et femmes est déclinée du point de 
vue des droits politiques, sociaux, économiques, juridiques, culturels 
et aussi environnementaux, elle reste textuellement conditionnée aux 
constantes et aux lois du Royaume. Quand on parle des constantes du 
pays, on fait référence à la devise nationale Dieu, la Patrie, le Roi 
(Allah, al-waṭan, al-malik), où les caractères islamique et 
monarchique de l’État posent problème par rapport à l’égalité des 
sexes. D’une part, la succession au trône est un droit exclusif du fils 
aîné du Roi, de l’autre, l’Islam, incontournable pour la stabilité du 
pouvoir central, légitime la discrimination envers les femmes dans le 
droit de la famille (en matière d’héritage, de polygamie, d’obligation 
de respecter la ʻidda, d’interdiction du mariage d’une musulmane avec 
un non musulman, etc.). De plus, les militantes indépendantes ont jugé 
insuffisant l’article 19 du fait que l’Autorité pour la parité et lutte 
contre les discriminations (APALD), qui est prévue dans le deuxième 
alinéa de l’article et qui est chargée de veiller au respect de la parité 
dans toutes les institutions du Pays, n’a pas encore vu le jour. De plus, 
le gouvernement élu le 25 novembre 2011 n’a inclus dans son équipe 
qu’une seule femme ministre – chargée du Ministère de la solidarité, 
de la femme, de la famille et du développement social ; et aux 
élections régionales du 4 septembre 2015 aucune femme n’est 
devenue Présidente de Région.19 On voit comment à une égalité 
formelle ne correspond pas une égalité substantielle. 
 
Libertés individuelles : frontières de la lutte pour l’égalité entre 
domaine politique et culturel 
Sur le plan national, la stabilité politique déclenchée par l’adoption 
de la Constitution de 2011 et l’élection du PJD en 2011 ont représenté 
un effet non désiré du M-20F, qui a perdu de son impact social à cause 
de sa fragmentation interne et de son incapacité à représenter une 
alternative crédible dans le jeu politique officiel. Si sur le plan 
politique les résultats du Mouvement n’ont pas été immédiatement 
                                                            
19 M. Yassine - E. Mohamed, « Élections : les 12 nouveaux présidents de régions 
passés à la loupe », 14/9/2015, http://telquel.ma/2015/09/14/elections-les-12-nou 
veaux-presidents-regions-connus_1462831 (accès 14/9/2015). 
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significatifs, sur le plan de l’activisme pour les droits humains et de la 
citoyenneté, les forces qui avaient animé les protestations de 2011 ne 
se sont pas perdues.  
Depuis 2011, en effet, on peut observer une redynamisation de 
l’activisme en faveur des droits humains et de la citoyenneté, qui 
concerne principalement les droits et libertés individuels, surtout 
sexuels et reproductifs, liés au corps des femmes. Et cela notamment 
après l’affaire que l’on peut appeler le suicide d’honneur de la mineur 
Amina Filali, une jeune fille de Larache qui, en mars 2012, a décidé 
de se donner la mort après avoir été mariée à son violeur, mariage qui 
permettait à ce dernier d’éviter la prison puisque « réparateur » envers 
la mineure violée, en accord avec l’(ex) art. 475 du Code pénal.20 
Apres ce suicide, l’Association marocaine des droits de l’homme 
(AMDH) a déclenché un débat national sur le lien entre droits des 
femmes, libertés individuelles et démocratisation. Le débat a été 
rapidement diffusé dans la presse : une bonne partie de la société 
civile, du monde académique et culturel s’est déclarée favorable à 
l’abolition de l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 qui garantit cette possibilité et 
de nombreuses voix ont appelé à la réforme des lois discriminatoires 
contre la liberté des femmes à disposer de leur corps.21  
Le secteur audio-visuel a été particulièrement réactif dans ce 
débat : le jeune réalisateur Nadir Bouhmouch, déjà connu pour avoir 
réalisé le film sur les protestations de 2011 au Maroc My Makzen and 
Me,22 avec le groupe Guerrilla cinema a produit en 2013 le 
documentaire Art. 475. When marriage becomes punishment, dans 
lequel plusieurs intellectuels et activistes ont dénoncé l’immobilisme 
des institutions contre le phénomène des mariages des mineurs garanti 
par cet article du Code pénal et la contradiction des dispositions du 
Code de la Famille du 2004 qui relève l’âge légal pour le mariage à 18 
ans pour les deux conjoints (art. 19), tout en permettant à un juge 
                                                            
20 Selon le réseau des centres d’écoute contre les violences faites aux femmes 
Anaruz, il y a eu 40 000 mariages de mineurs en 2012 : Anaruz - Réseau National 
des Centres d’écoute des femmes victimes de violences, Les violences fondées sur le 
genre au Maroc. Mariage des mineurs et partage des biens acquis pendant le 
mariage : lacunes du texte et difficultés de l’application, IVe rapport, Rabat, 2012. 
21 C’est le cas de la conférence organisée en mai 2012 par l’équipe de Fatima 
Sadiqi à l’Université de Fès, Le mariage des filles mineures : une perspective 
socioculturelle et juridique, http://www.psy-cognitive.net/up/uploads/files/psy-
cognitive.net-a831c73156.pdf (accès 15/9/2015). 
22 N. Bouhmouch, My Makhzen and Me (Maroc, 2011), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=zVNmMUYGnGw (accès 15/9/2015). 
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d’autoriser les mariages de mineurs (art. 20).23 Plusieurs 
manifestations, débats et conférences académiques ont provoqué une 
pression médiatique qui a poussé le Parlement à l’abolition de l’alinéa 
2 de l’article 475 du Code pénal (22 janvier 2014) et, dans la première 
moitié de 2015, à considérer la réforme du Code entier.24  
L’épisode de la jeune Filali a été saisi par l’AMDH pour également 
lancer un débat sur la dépénalisation des relations sexuelles hors 
mariage et sur la remise en cause de l’institution de la famille comme 
lieu unique des unions sexuelles légitimes.25 Au printemps 2012, la 
présidente de l’AMDH, Khadija Riadi, a aussi demandé l’abolition de 
l’art. 490 du Code pénal qui punit toute relation sexuelle hors mariage. 
Même si la publication de ces opinions a coûté à certains journalistes 
des menaces de mort,26 le débat a été relancé par le sociologue de 
l’Université de Rabat Abdessamad Dialmy, qui a dénoncé l’hypocrisie 
de la société marocaine envers les célibataires et en particulier envers 
les femmes non vierges, en invoquant l’urgence d’une transition 
sexuelle pour le Pays, c’est-à-dire d’une libéralisation profonde de la 
conception du corps et des relations sexuelles avant de prétendre 
l’affirmation d’une transition démocratique générale.27 
Pour Dialmy la double morale de la société marocaine se manifeste 
dans la prédominante condamnation de la femme non vierge – souvent 
surnommée vulgairement maṯqūba (littéralement percée, déflorée) – 
pendant que les hommes sont considérés plus virils grâce à leurs 
expériences sexuelles. À ce propos, le sociologue se demande 
comment les hommes peuvent avoir des relations sexuelles si les 
                                                            
23 N. Bouhmouch, Art 475. Le film (Maroc, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Ym07RKs-PJU (accès 15/9/2015). 
24 AFP, « Au Maroc, un violeur ne pourra plus échapper à la prison en épousant sa 
victime », 22/1/2014, http://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/au-maroc-un-violeur-ne-
pourra-plus-echapper-a-la-prison-en-epousant-sa-victime_511827.html (accès 25/9/2015). 
25 Y. Aït Akdim, « Maroc : fini les peines d’amour ? », 28/6/2012, http://www. 
jeuneafrique.com/140955/societe/maroc-fini-les-peines-d-amour/ (accès 15/9/2015);  
H. Jazouani, « Maroc : L’AMDH demande l’abrogation de la loi condamnant les 
relations sexuelles hors mariage », 20/6/2012, http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/de 
tails/11427/maroc-l-amdh-demande-l-abrogation-condamnant.html (accès 15/9/201 5). 
26 A. El-Yacoubi, ‘Morocco Salafi clerics back death for journalist’, 6/7/2012,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120706/ml-morocco-salafis/ (accès 
15/9/2015). 
27 A. Dialmy, « Le Maroc est en train de vivre sa période de transition sexuelle », 
16/7/2012, http://www.lavieeco.com/news/societe/abdessamad-dialmy-le-maroc-est-
en-train-de-vivre-sa-periode-de-transition-sexuelle--22768.html (accès 15/9/2015); 
A. Dialmy, Logement, sexualité et Islam, Eddif, Casablanca, 1995. 
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femmes ne le peuvent pas, en dénonçant l’hypocrisie de la société 
marocaine qui est contraire à l’homosexualité ou aux relations 
sexuelles non traditionnelles.28  
Cette hypocrisie contribue à la reproduction de la violence à l’égard 
des femmes, comme le dénonce le documentaire Le contrôle social 
sur les corps des femmes : le concept de virginité et la reproduction 
de la violence de genre (Al-raqāba al-ijtimāʻiyya ʻalā al-ajsād al-
nisā’: mafhūm al-ʻuḏriyya wa iʻāda al-intāj ʻunf al-nawʻ). Ce 
documentaire a été réalisé par l’écrivaine maroco-japonaise Maha 
Sano dans le cadre d’un programme de sensibilisation pour les élèves 
des écoles secondaires initié en 2013-2014 par la Fédération de la 
Ligue démocratique des droits des femmes (FLDDF). Le 
documentaire problématise la question de la virginité féminine comme 
valeur fondamentale pour la stabilité de la famille et pour la réputation 
de la femme et de son conjoint, en se concentrant sur la condamnation 
des femmes non vierges et sur les abus psychologiques qui en 
résultent. Une jeune protagoniste anonyme, qui a été violée, témoigne 
ainsi de la pression faite aux femmes à propos de la virginité : 
« Depuis ta naissance ta famille te dit de préserver ta virginité car 
c’est ton honneur et l’honneur de ta famille. Si tu la perds, il ne restera 
plus rien à ton père », dit-elle.29 Cette déclaration est confirmée par un 
homme interrogé dans la rue qui, à ce propos, définit la virginité 
comme « couronne sur la tête de la femme. Si elle ne l’a pas, elle n’a 
rien ».30 
Sur la question des violences faites aux femmes, le militantisme 
des associations et des groupes spontanés est devenu plus fréquent : le 
8 décembre 2013 pour la première fois des femmes victimes de 
violence ont marché devant le Parlement de Rabat, avec des masques 
pour protéger leur propre identité, comme le raconte le documentaire 
Hunna (Elles) de la journaliste italienne Sara Creta et de l’activiste du 
Forum des alternatives Maroc (FMAS) de Rabat, Jamila Lamnate.31 
                                                            
28 A. Dialmy, Which Sex Education for Young Muslims?, Filad, L’Aja, 2009. 
Pour le cas égyptien, voir G. Gillot, « Faire sans le dire. Les rencontres amoureuses 
au Caire », in Géographie et cultures, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2005, pp. 31-52. 
29 M. Sano, Documentaire Le contrôle social sur les corps des femmes : le 
concept de virginité et la reproduction de la violence de genre, FLDDF, Rabat, 
2014. 
30 Ib. 
31 S. Creta – J. Lamnate, Documentaire Hunna, Rabat, 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lK8RNnI9Gds (accès 27/20/2015). 
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On remarque aussi que la scène culturelle de Rabat s’est dynamisée 
sur le lien entre hypocrisie sociale concernant la sexualité et les 
violences faites aux femmes. En 2013, la compagnie théâtrale 
DabaTeatr Citoyen, très engagée sur le plan des droits humains et de 
citoyenneté, a mis en scène au théâtre national Mohammed V de 
Rabat un spectacle contre la violence à l’égard des femmes avec le 
titre Goullou! (Dis-lui!), une invitation à résister et à dénoncer les 
violences subies. La compagnie Acquarium de Rabat a proposé en 
darija le spectacle Dialy (Il est à moi, c’est le mien), référé au vagin, 
sur les tabous liés à la sexualité, qui dénonce l’obsession sociale de la 
virginité féminine. Ce spectacle, depuis sa première mise en scène en 
octobre 2012, a provoqué une polémique significative dans la presse 
et les actrices et auteures ont même reçu des menaces de mort. Réalisé 
grâce à des ateliers de prise de parole avec cent cinquante femmes de 
Rabat, le texte du spectacle est le résultat de témoignages 
autobiographiques transversaux à toutes les couches sociales, car 
selon la réalisatrice Naïma Zitan :  
 
Les souffrances des femmes n’appartiennent pas à une classe sociale 
défavorisée, mais elles sont transversales à toutes les classes sociales 
de la société marocaine.32  
 
À cet regard, l’auteure du texte, l’écrivaine Maha Sano, a déclaré :  
 
le titre Dialy est un symbole de l’urgence de réappropriation du corps des 
femmes. Dans le communiqué de presse, on a noté que le vagin, comme la 
sexualité des femmes, “ça c’est à moi, ni à toi, ni à vous!” [Hada dialy, 
meshi dialek aw dialkum].33   
  
Après 2011, également dans le cadre de la sphère publique en ligne 
le sujet du corps et de la sexualité des femmes a été très débattu, grâce 
à la création de plusieurs pages web ou groupes Facebook : Kullunā 
Amina Filali (On est tou(te)s Amina Filali), La femme n’est pas une 
cote khwiyya (mon frère), CEDAW et droits des femmes au Maroc, ou 
Femmes, réflexion et action sont des exemples des groupes qui ont 
                                                            
32 N. Zitan, « Ne jugez pas Dialy avant d’avoir vu la pièce », 10/2/2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rscqq1XwCLE (accès 15/9/2015); interview 
avec con Naïma Zitan, réalisatrice, Rabat, 21/5/2014. 
33 Interview avec Maha Sano, artiste, Rabat, 19/9/2014; A. Khalid, ‘Re-enacting 
Revolution and the New Public Sphere in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco’, in Theatre 
Research International 38/Special Issue 02 (July 2013), pp. 87-103. 
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contribué au débat avec des milliers de membres. Certaines pages 
Facebook sont devenues des outils pour consolider le partage 
d’informations et pour mieux organiser les pratiques protestataires 
dans la sphère publique réelle. Dans ce sens, il faut signaler que, à 
partir d’un groupe Facebook, Women Choufouch est devenu un vrai 
mouvement contre le harcèlement sexuel,34 pendant que le magazine 
Qandisha, qui prend le nom de l’esprit féminin de la tradition 
marocaine, est né à partir d’un blog de sa fondatrice Fedwa Misk et est 
aujourd’hui une revue en ligne militante.35 
Ce ferment culturel reflète une capacité renouvelée de mobilisation 
qui est transversale à la sphère publique virtuelle et réelle.36 À ce 
propos, un cas intéressant de réaction aux déclarations publiques des 
politiciens de plusieurs groupes et associations de femmes s’est vérifié 
en juin 2014 contre les déclarations du chef du gouvernement 
opposées au travail extra-domestique des femmes. Le 19 juin 2014, le 
Premier Ministre Abdelilah Benkirane a déclaré à la Chambre des 
Conseillers que « la meilleure place pour une femme est le foyer et 
quand elle sort de la maison, la lumière sort avec elle ».37 Subitement, 
le 22 juin, des militantes ont lancé la campagne avec le hashtag 
#anamachitria, qui signifie « Je ne suis pas un chandelier » (tria, en 
darija) pour revendiquer leur droit au travail, à la mobilité et à l’auto-
détermination.38 
Selon plusieurs militantes interviewées, cette rapidité de réaction, 
due entre autres à la dynamisation des réseaux sociaux qui rend la 
mobilisation plus efficace, a été renforcée en 2013 aussi par la 
mobilisation nationale contre la grâce royale concédée à Daniel 
                                                            
34 Z. Achraf, « Les sanctions pour les harceleurs s’alourdissent : interview avec 
Layla Belmahi, co-fondatrice de l’association Woman Shoufouch », 24/4/2015, 
http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/04/24/les-sanctions-pour-les-ha_n_713361 
4.html?ir=Maghreb&ncid=fcbklnkfrhpmg00000005 (accès 15/9/2015). 
35 S. Borrillo, ‘Telepredicatrici e attiviste on line in Marocco: la costruzione 
mediatica del genere femminile tra ideale islamico e libertà individuali’, in Renata 
Pepicelli (ed.), Le donne nei media arabi. Tra aspettative tradite e nuove 
opportunità, Carocci, Roma, 2014, pp. 99-110. 
36 A. Salvatore, Between Everyday Life and Political Revolution: The Social Web 
in the Middle East, in Oriente Moderno, XCI/1 (2011). 
37 Hespress Channel, Binkīrān wa ʻamal al-mar’a (Benkiran et le travail des 
femmes), 17/6/2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cfZm3rf124 (accès 
18/9/2015). 
38 W. Charrad, « Benkirane tancé par la twittoma qui lance #anamachitria », 
19/6/2014, http://telquel.ma/2014/06/19/benkirane-twittoma-anamachitria_139571 
(accès 27/10/2015). 
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Gavan, un pédophile de nationalité espagnole condamné à une peine 
de trente ans. Le Mouvement du 20-Février, l’Association marocaine 
des droits de l’homme (AMDH), l’Association Touche pas à mon 
enfant et d’autres formations politiques et syndicales ont organisé des 
manifestations devant le Parlement de Rabat, à Casablanca et dans 
d’autres villes, soutenues par des campagnes Twitter, une page 
Facebook et une pétition Avaaz. Même si la plupart des 
manifestations a été dispersée par la police, le Roi a retiré la grâce le 4 
août 2013, deux jours après les premières marches, et cette remise en 
cause d’une décision royale a donné à la société civile une confiance 
majeure dans l’efficacité de sa mobilisation.39 Selon la journaliste 
Fedwa Misk, il s’agit d’aspects significatifs qui témoignent de 
l’impact du M-20F sur la capacité de mobilisation de la société 
marocaine : 
 
Grâce au Mouvement, au Maroc il a eu un réveil démocratique. 
Aujourd’hui, on n’a plus peur du pouvoir et des autorités comme 
avant et on s’engage plus politiquement, car la politique n’est plus 
conçue comme une activité dans le cadre d’un parti, mais comme un 
exercice de citoyenneté.40  
 
Et dans ce scenario, les droits et les libertés sexuels et reproductifs 
sont intégrés dans la lutte pour une citoyenneté pleine et entière, 
respectant « le droit à avoir des droits » de façon égalitaire à tous les 
citoyens et citoyennes.41 
 
Le Mouvement alternatif pour les libertés individuelles (MALI) et 
les droits sexuels et reproductifs  
Les droits sexuels et reproductifs et pour l’autodétermination du 
corps font partie des libertés individuelles, revendiquées par les 
militantes interviewées, qui sont des éléments fondamentaux pour une 
                                                            
39 Article de rédaction, « Maroc : Le roi annule la grâce accordée au pédophile 
espagnol, Daniel Galvan », 4/8/2013, http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/ 
details/18837/maroc-annule-grace-accordee-pedophile.html (accès 16/9/2015); 
article de rédaction, « L’affaire du pédophile espagnol gracié au Maroc en 4 
questions », 5/8/2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/08/05/maroc-la-
grace-accordee-a-un-pedophile-espagnol-en-question_3457450_3212.html (accès 
27/10/2015). 
40 Interview avec Fedwa Misk, rédactrice en chef de Qandisha, Casablanca, 
5/9/2014. 
41 E. Balibar, Cittadinanza, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2012, p. 18. 
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citoyenneté renouvelée. Particulièrement actif dans ce domaine, le 
Mouvement alternatif pour les libertés individuelles (MALI) a été 
créé, grâce à un groupe Facebook, en 2009 par Ibtissame Betty 
Lachgar et Zinab El-Rhazoui, deux activistes très médiatisées.42 La 
première est très active sur les medias sociaux et dans les 
manifestations au Maroc et en France ; la deuxième, ex-journaliste à 
Charlie Hebdo, a exprimé ses opinions contestataires dans le journal 
marocain L’Hebdomadaire. Déjà connues des autorités pour avoir 
manifesté plusieurs fois pour le droit à ne pas jeûner pendant le 
Ramadan (obligation implicite dans l’art. 222 du Code pénal),43 les 
militantes du MALI ont récemment été protagonistes de plusieurs 
manifestations pour les droits sexuels et reproductifs. Des 
représentants du Mouvement ont animé le Kiss-in, une manifestation 
qui a eu lieu le 12 octobre 2013 dans le cadre d’un sit-in en face du 
Parlement de Rabat en solidarité avec deux adolescents de Nador, 
précédemment condamnés à la prison pour avoir posté sur Facebook 
la photo d’un baiser.44 En présence de plusieurs journalistes étrangers, 
la manifestation a été rapidement dispersée par des opposants, mais 
l’évènement a représenté une première sans précédent au Maroc.45  
De plus, dans le cadre de la lutte pour l’autodétermination du corps, 
une attention particulière est donnée par le MALI à la revendication 
du droit à l’avortement pour toutes les femmes. Avec la campagne My 
body is mine et plusieurs marches publiques, les activistes réclament 
l’abolition des normes du Code pénal marocain qui condamnent toute 
femme ayant recours à l’avortement ou qui tente de le faire, et 
quiconque l’aide et l’encourage, médecins compris.46 Sur ce sujet 
l’attention publique a été majeure quand, en janvier 2015, le 
professeur Chraïbi, Président de l’Association de lutte contre les 
                                                            
42 Interview avec Ibtissame Betty Lachgar, leader du MALI, Rabat, 9/9/2014. 
43 S. Sbiti, « Un collectif demande la protection des déjeuneurs du Ramadan », 
24/6/2014, http://telquel.ma/2014/06/24/collectif-demande-protection-jeuneurs-du-
ramadan_140095 (accès 12/9/2015). 
44 Canal 24 plus, Vidéo de la manifestation du Kiss-in: https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=TiuwkjaT0d0 (accès 27/10/2015). 
45 L. Vincent, « Maroc : le kiss-in de solidarité a tourné court à Rabat », 14/10/ 
2013, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131013-maroc-le-kiss-in-solidarite-tourne-court-ra 
bat-adolescent-nador-baiser-facebook (accès 19/9/2015). 
46 Au Maroc l’avortement légal est permis pour sauvegarder la santé des mères 
(art.453). Article de rédaction, « MALI se mobilise pour le droit à l’avortement », 
http://telquel.ma/2014/01/27/mali-se-mobilise-pour-le-droit-a-lavortement_10714 
(accès 27/10/2015).  
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avortements clandestins (ALCAC) a été démis de ses fonctions de 
chef de service à la maternité de l’Hôpital des Orangers de Rabat 
après avoir été protagoniste d’un documentaire télévisuel français sur 
l’avortement au Maroc.47 Le renvoi du médecin a été motivé par le 
Ministre de la Santé par des raisons liées aux autorisations de tournage 
du documentaire.48 Mais à partir de cet épisode la solidarité envers 
Chraïbi a été croissante et le débat sur l’avortement et sur la liberté 
des choix liés à l’autodétermination du corps au Maroc s’est répandu 
dans une bonne partie de la presse.49  
À l’occasion de la journée internationale de l’avortement (28 
septembre 2015), le MALI a lancé une campagne Avaaz pour demander 
« l’abrogation des articles 449 à 458 du Code pénal marocain qui 
condamnent toute femme ayant recours à l’avortement ou qui tentent de 
le faire, comme quiconque l’aide et l’encourage, médecins compris ».50 
L’objectif de la campagne est de mettre fin « aux pratiques clandestines 
qui comportent de nombreux dangers en offrant des moyens 
d’avortement légaux, contrôlés et sanitaires afin de sauver des vies ».51 
Dans une interview, Ibtissame Betty Lachgar a déclaré que : 
 
Affirmer le droit au choix de la femme implique aussi affirmer le droit 
à choisir un destin différent du rôle reproductif. La domination 
masculine et le patriarcat persistant dans notre société qui fait du corps 
des femmes un objet à des fins reproductives, en refusant aux femmes 
                                                            
47 Selon les données de l’AMLAC, entre 800 et 1 000 femmes se feraient avorter 
chaque jour au Maroc (200 par le recours à l’avortement non médicalisé et 600 à 
800 par une interruption de grossesse en clinique ou en cabinet privé). Pour le MALI 
il s’agit d’un numéro bien majeur. France 2, « Choc! Envoyé spécial. L’avortement 
au Maroc - avec Prof. Chraïbi », https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
o0VwYwShsqw (accès 25 septembre 2015); H. Bennani, ‘Prof. Chraïbi licencié : 
« Je vais aller en justice », 10/2/2015, http://www.h24info.ma/maroc/pr-chraibi-
licencie-je-vais-aller-en-
justiceexclusif/30672?utm_source=Newsletter_Datarget&utm_medium=email& 
utm_campaign=H24-AL3-10-02-2015 (accès 27/10/2015).  
48 S. El-Ouardighi, « Avortement. Le Ministre Louardi répond au professeur 
Chraïbi », 11/02/2015, http://www.medias24.com/SOCIETE/152699-Avortement.-
Le-ministre-Louardi-repond-au-professeur-Chraibi.html (accès 25/9/2015). 
49 N. Guessus, « La politique de laissez-les mourir », in L’Economiste 4464, 
17/2/2015, http://www.leconomiste.com/article/966894-l-avortement-au-maroc-la-
politique-de-laissez-les-mourir-par-le-pr-nouzha-guessous (accès 27/10/2015). 
50 Pétition Avaaz Dépénalisation de l’avortement au Maroc, https://secure.avaaz. 
org/fr/petition/LEGALISATION_DE_LAVORTEMENT_AU_MAROC_1/?pv=28 
(accès 26/9/2015). 
51 Id. 
410 Sara BORRILLO 
 
le droit de décider en toute autonomie. Nous réaffirmons notre volonté 
de garantir le droit inaliénable des femmes à disposer de leur corps. Le 
corps des femmes n’appartient qu’à elles-mêmes. Ce n’est ni à l’État, 
ni à la société, ni aux hommes (de lois) de décider. Les femmes 
n’avortent ni par plaisir, ni par hasard.52  
 
Avec ce type de déclaration, on pourrait définir les militant(e)s du 
MALI comme des commandos intellectuels ou des pionniers sexuels 
qui, selon Ghada Al-Samman, sont des révolutionnaires qui agissent 
pour des idées nouvelles et progressistes sans peur de la censure 
publique.53 Effectivement le MALI dépasse les frontières des tabous 
sexuels au Maroc, en étant très engagé aussi à sensibiliser la société 
sur la dépénalisation des relations sexuelles hors mariage et en 
particulier sur les relations homosexuelles sanctionnées par l’art. 489 
du Code pénal. À ce propos, à travers plusieurs campagnes promues 
sur Youtube et sur les réseaux sociaux, le MALI avec le Collectif 
Aṣwāt (Voix) pour la lutte contre la discrimination fondée sur la 
sexualité et le genre ont récemment lancé la campagne L’amour n’est 
pas un crime (Al-ḥubb laysa jarīma).54 
 
Un débat impossible à interrompre 
2015 a commencé avec plusieurs débats sur la sexualité et 
l’autodétermination du corps. En janvier, la sortie de la vidéo de la 
chanson de Zina Daoudia Aʻṭīnī ṣākī (Donne-moi mon sac), visualisé 
par des millions d’internautes, a scandalisé les conservateurs qui ont 
considéré la chanteuse trop vulgaire dans sa manière de s’habiller, de 
parler, de se maquiller.55 En mai, la participation de Jennifer Lopez au 
                                                            
52 Interview avec Ibtissame Betty Lachgar.  
53 G. Al-Samman, ‘The Sexual Revolution and the Total Revolution’, in 
Elizabeth Warnok Fernea - Basima Qattan Bezirgan, Middle Eastern Muslim 
Women Speak, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1976, pp. 391-399, transl. of ‘Al-
thawra al-jinsiyya wa al-thawra al-shāmila’, in Mawaqif 2/12 (1970), Beirut, pp. 68-
73. 
54 Collectif Aṣwāt pour la lutte contre la discrimination fondée sur la sexualité et 
le genre, Campagne L’amour n’est pas un crime (Al-ḥubb laysa jarīma), 
ةمیرج_سیل_بحلا#, #Love_is_not_crime, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pogAQ 
UUMdZY (accès 27/10/2015). 
55 M. Cheibi, « Polémique : La chanteuse Zina Daoudia répond à ses détracteurs 
dans une interview accordée à Goud.ma, morceaux choisis », 29/1/2015, 
http://www. huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/01/29/polemique-zina-daoudia_n_6572040.html 
(accès 27/10/2015) ; Article de rédaction, « Daoudia dévoile le clip de sa chanson 
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festival Mawazin de Rabat et sur la scène de la télé publique 2M a 
provoquée des initiatives de demande de démission du Ministre de la 
Communication, et cela bien que la Reine et ses enfants aient assisté 
au concert en première ligne. Puis, la sortie au festival 
cinématographique de Cannes du film Much Loved du réalisateur 
Nabil Ayouch, qui raconte l’histoire de quatre prostituées de 
Marrakech, a suscité une grande polémique et un débat d’une grande 
violence dans la presse et les média sociaux. Contre ceux qui ont 
condamné les scènes peu pudiques car considérées comme 
irrespectueuses de la morale nationale, beaucoup d’internautes, des 
journalistes et d’intellectuels ont dénoncé l’hypocrisie patriarcale de la 
société marocaine qui s’oppose à un film dénonçant la prostitution 
sans essayer de lutter contre le phénomène très enraciné dans le pays. 
Le film a été interdit par le Ministère de la Communication sans que la 
production du film n’ait même demandé l’autorisation officielle de 
distribution.56  
Ces derniers épisodes ont enrichi le débat sur l’avant-projet du 
Code pénal qui avait été présenté en avril 2015 par le Ministre de la 
Justice. L’avant-projet a été jugé comme rétrograde par la société 
civile continuant la mobilisation surtout pour ce qui concerne la 
pénalisation des relations sexuelles hors mariage ou homosexuelles.57 
Dans le cadre la campagne Le Code pénal ne passera pas (Al-Qānūn 
al-jinā’ī lan yamurru), un groupe de journalistes, activistes, 
citoyen(ne)s, se sont battu(e)s contre le projet de lois qui conserve les 
articles contre les relations sexuelles hors mariage et contre 
l’homosexualité.58  
Au mois de juin, d’autres épisodes ont attiré l’attention médiatique 
sur la lutte pour la dépénalisation des relations homosexuelles et sur 
l’autodétermination du corps. Le 3 juin 2015, pendant le festival 
                                                                                                                                           
Aatini Saki », 30/3/2015, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/03/30/daoudia-
aatini-saki -clip_n_6967484.html (accès 27/10/2015).  
56 L. Berrada-Berca, « Ce que raconte réellement Much Loved », 14/9/2015, 
http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/lamia-berradaberca/ce-que-raconte-reellement-
much-loved_b_8132474.html?ncid=fcbklnkfrhpmg00000005, (accès 15/9/2015). 
57 N. Lamili, « Maroc : l’avant-projet de réforme du Code pénal est-il 
rétrograde ? », 16/4/2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/229969/politique/maroc-l-
avant-projet-de-r-forme-du-code-p-nal-est-il-r-trograde/ (accès 27/10/2015). 
58 « Code pénal : Militants et activistes se mobilisent sur les réseaux sociaux 
contre le projet de loi », 6/4/2015, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/04/06/ 
code-penal-militants-activistes-mobilisation-reseaux-sociaux_n_7010618.html 
(accès 27/10/2015). 
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Mawazin de Rabat, un guitariste du groupe britannique Placebo a 
montré son dos sur lequel était inscrit le numéro 489 barré d’une 
croix ; ceci pour dénoncer l’article 489 du Code pénal qui pénalise les 
relations homosexuelles. Cet épisode s’est déroulé juste un jour après 
que deux activistes du groupe Femen se soient embrassées, seins nus, 
sur l’esplanade de la mosquée Hassan II de Rabat, symbole de la 
monarchie. Les Femen ont été tout de suite interrogées et expulsées en 
France, pendant que leur acte a été jugé contreproductif par les 
militantes féministes marocaines qui considèrent ce groupe exogène et 
caractérisé par un discours et des pratiques coloniaux.59 
Toujours en juin, deux jeunes filles à Inezgane, près d’Agadir, ont 
été harcelées par des hommes dans un marché car accusées d’avoir 
porté une robe trop courte. À l’heure de déposer plainte, les deux 
femmes étaient poursuivies pour outrage à la pudeur et encouraient 
une peine de prison d’un mois à deux ans à cause de leur tenue jugée 
contraire aux bonnes mœurs, en vertu des articles visant l’attentat à la 
pudeur publique (art. 483-485) du Code pénal. Cet épisode a généré 
une vague de protestations significatives à Rabat, Casablanca, 
Marrakech supportées par une campagne Twitter, une page Facebook 
et une pétition Avaaz dirigée vers le Ministre de la Justice titrées 
Porter une robe n’est pas un crime. Finalement le 13 juillet les deux 
filles ont été innocentées et la société civile, en particulier les 
associations féministes, surtout la Ligue Démocratique des Droits des 
Femmes (LDDF), ont fêté leur victoire.60 
Si ces débats montrent une attention renouvelée aux thématiques 
des droits sexuels et reproductifs, toutes les militantes rencontrées ont 
dénoncé le fait qu’il n’y a pas de changement dans la vie quotidienne 
des femmes, où le harcèlement sexuel continue régulièrement. 
                                                            
59 T. Savage - Y. Roudabi, « A Mawazine, Placebo dit non à la criminalisation de 
l’homosexualité », 3/6/2015, http://telquel.ma/2015/06/03/mawazine-placebo-dit-
larti cle-489-du-code-penal_1450114 (accès 30/9/2015); M. Yassin, « Seins nus, 
deux Femen s’embrassent devant la tour Hassan à Rabat », 2/6/2015, 
http://telquel.ma/ 2015/06/02/membres-du-femen-manifestent-rabat_1449896 (accès 
30/9/2015). 
60 TelQuel, « Des centaines de Marocains clament mettre une robe n’est pas un 
crime », 29/6/2015, http://telquel.ma/2015/06/29/centaines-marocains-clament-met 
tre-une-robe-nest-pas-crime_1453760 (accès 27/10/2015); Pétition Avaaz Mettre 
une robe n’est pas un crime, https://secure.avaaz.org/fr/petition/Au_ministre_de_la_ 
Justice_et_des_Libertes_Mettre_une_robe_nest_pas_un_crime/?pv=68 (accès 7/8/ 
2016). 
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Meriem Benlioua, entre 2013 et 2014 Secrétaire générale de 
l’association Cap Démocratie, qui a été créée en 2011 après les 
manifestations du M-20F, a déclaré : 
 
Le corps des femmes pose toujours problème, c’est là que tout le 
monde bloque : sur comment la femme s’habille, comment elle 
marche, comment elle fume, se maquille. La femme est toujours prête 
à la séduction selon les hommes et le problème est que beaucoup de 
femmes ont intégré une peur de séduire qui souvent les mène à 
s’autocensurer.61 
 
Yousra El-Barrad, jeune militante de Casablanca de la Ligue 
démocratique des droits des femmes, a affirmé que : « il y aura 
égalité au Maroc quand avant de sortir de ma maison je ne devrai 
plus réfléchir sur comment m’habiller en fonction du trajet que je 
fais ».62 Pour l’écrivaine Maha Sano, la centralité de la sexualité 
féminine dans le déséquilibre de pouvoir au sein de la société est 
due au fait que 
 
Le corps des femmes est toujours lié à la signification du sacré au 
sens positif et négatif : il est sacralisé en raison de son rôle 
reproductif, mais il est socialement sacrifié car il déstabilise.63 
 
Conclusions : « La révolution sera sexuelle ou ne sera pas » 
Les obstacles à la reconnaissance des droits et libertés sexuels et 
reproductifs au Maroc dévoilent le double paradoxe juridique et social 
de la citoyenneté. Si d’un côté la Constitution prévoit l’égalité de 
genre, la normativité sociale supportée par les articles du Code pénal 
prévoit la soumission à une vision patriarcale du corps et de la 
sexualité féminine, et de toute forme de sexualité non hétéronormée et 
donc considérée comme non légitime. 
En utilisant la distinction entre luttes de redistribution et de 
reconnaissance proposé par Fraser et Honneth, on peut remarquer que 
le Mouvement du 20 Février a agrégé à la fois deux types de 
revendications : celles re-distributives classiques et les exigences de 
                                                            
61 Interview avec Meriem Benalioua, Rabat, 12/9/2014; L. Skalli, ‘Young 
women and social media against sexual harassment in North Africa’, in The Journal 
of North African Studies 19/2 (April 2014), pp. 244-258. 
62 Interview avec Yousra El-Barrad, Casablanca, 17/9/2014. 
63 Interview avec Maha Sano.  
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reconnaissance de droits culturels et politiques.64 Le premier type de 
revendication inclut des luttes matérialistes – obtention d’emplois 
dans le secteur public, amélioration des conditions de travail, 
augmentation du salaire minimum légal et redistribution des revenus –
portées par les syndicalistes, les associations de diplômés-chômeurs et 
les collectifs citoyens. Le deuxième, des slogans culturalistes et/ou en 
support du discours des droits humains, est notamment représenté par 
les associations qui ont demandé la constitutionnalisation de la langue 
amazighe, ainsi que les mouvements de lutte pour la reconnaissance 
des libertés individuelles et l’égalité de genre.65 
Si d’un côté le M-20F a échoué dans son intention d’influencer les 
dynamiques politiques et socio-économiques sur le plan national, les 
expériences analysées dans cet article montrent que l’action de 
plusieurs forces de la société civile marocaine, qui sont des échos et 
témoignages de la r/ésistance de l’esprit contestataire et progressiste 
du M-20F, sont engagées aujourd’hui pour le changement de la 
mentalité patriarcale et des relations de pouvoir entre individus à 
travers des revendications de reconnaissance liées à 
l’autodétermination du corps et aux droits sexuels et reproductifs. 
À mon avis, ces nouvelles formations sociales et culturelles à 
travers des instruments artistiques, audio visuels, théâtrales, et à 
travers des nouvelles technologies, montrent l’exigence de 
promouvoir et performer des instances favorables aux droits des 
femmes et à l’égalité de genre selon trois trajectoires principales.  
1) En premier lieu, on assiste à ce que Loubna Skalli a défini un 
repositionnement féministe, c’est-à-dire que le champs d’action des 
militant(e)s pour l’égalité s’est étendu du territoire du politique à celui 
de la culture, où de nouveaux langages, des pratiques sociales et 
imaginaires reflètent le désir et l’urgence d’un projet global de société 
égalitaire.66  
                                                            
64 N. Fraser - A. Honnet, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political - Philosophical 
Exchange, Verso, London-New York, 2003. 
65 M. Sakhi - A. Esmili, « Comprendre et agir : appel à un autre Maroc », 
7/5/2015, http://autre-maroc.org/appel-a-un-autre-maroc/ et http://www.contretemps.eu/ 
interventions/comprendre-agir-appel-autre-maroc-cr%C3%A9er-conditions-nouveau-
mouvement-social (accès 27/10/2015). 
66 Skalli, ‘Young Women’; Salime, ‘A New Feminism? Gender Dynamics in 
Morocco’s February Movement’, in Journal of International Women’s Studies 11/ 
13/Issue5 Arab Women Arab Spring, pp. 101-114. 
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2) En deuxième lieu, ce type de revendications de droits de 
reconnaissance montrent l’indissolubilité du lien entre 
l’institutionnalisation des libertés et droits individuels liés à la 
sexualité et à l’égalité de genre et tout changement démocratique.67 
3) En troisième lieu, si le corps et la sexualité restent objets des 
dispositifs du pouvoir patriarcal et représentent le centre de blocages 
relatifs à la reconnaissance des droits et libertés individuels, il est aussi 
vrai que la lutte pour les droits sexuels et reproductifs animée par les 
militant(e)s, groupes et associations féministes a ouvert le débat au-delà 
des frontières hétéro-normatives du genre, en ouvrant des horizons de 
lutte nouveaux dans les discours et politiques liés à la sexualité. 
Aujourd’hui, la lutte féministe ou pour l’égalité de genre s’avère être 
non pas la lutte exclusive d’une partie de la société, mais une lutte qui 
peut influencer la démocratisation des relations de pouvoir entre 
individus et la manière de concevoir et redéfinir le processus de 
construction des genres, au pluriel, au-delà des conceptions binaires 
traditionnellement conçues comme étant les seules légitimes.  
S’il est pertinent de reconnaître, comme l’a affirmé Ghada Al-
Samman, qu’une révolution sexuelle ne peut se faire sans une révolution 
sur le plan économique, idéologique, politique et social,68 pour les 
militantes marocaines rencontrées, c’est la révolution sexuelle qui tend à 
devenir de plus en plus centrale pour contribuer à une révolution totale. 
D’autre part, dans une interview réalisée chez elle, Fatima Mernissi, la 
sociologue féministe décédée en novembre 2015, disait que : « Après 
l’indépendance nationale, le débat sur les libertés sexuelles au Maroc et 
dans le monde arabe représente la vraie révolution en cours ».69 
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Emergence of a New Women’s Activism 
 
Renata PEPICELLI 
 
 
Abstract 
For several months in 2011 a new generation of young women militants invaded 
the streets and the squares of more than sixty both small and large towns in 
Morocco, reconfiguring gender roles and turning squares and streets into new 
gendered spaces. Young women and young men joined and demonstrated together, 
producing a new kind of activism and a new form of relationship between the 
genders. Through the internet their message went viral, circulating within the 
country and abroad, spreading the feminist concept of equality between men and 
women. However, this young generation of activists did not feel that it fully 
belonged to feminist practices and ideas and broke away from the historical 
women’s associations which had dominated the public and political scene in 
Morocco since the 80s. The youth of the 20 February Movement occupied a political 
space, which can be defined as ‘post-ideological’, ‘post-secular’ and ‘post-feminist’. 
On the basis of interviews with activists from different generations, this paper 
investigates the forms and tools of this new young ‘post-feminist’ activism, placing 
it within the long history of the women’s movements in Morocco. 
 
Introduction 
The 20th February Movement demonstrated the emergence of a new 
women’s movement in Morocco, which surprised many on account of 
the shape it took and the forms of its engagement. For several months 
in 2011 a new generation of young women militants invaded the 
streets and the squares of more than sixty both small and large towns 
in Morocco, reconfiguring gender roles and turning squares and streets 
into new gendered spaces. Young women and young men joined 
together and demonstrated, resisted against the police, performed 
various forms of art, organized gatherings and meetings, and produced 
a new kind of activism and a new form of relationship between the 
genders. Through the internet their message went viral, circulating 
within the country and abroad, spreading the feminist concept of 
equality between men and women. However, this young generation of 
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activists did not feel that it fully belonged to feminist practices and 
ideas and broke away from the historical women’s associations which 
had dominated the public and political scene in Morocco since the 
80s. These new activists of the 20th February Movement occupy a 
political space, which can be defined as ‘post-ideological’, ‘post-
secular’ and ‘post-feminist’, in which the methods adopted in social 
and political conflict produced new and unexpected alliances with the 
Islamist movements rather than with historical feminist movements. 
Quoting activists from different generations, this paper investigates 
the forms and tools of this new young post-feminist activism, 
describing its genealogy, points of continuity and breaks from 
previous experiences, placing it within the long history of the feminist 
movement in Morocco. It is based on field research in Morocco and, 
in particular, on in-depth interviews with young female and male 
activists of the 20th February Movement in Rabat and on interviews 
with human rights and women’s rights activists.1 
 
‘New Antigones’: ‘Political Disobedience’ and Equality in 
Practices in the 20th February Movement 
Following on from the protests in Egypt and Tunisia between the 
end of 2010 and beginning of 2011, Morocco experienced important 
demonstrations across the country during several months of 2011. The 
demonstrators were asking for political, social and economic reform, 
such as the reform of Parliament, of the Government and of the 
Constitution, as well as for free education, jobs, housing and the 
recognition of Tamazight as a national language.2 There was a 
significant participation of young women right from the very first 
meetings set up to identify the steps to be taken to bring the Arab wind 
of protest also to Morocco. ‘Prior to 20th February, I attended 2-3 
meetings at the head-quarters of the Moroccan Association of Human 
                                                            
1 I would like to thank Lucile Daumas for her support and assistance during the 
fieldwork in Morocco. 
2 For an analysis of the 20th February Movement see the following articles: C. 
Bayloq - J. Granci, « 20 février. Discours et portraits d’un mouvement de révolte au 
Maroc », in L’Année du Maghreb. Dossier : Un Printemps Arabe ? VIII (2012), pp. 
239-258; T. Desrues, ‘Mobilizations in a Hybrid Regime: The 20th February 
Movement and the Moroccan Regime’, in Current Sociology 61/ 4 (2013), pp. 409-
423; T. Desrues, ‘Moroccan Youth and the Forming of a New Generation: Social 
Change, Collective Action and Political Activism’, in Mediterranean Politics 17/1 
(2012), pp. 23-40. 
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Rights (AMDH, Association Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme), in 
Rabat’ – recounts Ouidade Melhaf, who was 21 in 2011: 
 
These meetings were held in secret. We were afraid. We organized 
ourselves above all on Facebook. At that time, using the internet was 
not too risky as the Moroccan government had not yet developed an 
efficient system for controlling social networks.3 
 
When the movement decided to go public, young women 
immediately played a central role: they exposed themselves to the 
judgment of the community and to the repressive forces of law and 
order. With their votes, they soon became iconic figures in the 
movement, new ‘Antigones’, who, in the squares, in the streets, in 
meetings, and on the social media, revisited the figure of the Greek 
heroine, updating ‘the archetype of the disobedient woman’, who 
rebels against power.4 This had already happened in Iran, when Neda 
Agha Soltan, killed during the protests in 2009 at the age of 29 years 
old, became the symbol of the Green Wave; or in Egypt, when Asma 
Mahfouz, in a video posted on Youtube, invited Egyptians to 
demonstrate in the squares against Mubarak on 25th January;5 and 
again in Turkey with the ‘girl in the red dress’, photographed in 
Taksim square during the 2013 clashes, who became the emblem of 
the rebellious youth, both fragile and strong. In Morocco, the symbol 
of the movement was to be the face framed by the long dark hair of 
the then nineteen-year-old Amina Boughalbi,6 a third-year journalism 
student, who quickly became the local and international icon of the 
20th February Movement (as from now referred to as 20FM). Together 
with many other Moroccan girls, until then unknown to the public at 
large, Amina chose to take a risk, shedding her anonymity and 
protesting. Appearing in the first frames of the video, which was 
chosen to launch the announcement of the first demonstration – the 
one which gave the movement the name of 20th February – Amina 
                                                            
3 Interview with Ouidade Melhaf, Rabat, 11/1/2014. In 2014 she was a Master 
student and freelance journalist in Tangier. 
4 B. Casalini, ‘Nel segno di Antigone: disobbedienza femminista e queer’, in 
Genesis XIV (2015), pp. 117-140. 
5 See the video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIuiWLTMonY (Last access 
10/7/2015). 
6 The role played by Amina Boughalbi in the 20FM was analyzed in several 
academic essays (Salime 2012; Langohr 2014) and in magazines and newspapers’ 
articles. 
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invited people to protest, stating: ‘I am Moroccan and I will march on 
20th February because I want freedom and equality for all 
Moroccans’.7 Amina describes the first phase of 2011 in this way:  
 
When the 20FM appeared, my parents, like all other Moroccans, 
found out about what I was doing through television. My father saw 
me on YouTube asking people to demonstrate like the young people 
in Egypt and Tunisia. My mother supports the King. She was afraid. 
She said that the police would beat me, that I would lose my future. 
My father was afraid. He told me to be careful and to concentrate on 
my studies. However, the main problem was my mother. Above all 
when the threats by phone started to arrive. They said that my parents 
should silence me, that I would lose my life and my studies. But each 
time I reassured them, telling them that I was doing nothing illegal.8 
 
Coming from a lower-middle class family in the city of Oujda on 
the border with Algeria, Amina, an excellent student at high school, at 
the age of 17 moved on her own to Rabat in order to study at 
university; a radical change in her life which was soon to lead her 
down the path of politicization.  
 
I changed a lot at university. What made me change was the fact that I 
started to read and, before that, I had met with some young militants, 
members of associations like the AMDH. I used to go to cafés. We 
began to discuss God, religion, the social and political situation in 
Morocco, the situation of women. It was then that I began to ask 
myself questions. In class I had a friend who was a fan of Che 
Guevara and so I began to read about Che Guevara. As a result of 
these discussions, I began to read the great writers. And so in a year I 
underwent a complete transformation. I took off the veil and another 
Amina emerged.9 
 
Gradually, from week to week, as the 20FM grew, during the first 
months of 2011, in both large and small cities across Morocco, the 
                                                            
7 The video in Arabic is in: https://www.mamfakinch.com/video-campagne-20-
fevrier-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-20-
%D9%81%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1/; with English subtitles 
is on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0f6FSB7gxQ (Last access 10/7/2015). 
8 Interview with Amina Boughalbi, Rabat, 17/1/2014. At the moment of the 
interview she had got a degree in Journalism and worked for the association 
Médiateur pour la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme. 
9 Ib. 
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presence of women increased, mostly young women coming from a 
middle-class student environment, but also from sectors of the lower 
classes. Highly visible in the demonstrations and the general meetings 
(even though in numerical minority compared to the men), the young 
women within the movement filled all kinds of roles within the 
movement, from leadership to logistics, facing the police in the same 
way as did the men. Sabra Talbi, a female student during the 20FM 
and now a music teacher in a public high school recounts:  
 
During the movement I felt I was a real 20FM militant and did not 
primarily think of myself as a woman; there was no difference 
between myself and the militant men. I did everything. I had my own 
ideas, my own point of view. The police beat everyone, men and 
women. There was no difference. When the movement came to an 
end, I felt I was a woman. I cried a lot.10 
 
For those who had been militants in Morocco for years, this new 
female presence in both the public and political field represented a 
significant change, both materially and symbolically. Young women 
appeared in a significant manner in public in a new relational 
dynamic. According to Khadija Ryadi, who has been involved in the 
Moroccan political scene since the ’80s as a member of the radical left 
and the human rights’ movement:  
 
The experience of the 20FM saw the participation of many women, 
many young women, unlike previous demonstrations in Morocco’s 
history. The 20FM militants are more numerous, assert themselves 
more forcefully, have more faith in themselves compared to when we 
were young.11  
 
For Ryadi’s generation and above all for the women who were 
active in the ’60 and the ’70s, like Latifa Jbabdi, Fatna El-Bouih, 
Widad Bouab – who even paid for their activism by imprisonment and 
torture –, 12 feminist activism was mostly in left-wing parties and in 
                                                            
10 Interview with Sabra Talbi, Rabat, 14/1/2014. 
11 Interview with Khadija Ryadi, Rabat, 15/1/2014. At the moment of the 
interview she was president of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights 
(AMDH). 
12 For an analysis of the repression of women’s activism in the ’70s and ’80s see 
the experience of Fatna El Bouih: F. El Bouih, ‘Narrare il buio’, in Elisabetta Bartuli 
(a cura di), Sole nero. Anni di piombo in Marocco, Mesogea, Messina, 2004, pp. 27-
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the extra-parliamentary extreme left. However, within these 
organizations, inequalities linked to class were perceived to be more 
unacceptable than those related to gender, and the voices of women 
were often silenced in the name of other objectives, which were 
considered a priority.13 
 
A ‘Post-Ideological’ Generation 
The greater presence of women and their significant role in the 
20FM compared to the mobilization of the left of previous decades 
was accompanied by a series of changes in the form, the instruments 
and the content of the struggle, which underline the important 
differences between generations.14 Khadija Ryadi adds:  
 
These young women place more importance on daily struggle than on 
reflection. In our time there was more debate, more reflection, people 
read more. Now technology has greatly influenced the young. There 
are certainly some better things today: young women are more 
numerous and quickly learn the practices of the militants. However, 
there is a difference in the awareness of what they do. There is a 
cultural and ideological decline. Insufficient importance is given to 
political ideology, to the content of the struggle. These young women 
are more interested in immediate results. Compared to before, it is a 
more practical than political logic. This does not only regard young 
women but also young men.15  
 
The young people involved in the 20FM, unlike the generations 
that preceded them, did not have a strong political background 
supporting them, nor – and this was one of the main weaknesses of the 
movement – were they able to create a new and alternative political 
agenda, capable of obtaining consensus in the long-term throughout 
the population. The post-ideological approach adopted by the 
movement on the basis of a series of watchwords such as ‘liberty, 
                                                                                                                                           
140; S. Slyomovics, ‘This Time I Choose when to Leave: An Interview with Fatna 
El Bouih’, in Middle East Report 218 (Spring 2001), pp. 42-43. 
13 R. Naciri, The Women’s Movement and Political Discourse in Morocco, 
Occasional Paper, 8th March, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Geneva, 1998, p. 8.  
14 For a comparative analysis on the changes in youth activism see F. Vairel, 
« Qu’avez-vous fait de vos vingt ans ? Militantismes marocains du 23 mars (1965) 
au 20 février (2011) », in L’Année du Maghreb. Dossier : Un printemps arabe ? 
VIII (2012), pp. 219-238. 
15 Interview with Khadija Ryadi. 
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dignity, justice, end of corruption…’ and on the basis of a general 
program of content, allowed for the relatively easy and immediate 
creation of a mass movement capable of overcoming political 
differences and positions. Different ideologies and currents of thought, 
such as those in favor of a form of republican state and those 
advocating for a parliamentary monarchy, those supporting secularism 
and those supporting Islamist movements, succeeded in coexisting for 
several months outside party boundaries and traditional forms of 
political alliance. However, this post-ideological dimension did not 
produce an alternative structured political ideology – partly due to the 
short life of the 20FM. From an element of strength, the post-
ideological nature of the movement turned into a form of weakness. 
When the King showed his intention of fulfilling his promises on the 
subject of reform in his speech of 9th March 201116 various segments 
of civil society, of the political parties, of the trade unions, of the 
women’s movement, who had given initial, if lukewarm, support to 
the 20FM, abandoned it in favor of the new course promoted by the 
monarchy. 
Indeed, many of the young people who participated in the 20FM 
obtained their political training in the field during the first months of 
2011, following, for a number of them, some previous experience 
within various associations. However, as stated previously, they had 
no real theoretical political training. With the exception of some 
significant political experience, such as that of unemployed graduates 
who emerged in the early ’90s and demanded a job in the public 
sector,17 most young people felt they had been distant from politics 
since the ’80s. The ‘elitist’ nature of politics was a problem for young 
people who considered themselves far from parties and politics, and 
excluded from power and from the possibility of criticizing it.18 
Political parties were thereby discredited insofar as popular discourse 
presented the ‘political game’ as being rather unethical and motivated 
                                                            
16 See the royal speech of 9th March 2011: https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=9pTJoUI3W8s. The French translation is at the following link: 
ttp://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-int%C3%A9gral-du-discours-
adress%C3%A9-par-sm-le-roi-la-nation (Last access 10/7/2015). 
17 M. Emperador Badimon, « Diplômés chômeurs au Maroc : dynamiques de 
pérennisation d’une action collective plurielle », L’Année du Maghreb. Dossier : 
Justice, politique et société III (2007), pp. 297-311. 
18 M. Bennani-Chraïbi, Soumis et rebelles, les jeunes au Maroc, Le Fennec, 
Casablanca, 1994. 
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by individual interest.19 Consequently, for many of the young people 
taking part in the 20FM, areas of conflict against the establishment 
could be found in associations, mostly in those favoring human rights, 
such as the AMDH, or in those fighting against neoliberal 
globalization such as Attac, rather than in political parties which were 
considered to be colluding with or co-opted by the system. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the 20FM is characterized by a 
reality far distanced from pre-existing political experiences. Parties, 
trade unions and associations were only able to support the movement 
from the outside.20 To this end, in fact, the National Council of 
Support (NCS) was set up, constituted by leftist parties, labor unions, 
civil society organizations and the Islamists of Justice and Spirituality, 
Al-ʿadl wa-l-iḥsān. However, the role of the NCS was one solely of 
external support. Due to a code of conduct within the movement, it 
was not possible to exhibit any party symbols during demonstrations, 
nor was it allowed to recite slogans which could be traced back to 
specific political ideologies. 
Ouidade Melhaf, aged 21 in 2011, describes this need for change 
which drives the young as follows:  
 
The 20FM was made up, above all, of youth, high school students, 
university students, occasional workers of up to 35 years of age. We 
were above all young people. We wanted to do something new, with a 
new leadership. We recognized that the old political generations had 
done a lot for this country, for the freedom that we have today, but we 
wanted to do something new.21  
 
And Lucile Daumas, a long-term militant in the history of 
Morocco, from the struggle within the family committees of the 
political prisoners during the ‘years of lead’ (in Arabic, sanawāt al-
raṣāṣ)22 to the recent anti-liberalist movements against economic 
                                                            
19 Naciri, The Women’s Movement and Political Discourse in Morocco. 
20 If at Rabat many gatherings and assemblies of the 20FM took place in the 
siege of AMDH, in Casablanca they took place in the siege of the Unified Socialist 
Party (Parti socialiste unifié, PSU).  
21 Interview with Ouidade Melhaf. 
22 ‘Years of Lead’ is the term used to describe a period from mainly the 1960s 
through the 1980s marked by state violence against political dissidents. See: Bartuli 
(a cura di), Sole nero. Anni di piombo in Marocco; R. Pepicelli, ‘Memorie degli 
“anni di piombo” e percorsi della giustizia transizionale in Marocco. Storia 
dell’Instance équité et réconciliation (Hay’at al-Inṣāf wa ’l-Muṣālaḥa)’, in Anna 
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globalization, comments on the new forms given to the movement as 
follows:  
 
I was not part of the 20FM organization; I felt that I could not belong 
to it. No one prevented me as the movement was open. I felt it was not 
my place. The young were very keen to operate differently, to militate 
differently, to propose different things from those proposed so far by 
the parties and trade unions. I thought it was right to leave all the 
creative space to them. I only followed, I didn’t participate in the 
meetings, I only went to the demonstrations.23 
 
The novel forms and languages of the new political militants 
appeared day after day in the streets, at meetings and on the internet, 
in an attempt to expand popular participation. ‘The common people 
and the young felt very distant from politics, from elections’ – 
recounts Ouidade Melhaf: 
 
We wanted to be a creative movement; we wanted new ways of 
communicating, by video, with banners and through social networks. 
A lot of people do not read newspapers but are on the internet and on 
Facebook.24  
 
As in other countries overtaken by the protests of the so-called 
period of the Arab revolt, there has been a widespread use of 
alternative tools of communication such as social media,25 but also the 
theatre and video documentaries. The internet was considered an 
important tool as an amplifier for the struggle, and as a means to 
coordinate militants within the same city and across the different cities 
                                                                                                                                           
Maria Di Tolla (ed.), Percorsi di transizione democratica e politiche di 
riconciliazione in Nord Africa, Ed. Scientifica, Napoli (forthcoming). On the 
women’s role during the ‘Years of Lead’ see J. Guillerot - N. Benwakrim - M. 
Ezzaouini - W. Bouab, Morocco: Gender and the Transitional Justice Process, 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ,) 2011,  
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Morocco-Gender-Transitional%20 
Justice-2011-English.pdf.  
23 Interview with Lucile Daumas, Rabat, 26/1/2014. 
24 Interview with Ouidade Melhaf. 
25 See A. Salvatore (ed.), Between Everyday Life and Political Revolution: The 
Social Web in the Middle East, in Oriente Moderno XCI/1 (2011); S. Sibilio ‘La 
rivoluzione dei (nuovi) media arabi’, in Francesca M. Corrao (ed.), Le rivoluzioni 
arabe. La transizione mediterranea, Mondadori Università, Milano, 2011, pp. 81-
109. 
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of Morocco. However, it was only one tool among many, as the 
activists are keen to point out. Even though social media was 
important in the creation of the movement, it was also a tool which 
was used against the activists. In the stories of many of the young 
women interviewed, the description of the disparaging campaign 
organized on Facebook against the most visible figure of the 
movement is continually repeated. Amina Boughalbi, for example, 
recounts:  
 
They did some photomontages. They put my photo on the internet in 
an embrace with the leader of the Polisario Front, to mean that we 
were pro Sahara, to mean that we were pro Polisario, against our 
country. And people began to say that the 20FM young were a threat 
to the country, that they were paid by the Algerians to attack Morocco 
through Polisario. Another young man was portrayed in a church, 
meaning that he was against Islam. Another one was photographed 
with some bottles of alcohol.26  
 
While Ouidade Melhaf states:  
 
Above all on Facebook I have received insults because of my 
participation as a woman, rather than because I was a militant. At first 
it was shocking but then it became the norm.27 
 
The desire to open up to a wide segment of the population, to 
overcome the ideological barriers which divide society in order to give 
life to a movement ‘which reflected’ Moroccan society as closely as 
possible, and which had the strength to demand radical change, led the 
young members of the 20FM, who defined themselves mostly as 
supporters of secularism, to form new collaborations which until that 
moment had been considered impossible; in other words, to admit into 
the movement Islamist activists, the youth of the Pjd – the party that 
over the course of 2011 became the major government force – but 
above all the militants of the strong and numerically large extra-
parliamentary organization Al-ʿadl wa-l-iḥsān.28 And, surprisingly, it 
                                                            
26 Interview with Amina Boughalbi. 
27 Interview with Ouidade Melhaf. 
28 On the role of the Islamists in the 20FM see J. Granci, ‘Traiettorie dell’islam 
politico in Marocco. Dissidenza e riformismo al cospetto della monarchia’, in Laura 
Guazzone (ed.) Storia e evoluzione dei movimenti islamisti arabi. I Fratelli 
musulmani e gli altri, Mondadori, Milano, 2015, pp. 230-242. 
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was this very collaboration, albeit problematic concerning the issue of 
gender equality, as will be better explained in the following paragraph, 
which was considered by many young men and women as one of the 
main legacies of the movement. Ouidade Melhaf asserts:  
 
On a personal level, what this movement has given me is the fact that 
before the 20FM it was impossible for me to talk to Islamists. The 
20FM has broken down this obstacle against change: to accept 
someone who has a vision for society which is different from my own. 
For me the great difference is the fact of participating with young 
Islamists. For me this has been one of the most important things.29 
 
The 20FM, therefore, is characterized as being the mark of a ‘post-
ideological’ and ‘post-Islamist’ generation,30 which presented several 
shifts in the identity of the young, breaking with the forms and ideals 
which defined the previous generations.31 And also as regards gender 
equality, the positions of the activists underwent significant 
transformations. 
 
A ‘Post-Feminist’ Generation 
Despite the equality in practices, the 20FM did not carry a strong or 
clear message of equality. The movement did not produce a statement 
on gender, nor any specific demands that went beyond the demands 
for equality chanted in some of the slogans (often boycotted by the 
Islamists) and present in the platform of the movement.32 In this 
connection, Khadija Ryadi states: 
 
There is a paradox in the experience of the 20FM: admittedly many 
women and young women participated; however, there was little 
mention of equality between men and women. Equality could be seen 
                                                            
29 Interview with Ouidade Melhaf. 
30 A. Bayat, ‘A new Arab Street in Post Islamist Times’, in Foreign Policy. The 
Middle East Channel, 26/1/2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/26/a-new-arab-
street-in-post-islamist-times/ (access 2/12/2016). 
31 Z. Salime, ‘A New Feminism? Gender Dynamics in Morocco’s February 20th 
Movement’, in Journal of International Women's Studies 13/5 (2012), pp. 101-114. 
32 The gender equality was mentioned only in the second platform of the 20FM – 
27th January, 14th and 17th February. See S. Borrillo, ‘Il Movimento del 20 Febbraio 
(M-20F) e l’uguaglianza di genere in Marocco tra dibattito interno e riforma 
costituzionale’ in A. M. Di Tolla - E. Francesca (a cura di), La rivoluzione ai tempi 
di internet. Il futuro della democrazia nel Maghreb e nel mondo arabo, Università 
degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”, Napoli, 2012, p. 37. 
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in the streets; young men and women shared the same role of 
leadership, but in the slogans this was not very evident. This was 
caused by the presence of the Islamists. In order not to have problems 
with them, and to preserve unity, this concession was made: the 
question of equality was avoided. It was an implicit consensus. 
Women and equality were sacrificed. The question of women which 
was, in fact, present at the beginning returned when the Islamists left 
the movement.33  
 
These words are confirmed by Amina Boughalbi, as the reasons 
behind the sidelining of the gender question:  
 
Initially, men applauded and encouraged the women participation. 
They always encouraged young women to lead in meetings, to appear 
in videos. They had no problems with this, or regarding the 
demonstrations. However, 3-4 months after the creation of the 
movement, with the ‘invasion’ of the Islamists, things began to 
change. They made us discuss subjects, which for us were obvious, 
such as equality between men and women. At first, everyone agreed 
with these ideals and total equality between men and women was 
taken for granted. Later the Islamists imposed their view on the 
debate. They said that it was necessary to give priority to social and 
economic needs; in other words, bread, jobs and education. Important 
demands for us also of course, without, however, abandoning the 
subject of freedom, individual freedom, equality. As time passed the 
situation started to become serious, so much so that there were 
conflicts between young people within the movement at 
demonstrations and general meetings. For example, when we got to 
the slogan that said: ‘Men and women are equal’, the Islamists began 
to shout us down and say Allāh Akbar, so we could not be heard. […] 
They began to attack us also because of the way we dressed, because 
we went to the demonstrations in jeans or mini-skirts.34 
 
However, analyzing the speeches and practices of the movement 
and talking to activists both within and outside the 20FM, it does not 
seem that the only reason for the lack of centrality of the question of 
gender was the presence of the Islamists. On close inspection, the 
young women (just as the young men) of the 20FM did not consider 
the question of gender a central one. Although egalitarian and 
libertarian practices permeated their public and private lives, they did 
                                                            
33 Interview with Khadija Ryadi. 
34 Interview with Amina Boughalbi. 
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not formulate an agenda or any specific claims. They did not tackle 
central themes in their everyday life, such as the question of inequality 
in the law, or the strengthening of a conservative and backward 
morality in the face of the development of libertarian behavior 
practices. For example, in Morocco abortion is illegal even though it 
is widely practiced,35 and it is against the law to have sexual relations 
outside marriage. Article 490 of the penal code criminalizes 
extramarital sex, calling for punishments ranging from one month to 
one year in jail.36 Any form of conduct that does not lie within a 
strictly hetero-normative perimeter is condemned by popular morals 
and by the law. For the young men and women of the 20FM, 
individual freedom and equality are important themes but to be faced 
at a later date and would have been brought up only following the 
establishment of a real democracy. Ouidade Melhaf affirms: ‘The 
20FM was a protest movement and only after democratization would 
the specifics be considered’.37 While Sabra Talbi states:  
 
Personally, I am against feminist demands. There is no need to treat 
the woman in a specific context, separate from society. When we talk 
of democracy, we are automatically talking of citizens, women, men, 
who are all equal before the law. We are all human beings. If there is 
democracy, there will be equality between men and women; 
everything that is against women will be automatically abolished; 
women’s rights will be respected and there will be no need to talk of 
the woman as though she were separate from Moroccan society.38 
 
Young people, both women and men of the 20FM generation, 
consider the feminist struggle to be an area of demand which is too 
                                                            
35 Chafik Chraïbi, president of the association AMLAC (Association marocaine 
de lutte contre l’avortement clandestin) estimates that between 600 and 800 
abortions take place illegally every day. Recently even the PJD has stated the 
necessity to discuss the law prohibiting abortion. See S. Hamma, « Maroc : El 
Othmani, numéro deux du PJD, relance le débat sur l’avortement », in Jeune 
Afrique, 4/3/2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/226003/politique/maroc-el-
othmani-num-ro-deux-du-pjd-relance-le-d-bat-sur-l-avortement/ (Last access 
10/7/2015). 
36 These cases are rarely taken to court, since a conviction depends on either 
eyewitness testimony or a confession by one of the perpetrators. However, an 
unmarried woman’s pregnancy is proof of sexual relations and may lead to criminal 
prosecution, while the fault of her male partner is not established by law. 
37 Interview with Ouidade Melhaf. 
38 Interview with Sabra Talbi. 
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narrow, too limited and too limiting, and tied to another period of 
political militancy. Qods Lefnatsa says:  
 
Previously, women were more tied to the battle for women’s freedom 
but now this is no longer true. Women are not just directing their 
attention to this cause but also to others, though always with the 
knowledge that there is still work to be done in order to obtain 
women’s rights in Moroccan society.39  
 
And Amina Boughalbi claims: ‘I fight for women’s rights but in 
their entirety. I always join women’s rights to other rights. For me 
fighting only for women’s rights is a waste of time’.40  
And stone cutter Omar Radi, who, was 23 years old in 2011 and 
one of the 20FM leaders, asserts: ‘I believe there was a priority, an 
agreed hierarchy of objectives, and the question of women was not a 
priority objective’.41  
According to this perspective, it is from the battle for democracy 
and for human rights that women’s rights will pour forth. The young, 
albeit recognizing the important battles fought by the women’s 
movement in Morocco, looked with detached criticism at the feminist 
associations created in the ’80s and ’90s whose experiences will be 
better described in the following paragraph. They accused historical 
women’s rights militants of having been co-opted by the system in 
exchange for concessions regarding legislative reform concerning the 
status of women and personal positions of power in the top echelons 
of public and private institutions. Qods Lefnatsa states:  
 
In Morocco today women’s associations are no longer feminist 
associations. There is no longer a strong feminist movement that has 
the courage to demand freedom for women. Feminist organizations in 
this country no longer demand equality (musāwā) but equity, parity 
(munāṣafa), i.e. a number of seats in Parliament.42  
 
Their commitment, Amina Boughalbi asserts, is  
 
traditional, in the sense that their work does not involve the great 
majority of Moroccan women. But this does not mean that they did 
                                                            
39 Interview with Qods Lefnatsa, Rabat, 21/1/2014. 
40 Interview with Amina Boughalbi. 
41 Interview with Omar Radi, Rabat, 23/1/2014. 
42 Interview with Qods Lefnatsa. 
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not do anything in the past. It is true that the feminist movement in 
Morocco played a fundamental role, for example, in the change of the 
family code. They followed a course of militancy, which was much 
appreciated, on a national level and at the North African region level. 
But there was no involvement of young people. Today, they are 
organizations, which are dominated by figures of old women; there is 
no renewal and they have not allowed for any exchange. These 
women have played an important role and we are grateful to them; it 
is an inheritance which we must defend but it is not sufficient.43 
 
An inheritance, moreover, that does not represent a model of 
activism to be imitated. For the 20FM generation, women figures, 
symbols of their commitment, are in fact women committed to the 
associative sector, in the field of human rights and in the area of social 
commitment, but not immediately identifiable with the feminist 
movement (even when dealing with questions of gender) like the 
previously quoted Khadija Ryadi, Khadija Merouazi, President of the 
association Médiateur pour la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme, 
Aicha Ech-Channa, President of the association Solidarité Feminine, 
which helps single mothers, a category of highly stigmatized women 
in Moroccan society44, and Assia El Ouadie, also known as Mama 
Assia, a magistrate, who, for a long time, looked after the re-education 
of under-age prisoners. 
The split between historical associations of women – such as the 
Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), the Ligue 
démocratique des droits des femmes (LDDF), the Union de l’Action 
Féminine (UAF), the Association Marocaine pour le défense des 
droits des femmes – and the youth of the 20FM occurred when the 
former chose not to participate in the movement and to endorse 
constitutional reform, while the latter invited people to protest and to 
boycott the constitutional referendum. It was an important rift which, 
however, should not be interpreted exclusively in terms of a 
generational split, of a dialectic clash between generations of 
‘mothers’ and ‘daughters’. Harsh criticism also came from women of 
previous generations. Khadija Ryadi affirms:  
 
                                                            
43 Interview with Amina Boughalbi. 
44 On the topic see the report ‘Le Maroc des meres celibataires’ (2010) realized 
by the association Insaf: http://www.egalite.ma/attachments/article/212/INSAF-
Rapport%20Etude%20nationale%20%27%27Le%20Maroc%20des%20m%C3%A8
res%20c%C3%A9libataires%27%27.pdf (Last access 10/7/2015). 
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The traditional associations of women in Morocco did not join the 
20FM. The pretext was the presence of the Islamists. In my view the 
reasons for their lack of involvement lie in the fact that the movement 
made some very strong demands, for democracy, against the existing 
power. It wanted some fundamental and radical changes. Women’s 
associations in Morocco maintain their elitism and want to change 
things through negotiation. They are not in favor of mass struggles 
and street demonstrations as a means to obtaining radical changes. 
Traditionally, this is not their chosen method. It was also like this for 
the Constitution. They voted for the Constitution, while we invited 
people to boycott the referendum. Admittedly, article 19 of the new 
Constitution states social, economic and civil equality between men 
and women45 but on condition that the principles of Islam and the 
monarchy are not challenged.46 
 
On their part, feminists accuse 20FM female activists of having 
taken gender equality for granted, and of not recognizing the 
important results of feminist struggles over the last 10 years, such as 
the 2002 introduction of the quota system for Parliamentary seats 
(women obtained the right to 10% of seats); the 2004 reform of family 
law, Mudawwana (which establishes gender equality, removes the 
marital guardian and obedience laws, provides women with the right 
to initiate divorce and gain custody of children, abolishes repudiation 
and restricts polygamy);47 the 2007 reform of the Nationality code 
enabling Moroccan women to pass on their nationality to their 
                                                            
45 For an analysis of the reform of the Constitution in Morocco and of the article 
19 see P. Longo, ‘Il rinnovamento costituzionale in Nord Africa dopo la Primavera 
Araba (Egitto, Tunisia, Marocco)’, in Laura Guazzone (a cura di), Storia e 
evoluzione dei movimenti islamisti arabi, pp. 312-314. Article 19 states: ‘The man 
and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in this Title and in 
the other provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international conventions 
and pacts duly ratified by Morocco and this, with respect for the provisions of the 
Constitution, of the constants and of the laws of the Kingdom. The State works for 
the realization of parity between men and women. An Authority for parity and the 
struggle against all forms of discrimination is created, to this effect’.  
46 Interview with Khadija Ryadi. 
47 For an analysis of the reform of the Mudawwana see L. Buskens, ‘Recent 
Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in an 
Emerging Public Sphere’, in Islamic Law and Society X/1 (2003), pp. 70-131; Z. 
Salime, Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2011; R. Pepicelli, Femminismo 
islamico. Corano, diritti, riforme, Carocci, Roma 2010, pp. 92-98. 
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children;48 and finally the 2011 reform of the Constitution and the 
approval of Article 19 on gender equality. Moreover, the feminists 
reproach the new generations of activists for having re-adopted and 
made their own an old vision of the struggle for democracy, which 
places the battle for equality in second place. Naima Benwakrim, a 
leading figure in the Moroccan feminist movement, who has gone 
through various phases of the movement, founding and participating 
in many associative experiences of women like Espace Associatif and 
Jossour, replies to the criticism voiced against women’s associations 
with these words:  
 
The 20FM militants suppressed the question of equality in order to 
allow the participation of Islamists. Nobody came to discuss things 
with women. Every time I met them, I told them to call us. They 
always used to say ‘Are you pro Makhzen or against Makhzen49?’ 
They criticized our support of the Constitution and yet this is the best 
Constitution of the region in terms of women’s rights. Everything that 
was in the women’s memorandum50 was taken into consideration. 
After 20 years of struggle we managed to obtain the feminization of 
the state; it was a great victory. Communication between the women’s 
movement and the state was, therefore, most constructive. Equality 
had not been requested by the 20FM.51 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 On the legal reforms in Morocco concerning women’s rights see F. Sadiqi, 
‘Special Report on Women's Rights in Morocco’, in S. Kelly - J. Breslin (eds.), 
Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance, 
Freedom House, New York; Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2010, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Morocco.pdf. 
49 In the current language with the term Makhzen Moroccans refer negatively to 
the power system in Morocco. 
50 After the Royal speech of 9th March 2011, many components of the Feminist 
Movement in Morocco created ‘The Feminist Spring for Democracy and Equality 
Coalition’ on 16th March 2011 in Rabat. The coalition aims was to draw up a 
memorandum reflecting the feminist movement vision of the new Constitution 
regarding the equality between women and men in civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights. More information are on the blog of the coalition: 
https://pfdemaroc.wordpress.com/. The text in Arabic of the memorandum is at the 
following link: https://pfdemaroc.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/flddf.pdf (Last 
access 10/7/2015). 
51 Interview with Naima Benwakrim, Rabat, 24/1/2014. 
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Genealogy. The Activism of the 20FM Generation within the 
Course of the Moroccan Feminist Movement 
However, despite the absence of a gender agenda and of specific 
demands regarding equality between men and women, and despite the 
split with traditional women’s associations, the activism of the young 
20FM generation can be located within the long history of the 
women’s movement in Morocco. As underlined by Zakia Salime, 
feminism, as a matter of gender equality, has penetrated the social 
imagination of a new generation of activists.52 It has shaped their 
actions and has made gender equality a course to be followed and 
pursued in their practices both in public and private life. In fact, Qods 
Lefinatsa, albeit extremely critical of the actions of the women’s 
associations in Morocco, does not hesitate to affirm:  
 
Even though I do not militate as a ‘real feminist’, perhaps because I 
am active in other fields, I consider myself a feminist. I feel I am a 
feminist although I do not use the term.53  
 
The new kind of gender activism of the 20FM youth can be seen as 
constituting a new wave in the history of women’s activism in 
Morocco when set against the background of various phases in the 
evolution of the feminist movement in the country.54 The first phase 
goes from independence to the ’70s. During this initial wave, there 
initially emerged a women’s movement tied to the struggle for 
independence and to philanthropic associations, and then, during the 
’60s and ’70s, within the parties and trade unions, in particular of the 
left and extreme left. These were the years that saw the growth of 
political parties’ female sections, as women appeared on the public 
and political scene, but there was no specificity in the feminist 
struggle and the battles for gender equality were subordinated to class 
struggle.55 
                                                            
52 Salime, ‘A New Feminism? Gender Dynamics in Morocco’s February 20th 
Movement’. 
53 Interview with Qods Lefnatsa. 
54 For a deeper analysis of the reconstruction of the wave in the course of the 
feminist movement in Morocco see R. Pepicelli, ‘Genere e generazioni in 
transizione: il movimento delle donne in Marocco dall’indipendenza al post-rivolte 
arabe’, in R. Pepicelli - A.Vanzan (eds.) The future of Women’s Movements in the 
Mena Region. A New Feminist Wave?, in afriche e orienti 17/1 (2016), pp. 14-33. 
55 R. Naciri, The Women’s Movement and Political Discourse in Morocco; F. 
Sadiqi - M. Ennaji, ‘The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s Activism, the 
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The second wave goes from the first half of the ’80s to the end of 
the ’90s. It signals the birth of a women’s movement which was 
autonomous from the parties and unions, and which supported the 
centrality of a separatist struggle in order to obtain the reform of legal 
institutions that support and strengthen gender inequality. These were 
the years that saw the birth of a number of associations such as the 
ADFM, Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc 
(Democratic Association of Moroccan Women), the UAF, Union pour 
l’Action Feminine (Union for Women’s Action), the Collectif 95 
Maghreb Egalité (Association 95 Maghreb for Equality), and the 
ADMF, Association Marocaine pour les Droits des Femmes 
(Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights), which were to dominate 
the feminist public scene up until the present day, placing the gender 
question at the center of the political debate.56 These realities were 
strengthened and consolidated thanks to funds from international 
donors who were interested in broadening the ‘emancipationist’ 
debate in the Arab world.57 
The third wave goes from the end of the ’90s to the present day, 
with a moment of discontinuity in 2011. The year 2011 represented a 
turning point which saw the contemporary emergence of a new wave, 
the fourth. In this phase, which coincides with the first period of the 
reign of Mohammed VI, women’s associations born in the ’80s and 
the ’90s, encouraged by the support of international institutions such 
as the UN, EU, WB, chose a method of struggle which was no longer 
one of conflict with the system, but of consultation and negotiation, in 
order to obtain a series of reforms regarding the legal system.58 
Feminist reasoning and feminist practices were taken up by the system 
and a sort of ‘feminism of state’ began to emerge,59 while leading 
figures from the women’s movement were co-opted and absorbed into 
state institutions. Despite a series of important victories regarding 
                                                                                                                                           
Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco’, in Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies II/2 (Spring 2006), pp. 86-114. 
56 H. Alami M’chici, Genre et politique au Maroc. Les enjeux de l’égalité 
hommes-femmes entre islamisme et modernisme, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2002, p. 125.   
57 V. Moghadam, Feminist Activism in the Arab Region and Beyond: Linking 
Research to Policy Reform and Social Change, Freia - Feminist Research Center in 
Aalborg, 72 (February 2010), http://freia.ihis.aau.dk/Publikationer+og+skriftserie/ 
Skriftserie0907-2179. 
58 Naciri, The Women’s Movement and Political Discourse in Morocco.  
59 S. Eddouada, Women, Gender and the State in Morocco: Contradictions, 
Constraints and Prospects, PhD Thesis, University Mohamed V, Rabat, 2003, p. 24. 
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women’s rights, such as the reform of the Mudawwana (2004) and the 
nationality code, already mentioned above, the women’s movement 
lost the anti-systemic character of its early years. At the same time, the 
Islamist movement – embodied by the institutionalized PJD (Party for 
Justice and for Development) and in the extra-Parliamentary group Al-
ʿadl wa-l-iḥsān – gained approval amongst the population60 and 
women’s associations asked themselves if it was appropriate to 
continue along a path which demanded rights within the framework of 
secularism, which did not include any reference to Islam, or if it was 
instead necessary to engage in a struggle based on a gender re-reading 
of the sacred scripts, and which has indeed been defined as ‘Islamic 
feminism’.61  
The fourth wave – which coexists with the third one – is 
characterized, as already stated, by the establishment of a new 
generation of activists, engaged within that reawakening in Moroccan 
civil society which culminated in the 20FM. This new activism was 
not confined to the 20FM experience but also included groups close to 
the movement though not necessarily produced by it, such as the 
M.A.L.I. group, Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertés 
Individuelles,62 which existed before the 2011 protests, or groups 
which, in one way or another, indirectly emerged out of experiences 
                                                            
60 Symbolic of the strength of the Islamist movement was the demonstration of 
20th March 2000 in Casablanca in which between 100,000 and 200,000 people 
opposed the proposed reform of the Mudawwana, demonstrating a numeric strength 
which was far superior to that deployed by the left and by the women’s movement 
which had taken to the squares on the same day in Rabat to express their support for 
the reform and more in general for the ‘Panifed’, Plan d’Action National 
d’Intégration des Femmes au Développement (National Plan of Action for Women’s 
Integration in Development), proposed by the then government (Buskens, ‘Recent 
Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco’, p. 104). It was the first time that the 
Islamist women had appeared on the public scene. Some of them rose to the fore. 
Particularly, Nadia Yassine, daughter of shaykh Abdessalam Yassine, founder of the 
Al-ʿadl wa-l-iḥsān movement emerged in the public debate (Interview with Nadia 
Yassine, Salé, 15/1/2006). A significant number of Islamist women were present at 
the 20FM demonstrations, although in different forms and in different ways 
compared to those of the young secular activists, whose activism is analyzed in this 
paper (Interviews with Hakima El Alaoui and Latifa Hamdaoui, members of Al-ʿadl 
wa-l-iḥsān, Rabat, 24/1/2015). 
61 For an analysis of the Islamic feminism in Morocco see R. Pepicelli, 
Femminismo islamico, pp. 69-82 e 92-98; S. Eddouada - R. Pepicelli, « Maroc : vers 
un féminisme islamique d’État », in Critique Internationale XLVI (2010), pp. 87-
100. 
62 See S. Borrillo, supra. 
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from the widespread uprising of the younger generations. An example 
of this is the magazine ‘Qandisha’ edited by Fedwa Misk, which 
gathers numerous views on the conditions of women, and the 
emergence of blogs and online platforms against sexual molestation.63 
This fourth phase is distinguished by a series of characteristic features 
that have in common some kind of ‘post-’ prefix. In fact, the activism 
of the 20FM generation is distinguished by the fact that it is ‘post-
ideological’, ‘post-Islamist’, ‘post-secular’ and ‘post-feminist’. It 
refuses to confine gender activism to women’s issues; it is against 
feminist reasoning being regulated by state institutions and criticizes 
the NGO-ization of women’s activism and demands. While liberal 
feminists desired change to take place through state institutions, 20FM 
activists wished for the overthrow of these same institutions.64 
However, while this new activism clearly breaks away from the so-
called third wave associations, following the end of the 20FM and the 
growing repression in the country, it has had difficulty in finding 
words and forms with which to define itself and continue its battles. 
Nevertheless, while some of the movement’s activists eventually 
withdrew, disappointed by the protest’s outcome, many others 
founded new associations, with a mixed gender composition, mostly 
tied to educational, cultural and artistic projects, and, in many cases, 
avoiding direct political confrontation. Amina Boughalbi explains this 
new phase as follows:  
 
For me the 20FM is not dead; because 20th February is not a 
demonstration but a generation of young people aware of the need for 
change in Morocco. It is true that today there are no longer 
demonstrations in Morocco, but the young are still active and have 
channeled their activities towards other forms of activism. There are 
those who have created human rights associations like Prometheus, 
Jeunes pour Jeunes. There are those who have made films, who have 
made documentaries on gender violence, on the story of Amina 
Filali.65 There are some young men and women who perform a 
                                                            
63 S. Borrillo, ‘Telepredicatrici e attiviste on line in Marocco: la costruzione 
mediatica del genere femminile tra ideale islamico e libertà individuali’, in R. 
Pepicelli (a cura di), Le donne nei media arabi. Tra aspettative tradite e nuove 
opportunità, Carocci, Roma, 2014, pp. 107-109. 
64 Salime, ‘A New Feminism?’. 
65 It is the case of the video-makers group ‘Guerrilla cinema’ that realized the 
documentary 475. When marriage becomes punishment on the violence against 
women.  
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‘theatre of the oppressed’ in several Moroccan cities, dealing with 
issues of a political, economic and social nature. There are some 
young people who play music, who have created rap groups. The idea 
of the movement continues to live through these young people.66 
 
Following the 20FM, a new political gender awareness appeared in 
the country, which led Moroccan society not to be afraid to demand its 
rights and to denounce wrongs. It is common knowledge amongst 
male and female activists that the 20FM brought a considerable 
amount of freedom to Moroccan society and encouraged people to 
mobilize for social, political and economic justice, as well as gender 
justice. Amina Boughalbi continues:  
 
Before 20th February, people did not demonstrate, now they do, even 
in small villages. People discuss subjects that used to be taboo like 
sexual violence, sexual relations outside marriage, relationships 
amongst the young. There are certain positive changes, even if there 
are some negative ones with the arrival of the Islamist government. 
Following the 20th February, Moroccan civil society has taken up a 
significant amount of control. For example, after the royal decision to 
pardon the Spanish pedophile, Daniel Galvan Vina, people took to the 
squares. After the arrest of the two young men who kissed in the 
street, people took to the squares. There is a general tendency to 
demonstrate, to take to the squares.67 
 
An important case in point for this new gender awareness was the 
battle for the reform of Article 475 of the Moroccan penal code, which 
authorized an abuser to marry his victim in order to avoid going to 
jail. After sixteen-year-old Amina Filali committed suicide on 10th 
March 2012 because she was forced to marry the man who raped her, 
a large demonstration took place. Amina’s suicide could have been a 
‘news story’, quickly dealt with by the press and then forgotten, as 
with many other pieces of news of a similar nature, but civil society, 
reborn after 20FM, together with feminists and human rights 
associations mobilized and were quickly joined by thousands of 
anonymous supporters, demonstrating in several cities in Morocco a 
                                                            
66 Interview with Amina Boughalbi. 
67 Ib. 
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week after Filali’s suicide.68 Their demands received a positive answer 
in January 2014 when the reform of Article 475 of the penal code took 
place. The idea, spread by the 20FM protests, that it was possible to 
express an opinion in public, and manifest one’s own ideas, did not 
remain confined to young people and to the student environment, or to 
the women who belong to this category. As Lucile Daumas recalls: 
 
In the 20FM demonstrations there were two types of women: on the 
one hand, young women and female students, and on the other, many 
women from a lower class environment. These women were strongly 
aware. They were not in the squares to follow their husbands or sons, 
but because they knew what they wanted […] And the thing that was 
most spectacular was their emergence in the small villages and cities 
of the South, where the custom was not the ḥijāb but the ḥā’ik; veiled 
women, always hidden, took to the streets. […] In Ait Abdi, for 
example, they demonstrated to obtain a hospital in which to deliver 
their babies.69  
 
As Zakia Salime wrote, the feminist quest for equality in the youth 
movement’s demands for social justice bore fruit, and raised the 
visibility of scattered and much more localized protest movements led 
by women in many poor urban neighborhoods and rural areas.  
 
We have no particular name for these uprisings here and there, other 
than the names of the women who started them. For instance, when 
we mention the ‘women of Ben Semime’, we mean the protest 
movement that the women of this rural community started against the 
privatization of a local source of water by a French company. […] 
YouTube is crowded with pictures and voices from these widespread 
and spontaneous protests by women facing situations that drove them 
to act together.70 
 
Conclusion 
It is not easy to predict the forms that this new gender activism will 
take in the near future. The freedom of expression in Morocco is once 
again diminishing under the weight of new repressive waves. In 
                                                            
68 Z. Touati, ‘The Struggle for Women’s Rights in Morocco’, in Mohamed 
Olimat (ed.), Arab Spring and Arab Women: Challenges and Opportunities, 
Routledge, London-New York, 2014, p. 131. 
69 Interview with Lucile Daumas. 
70 Salime, ‘A New Feminism?’, p. 110. 
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parallel to this, a neo-traditionalist approach to values is becoming 
established throughout the country, also due to the coming to power of 
the PJD, in 2011.71 Any conduct that does not strictly conform to a 
conservative and traditionalist ethical code is condemned by public 
morality and by Moroccan laws, applied more and more repressively. 
This has been the case, for example, with the arrest of a teenage 
couple who had posted a photo of them kissing on Facebook in 
2013,72 or with the arrest of two young women wearing a mini-skirt in 
2015.73 At the same time, experiences such as that of the online 
newspaper ‘Qandisha’ (www.qandisha.ma), founded in November 
2011, find it difficult to make progress.74 
Only viewed in the long-term will a historical analysis be able to 
give us information regarding the women’s movement in Morocco 
and the factions within it.  
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